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This thesis introduces extended artificial memory, an integral cognitive 
theory of memory and technology. It combines cross-scientific analysis and 
synthesis for the design of a general system of essential knowledge-
technological processes on a sound theoretical basis. The elaboration of 
this theory was accompanied by a long-term experiment for understanding 
[Erkenntnisexperiment]. This experiment included the agile development of a 
software prototype (Artificial Memory) for personal knowledge management.  
In the introductory chapter 1.1 (Scientific Challenges of Memory Research), 
the negative effects of terminological ambiguity and isolated theorizing to 
memory research are discussed.  
Chapter 2 focuses on technology. The traditional idea of technology is 
questioned. Technology is reinterpreted as a cognitive actuation process 
structured in correspondence with a substitution process. The origin of 
technological capacities is found in the evolution of eusociality. In 
chapter 2.2, a cognitive-technological model is sketched. In this thesis, 
the focus is on content technology rather than functional technology. 
Chapter 2.3 deals with different types of media. Chapter 2.4 introduces the 
technological role of language-artifacts from different perspectives, 
combining numerous philosophical and historical considerations. The ideas 
of chapter 2.5 go beyond traditional linguistics and knowledge management, 
stressing individual constraints of language and limits of artificial 
intelligence. Chapter 2.6 develops an improved semantic network model, 
considering closely associated theories.  
Chapter 3 gives a detailed description of the universal memory process 
enabling all cognitive technological processes. The memory theory of 
Richard Semon is revitalized, elaborated and revised, taking into account 
important newer results of memory research. 
Chapter 4 combines the insights on the technology process and the memory 
process into a coherent theoretical framework. Chapter 4.3.5 describes four 
fundamental computer-assisted memory technologies for personally and 
socially extended artificial memory. They all tackle basic problems of the 
memory-process (4.3.3). In chapter 4.3.7, the findings are summarized and, 
in chapter 4.4, extended into a philosophical consideration of knowledge. 
Chapter 5 provides insight into the relevant system landscape (5.1) and the 
software prototype (5.2). After an introduction into basic system 
functionality, three exemplary, closely interrelated technological 
innovations are introduced: virtual synsets, semantic tagging, and Linear 
Unit tagging. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
It is easy to speak with precision upon a general theme. 
Only, one must commonly surrender all ambition to be 
certain. It is equally easy to be certain. One has only to 
be sufficiently vague. 
(Peirce, 1931-1958, S. 4.237) 
1.1 SCIENTIFIC CHALLENGES OF MEMORY RESEARCH 
1.1.1  PLURALITY OF THEORIES 
During the last decades, the productivity of scientific research has 
increased considerably. Following the paradigm of evolutionary 
epistemology, science has created a great variety of theories and facts, 
enabled by a fine-grained division of labor. In 1927, Karl Bühler (Bühler, 
Die Krise der Psychologie, 1927) could still plead for a cautious pluralism 
of theories in psychology. Bühler had to consider but a handful of schools 
of psychology. Though he rejected the theoretical stance of some schools, 
he would still recognize the partial truth of each. To Bühler, it was still 
possible to compare in detail to form a balanced judgment. Today, pluralism 
of theories is nothing one would have to vote for anymore. It is no longer 
a choice, but a seemingly unalterable historical and social fact, and a 
growing epistemological challenge of its own. 
1.1.2  PLURALITY OF WORD-SENSES 
In his contribution to The Oxford Handbook of Memory 1, the distinguished 
memory researcher Endel Tulving talks about a source of frequent confusion 
in theoretical debate amongst memory researchers: their ambiguous use of 
words. 
In the past, relatively little explicit attention has been 
paid to terms and concepts. As a result, problems have 
arisen. A frequent source of confusion lies in the use of 
one and the same term to designate rather different 
concepts. 
(Tulving, Concepts of Memory, 2000, p. 42)  
Tulving lists no less than six different scientific meanings of the term 
memory2, the clear definition of which, of course, ought to be of central 
                         
1 (Tulving & Craik , The Oxford Handbook of Memory, 2000) 
2 (Tulving, Concepts of Memory, 2000, p. 36): 
[…] consider the term 'memory' that designates the central concept of all 
the chapters in this handbook. What does it mean - that is, how is it used 
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importance to memory researchers. Tulving expresses a clear idea about the 
coming about of this problem: The terms and concepts have evolved as 
natural by-products of the normal data-gathering and hypothesis-making 
activities of students of memory. 3 Each strain of memory research tends to 
create its own, special reference field for word usage: theories re-use 
common words to describe specific methods, hypotheses and findings. A 
plurality of theories will thus inevitably also create a plurality of word 
senses of more or less central terms. A word having more senses does not 
necessarily result in it becoming more difficult to use. In most cases, it 
will be applied in one sense only, which is not meant to say that it will 
be used in a consistent manner, but rather that it will be used in one 
sense at a time. However, the more senses a word acquires, the more likely 
it will become that it will not be understood as intended. Any further 
theory therefore is likely to contribute both new knowledge and new 
ambiguities. As growing ambiguity tends to increase the number of 
misunderstandings, learning is affected, too. One could imagine the 
paradoxical situation wherein new scientific theories create more harm (by 
making it difficult to learn) than good (by new discoveries). The easiest 
and natural solution to this problem seems to be forgetting or ignoring 
theories by following the latest (for progressives) or dominant theoretical 
trend (for conservatives). Another, critical way is to find criteria to be 
able to condemn theories as a whole (for censors). A famous and 
controversial example is Karl Popper’s label Pseudowissenschaft (pseudo-
science) 4  and his postulation of falsifiability as the demarcation 
criterion between science and pseudo-science. 5 The problem of theoretical 
ambiguity, however, is to stay, irrespective of whether we try to deal with 
it as progressives, conservatives, or censors. It is of such a serious kind 
that it stops us from a balanced assessment and integration of theories, 
and, consequently, prevents us from efficiently learning and applying 
scientific knowledge. It literally forces us to become forgetful, negligent 
scientists, whether we wish or not. 
                                                                            
by students of memory? The term 'memory,' in addition to denoting a field 
of study, can designate a number of different concepts. Among the more 
frequently occurring meanings of 'memory' are (1) memory as neurocognitive 
capacity to encode, store, and retrieve information; (2) memory as a 
hypothetical store in which information is held; (3) memory as the 
information in that store; (4) memory as some property of that 
information; (5) memory as a componential process of retrieval of that 
information; and (6) memory as an individual's phenomenal awareness of 
remembering something. 
3 (Tulving, Concepts of Memory, 2000, p. 42) 
4 (Popper, 1959) 
5  Ironically, Freud’s psychoanalysis, blamed as a Pseudowissenschaft by Popper, might be 
useful in explaining why Popper appears to have hidden the true origin (namely Otto Selz’s 
psychology of knowledge) of his new theory, as Hark (Hark, 2004) has uncovered.  
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1.1.3  PLURALITY OF SENSE-WORDS 
There is a counterpart to polysemy (somewhat different word senses of a 
single word) and its sibling homonymy (very different word senses of a 
single word), namely synonymy (similar word senses of different words). 
Theoretical plurality, besides disadvantageously increasing the senses per 
word ratio, also leads to a variety of words per sense. Experimental 
paradigms, theoretical stances, goals, and, hence, scientific focus tend to 
differ across sciences, research fields, research groups, and individual 
researchers. However, all too often the subject of research will be the 
same, be overlapping, or, at least, closely related. Of course, some 
matters of research are more prone to this than others are, but the general 
principle still holds true. While plurality of word senses, i.e., polysemy, 
uses to cause misunderstandings (false positives), plurality of sense-
words, i.e. synonymy, uses to cause lack of understanding (false 
negatives). The reason for this is that, especially in cases of neologisms, 
the listener or reader may not know the sense of a word that is used 
synonymously. Not because of not knowing the intended sense, but simply 
because of not understanding that the word is used to denote this sense. 
The problems of plurality of word-senses and plurality of sense-words are 
unquestionably closely interrelated. One can try to escapes word-sense 
plurality by neologisation ― eventually causing sense-word plurality. 
Alternatively, one can try to escape sense-word plurality by re-using words 
― causing word-sense plurality. More often than not, both strategies will 
be applied, without, however, being aware of the possible consequences. 
Ultimately, the difference is only between creating more or less words and 
not between creating more or less understanding, efficiency of learning, or 
ease of practical application.  
1.1.4  GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE AT THE EXPENSE OF SYNTHESIZABILITY 
Thus navigating between Scylla and Charybdis, one could argue that, 
nonetheless, new, often surprising insights are being accumulated. Science 
is rapidly progressing; scientific knowledge is increasing, literally by 
the hour. And, indeed, this is undoubtedly true and represents a great 
achievement. At what cost, however? Not, as one is first tempted to 
believe, at the cost of less and less understandable science. For 
understanding can still be achieved. It only takes enticing people into 
over-specialization, following single lines of scientific evolution, ever 
limiting focus (and, thus, mutual understanding). Division of labor can 
attain this and has attained this in the past. The true cost of 
evolutionary epistemology, however, is in the ever-increasing cost of 
synthesis of knowledge. 
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1.1.5  DENSE VIEWS UNEQUAL OVERVIEWS 
How is one to describe, interconnect and abstract the formidable findings 
of science, when there is no coherent language at hand (and obviously no 
incentive to create one), and when there is, as a result, no common 
understanding? To give a suitable example, I will indicate how Tulving does 
it in The Oxford Handbook of Memory (Tulving & Craik , The Oxford Handbook 
of Memory, 2000). Tulving compiles or stacks different lines of research. 
He uses a plausible order, having authors starting with historic and 
methodological contemplations, branching into specialized research fields, 
thus offering insights into different sub-lines of memory research. As an 
editor, he carefully sequences each individual contribution and adds a 
foreword. In other words, Tulving (and I am far from blaming him for doing 
so) does himself nothing for real knowledge synthesis. He leaves it to the 
contributors, who leave it to the readers, who leave it out, because it is 
too difficult with the information presented in the language(s) given. This 
is a pragmatic as well as typical solution, to be found in most handbooks 
of sciences rich in theories. A dense, often historic (research-oriented) 
view is provided without, however, providing an overview, or, rather, with 
just providing the illusion of an overview. 
1.1.6  THEORY FOR TECHNOLOGY VERSUS TECHNOLOGY FOR THEORY 
The reader will pardon the author’s lamenting tone when he learns that the 
missing synthetic view of memory research from the example given poses an 
actual problem to his own work. As the author is to set out before the 
reader a theory of extended artificial memory (let it be enough here to say 
that this is meant to describe a technology and practice reflecting, 
supporting and augmenting remembering and thinking), it would have been 
rather helpful to be able to refer to and build upon a unified 
(integrative) theory of memory. Instead, the author is forced to refer to 
diverse, rather heterogeneous theories of memory and has apparently nothing 
completely coherent to build upon. Sheer practicality should move him to 
follow Tulving’s example, one would think, constructing his theory and 
technology along the lines of different memory theories. However, it is, 
above all, the author’s very wish for practicality that prevents him from 
following Tulving’s example. For the diversified state of the science of 
memory is somehow reflected in the diversified state of information 
technology, probably for some comparable reasons of evolutionary 
epistemological (technological) developments. Now, this very state of 
information technology is exactly the reason why the author’s endeavor 
started: the technological insufficiency to adequately and consistently 
support and extend human memory.One could argue that the construction and 
theorizing of an integrative memory technology depends on a unified theory 
of memory (to be translated into technology). Then again, there is another, 
rather bold way of thinking about this relationship: namely that a unified 
theory of memory by now depends on a unified memory technology, which, in 
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turn, depends on a unified theory of memory. If prominent memory 
researchers have to shy away from an integrative memory theory, it cannot 
be achieved easily. It seems to be impossible without technological support 
semantically coordinating the diverse lines of evolution of scientific 
knowledge of memory, thereby countering and economizing the before 
mentioned abundance of word-senses and sense-words. It is unpromising to 
wait for an ingenious scientist to appear on the scene and solve this or a 
similar problem by advancing a new, perfectly integrative theory. A proper 
solution, that is a unified field of theories of human memory or a unified 
memory/information-technology, cannot be achieved by a single person 
anymore.  
1.1.7  WICKED PROBLEM 
In design theory, Horst Rittel 6  coined the term wicked problem 7  for a 
complex theoretical and practical problem such as the one we face here. A 
wicked problem is a problem that cannot be defined (theorized) in a way 
that all stakeholders agree on the problem to solve. It is even often 
unclear at what abstraction level the problem ought to be described. 
Managing to re-frame a wicked problem can lead to innovation, but for that 
to happen several people are necessary, because a single person cannot know 
or overlook all aspects of a wicked problem. Attempting to solve a wicked 
problem will change the understanding of the problem or even the problem 
itself. The latter is true not least because every solution tried comes at 
a cost and can have unintended consequences. However, one cannot understand 
a wicked problem until one has tried a solution (i.e., a practical approach 
enables further understanding and theorizing8).  
Rittel thought of the process of argumentation as the adequate method for 
taming wicked problems. Every solution tried reveals aspects of the problem 
that cause a revision of the solution by means of argumentation 
(interpretation informed from all-around). It is for this reason that there 
is no right or wrong solution of a wicked problem, but only a worse to 
better. There are no clear stopping rules for the iterative process of 
solution development. The concept of wicked problems has gained importance 
in design theory, especially in agile software design 9 , because wicked 
problems cannot be tackled successfully in a one-step solution. This thesis 
represents the first step in a practical and theoretical solution approach 
                         
6 See en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Horst_Rittel (accessed on 01.08.2012). 
7 See (Rith & Dubberly, 2007). 
8  This is reflected, for example, in the growing importance of building simulators for 
understanding the dynamics of complex (artificial or natural) systems. 
9  In software engineering, the frequent failure of waterfall-model solution planning and 
solution development (and the like) in highly complex environments, such as the World Wide 
Web, has led to an agile software development movement. This movement’s principles can be 
best understood as reactions to the rising number of wicked problems in software 
development.  
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to a wicked problem, namely the problem of a universal memory/information 
technology by (and for) memory theorizing. 
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1.2 SCIENTIFIC APPROACH 
1.2.1  INVITATIONAL THEORY 
In this thesis, extended artificial memory is being introduced; a 
theoretical and practical attempt to model a general information and 
communication tool to better fit the human cognitive apparatus. The reader 
should not expect to obtain a fully elaborated theory, though. Extended 
artificial memory and the respective software prototype is work in 
progress, an invitation to help further frame a complex theoretical and 
practical problem. 
1.2.2  META-THEORY 
Due to the intricate nature of the problem tackled, neither is a narrow 
perspective taken, nor is the subject being dealt with in a sufficiently 
vague manner, so as to be able to maintain something with certainty. 
Precise general theorizing, at this stage of knowledge of the problem, 
would create nothing but premature, improperly reductionist formal 
certainty (or rather, in fact, uncertainty). In this thesis, therefore, the 
choice is to try to be integrative. I will try to outline the problem 
structure to the greatest extent possible under the circumstances given (at 
the risk of superficiality and a somewhat coarse-grained framing). Then 
again, I will try to integrate various details into the resulting holistic 
perspective, creatively hypothesizing / theorizing across gaps and ditches 
(inviting corrective and aversive refutation respectively). In exceptional 
cases, I will have to be precise and formal about details of the prototype 
created. This is simply due to the strictly logical nature of software code 
and database queries, as represented by the Artificial Memory prototype10. 
At no time, however, will my purpose be to describe technology in terms of 
software code and its one-dimensional formalisms. Technology has always to 
be described firstly in terms of cognitive information processes, as will 
become evident in the next chapter, in which I try to unveil the conceptual 
interdependency between cognitive and other informational processes in 
technology. 
  
                         
10 As of August 6, 2012, the Artificial Memory prototype comprises  
- 132k lines of hand-written programming code  
- 29k lines of hand-written SQL (structured query language) code  
- 3k lines of HTML code and JavaScript code 
Together more than 165k lines of handcrafted code, which represents a commercial equivalent 
of more than 10 person-years of programming efforts. Not to mention about 10 million 
database records of lexical entries, all extracted, loaded, transformed, and interconnected 
from a number of open sources. The Artificial Memory prototype is planned to be used for 
further scientific experimentation. 
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2. COGNITIVE TECHNOLOGY 
2.1 REFRAMING THE NOTION OF TECHNOLOGY 
2.1.1  HUMAN TECHNOLOGY 
From a cognitive perspective, all technology (in the common sense) can be 
separated into two broad main categories, namely content technology and 
functional technology. Content technology stimulates sense organs, directly 
informing the human organism. It interfaces with the human sensory organs 
(often also affecting the organism as such 11), directly replacing natural 
sense stimuli or changing natural/given conditions affecting the organism 
indirectly. Functional technology conducts operations (actual and 
cognitive) instead of the organism. Content technology and functional 
technology are closely interlinked. Any content technology is also 
functional technology (at least fulfilling a cognitive function), but not 
all functional technologies are also direct content-technologies, as 
becomes obvious, for example, from machine-to-machine (communication) 
technology. Any machine ever built, and, consequently, any machine action, 
however, can be tracked back to human knowledge and human creative 
actions. 12  In technology, therefore, something is informed by humans at 
some point, and is operating and informing at another point. A hunting dog, 
a machine tool, and a computer are all objects of technology. A hunting 
dog, for example, is both content producing and functional. Hunting dogs 
track game, thereby disclosing the whereabouts of the game (as in content 
technology). Hunting dogs also catch game, thereby acting on behalf of 
their owners (as in functional technology). 
2.1.2  HUMANS AS MACHINES 
It is important to notice, though, that, according to this common 
description of human technology, humans become technological tools, too. 
They can be informed, be informative and operative on behalf of and for the 
benefit of others. A hunter, a toolmaker, and a human computer 13 turn all 
into technological objects when instructed to hunt, to make tools or to 
compute respectively, just as hunting dogs, machine tools, and computers 
                         
11  Seeking refuge under a broad-leaved tree, for example, makes use of the tree as a 
technological tool to shield the body from inclement or sunny weather. The tree here is 
both a functional object (something shielding from rain and sun, thus affecting the body) 
and a content object (something informing the organism with the dry air and shadow 
belonging to it). 
12 To consider, for example, a thrown stone or a shady tree a technological object informed 
by humans does not mean that stone or tree are changed substantially. A stone thrown at an 
attacking animal is functional, affecting (stoning) the animal by following the intended 
thought operation. The thrown stone is informed only insofar as its location changes. The 
broad-leaved tree fulfilling the thought operation of shielding would be informed only 
insofar, as its immediate environment changes (by somebody searching for shadow). In this 
very broad sense, any technology tool is originated by informing it first.                     
13 Initially, the term computer denoted real people doing mathematical calculations. 
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are technological objects. Well-educated humans are technologically near 
universal, only, in most cases, by far not as efficient as specialized 
artificial automats. It is at least safe to say that anybody and anything 
can serve multiple purposes, depending on how it is informed and, 
accordingly, becomes operative and/or informative. Furthermore, two things 
can serve the same technological purpose by being operative in the same way 
and being informative in the same way. 
2.1.3  NATURAL TECHNOLOGY 
Human technology and humans as automats are largely cultural 
accomplishments, in most cases instructed by means of some natural or 
artificial human language / sign-system respectively. Beyond human 
technologies (by objects like tools and servants), there are also quite 
natural, inherited technologies. Humans as technology (automats) serve 
group or societal functions, as do human technologies. Some other animals 
serve group or societal functions, too, without, however, first acquiring 
cultural technology tools (such as language) during their lifetime. This is 
closely related to a fundamental achievement of biological evolution: 
eusociality. The nature of human technology (and humans as technology) can 
best be understood by disclosing its likely origin in eusociality.  
2.1.4  EUSOCIAL TECHNOLOGY  
In his book The Social Conquest of Earth, Edward Wilson (Wilson, 2012) 
defines eusociality as the characteristic feature of animal societies 
displaying group members containing multiple generations and prone to 
perform altruistic acts as part of their division of labor. 14 Eusociality 
created superorganisms, the next level of biological complexity. 15  The 
biological raison d'être of eusociality is that even a little society does 
better than a solitary individual belonging to closely related species both 
in longevity and in extracting resources […].16  
[…] an iron rule exists in genetic social evolution. It is 
that selfish individuals beat altruistic individuals, while 
groups of altruists beat groups of selfish individuals. 
(Wilson, 2012, p. 243) 
Such being the case, the rarity of its occurrence in animal kingdom (humans 
disregarded17) seems remarkable:  
                         
14 (Wilson, 2012, p. 16) 
15 (Wilson, 2012, p. 132) 
16 (Wilson, 2012, p. 149) 
17  Depending on the exact definition of eusociality, humans and other vertebrates can or 
cannot be classified as downright eusocial. In this thesis, I follow a very broad 
definition of the socio-biological concept of eusociality. According to this broad 
definition, division of labor in groups of individuals of one species spanning generations 
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Eusociality arose in ants once, three times independently in 
wasps, and at least four times - probably more, but it is 
hard to tell - in bees. 
(Wilson, 2012, p. 136)  
Due to evolutionary limitations (namely the exoskeleton), insects cannot 
evolve massive nervous systems anymore that would allow them to learn 
complex cultural technologies. Instead, due to extreme epigenetic 
plasticity, insects such as ants are able to develop into highly 
specialized individuals, forming colony casts marked by distinctive sets of 
instinctive behaviors and specific organismic phenotypes. Eusociality means 
evolution by survival of the fittest group of individuals or of individuals 
(e.g. ant queens) extending into groups. Epigenetic plasticity is the 
evolutionary mechanism insects have to their avail in order to establish 
eusociality. Conversely, brain plasticity, brain growth, and brain 
complexity are the evolutionary lines of mutation that led humans to evolve 
eusociality.  
Although the largely chemical communication devices of ants do not inform 
in the same manner as human gestural or spoken languages do, the effect of 
informing ant individuals, their operating on behalf [in Vertretung] of 
others and feedback activities are sufficiently similar to the human-
technology process to be dubbed as natural technology. Even though, in the 
case of insects and most other animals than humans, the eusocial technology 
is restricted to hereditary behavior in vitally important situations, 
technology, regardless, can universally best be characterized as a 
substituational information process based on the principles of division and 
orchestration of labor that mark full eusociality.  
The hereditary and cultural capacities for eusocial technological 
advancements, so far, have been crucial evolutionary success factors, 
leading to ants and humans dominating animal kingdom (each in their 
respective biological spheres). All crucial human technological 
achievements were only possible and beneficial in eusocial groups: The 
control of fire is only imaginable at campsite (nest), cooking for 
preservation of food necessitates fierce defense of campsite supplies, the 
efforts of primitive tool-making pay off best in groups (e.g. during group 
spear-hunting and subsequent collaborative processing of large game). 
  
                                                                            
would be a sufficient criterion of eusociality. For more information, see, e.g., 
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eusociality (accessed on 9.08.2012). 
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2.1.5  DETERMINANTS OF TECHNOLOGY 
Referring to the convictions of Michael Tomasello 18 , leader of the 
Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology at the Max Planck 
Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, which are based on experimental 
findings from child and primate research, Wilson concludes that  
Humans […] are successful not because of an elevated general 
intelligence that addresses all challenges but because they 
are born to be specialists in social skills. By cooperating 
through the communication and the reading of intention […]. 
(Wilson, 2012, p. 227)  
Following this assumption, technology appears as an integration of 
processes of communication and of cooperation or collaboration. This causes 
an individual’s intentions, cognitions, and actions to be mirrored and, 
partly, dissociated into another individual. The basic unit of human 
eusocial technology therefore consists of, generally speaking, two 
interwoven cognitive processes in two distinct individuals (a double 
process), being in correspondence with each other. The animism of early 
cultures demonstrates the generalization potential of processes of shared 
attention and shared intention to naturally occurring processes and their 
naturally causative objects. 19  The immediacy and uncompoundedness of 
animistic Gestalt qualities20 of inanimate objects bears further witness to 
the generality and force of this phenomenon. Perceived causality is coupled 
with the perception of intentionality. Thus stepping into the arena of 
beliefs sharpened the human mind for natural phenomena, by creating pseudo-
explanatory, imaginary associations, by constantly looking for signals of 
an imaginative (godly or devilish) will. Superstition paved the way to 
scientific knowledge, functional objects, and cultural progress21. Whether 
the technological double process is based on two humans interacting, or on 
a human and an inanimate tool, or a human and a mechanized tool, does not 
affect the cognitive primacy and informational nature of the process. I 
shall now progress to define the crucial determinants of eusocially derived 
technology: 
                         
18 See, e.g., (Tomasello, Die Ursprünge der menschlichen Kommunikation, 2011). 
19  This idea is similar to the notion of an intentional stance, as promulgated by the 
philosopher Daniel Dennett. See en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intentional_stance (accessed on 
06.08.2012). 
20  The (somewhat dubious) psychological school of holistic psychology 
[Ganzheitspsychologie], which replaced Gestalt psychology in Germany during the Nazi 
regime, has stressed and elaborated this point. See, e.g., Hans Volkelt’s Grundfragen der 
Psychologie (Volkelt, Grundfragen der Psychologie, 1963). 
21  The sociologist Norbert Elias, for example, gives a socio-historic view into the 
development of time and calendar categories in his book Über die Zeit: Arbeiten zur 
Wissenssoziologie (Elias, 1988). Elias exemplifies the close interlink between superstition 
and epistemic progress in Old Egypt: observing stars was a cultic act of priests that 
helped them improve their understanding of natural regularities.  
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2.1.5.1 Specificity – degree of informational correspondence  
To start a substitution-process of human-based technology, the initial 
information process between the human informant and the information 
receiver has to ensure a sufficient degree of correspondence (mapping) 
between the sender’s goal-directed (cognitive) information states and the 
receiver’s matching (information) states. 22  The specificity of the 
resulting effects will depend on proper informational correspondence or 
overall mapping. 
2.1.5.2 Adjustability – degree of functional correspondence  
While it is easy to see that specific informational correspondence is a 
determinant of technology, due to it parameterizing and goal-directing the 
recipient process, it is a bit more difficult to understand why functional 
correspondence [Funktionskorrespondenz] is of importance, too. It is not 
that the operations of the technological process have to be the same as 
those thought up by the instructor or, more generally, actuator. Indeed, in 
this respect, there could well be no direct correspondence whatsoever. One 
can have a false idea of the workings of substitution processes without 
this limiting controllability and effectiveness. One might, for example, 
think of a ghost operating a machine or have a simplified or inappropriate 
metaphorical theory about its functioning that does not reflect the 
workings of the machine. Technology can be operative without following the 
causal patterns attributed to it. However, when functional technology 
becomes more complex, when there are more intermediate and parallel states 
in the technological process, and when the number of possible outcomes 
increases, it will become ever more important to further influence and 
steer the technological process, beyond its initial parameterization (if 
any). Complex technology that does not want to run the risk of escaping 
into decoupled, non-technological (as I would argue) substitution 
processes, has to be accessible (informative) and adjustable (inform-able), 
or, in other words, it has to correspond on a shared structural basis. 
Functional correspondence means bidirectional responsiveness within closely 
interwoven regulative structures. Complex technology imposes both a 
theoretical regulatory demand (on the side of the actuator’s substituted 
process) and a functional regulatory demand (on the side of the 
substituting process). Adjustability allows regulatory information to be 
injected whenever needed.  
                         
22 Even a tree, in order to serve as a technology to shield from rain or sun, has to be at 
the expected place (as part of its state) to be used as a shelter. The initial 
informational correspondence is not always based on a real (outer) information process, but 
can also be based on a memory-based informational mapping, or on a reverse information 
process (of the actuator being informed).  
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2.1.5.3 Effectiveness – overall correspondence  
The real, factual result of a technological substitution process does not 
have to correspond to the intended goal to stamp it technological. Often 
enough, a technology will not work as expected. Still, if its functioning 
bears the marks of specificity and adjustability, it is usually 
acknowledged as technological. In this case, expectations are being limited 
to earlier or partial goal-directed states of the technological 
substitution process. This comes down to a shortening of the technological 
process. If, however, the unintended, non-corresponding tail end of a 
process were to persist and somehow be in force, the process, as a whole, 
would become non-technological. Arbitrary beginnings, progressions, or ends 
characterize degenerating technology (processes). Effectiveness is another 
determining factor of technology: in complex technologies, effectiveness is 
not only to be found in a final effect, any specific process outcome, but 
rather in overall correspondence in what is realized of what is expected to 
realize. Effectiveness, therefore, cannot be achieved without overlapping. 
Overlapping requires starting points and end points of the parallelized 
(information) states of a technological process unit to match.23  
2.1.5.4 Determinants of technology and their respective 
eusocial skills 
With regards to eusocial skills, specificity can be translated into, on one 
side, expressivity / expressive power (precise, unambiguous display) 
[Ausdrucksfähigkeit] and, on the other side, impressivity or receptivity 
(precise, correct impressions) [Begreifensfähigkeit]. Adjustability 
translates into reciprocal attentiveness [wechselseitige Zugewandtheit] and 
continuous expression and reading of (intentional) information states 
[Absichtserkenntnisfähigkeit]. Effectiveness, at last, translates into, on 
one hand, will to express and inform [Ausdruckskraft] and goal-orientation 
[Zielstrebigkeit] and, on the other hand, preparedness (or will to react) 
[Bereitschaft] and steerability [Steuerbarkeit]. Of course, these notions 
and, admittedly, somewhat vague concepts are thought here to but help us 
further comprehend the basic correspondence between fundamental human 
capacities and the vital roles they play in technology processes. This, in 
turn, will help us to see clearer what technology is not. 
  
                         
23 This is not meant to say that the substituting states have to be at the same time as the 
states being substituted. A technologically substituting process can be delayed repeatedly, 
thus taking place after its corresponding actuating or anticipating information state. A 
phase shift, however, does not affect the informational mapping (and respective 
overlapping). 
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2.1.6  WHAT TECHNOLOGY IS NOT! 
One purpose of the description and the definition of technology here is to 
be able to draw a clearer borderline between what technology is and what 
technology is not. Reading the following sections, the reader may find that 
most of her ideas about technology are actually misleading. 
2.1.6.1 Technology is not in nature  
We have spoken of natural technology in the sense of eusocial 
specialization generating substitution by hereditary and cultural means. 
Oftentimes people speak of nature’s technologies in a very different sense. 
They mean things such as, for instance, a spider’s net, a snake’s poison, 
or a bird’s nest, etc. All these marvelous things have really nothing to do 
with technology. A complex natural system, its occurrence and progression, 
is not in itself already a technological process. It may appear as 
technology to humans as they develop an understanding of its complex 
functioning and start attributing it to an individual creator (such as the 
spider) or to a universal creator or process (such as God, nature or 
evolution). However, there is, as a rule, no anticipation or goal-
determined substitution involved. 24  These are successful but, in a way, 
blind processes. A physical or, on a higher level, biological causality 
chain, though, is far too wide a demarcation criterion to grasp the 
distinctiveness of the eusocial cognitive-technological process. 
2.1.6.2 Technology is not material (objective)  
Most people think of technology as of something material: a tool, a 
computer, a car. These are all artifacts, possibly playing a role in 
technological processes. To call them technology is as misleading as it is 
common. The technological process is a process of cognitive-informational 
correspondence. If at all, an artifact can be named technology in the state 
of being a constituent of a technological process. However, I would prefer 
to reserve the term technology to denote an abstraction of the process 
itself and to use the label technology xyz to denote a subsumed type of 
technology, preferentially irrespective of its specific (volatile, easily 
to be virtualized) material (objective) foundation.  
                         
24  Hans Volkelt (and before him Thorndike) had demonstrated that lower animals (Volkelt 
experimented with spiders and wasps) do not (learn to) recognize objects as constant things 
[dinghafte Konstanzen] (Volkelt, Über die Vorstellungen der Tiere, 1914). In lower animals, 
there is no objective structure [dinghafte Gliederung] of perception or thought; and even 
if, in higher animals, there is learnt object-perception, eusociality, first and foremost, 
is the mechanism that breathes life into perceived things, revealing them as intentional, 
collaborative members of the same (or another) species or as pseudo-intentional, effective 
things. 
Extended Artificial Memory 
[23] 
2.1.6.3 Technology is not stable 
Most people would think that technology is something rather stable. 
However, the specific relational character [Korrespondenzcharakter] of the 
technological process introduces several breaking points: both the 
substituted and the substituting process are prone to change and, hence, 
prone to uncoupling, potentially bringing the technological process to a 
halt. Nowadays, for example, one will find many historical mechanical 
devices nobody anymore knows how and what for to use. In a discontinued 
technology, the possibility for correspondence is lost. The technology (if 
not documented and for that reason reconstructable) has ceased to exist, 
remaining artifacts notwithstanding.  
Technological processes change all the time, as the measures of degree of 
correspondence (specificity, adjustability, and effectiveness) vary. A race 
driver uses a different technology than a normal driver (both driving the 
same car), not just a different technique, but, literally, a different 
technology. The technological correspondence is one of two-sided 
potentiality: both sides tend to be more or less aligned with each other, 
and both sides might lose their capacity for the technological process to 
proceed. This makes technology an overly variable and fragile process.  
2.1.6.4 Methods are not yet technology 
Many people would think that a method (i.e., technique) to solve a problem 
is already a technology. In fact, method is often used to denote the 
process realized (solution method) [Lösungsmethode], as well as it is said 
to be the process realizing (execution method) [Ausführungsmethode]. In 
case of humans as technology, both processes are realized by cognitive 
processes in the brain. These are usually supposed to be closely 
corresponding (co-mirrored). Sometimes, when instructor and executor 
exchange roles, a solution method may turn directly into an execution 
method. However, the method alone does not yet constitute a technological 
process, be it manifested in a solution process or in an execution process. 
It is a necessary, not a sufficient condition. It misses the specific 
teleconnection and telecorrespondence [Fernwirkung] necessary to establish 
the collaborative division or extension of labor that earmarks eusocial 
technology.  
2.1.6.5 Technology cannot be made 
For it is a process! Therefore, technology has to be arranged. Thinking of 
technology as a product is a frequent misunderstanding. Material 
constituents of technology are produced, of course, but the technological 
process as such has to be organized.  
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2.1.6.6 Technology cannot be used 
That technology cannot be used is, of course, surprising. Whenever we think 
we use technology, we are actually more likely to take part in it. We use 
(handle) a chair, a tool, or a computer, indeed. During a technological 
process (sitting, screwing, or programming), these things may all become 
important constituents of the technological process. Technology then, 
however, is not being used; instead, people and things are engaged in a 
technological process. Furthermore, oftentimes when we might think we are 
using technology, we are actually not or only distantly part of the 
technological process. Think, for example, of traffic lights. One might 
assume that one uses traffic lights (as an indicator system, for example, 
in order to decide when to start or stop one’s car) and this somehow would 
mean using the traffic light technology. The truth is that the traffic 
authority is engaging the traffic lights in a technological process of 
teleregulating traffic (the drivers). Within this technological process, 
the driver is a (distant) receptor, not an effector. Talking about usage of 
technology, therefore, does not only conceal the process-character of 
technology, it also leaves in the dark on which side we stand in the 
intertwined double process of technology. Are we parameterizing, 
substituting actuators or are we but tools? All too often, the notion of 
using technology will give us a false impression of where we stand. People 
watching TV, for example, might think that they are using a technology to 
their avail. There are, indeed, a few buttons to press to manipulate the 
workings of the TV set and one, hence, is engaged in a minor technological 
process of choosing channels etc. TV-technology is, in the main, a process 
steered by broadcasting companies and advertising agencies, a massive 
perceptual manipulation. To put it pointedly, instead of thinking of one 
using the telly, it would be more appropriate to speak of being used by the 
telly. It is however, best to avoid the notion of using technology 
altogether. One should rather ask in which technological processes people 
participate in which roles. In terms of effectuation, technologies are 
perhaps best conceived as overlapping spheres of influence and 
interdependent force-vectors. The traditional object-oriented and, based on 
this, usage-oriented notion of technology 25  blinds us for the real 
complexities of technology and its double-processual characteristics of 
paralleled actuation and substitution.  
                         
25 A diffuse, but not untypical example is given in Wikipedia’s definition of technology, 
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technology (accessed on 05.08.2012) as:  
[…] the making, modification, usage, and knowledge of tools, machines, 
techniques, crafts, systems, methods of organization, in order to solve a 
problem, improve a preexisting solution to a problem, achieve a goal or 
perform a specific function. 
The definition revolves around more or less concrete objects (tools, machines, systems, 
methods, knowledge) that are being made, modified, and used. 
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2.1.6.7 Technology cannot be controlled 
When one thinks of technology as of objects, one easily gets to believe 
that technology can be controlled, that is it can be in a certain state 
labeled as controlled, because objects appear to be stable and persistent. 
Corresponding processes, by contrast, are occurrences, unstable and 
transient by definition, and always at risk of dephasing and mismatching. 
Therefore, technology cannot be said to be controlled. It can, at best, be 
said to be being controlled. The difference may appear to be marginal at 
first glance. It is, however, neither a trivial nor an unimportant 
difference. Whenever one attributes a stable feature to the technology 
process, one supposes stability of a constituent of the process, or the 
state of the process at a certain point of time, or of a specific instance 
of the process. Neither of these reference points, however, is appropriate 
to describe technology. Sitting on a chair is not safe because of the chair 
being made of stable material (for the person sitting could still be too 
heavy for the chair). It is not safe because one can sit on it now (for the 
glue may be of poor quality and the chair is thus destined to collapse 
soon). It is also not safe because person A sat on it successfully (for 
person B enjoys falling into the chair while person A, better-behaved, sits 
down). 
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2.2 COGNITIVE-TECHNOLOGICAL MODEL 






























































































































































FIGURE 1: EXEMPLARY VISUALIZATION OF AN EXEMPLARY TECHNOLOGICAL PROCESS ALONG WITH 
ITS DETERMINING CORRESPONDENCE STRUCTURE 
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2.2.2  DESCRIPTION OF THE COGNITIVE-TECHNOLOGICAL MODEL 
2.2.2.1 Technological Framework  
In Figure 1, an exemplary technology unit is visualized, integrating what 
has been said so far. The whole structure represents a technological 
process. It is always comprised of at least one real cognitive actuation 
process and one substitution (or dissociation) process. Each process 
undergoes different information stages. There are three exclusive process 
phases: initiation, (pseudo-) operation, and dephasing. Even though, in 
Figure 1, dephasing is put at the end, it can as well appear at the start 
(imagine, for example, a car rolling backwards down a hill before the 
driver manages to start it). Initiation marks the beginning of the 
actuation process. It creates the mandatory parameterization (parameter 
correspondence) of any technological double process. In Figure 1, the 
substitution process is initiated by the actuator. Conversely, the actuator 
process can be initiated by a substitution process (imagine setting the 
brake after the car started rolling backwards down the hill). Of course, 
one could as well maintain that a technological process can only be 
initiated by an actor (which would imply the exclusion of dephasing at the 
beginning of the technology process). By definition, based on eusocial 
division of labor, the substitution (or dissociation) process has to become 
operational on behalf of the actuator. In case of total dissociation, when 
there are no information stages corresponding to effectuation left in the 
actuation process, the pseudo-operational phase of the actuation process 
will be empty (imagine a husband making coffee for his wife, without 
realizing/remembering it, simply by turning on the coffee machine in the 
morning). If this happens, only the parameterization of initiation can 
create correspondence (the man will not see the coffee getting ready, he 
will not get to know if the water container was filled, etc.). In Figure 1, 
there is no distinct goal-phase, as technology does not depend on a 
definite goal. This is not to mean that actuation and substitution process 
use to be aimless, or even that there are no goal-like information stages. 
Analyzing the correspondence structure is crucial for understanding in how 
far actuation and substitution process harmonize with each other. 
Correspondence, however, is not the same as synchronicity (imagine, e.g., 
the time span between setting the alarm clock and the alarm clock going 
off). Mere phase shifting (response time delay) is different from 
structural de-phasing, that is, for example, deserialization or one-sided 
pruning or extension (think, e.g., of the alarm clock unintentionally going 
off the day after tomorrow). As process schemes, actuation and substitution 
seem very general, but most technologies are general (take, e.g., the 
process of sending a messenger to somebody: it might be a messenger boy, a 
horseman, a messenger pigeon, or, just as well, an e-mail). Technological 
division of labor entails a certain degree of permanence, and a minimum 
number of repetitions. A unique event cannot normally be termed a 
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technology, as it tends to unfold in unforeseen ways. A unique event 
absolutely may establish a technology, though. Actuation structures have to 
preexist for the double process to be called technological. An actuation 
structure can be learnt from experience or be thought up in advance. The 
latter can be difficult in case of actual tool use, because using tools 
normally requires prior experience in order to be able to establish good 
correspondence. In conclusion, it can be said that the technological double 
process is essentially based on the activation of memory structures. 26 
Technology is, in a way, not the original (unexpected, creative), but a 
reproductive process. This is not to say that a technological process 
cannot be creative and unique in its specific instances, especially with 
respect to its unique instantaneous informational situation. Varying 
circumstances will evoke varying parameters having different effects. Due 
to the essential preexistence of the actuation scheme, however, 
technological creativity appears to be limited to its parametrical 
variables and respective information states (as compared to structural 
variables, which potentially destruct technology) 27 . Structural mutations 
(any form of deparallelization, rearrangement, extraction and injection) 
make up another type of technological creativity if they have a lasting 
(i.e., memory-) effect on the actuation structure. It is, however, 
important to mention that these mutations are rather unplanned, 
unsystematic (i.e., inessential) by-products of technology processes, which 
does not mean that they do not become essential structural components of 
their respective technologies, or that they would not be capable of 
originating new types of technology. 
  
                         
26 In this chapter, I will (have to) use the term memory in the ways it is used in folk 
psychology. 
27  There are, of course, meta-technologies, which vary sub-technologies as parameters. In 
this case, however, the problem of technological creativity simply shifts up one level.    
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2.2.2.2 Technological Parameterization 
At this point, I do not yet want to deepen my perspective on the discrete 
units of the technology model, coined parameters and information stages 
respectively. This will be part and parcel of later chapters, when I take a 
dedicated cognitive-psychological perspective with regard to informational 
memory units and cognitive states. Suffice it here to say that parameters 
of actuation have to be perceptual or behavioral/expressive units, and that 
information stages can be understood as distinct actual cognitive 
constellations, somehow glued together by the instantiation of the 
actuation (memory) structure. Parameters and information stages are units 
of systematization. The technology process cannot be finer-grained than 
these units, as they structure the correspondence between the involved 
processes. Parameters and information stages of the substitution process 
may well entail finer-grained sub-stages, indispensable for, say, digital 
computation or mechanical functioning, but these do not usually become part 
of the correspondence structure of a technology double-process involving, 
say, computers or precision mechanics.  
The user of spreadsheet software knows how to sum up a column of numbers 
(which is a special technology). The software programmer programming this 
part of the spreadsheet software uses other technologies, for example 
calling a library-function summarizing an array of cell values. The 
programmer of the respective function library may apply certain loop 
structures in her programming language’s syntax, supported by her software 
compiler, to realize her function. And so on and so forth, all the way down 
to a very distant bottom, where we find inventors of logical notations and 
toolmakers with their very own basic set of expressive technologies. The 
tools and their automated workings get ever more complex. One will find a 
stack and history of technological processes involved in creating a tool 
like a spreadsheet-program running on an Operating System on a Personal 
Computer. The parameters of a technology like summing up numbers in a 
column of a running spreadsheet program, however, are things like defining 
start- and end-cell and stating or clicking the sum-function. Well, the 
corresponding substitution process does not substitute or dissociate all 
the before mentioned stacked processes leading up to the development of the 
tools used in the technology. The tools are historic physical 
manifestations or ongoing events resulting from other technological 
processes; they become part of an environment that allows new technologies 
to evolve and take place. Therefore, in our spreadsheet example, the 
information stages being substituted or dissociated have nothing to do with 
a spreadsheet program, an Operating System, or a Central Processing Unit, 
the technological origins of which are not widely understood (just like 
most young people, contrary to a widely held belief, and quite forgivably 
so, do not know computer technology or software technology). Software, OS, 
hardware are but necessary things that can be found in the before mentioned 
technological situation. The substitution process is always derived from 
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the corresponding actuation process, and not the other way around, however 
technologically advanced situational artifacts (e.g. hardware) and 
processes (e.g. software processes) may appear.  
2.2.2.3 Technological Substitution 
The substitution process, as part of technology, corresponds with the 
actuation process in two different ways: First, by direct information 
exchange (parameters) and, second, by structural correspondence, that is 
parallelization. Neither would it be fair to say that the substitution 
process is represented in the actuation process, nor, on the contrary, that 
the actuation process is represented in the substitution process. At best, 
one finds a closely co-structural development, with parameters exchanged as 
expected and as acceptable for the actuator (process). Goal attainment, in 
this model, where it is given, means nothing but the realization of an 
anticipated (i.e., pre-realized) information stage in the actuation 
process. Even though goal stages may be part of the correspondence 
structure of the technology process, they do not have to be based on any 
actual information provided by the substitution process. A silent 
substitution process, if this is what was expected, can be found 
acceptable. The effectuation [Bewirkung] of the substitution process is to 
indicate the possible non-actuator (real, if you will) effects of a 
substitution process. During the technology process, the effectuation is 
only accessible via the corresponding information stages of the 
substitution process. Exploring the distant effects of a technological 
process, analyzing its results, is not usually part of a technological 
process (as the correspondence structure will collapse when focusing on 
partial results, leaving but independent fragments of the substitution 
process). Analysis and theorizing about results will likely comprise 
technology processes and types of technology of their own, though. An 
interesting question is what effectuation means if the substitution process 
is grounded in a human substitutor. Beyond any direct action and its 
effects, effectuation will probably encompass effects on the substitutor’s 
memory, likely leading up to late (de-phased, unspecific) or altogether 
uncoupled effects. The substituent can take many forms. The substituent 
ought not to be perceived as objects. The substituent is itself a process, 
one that could involve many objects and material components. While, on the 
surface, it may appear easy to separate the substitution process’s 
information stages in case of a human substitutor, it is difficult to do so 
in cases where no human substitutor is involved. What are, for example, the 
information stages of a stick one uses in order to reach an apple high on a 
tree? Wherein do we find the substituent here? Well, the properties 
potentially leading up to the actuator’s perceptions (such as, for example, 
those that make up the stick’s grip or the stick’s weight building up 
tension against the apple) ought to be recognized as part of the 
substitution process’s information stages. In other words, features 
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directly (dyadically) relatable to (or from) the actuator are to be dubbed 
as stageable28. Analytical properties (say, the molecular structure of the 
stick, its hidden growth rings etc.), i.e. features not directly relatable 
to the respective actuation process are not to be thought of as being part 
of the substitution process’s information states. They are part of a wider, 
causal-analytical network with regard to technological pre-conditions. 
They, however, do not directly belong to a cognitively oriented model of 
technology, whatever there indirect effectiveness or physical process-
criticality may be. It is, it cannot be stressed enough, a critical mistake 
to confuse the subordinated causative situation with the technological 
process, even if highly complex technological achievements (such as 
computers) were to dominate the causative situation. The artificiality of 
such a situation ought not to lead us to believe in an analogous 
artificiality of the cognitively dominated technology process to be found 
in it. With regard to the substitution process’s effectuation, I would like 
to propose restrictions similar to those stated with regard to the 
substitution process’s information stages. Effectuation comprises 
substitution effects and side effects. To be considered part and parcel of 
the technological process, effects ought to be relatable to actuation. Due 
to dissociative substitution, that is pruning of the actuation process, 
with substitutive effects disappearing, it becomes unclear whether certain 
effects are still covered by the cognitive lead-structure of actuation. In 
other words, the actuator may simply have forgotten some parts of what 
would normally happen when she, for example, instructs a friend to prepare 
a birthday party for her (e.g. forgetting to give her friend money to buy 
cakes or forgetting about that invitation cards will have to be prepared 
and sent out, etc.). In this case, from the perspective of the actuator, 
the actuation process will at best compress the substitution process into 
fewer information stages, basically only starting it rather than also 
accompanying and adjusting it, without changing the effectuation (leaving 
the substituent unchanged, that is generating results as planned), though. 
At worst, the substitution process will break down. In any case, due to 
pruning, substitution becomes unrelatable, because of there being no stage 
left for correspondence in the actuation process. In the technology model, 
the effectuation informs the substitution process’s information stages. 
Effectuation is special because it is subject to anticipation (knowledge29 
about how the technological process progresses and what it results to). The 
substitution process’s information stages, however, potentially collect 
                         
28  Besides direct dyadic relations, any components of higher-ary relations involving the 
actuator might as well be considered stageable (i.e., they can become part of the 
substitution process’s information stage. As an example of a triadic relation (thirdness), 
consider the intention of a substitutor to go and fetch something from outside to give it 
to the actuator. What he is going to fetch cannot be dyadically related to the actuator 
(for it being out of context). Still, the intention establishes a triadic relation directly 
involving actuator, substitutor and an object with each other.  
29 At this point, I use the term knowledge in a folk-psychological manner only. The same as 
with memory, we will sort this out in detail later (see chapter 3 and chapter 4.4)! 
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more information than from planned effects alone. For whatever grabs (or 
distracts) the technologically directed attention of the actuator, might be 
perceived as being part of the substitution process or simply have a 
technologically destructive effect. Foreseen and unforeseen situational 
circumstances and information stemming from the actuation process itself 
(leading up to reflections) will contribute anticipatorily relatable 
information. 
2.2.2.4 Technological Correspondence 
2.2.2.4.1 Definition of Technological Specificity 
In Figure 1, the correspondence structure is outlined in a quasi-formal 
manner. This, however, does not aim at further formalization at this point. 
It is merely meant to illustrate different types of relatedness between 
actuation and substitution process. It also helps specify the terms used to 
describe the correspondence structure by conceiving them in their semantic 
word field structure. Correspondence is circumscribed by actual and 
potential information stages of the actuation process. Matching information 
stages of actuation and substitution exhibit different degrees of 
similarity, that is specificity. It is important to notice that similarity 
here does not first and foremost mean similarity as derived from a direct 
comparison between two matched information stages of actuation and 
substitution. The similarity judgment arises from a comparison of two 
information stages of actuation, namely the momentary information stage and 
a respective potential information stage. This potential information stage 
is to be conceived as the momentary information stage of actuation if it 
were to come under the direct influence (parameterization) of its matching 
(corresponding) information stage of substitution.  
2.2.2.4.2 Types of Technological Specificity 
From the definition of specificity, we can generate six distinct types of 
specificity: 
a. Actuator specificity 
b. Substitutor specificity 
c. Parallelization (and dissociation) specificity 
d. Actuator non-specificity 
e. Substitutor non-specificity 
f. Deparallelization specificity 
ACTUATOR SPECIFICITY 
Actuator specificity [see Figure 1] means that at this stage the 
substitution process is informed by the actuator. If the resulting 
information stage of substitution were to be fed back to the actuator stage 
and compared with the original actuator stage, the degree of their 
similarity would determine the specificity of their correspondence.  
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SUBSTITUTOR SPECIFICITY 
Substitutor specificity means that the substitution process informs the 
actuation process. The situation given with substitutor specificity 
resembles the condition of the similarity comparison/impression defining 
any technological specificity. This would mean that the specificity is 
always perfect, as the relatable features of the substitution process are 
to be thought of as already having been integrated into the actuation 
process’s information stage under review. The specificity of the 
correspondence cannot surpass the relate-ability of the substitution 
process. Thus, the relate-ability of the substitution process is an 
important quality-criterion of technology in its own right, not to be 
mistaken for specificity of correspondence. A substitution process of 
insufficient relate-ability will either de-phase quickly (due to 
uncontrollability) or not meet expectations30, both cases likely to result 
in quick discontinuation of the technology-process.  
PARALLELIZATION SPECIFICITY 
Parallelization specificity is a quite interesting theoretical type of 
specificity of great practical importance, as it describes correspondence 
without actual information exchange between the two constitutive processes 
of technology. For highest parallelization specificity to occur, the 
respective actuation information state has to be void of information not 
being part of the concurrent substitution information state, but, 
conversely, it does not have to be filled with any specific information 
given in the substitution process. In theory (as can also be predicted for 
practice), a mere placeholder or pointer would be sufficient to keep the 
correspondence structure in full force. Parallelization, however, ought to 
be bridged by the actuator being informed by the substitution process 
(substituational adjustment), as a succeeding non-informed actuator-
parameterization will always get in a state of low specificity, at least 
unless the substitution process is in a state of low relate-ability, of 
course. These theoretical considerations explain the general (actuator-) 
principle, according to which one should strive to be informed before 
deciding to intervene technologically, without, however, demanding for an 
ongoing information-rich reflection of the substitution process’s 
information states. 
ACTUATOR NON-SPECIFICITY / SUBSTITUTOR NON-SPECIFICITY 
Actuator non-specificity and substitutor non-specificity are both marked by 
failed parameterization. Actuator non-specificity is always at least non-
specific to the degree to which the non-effective parameter (from the 
substitutor) contains new information. Substitutor non-specificity is 
                         
30 Meeting and not meeting expectations are not yet part of the technology model and are 
therefore no further regarded at this point.  
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always at least as non-specific, as the non-effective parameter (from the 
actuator) would have been new to the substitutor.  
DEPARALLELIZATION NON-SPECIFICITY 
Deparallelization non-specificity is characterized by one process not being 
in a relatable state anymore. The share of relatable features is an 
important measure with regard to the substitution process. However, it is 
also an important measure with regard to the actuation process. In the 
state of deparallelization, either the actuator or (exclusive or / XOR) the 
substitution process is marked by zero relate-ability (no relatable 
features). Another characteristic of this situation is that it is headed, 
followed, or enclosed by non-deparallelized information stages. A special 
case is given in a substitution process having zero relate-ability: the 
method of supposed substitutor adjustment (for the determination of the 
degree of specificity) is not valid in this case. Instead of concluding 
full specificity, no specificity at all ought to be set. 
2.2.2.4.3 Measures of Correspondence 
The types of specificity can be grouped into diametrically opposed sets: 
adjustability and inadjustability, effectiveness and ineffectiveness, as 
illustrated in Figure 1. From these groups, overall measures of specificity 
may be derived by way of aggregation. Until now, the Cognitive-
Technological Model was destined to act merely as a counter-weight against 
the common (mis-) understanding of technology, illustrating a profoundly 
different approach to the matter. It is not fully formulated and by no 
means final. Its purpose will be to provide a fresh template to detect and 
re-interpret technology-problems. At this point, I will not delve any 
further into possible ways of aggregating specificity values. Such measures 
would be premature, but are still indicated in Figure 1. 
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2.3 CONTENT TECHNOLOGY 
2.3.1  HOT MEDIA VERSUS COOL MEDIA 
In our modern world, there are some very basic content-technologies, such 
as pressing the On-button of a TV-set (which even toddlers are capable of), 
or reading / thumbing through a book by turning pages (which preschoolers 
manage). The content presented thereafter is not usually perceived as part 
of a technological process involving readers/listeners/viewers as 
actuators, though. The respective actuator processes (like reading) are 
highly automatized, sub-conscious and, thus, seemingly unelaborate. They 
often do not reach beyond the next moment of attention or exposure to the 
medium (leaving aside diffuse senses of expectation such as being 
entertained, amused, touched, or getting tired, etc.). A medium does not 
establish a content technology by itself. It is, in the first place, a 
natural or artificially created environment or situation, into which one is 
thrown. Marshall McLuhan famously differentiated between hot and cool 
media. 31 Hot media, such as radio or movies, extend (specific or several) 
senses in high definition, requiring and allowing only low or highly 
automatized active participation from users, whereas cool media, such as 
comics, leave room for and even require constructive imagination. These two 
types of media can be associated to content technology (as defined in the 
notion of cognitive technology). Hot media tend to prevent technology-
processes from happening, while cool media encourage technological 
processes. 
  
                         
31 See (McLuhan, 1964). 
Extended Artificial Memory 
[36] 
2.3.2  ACTUATOR-TRIGGERED VERSUS SUBSTITUTOR-TRIGGERED TECHNOLOGY 
First, fully occupying a sense uses to mean occupying a sense for some 
time. Pausing is not an option for a hot medium. An actuator-triggered 
technology-process cannot (or, at most, only attentionally) influence a 
constant stream of information. One hallmark of a hot medium is its 
stimulus rigidness (i.e., non-manipulability). Rigidness, however, is not 
an exclusive feature of hot media. Cool media, too, can be rigid (and still 
demand involvement). Their attentive structuring tends to have more degrees 
of freedom. Rigidness and hot media are essentially correlated. It is 
important to notice that rigidness does not categorically exclude a 
content-technological substitution process. If one is interested to know 
the weather forecast, weather forecasts on radio and on television 32  are 
valid options. An advanced technology process might involve selecting the 
right time and the right radio station or television channel, and paying 
attention to the program at the right moment. However, even if accidentally 
listening to the radio or watching television when the weather forecasts 
are broadcasted, a substitutor-triggered content-technology process (paying 
attention to the hot medium to get to know tomorrow’s weather) may start, 
in which a specific content-expectation (the actuation process) is set up 
on the fly and hopefully met by the rigid broadcasting (the substitution 
process). In other words, hot media are prone to substitutor-triggered 
content-technology processes; they are, in that sense, passive technology, 
at least if they were to be perceived as technological and not just as 
experiential. 
  
                         
32 McLuhan saw TV as a cool medium. Here, it is treated as a hot medium, though, which the 
author thinks to be a more appropriate characterization for television nowadays, 
considering, on one hand, the development of far cooler modern information media, and, on 
the other hand, the incorporation of more and more (hot) movie theatre productions into 
television broadcasting. 
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2.3.3  FRAGMENTATION OF CLASSIC HOT MEDIA 
A special case is presented by interactive (new) hot media. Being able to 
see an asynchronous stream of the weather forecast at any time offers a 
simple actuator-triggered technology for experiencing classic hot media. 
The hot medium will remain rigid. Its duration will shorten considerably, 
though. It will be clipped, clipped, at best, to match an anticipated 
information stage or process of actuation. This can be seen, for example, 
in the fragmentation or Youtube-ization of television broadcasts in digital 
media. Such fragmentation does not automatically imply a clear-cut content 
focus by necessity. This is due to traditional hot media still being mass 
media. That is, their content is limited to a few messages (one per 
channel). Different people (representing different expectations) have to 
conform their expectations to the general content available. Information of 
interest (matching expectation) tends to overlap with information of no 
interest (not matching expectation). The relate-ability of the fragmented 
content, as high as it may be, cannot disguise its generally imperfect 
technological effectiveness. For the general actuator’s expectation (an 
anticipatory actuator information stage) will never be perfectly reflected 
and fully completed in the information state of the substitution process. 
To give an example, I want to point the reader to my frequent failure to 
get to know the weather forecast for Cologne, my hometown, when watching 
the national forecast. It does not change anything whether I watch it 
during live broadcasting of the evening news, or whether I decide to pick 
the short forecast section for asynchronous streaming anytime afterwards.  
2.3.4  ATTENTION-GRABBING MEDIA 
Classic hot mass media cannot fundamentally change to arrange for freely 
actuator-trigged technologies. The reason is that hot media monopolize the 
involved sense modalities, effectively paralyzing their non-perceptual 
reproductive potential. The two main modalities of human perception are 
sense of vision and sense of hearing, which were dominant during the time 
when our ancestors used to live in trees. Hot media replace a natural 
environment with an artificial environment, but not just any artificial 
environment. Hot media grab attention! The hot environment is one that 
changes constantly. A movie without or with little change, for example, 
offers an ambivalent, irritating experience.33 During a movie performance, 
one is not prepared to actively (inwardly reproductively) think or act, 
because watching a movie is actually as if acting all the time, moving 
around, being addressed etc. The rigidness of hot media becomes effective 
only to the extent that it entails a quality of as-if-acting. Outer 
                         
33  The author has vivid recollections of some of Andy Warhol’s early experimental movies 
shown in the movie theatre of the Museum Ludwig in Cologne. In one of these films, one 
would see somebody very, very slowly smoking a cigar, which many people could not stand. 
They had to leave the theatre after some time, but not before first showing strong emotions 
of all kinds.  
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attention prevails over inner attention. Technological correspondence 
structures cannot (or, at least, not without difficulty) be initiated and 
sustained within a rigidly prescribed passive attention structure.  
2.3.5  INTERACTIVE HOT MEDIA 
The pseudo-activity of hot media culminates in the virtual reality of 
computer games. A computer game has the attention-grabbing qualities of a 
movie. Well, to some extent, it can even be said to be a movie, only an 
unusual one. In computer games, the rigidness of the experience is not down 
to any particular sequence of information. The information evolves 
depending on the steps taken by the player. The rigidness of the computer 
game can also not be in any as-if-acting quality, as the player is indeed 
acting. Still, the computer game grabs the player’s attention to the degree 
it would be grabbed by a movie (or even more so). In computer games, the 
as-if-acting of the film turns into an acting-as-if. The player is forced 
to constantly act within the game and attend to it as if the player were a 
figure of the game (that is without being herself). In most games, there is 
a limited set of very short and simple technological processes the player 
can engage in. They are all more or less directly triggered by the virtual 
environment of the game. They are, therefore, for the most part, 
substitutor-triggered, not actuator-triggered. Furthermore, any technology-
process occurring is limited, in structure and effect, to the givens of the 
endemic world of the game. Any technology process has to follow the rules 
of the game. Computer games add the illusion of acting to the illusion of 
action. Instead of acting freely, the gamer’s actions follow the game’s 
actions. Instead of pursuing a goal, the gamer is literally pursued by 
goals, engaging her in a never-ending stream of attention-grabbing acts. 
The gamer is instructed (and motivated) to follow the game. The gamer thus 
meets the demands of the game-maker. The gamer appears, so to speak, as an 
active substitutor more than a passive actuator. Games and gamification of 
life are manipulations of gamers and their lives.  
2.3.6  INTERACTIVE-MEDIA TECHNOLOGY 
In this thesis, we do not deal with hot (manipulative) content technology, 
though. My focus is on cool (manipulable) media tools, which allow 
actuation processes to occur and evolve. By now, the reader will understand 
that it is not sufficient to attribute the coolness of a medium to it being 
interactive or non-rigid. So-called interactive technologies are really a 
hodgepodge. Observing the progression of the Internet, which is about to 
become or has already turned into the dominant electronic medium (replacing 
TV), it is not difficult to see that there is a huge effort under way to 
make the interactive, manipulable Web a manipulative Web. The most 
prominent gaming platform right now is Facebook; their game plot is their 
users’ social life, skillfully substituting real, directed social 
interaction with virtual, unspecific social actions such as liking and 
Extended Artificial Memory 
[39] 
posting. The Facebook wall is but a movie that is algorithmically optimized 
to serve a single purpose: holding attention for as long as possible to 
place advertisements. To be fair, Facebook, like all the other big 
advertising Internet-players, is really a mixed bag. However, the 
predominance of manipulative technologies over manipulable technologies and 
the growing proportion of the former cannot be overlooked.  
2.3.7  INFORMATION-MEDIA TECHNOLOGY 
So far, I have used the term information technology as it is commonly used, 
to denote digital software and network systems. Information is a term for 
both an abstract thing (information) and a process (being informed). 
Content technology here has been clearly defined as a technological double 
process stimulating the actuator’s senses in a pre-structured, expectant 
manner. The cognitive valence of information technology, in contrast, is 
unclear. It may refer to the fact that making or usage of information 
technology somehow involves information (the process). Alternatively, 
information technology may denote systems that hold information (the thing) 
and inform other systems or users (the process, again). The development of 
the provisional cognitive-technological model has already helped us to see 
how problematic and misguiding these conceptions of technology are. Not all 
information technology can reasonably be counted as technology at all. In 
the cognitive-technological model [see Figure 1], the process of 
information is reflected in the in/out swimlanes. Information states are 
reached by different information processes: parameter inputs, previous 
states, and memory (as mentioned, but not yet explained). So far, the exact 
mechanisms are left unclear. From the model, however, we learn that 
substitution information states must correspond with the actuators 
information stages and must be relatable. In this sense, there cannot be an 
information technology holding information independent of any actuator. 34 
It must be doubted that there is a world of abstract information (things) 
independent of cognition. The substituational information states are 
specific to the actuator’s information stages.  
Terry Winograd and Fernando Flores (Winograd & Flores, 1986) have pointed 
into a similar direction in their semi-philosophical book on Understanding 
Computers and Cognition, discussing the importance of Heidegger’s famous 
concepts of thrownness [Geworfenheit] and being ready-to-hand 
[Zuhandensein] for the design of information technology. They note that 
Heidegger insisted on that it is meaningless to talk about the existence of 
objects and their properties in the absence of concernful activity. Every 
representation has to be seen as an interpretation. As observers, we may 
talk about the hammer and reflect on its properties, but for the person 
                         
34  This is actually a very bold argument, sharply contrasting, for example, with model-
theoretical ideas in logics trying to establish a dyadic link between models and reality, 
or Karl Poppers idea of an independent World 3, etc. 
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engaged in the thrownness of unhampered hammering, it does not exist as an 
entity35. Summing up Heidegger’s concepts, Winograd and Flores remind us of 
a fundamental restriction of ontology: The structure of objects (as 
represented in and by technology in the classic sense) derives from their 
specific uses (actuation processes). They are, thus, not simply within the 
objects. In this, we disclose the reason why the cognitive-technological 
model states a clear primacy of actuation over substitution, expressed in a 
structure defining correspondence in terms of actuator-related specificity. 
Unfortunately, these philosophical ideas are not widely known in IT, and 
this, in turn, may explain why the conception and optimization of 
information technology as holding static information (thing) continues to 
misdirect the development of content-oriented information technology.  
Winograd and Flores also adopted Heidegger’s idea that thrownness of a 
person within language is an essential feature of language activity. 36 
Tentatively applying this idea to the cognitive-technological model, we may 
say that perceiving (and perhaps even generating) language is a 
technological process wherein language appears as an integral corresponding 
information structure. Although, at first glance, this might seem strange, 
considering the immutability of language expressions, spoken and written 
language are obviously initiating and parameterizing a somehow 
corresponding cognitive process. One has to read written language and to 
listen to spoken language. Reading is more than a unidirectional 
transformation of letters into spoken words. There are, for example, 
different ways of reading (or expressing) the phrase human problem solving. 
                         
35  Here Winograd and Flores are obviously referring to a passage in Heidegger’s Sein und 
Zeit:  
Der je auf das Zeug zugeschnittene Umgang, darin es sich einzig genuin in 
seinem Sinn zeigen kann, z.B. das Hämmern mit dem Hammer, erfaßt weder 
dieses Seiende thematisch als vorkommendes Ding, noch weiß etwa das 
Gebrauchen um die Zeugstruktur als solche. […] In solchem gebrauchenden 
Umgang unterstellt sich das Besorgen dem für das jeweilige Zeug konstitute 
Um-zu; je weniger das Hammerding nur begafft wird, je zugreifender es 
gebraucht wird, um so ursprünglicher wird das Verhältnis zu ihm, um so 
unverhüllter begegnet es als das, was es ist, als Zeug. […] die Seinsart 
von Zeug, in der es sich von sich selbst her offenbart, nennen wir die 
Zuhandenheit. […] Das schärfste Nur-noch-hinsehen auf das so und so 
beschaffene 'Aussehen' von Dingen vermag Zuhandenes nicht zu entdecken. 
Der nur theoretisch hinsehende Blick auf Dinge entbehrt des Verstehens von 
Zuhandenheit. […] Der Umgang mit Zeug unterstellt sich der 
Verweisungsmannigfaltigkeit des 'Um-zu'.  
(Heidegger, 2006, S. 93) 
36 E.g. (Heidegger, 2006, S. 80):  
Zeichen ist nicht ein Ding, das zu einem anderen Ding in zeigender 
Beziehung steht, sondern ein Zeug, das ein Zeugganzes ausdrücklich in die 
Umsicht hebt […]  
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One could read it as human – problem solving or human problem – solving or 
even as human – problem – solving or, simply, human problem solving.  
The correspondence structure of written language is variable, depending on 
the actuator’s actuation process. This is not only to say that one gets to 
understand these phrase variants in different ways, but also that one 
actually reads (or expresses) them differently, fixating and perceiving 
different sub-chunks as visual wholes [Gestalten]. I would go as far as to 
maintain that one is able to hear different word chunks listening to the 
same (static) audio recording, it does not matter whether we direct visual 
or auditory attention. The actuator’s correspondence structure of perceived 
language is not just a matter of word chunking. Person A might understand 
human - problem solving in the same way, as person B understands human 
problem solving. Person A needs to combine two separate sign-wholes in 
order to derive at the concept/idea of human problem solving which is 
available to person B right away, by a single three word phrase. The 
meaning correspondence of expressed language is thus not fully defined by 
its composition (nor by its syntax), even if one postulated a somehow 
shared/agreed upon, defined or feature-like word meaning of individual 
words and phrases (a general lexicon).37  
Heidegger noted that signs are not to be understood as something that is 
dyadically related to something else by pointing to it [ein Ding, das zu 
einem anderen Ding in zeigender Beziehung steht] 38. Even by explicating / 
marking the structure in which spoken and written language are to be 
understood, ambiguity, or, in other words, differing actuation processes, 
will occur. Any particular sign becomes literally meaningless if serving as 
part of a wholeness of signs (a chunk), which generates a meaning-Gestalt 
[Bedeutungsgestalt] or concept of its own, as it were. This, it appears, is 
difficult to accept for many people, as it would mean that expressed 
language does not simply have a meaning (as, for example, assumed in 
Tarski-dyads 39  or everyday psychology and school wisdom). There is no 
meaning of language expressions beyond what is realized in cognitive-
technological processes. And there is a further peculiarity of language 
                         
37 In our example, person A and person B might share the same basic vocabulary (containing 
human and problem solving and even human problem solving as a special concept). Still, 
person A might read the phrase human problem solving as human - problem solving deriving at 
the meaning of human problem solving, or person A might read human – problem solving, not 
deriving at the special combined meaning (particular concept) of human problem solving.   
38 In zeigender Beziehung is, of course, a relation of thirdness. It is meant as a dyadic 
relation here, though. 
39  A term I learnt from John Sowa, who used it in his noteworthy contributions to the 
Ontolog Community Forum news group -  ontolog.cim3.net (accessed on 14.08.2012). He uses 
the term Tarski dyad to stress that Tarski, Quine, and many other logicians ignored the top 
of the [semiotic] triangle and focused on the dyadic link between the sign and object. 
Tarski, therefore, had a clear criterion for truth, but no recognition of intention (what 
somebody intends something to mean). Alfred Tarski’s dyads are contrasted by Sowa with 
Ferdinand de Saussure's dyads that unite not a thing and a name, but a concept and a sound-
image, where the latter is not the material sound, a purely physical thing, but the 
psychological imprint of the sound, the impression that it makes on our senses. 
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that I want to point the reader to: The technological double process of 
language perception turns out to be a double technological double process 
in human language communication. Because the production of language 
involves an actuation process, just as the perception of language does. 
Both language production and language understanding are actuator-led 
processes. The basic substitution process involved in simple language 
expressions aims at expressivity as such. That is, enacting meaning by 
signs that substitute this meaning in a language-perceiving 
substitutor(-actuator). A higher-order substitution process, speech acts, 
if you will, stem from one actuator process developing a determination to 
act on behalf of a language-expressing actuator or at least to somehow 
conform and agree to this actuator’s ideas, beyond merely mimicking the 
expressed meaning.  
Karl Bühler, in his famous triad of linguistic functions 40, distinguishes 
between three functions of (any human sign) language. The expressive 
function [Ausdrucksfunktion der Sprache] is unconscious and non-intentional 
(on the side of the sign-bearer or sign-expresser). In it, a sign is a mere 
symptom (such as, e.g., hereditary facial expressions or basic emotional 
and onomatopoeic vocal utterances). Language of this type is not yet 
language in the sense of a cognitive-technological double process, but much 
rather a mere precursor and constitutive element of more advanced 
languages. The descriptive function of language [Darstellungsfunktion der 
Sprache] matches the double cognitive-technological double process of 
language (sign) expression and perception. Bühler’s third function, the 
announcement function of language [Appellfunktion/Kundgabefunktion der 
Sprache], extends a language sign to signal an intention toward a language 
recipient. It matches a higher-order cognitive-psychological process, in as 
much as it strives to institute an intention or trigger an action in the 
substitutor(-actuator). Such intentions and actions, however, cannot be 
said to be part of the meaning of any language sign, they are, much rather, 
part and parcel of an overarching intentionality, or, higher-order 
actuation scheme, destined to induce specific information states on the 
part of the substitutor (process). 
  
                         
40  See (Bühler, Sprachtheorie: Die Darstellungsfunktion der Sprache., 1999), originally 
published in 1934. 
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2.4 LANGUAGE-CONTENT TECHNOLOGY 
2.4.1  SPEECH ACTS41  
The announcement function of language, which can be tracked back to Adolf 
Reinach, Karl Bühler, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Edmund Husserl, was further 
elaborated and popularized by John Austin42 and his pupil John Searle43 in 
their speech act 44  philosophy. Speech acts are classified into different 
acts. For example: The locutionary act (what we, in fact, say) reflects the 
literal (lexical) meaning of what we say. It is, however, very doubtful 
that any language utterance can be explained by lexical definitions. 
Lexical definitions contain themselves expressions that, in turn, would 
have to be explained by further lexical definitions. Language signs, 
however, form a close co-referential network45 that has never been and can 
never be reduced to isolated basic terms of meanings ridden of 
interpretation and interdependence. In so far, in this respect, speech act 
philosophy is misdirecting us. The illocutionary speech act (what one 
intends to say or do by saying it) contrasts with the locutionary speech 
act. It resembles the actuator’s actual, particular actuation scheme. The 
illocutionary act is therefore said to fall within the area of pragmatics, 
not just semantics (as the locutionary act allegedly does). The 
                         
41 This passage goes back to (Ludwig, Speech Acts and Communication. Presentation given at 
the Digital Enterprise Research Institute, Galway, Ireland., 2005).  
42 See (Austin, 1962). 
43 See, for example, (Searle, 1975) 
44 A short definition of speech act, based on Searle, is provided in (Krämer, 2001, S. 60): 
Ein Sprechakt ist die kleinste Einheit menschlicher Kommunikation, mit 
welcher der Sprecher gegenüber einem Hörer eine Handlung ausübt. Er 
besteht aus zwei Komponenten, aus propositionalem Gehalt und 
illokutionärer Funktion. Unter 'propositionalem Gehalt' versteht Searle 
Aspekte von Referenz und Prädikation, die 'illokutionäre Funktion' bezieht 
sich auf die Rolle, auf das, was ein Sprecher mit der Äußerung eines 
Satzes in einer bestimmten Situation zu tun beabsichtigt, ob er also eine 
Feststellung, einen Befehl, eine Frage oder ein Versprechen äußert. […] 
wenn der propositionale Gehalt zusammenfassend mit '(P)', die 
illokutionäre Funktion mit 'F' notiert wird, entsteht die Standardform 
eines Sprechaktes: 'F(P)'. 
45  The idea of words forming a word field [Wortfeld] covering an idea field [Ideenfeld] 
originated with Jost Trier (Trier, 1931). Trier stressed the fundamental interdependencies 
of word meanings [Prinzip der Wechselbestimmtheit der Wörter des Wortfeldes]:  
Und daß wir genau wissen, was mit ihm [dem Wort] gemeint ist, das liegt 
gerade an diesem Sichabheben von den Nachbarn und diesem Sicheinordnen in 
die Ganzheit der den Begriffsbezirk überlagernden Wortdecke, des 
lückenlosesn Zeichenmantels. Die Worte im Feld stehen in gegenseitiger 
Abhängigkeit voneinander. Vom Gefüge des Ganzen her empfängt das 
Einzelwort seine inhaltliche begriffliche Bestimmtheit." 
(Trier, 1931, S. 2) 
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illocutionary act resembles the (wider, not only language-expressive) 
actuation-process in our cognitive-technological model. The perlocutionary 
act (what one thinks one does by saying something), in our model, would 
refer to higher-order actuator-anticipated information states referring to, 
or, better, hopefully corresponding to substitution-process stages. In 
speech act philosophy, illocutionary acts have been further classified 
depending on their illocutionary force. Assertive speech acts, for example, 
tell about the world (e.g. Peter is tall.). Commisive speech acts adapt the 
world by deeds (e.g. I invite you to come!). Declarative speech acts adapt 
the word by speech (e.g. I pronounce you as man and wife!). Expressive 
speech acts show one’s inner feelings (e.g. I feel good!). Directive speech 
acts let others adapt the world (e.g. Please, answer the phone!). If the 
auditor (substitutor) understands the speaker’s (actuator’s) intended 
illocutionary point (illocutionary force) in its relation to the 
propositional content, one can be said to have communicated, as speech act 
philosophy puts it. The problem with language expressions (propositional 
content) is that illocutionary indicators (or parameters) are often missing 
in them, especially so in language artifacts such as written or recorded 
spoken language. The intended meaning and purpose is often only to be 
understood by additional situational, cultural, and habitual knowledge, or 
knowledge about the speaker/writer. The (unconvincing to me) indicative 
(locutionary) statement in speech act philosophy, as compared to an 
intentional (illocutionary) statement, can perhaps only be understood as an 
illocutionary statement that was stripped off of most of its illocutionary 
indicators. In philosophical examples, this tends to be achieved by an 
explicit, imperative illocutionary force forcing the reader to leave out 
the background information given to illustrate the difference between the 
illocutionary and the locutionary stance of an example. The differentiation 
between locutionary and illocutionary acts is rooted in a false dualism, it 
seems. Speech acts are also misleading in another sense: They perceive 
communication as a single act. In the cognitive-technological model, on the 
other hand, any speech act is to be understood as a double technological 
double process. The difference becomes clearer when we imagine that the 
listener can have an agenda of her own, being an actuator with her own 
intentional/anticipatory actuation scheme. Communication does not 
necessarily and perhaps not even often depend on the intention 
(illocutionary point) of the speaker. The speaker’s illocutionary act may 
fail, while the listener’s illocutionary act-uation may succeed. And even 
if the auditor understands the intended illocutionary point, can one really 
be said to have communicated just because the other understood what one 
meant? In terms of correspondence structure, this would mean to cut an 
anticipatory (actuation-process) whole [Erwartungsgestalt] into two 
purportedly unrelated pieces: first, some proposition-related substitution 
stages and, second, any intended effects and reactions. There is another, 
as it were, basic phenomenological misunderstanding in this conception of 
communication. I have elucidated before that the definition of a term’s 
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meaning is something else than the term’s meaning. That is to say, these 
are different cognitive-technological processes. Heidegger’s terminology 
[Zuhandensein, Zeugganzes] emphasizes this. Besides, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s 
late philosophy of language points into the same direction. Now, I would 
claim that the auditor’s actuation processes are fundamentally different 
(in terms of higher-order as well as lower-order correspondence) in the two 
cases of, first, merely understanding the illocutionary point and, second, 
sharing the illocutionary point. If the auditor really were to understand 
the speaker’s illocutionary point, there must be a resisting or contrary 
intention (anticipation) scheme in operation, which would not only 
structure the auditors own (lower-order) actuation-process of language 
perception, but also affect the higher-order correspondence structure of 
the interaction between speaker and hearer. Therefore, I think, it is not 
viable to entertain the idea of a divisibility of the understanding of an 
illocutionary act into an understanding with and the same understanding 
without sharing of the illocutionary point. 
Despite these problems, speech act philosophy represents an interesting and 
valuable contribution to the research on language communication. It clearly 
demonstrates pitfalls and shortcomings of an un-pragmatic, restricted 
conception of language and language meaning: the naive view that takes 
language as conveying information about an objective reality. […] the basis 
for the meaning of words and sentences is not ultimately definable in terms 
of an objective external world (Winograd & Flores, 1986, S. 61). 
Unfortunately, the philosophical quest for differentiating illocutionary 
factors never translated into a quest for software supporting communication 
formalizing and explicating these factors in a systematic way. 46 
Impoverished, de-intentionalized language artifacts, devoid of emotional 
valences, however, carry many risks to human language-based interaction and 
disguise the eusocial origin and function of language-technology: 
The rationalistic tradition takes language as a 
representation - a carrier of information - and conceals its 
central social role. To be a human is to be the kind of 
being that generates commitments, through speaking and 
listening. Without our ability to create and accept (or 
decline) commitments we are acting in a less than fully 
human way, and we are not fully using language. 
(Winograd & Flores, 1986, S. 76) 
If language production is embedded into speech acts (as a form of 
cognitive-technological process), language artifacts and language 
                         
46 There is a single notable exception I know of, though: Fernando Flores founded a software 
company, Action Technologies Inc., which develops Business Process Management software 
(ActionWorkflow™) that improves communication processes by enabling the formal expression 
of intentions in interaction patterns of predefined communication types.   
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reproductions must be mimicking speech acts. If we want to understand the 
pros and cons of language-content technology, we must understand more about 
language and its use. Although this thesis is not the right place to delve 
into the mysteries of language, I will still try to give an idea of the 
importance of some of the characteristics of language to our theoretical 
endeavor. 
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2.4.2  ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE (A HISTORICAL EXCURSION) 
There are two basic ways of viewing language originating: first, as 
developing gradually and, second, as emerging abruptly. The latter way, 
presupposing a sudden huge jump in evolution, appears to be very unlikely, 
even though it is still promulgated (in ever weaker forms, though) by the 
prominent researcher Noam Chomsky (and his disciples) in the idea of a 
language module. George Mandler, in his history of modern experimental 
psychology (Mandler, 2007, S. 211), reminds us that this is an old 
question. In 1900, Wilhelm Wundt, the father of institutional psychology, 
had already (splendidly) characterized the abrupt stance as a miracle 
theory [Wundertheorie] in the volume on language of his Völkerpsychologie 
(ethnological psychology), noting:  
[…] that 'language presumably developed out of the simpler 
forms of expressive movements.' And in his introductory 
text, Wundt comments on the power of the naturally occurring 
sign language of deaf and mute children, who, when raised 
without any deliberate instruction, communicate by means of 
'a natural development of gestural speech, which combines 
meaningful expressive movement.' 
When considering the origin of language, it seems to be important to keep 
in mind that humans did not only develop a single language. There is a 
great variety of human languages, characterized by an astonishing huge 
number of different traits in different constellations. 47  Linguists have 
found many syntacto-structural ways of grouping languages. For an overview 
of syntactic traits of known languages usable for this purpose, see the 
World Atlas of Language Structures (Dryer & Haspelmath, 2011). The richness 
and variance of syntactic features of human languages mark them clearly as 
cultural achievements. Thus, language structures (grammars) are historic, 
cultural developments! Against the backdrop of the apparent language 
culture, the idea of a universal grammar seems absurd. The richness and 
variety of syntactic language features is very unlikely to be matched by a 
                         
47 See Daniel Leonard Everett’s autobiographical notes (Everett, 2010) on the Pirahã people 
of Amazonia for a vivid example of a language (and culture) that seems to be at odds with 
many expectations on language taken for granted. The Pirahã-language is a zero-marking 
language (i.e., it does not use any syntactical markers at all) following the immediacy of 
experience principle, shortly summarized, e.g., in (Pavey, 2010, S. 323): 
The Pirahã (Mura, Brazil) language does not have perfect (relative) tenses 
[…]. All its tenses are absolute, which means the reference time is always 
the same as the time of speech. Everett makes the strong (and not 
uncontroversial) claim that this is because the culture of the Pirahã 
people actually constrains the structures of their grammar: in other 
words, they do not have relative tenses because they live within the time 
and space of their immediate environment, and relative tenses require one 
to metaphorically place oneself outside that world of immediate 
experience. 
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great variety of syntax-specific inherited cognitive capacities or programs 
(to be turned on and off as culturally needed). With regard to 
language(-structure), it is likely that in it one is encountering the 
results of many non-language-specific, general cognitive capacities in 
conjunction with probably just a small number of specialized, possibly 
language-universal cognitive operations. Wilson links language development 
and development of thinking, following a path paved by cognitive 
archeology: 
[…] by new methods of analysis and experimentation, 
researchers have been able to conclude this much: abstract 
thought and syntactical language emerged no later than 
70,000 years ago. The key to this conclusion lies in the 
existence of certain artifacts, and in deductions of the 
mental process required to manufacture the artifacts. Of 
special importance in the mode of reasoning is the hafting 
of stone points onto the ends of spears. The practice was 
begun as long as 200,000 years ago by both the Neanderthal 
people of Europe and early Homo sapiens of Africa. This in 
itself was a significant technological invention, yet still 
it tells us little about reasoning and communication. By 
70,000 years ago, however, a major new advance had been 
achieved by Homo sapiens which, when recently analyzed, shed 
light on cognitive evolution. Hafting, the study concluded, 
had become far more sophisticated. A series of steps was 
used to build spears […] The artisans needed to understand 
the properties of their ingredients (e.g. cohesiveness), to 
be able to judge the effects of temperature, to be able to 
switch attention back and forth between separate rapidly 
changing variables, and to be flexible enough to adjust to 
the variability inherent in naturally occurring ingredients. 
(Wilson, 2012, S. 217-218) 
The complexities of language seem to be closely interlinked with the 
complexities of action and action-related thought. Well, it is difficult to 
imagine that early language expressions could have denoted and structured 
complex meaning beyond the cognitive capacity of imagining and remembering 
complex actions and events:  
A conscious mind able to generate abstractions and piece 
them together in a complex scenario might, it seems, also 
generate a syntactical language, with sequences of subject, 
verb, and object. 
(Wilson, 2012, S. 218) 
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The propositional structure (in whatever cultural order) is the earmark of 
a cognitive and memory event structure, which both have to precede it. 
Wilson advances additional arguments based on evolutionary theory: 
The key properties of the mind guiding language evolution 
almost certainly appeared before the origin of language 
itself. Their wellsprings are thought to be in the earlier, 
more fundamental architecture of cognition. […] The 
multiplicity of pathways in the evolution of elementary 
syntax suggests that few if any genetic rules guide the 
learning of language by individual human beings. The 
probably reason has been revealed in recent mathematical 
models of gene-culture evolution constructed by Nick Chater 
and his follow cognitive scientists. It is simply that the 
rapidly changing environment of speech does not provide a 
stable environment for natural selection. Language varies 
too swiftly across generations and from one culture to the 
next for such evolution to occur. As a consequence, there is 
little reason to expect that the arbitrary properties of 
language including the abstract syntactic principles of 
phrase structures and gene marking, have been built into a 
special 'language module' of the brain by evolution. 'The 
genetic basis of human language acquisition,' the 
researchers conclude, 'did not coevolve with language, but 
primarily predates the emergence of language. As suggested 
by Darwin, the fit between language and its underlying 
mechanisms arose because language has evolved to fit the 
human brain, rather than the reverse.' 
(Wilson, 2012, S. 234-235) 
Now, this re-embedding of language grammar into the general framework of 
cognitive competencies is important, because the practical effect of 
proclaiming and sticking to a universal grammar is the exclusion of 
psychological theorizing and psychological-empirical research from language 
research, ignoring findings of developmental psychology48, of psychology of 
thinking, and of psychology of memory etc. Within the cognitive-
technological model, in contrast, language structure is but another group 
of types of anticipatory schemes of actuation processes, stressing the 
technological (anticipatory, substituting or extending) character of 
language use and its basis in general memory structures that are 
established by general mechanisms of memory development. In a nutshell, in 
this thesis, I theorize that language is technology and that information 
                         
48 Assuming a universal grammar module was certainly not helpful in disclosing the obviously 
staggered learning of syntax during the child’s language development process. For more 
information on this, see, e.g., (Tomasello , Die kulturelle Entwicklung des menschlichen 
Denkens: Zur Evolution der Kognition, 2006). 
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technology is made up of (and ought to be treated as) impoverished 
artifacts of language expression.   
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2.4.3  SIGNS AND SYMBOLS 
The first human artificial signs we know of are visual signs, namely stone 
and bone carvings, and cave paintings. In his book about art as a global 
language, the ethologist and anthropologist Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt 
comments on the surprising abstractness of the first artifacts of art:  
Wir halten gerne jede Abstraktion für das Schwierigere, weil 
ein Kürzel unserer Meinung nach die Kenntnis eines Ganzen 
voraussetz. Dem ist aber nicht durchwegs so. 
(Eibl-Eibesfeldt & Sütterlin, 2007, S. 48) 
The first pieces of art we know of are outline drawings. This is not an 
expression of a lack of artistic skills, though. According to Eibl-
Eibesfeldt, what created the first signs might have been the joy to create 
something that leaves traces behind. These traces are, at least for 
oneself, loaded with meaning. This can still be observed in child behavior 
today. Hence, the first artistic images do not appear to have been social-
communicative, realistic depictions; they must have been rather personal in 
nature, rather abstract, simple contours that must have provoked vivid 
recollections in order to become attractive. These earliest artifacts are 
based on a universal, biologically anchored human capacity for Gestalt-
perception. This is the reason why they could and would turn into 
communicative signs. Pointing movements (which can even be found in great 
apes) very probably predate communicative visual signs. Artificial visual 
signs, however, are different, as they are icons, actually (and somehow 
magically) bringing about what they point toward and what itself is not 
present in any real way. In this respect, they surpass natural visual 
traces such as an animal’s paw prints, which represent a mere extension of 
the animal in time and space, not forming an independent symbol of it. The 
importance of visual art lies in its very independence from the presence of 
what was depicted, not just because of evoking independent memories of 
distant things, but also because of serving as a tool for these things to 
be imagined, named, and discussed in their absence. Language symbols are 
powerful because of the ease and quickness with which they can be created 
and communicated, but they must be learnt first, and learning symbols can 
best take place in the presence of what they are destined to symbolize. 
Therefore, language development in children, cultural development of 
language, and cultural development by language all benefit from visual art. 
Visual art is a direct precursor of script, and a catalyzer of language 
development. Is there an equivalent to the role of Gestalt-perception in 
the evolution of (vocal) language symbols? Are early language signs 
abstractions similar to those of visual art? Are they memory-abstractions 
of natural interjections such as cries of pain or aggression? And if so, 
would not language emotions have to be based on a human capacity to feel 
with others? The communicative purposefulness, the intentionality of 
language symbols is deeply rooted in their origin as vocal co-signs of 
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personal and social emotional conditions. The basic conviction of being 
able to create the intended (self-felt) emotional condition in the other 
must be at the core of each speech act. For there to be more and more 
specific language symbols, for language to open a window to the world of 
memories irrespective of the actual presence of things, fetish objects and 
depictions had to be created and cherished first. Things iconized are easy 
to symbolize, and icons symbolized come to symbolize the symbols of what 
they iconize, opening themselves up to further abstraction for easier 
reproduction. The transition from signal to symbol is the transition from 
directing outer attention to directing inner attention; it is the 
transition from perceiving and recognizing to reproducing and remembering. 
Icons and language expressions, as things of the world, are sign-tools, 
tools that directly affect their creator as well as indirectly affecting 
any other recipient. In the cognitive-technological model, the perception 
of these tools represents a substitution-process. At the moment of their 
creation, on the side of the creator(-actuator), the non-specificity of the 
resulting correspondence structure is defined by the sign-tools’ reverse 
capacity of evoking memories that differ from the information states that, 
in the first place, triggered the expressions of the respective signs. 
Later, on the side of other recipients, the sign-tools establish a 
substitution process corresponding with an actuation process that is likely 
to be predominantly influenced by an ongoing process of anticipating spoken 
language (in reading or listening) and, hence, its meaning (in 
interpreting). In this case, the specificity of technological 
correspondence is based on forward-directed anticipation-comparisons, and 
not, as in the case of self-reception, on backward-directed comparisons 
(regarding the information states during the original language expression). 
I want to mention that self-reception benefits from objectified signs 
(images or written language), as persistent signs extend the phase in which 
self-reflection can take place [memory buffer function]. But even 
unexpressed, merely conscious signs (inner language and imagination) can 
have the same effects as expressed sign-tools. Signs are tools, 
nonetheless. The term communication is perhaps best to be reserved for the 
(higher-order) technological processes of anticipatory interaction, as, for 
example, in turn-taking conversations or complex, sign-tools-involving 
collective behaviors such as those signified in Wittgensteinian language 
games. These real human interactions are likely to comprise far more 
percepts than sign-tools only, and to involve further-reaching 
anticipations, framing and influencing those narrower and short-lived 
anticipations typically evoked by sign-tools. 
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2.4.4  WRITTEN LANGUAGE 
I cannot retell the fascinating story of the invention of script here. A 
richly illustrated and up to date account of the history of script can be 
found in (Woods, Teeter, & Emberling, 2010). The oldest artifacts of script 
date back 5.500 to 5.300 years, in Mesopotamia. However, nobody knows for 
sure that script did not exist before that time in other places. Any old 
culture of settling could have developed it easily. I have already pointed 
out the script-like function of visual art, which dates back about at least 
40.000 years in Europe. The oldest artifacts of script suggest that script 
was used for trade and administrative purposes first. Ceremonial, religious 
script, however, is another possibility 49 of origin. From a psychological 
perspective, it is interesting to learn that it did not take long before 
the original pictographic scripts turned into semi-pictographic scripts. 
This happened in two different ways. First, by developing handwriting (on 
soft clay tablets, instead of engraving pictograms in stone or rocks, or 
using objects in a token system etc.), which caused a very rapid process of 
abstraction of logograms. Second, logographic script soon developed into a 
mixture of logographic script and syllabic characters and semantic and 
syntactical markers. To understand the difference between the (Old 
Egyptian) town Elephant and the animal elephant, one had to mark the 
difference, for example by bracketing logograms to form a perceptible word 
compound. Furthermore, many existing terms must have been difficult to 
visualize (and learn). Even though the earliest scribes used lists of 
logograms, sorted by topics, in order to be able to learn them and to look 
them up, names and abstract terms must have posed a great challenge to 
them. Fortunately, many names and abstract terms sounded like things that 
were easy to visualize. As soon as one started marking some logograms as 
syllabic, one had derived at an expressive hieroglyphic script. The use of 
logographic syllabic characters stimulated the development of new syllabic 
characters to fill in the gaps, sometimes reusing logograms associated with 
spoken words starting with the syllable needed, thus shortening their 
vocalization. Spoken language was very likely already highly complex at the 
time script systems developed. Agglutinative languages must have put 
pressure on scribes to reflect spoken syntactic markers in written 
language, bringing about fine-grained affix symbolization (entailing, e.g., 
syllabic onsets and offsets). At that moment of history, all it took for an 
alphabet to develop must have been an innovative polyglot (Greek) trader 
wanting to create an easy to learn script for his mother tongue, 
experienced in the relative ease of learning of syllographs as compared to 
logographs, and understanding the directly proportional relation between a 
character’s reusability and its phonetic granularity. Comparably isolated, 
monosyllabic languages (like Chinese), on the other hand, might never have 
felt the pressure to progress beyond the hieroglyphic or syllabic stage of 
                         
49 See, e.g., (Haarmann, 1998) on the Minoan script Linear A.  
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script development, leaving them with a difficult to learn but perfectly 
usable historic script. Maryanne Wolf stresses the cultural importance of 
the Greek alphabet: 
The classicist Eric Havelock and the psychologist David 
Olson assert the thought-provoking hypothesis that the 
efficiency of the Greek alphabet led to an unparalleled 
transformation in the actual content of thought. By 
liberating people from the effort required by an oral 
tradition, the alphabet's efficiency 'stimulated the 
thinking of novel thought.   
(Wolf, 2008, S. 65) 
The development and use of script was not always hailed as liberation, 
though. 
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2.4.5  PLATO’S CRITICISM OF WRITTEN LANGUAGE 
Well-known are Plato’s comments on the use of script in his Phaedrus 
dialogue. In a history reported by Socrates, the Egyptian God Theuth 
maintains that his invention of script had improved wisdom and memory. This 
leads Thamus, King of Egypt, to answer as follows:  
Those who acquire it will cease to exercise their memory and 
become forgetful; they will rely on writing to bring things 
to their remembrance by external signs instead of by their 
own internal resources. What you have discovered is a 
receipt for recollection, not for memory. And as for wisdom, 
your pupils will have the reputation for it without the 
reality: they will receive a quantity of information without 
proper instruction, and in consequence be thought very 
knowledgeable when they are for the most part quite 
ignorant. And because they are filled with the conceit of 
wisdom instead of real wisdom they will be a burden to 
society. 50 
From this, we learn that there must have been a practice of mnemonic 
techniques in the old, script-less Greek culture. Literate people started 
to compete with illiterate people. The objections to script are, as it 
seems to me, eternally true: Those who tend to remember from script will 
probably neglect to try to memorize, even if what is to be remembered were 
presented in a form that is easy to memorize. In some way, an inscription 
of script seems to replace an inscription of memory. This is not exactly 
true, though, as we have already learnt that the self-reflective process of 
language expression benefits from persistent script. Furthermore, a writer 
tends to sway to and fro between two processes: writing and reading. 
Writing down what comes to mind, and reading what has (just) been 
expressed. Each intermediate episode of reading will start an actuation 
process (interpretation) of its own, potentially evoking new memories and 
new ideas. For the writer, the written sign layer is an inspirational 
source of its own, helping to refocus, to redirect and enrich the writer’s 
original stream of thought. This, however, comes at a price. Inserting new 
phrases and sentences into a text after reading and rereading, destroys the 
concurrence of the original sequence of thoughts and the final sequence of 
text. A creatively written text is difficult to remember as a whole. It is, 
furthermore, difficult to remember what has been said where, because the 
episodes of writing do not match the sequence of propositions in the text. 
Of course, this is true only in general. There is always the possibility to 
note things in a strict regime, that is to note them exactly as remembered 
or forethought. In this case, however, there would be little difference 
                         
50 (Plato, 1973) 
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between classic recitation or speech-making and writing. From the writer’s 
perspective, writing, in the first place, is a creative and not a mnemonic 
technology. It is a creative technology that, on the surface and according 
to its organizational use, appears to be a mnemonic and communicative 
technology, because it creates an artifact that one might rely on to bring 
ideas to remembrance or to pass ideas on. The underlying value of writing, 
namely reflectively provoking new ideas, has been overlooked.  
Plato understood the limited mnemonic qualities of text when he claimed 
that writers would cease to exercise their memory and become forgetful, 
which implies that Plato could not have thought of writing or reading as 
ways of exercising memory. Whilst indeed new ideas are created by writing, 
these new ideas are to fade into obscurity if memory is not exercised 
properly. In order to bring these new ideas to mind, it will often become 
necessary to reread what one has written. The conflicting sequences of 
utterances of thought, on one hand, and written thoughts, on the other 
hand, can make it difficult to find an idea (of one’s own) in a text (of 
one’s own). One might think that a properly structured text would solve 
this problem. However, the normal structure of sequential text just splits 
the text into smaller text containers. This, at best, diminishes the 
problem to some degree, but the problem will not be resolved by it. No 
typical creative, sequential text has the qualities of a highly organized 
memory structure, no such text, therefore, could replace exercising memory. 
Writing a text and learning a text are not the same. Neither is learning by 
a text the same as learning a text. A text structure, to be memorable, has 
to have a meter, rhymes, in other words, it has to be epic and poetic. 
Instructions do not easily translate into poetry, though. Of course, it is 
easy to object to the idea that the text itself had to be memorable. One 
could argue that what matters is the content of the text, not the text 
itself. An extreme position would claim that written language is just a 
medium of some language-less content or meaning. The question is, of 
course, why in this case one would have to memorize anything at all. As 
soon as one has read the text, one knows its content (in as much as one 
understands the language), and as language was the means to memorize the 
content, it also is the means to express it. One just has to remember the 
content. Language would be but a learning and communication tool. This 
view, however, neglects a fundamental function of language technology: 
being able to remember and directing remembrance.  
When Plato fears that readers will rely on writing to bring things to their 
remembrance by external signs instead of by their own internal resources, 
the internal resources he speaks of are internal signs (in opposition to 
external signs), which are readily available in order to make available the 
things (content) to be remembered. In Plato’s view, thus, language is more 
than a mere tool to acquire and express the content of language. Plato 
understood that language is a memory tool, a memory access technology. 
Moreover, this technology is believed not to be available from written 
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texts, at least not at short notice. In Plato’s critique, we encounter the 
implicit differentiation of two types of knowing: knowing as in having 
known once and, in principle, being capable of being reminded of it by 
external (language) signs; and knowing as in having known once and being 
easily available by a sort of (internal) language organization system. 
Plato couples the latter type of knowing with wisdom, whereas the former 
type is said to generate the reputation for it without the reality. 51 
Another interesting point of Plato’s critique is his stress on personal 
instruction of pupils. When reading, pupils will receive a quantity of 
information without proper instruction. Whatever instruction means exactly, 
it somehow involves pupils who are being instructed. That is to say that we 
can assume it to mean a dialogue between teacher and pupil, as compared to 
a one-sided lecture (which could easily be written down). The presumed 
quality of an instruction is that it is individually constructive in the 
sense that the teacher recognizes what the particular pupil does know, does 
not know, or does know, but does not understand, teaching the pupil 
accordingly. The static written text does not know and has no means to get 
to know what the pupil reading it knows, and it cannot know it as to 
restructure, to decrease, or to increase itself in order to meet the 
specific demands of an individual instruction. This poses a fundamental 
problem to the use of any written information in education. Then again, 
Plato did clearly miss the value of libraries of historic texts collecting 
the world’s knowledge of all (literal) times. Texts containing information 
to an amount that no living teacher could teach anymore, that, perhaps, not 
even all the teachers of the world living at the same time could teach 
anymore or find pupils to study for. The information collected in these 
texts surpasses human memory capacities, or at least the time available to 
learn it. Plato’s quantities of information have turned into an information 
flood. It is not anymore only ignorant to believe to know the information 
one reads; it is as ignorant not reading the information one ought to read. 
However, not reading is an impossible to avoid factual ignorance, while 
non-instruction is a possible to avoid social ignorance. Written language 
remains silent:  
SOCRATES: The fact is, Phaedrus, that writing involves a 
similar disadvantage to painting. The productions of 
painting look like living beings, but if you ask them a 
question, they maintain a solemn silence. The same holds 
true of written words; you might suppose that they 
understand what they are saying, but if you ask them what 
they mean by anything, they simply return the same answer 
                         
51 In today’s world, as written knowledge has become abundant and it is easy to search for 
any information on the Internet, the illusion of wisdom by written language got its 21st 
century name: digital dementia. People suffering from digital dementia are less and less 
able to remember things by their own, and they are less and less likely to form memories. 
This is probably caused by a lack of memory elaboration. See, e.g., (Spitzer, 2012).  
Extended Artificial Memory 
[58] 
over and over again. Besides, once a thing is committed to 
writing it circulates equally among those who understand the 
subject and those who have no business with it; a writing 
cannot distinguish between suitable and unsuitable 
readers. And if it is ill-treated or unfairly abused it 
always needs its parent to come to its rescue […] 
(Plato, 1973) 
Text is decoupled from its author‘s thinking. It is distributed in a way 
that it will be read by readers who cannot understand it. Their questions, 
however, remain unanswered, or they think themselves knowledgeable, when 
they are not, because written texts cannot be questioned and they cannot 
question. These are insights that are as simple as lucid and as valid today 
as they have ever been. Today, however, in view of the enormous advances of 
information technology, we may finally attempt to tackle the problems 
associated with them.52  
It is interesting to learn that a later historic development can be added 
to the Platonic-Socratic critique of script. As long as script depended on 
handwritings, which were difficult to copy and thus as difficult to 
distribute (without losing the script and the knowledge in it), script 
often bore marks of structures aimed at assisting memorization. The 
printing press, however, put an end to this:  
The schematic layouts of manuscripts, designed for 
memorisation, the articulation of a summa into its ordered 
parts, all these are disappearing with the printed book 
which need not be memorised since copies are plentiful.53  
Handwritten manuscripts were well prepared for memorizing, by a high degree 
of schematizing, by summarizing and by ordering of written thought. These 
meta-structures of text helped to increase the ability to remember text 
thoughts, by hierarchically indexing or summarizing them, in order to be 
able to teach the content of the text, as the author of the text or as 
another reader. For the author, the manuscript still had a memory-assisting 
function, as it could not just be passed forward. The manuscript structure 
represented an explicit ars memorativa, destined to degradation as soon as 
printed replications in large quantities allowed for mass distribution of 
texts, for then the originally limited communicative function of 
manuscripts started to outweigh their mnemonic function. The situation has 
not changed considerably since then. Strictly speaking, the structuring of 
most present-day texts is not aimed at aiding memorization. Text sections, 
titles, tables of content, page numbers and chapter numbers etc. all serve 
another purpose: orientation in the text. They are ways of supporting 
                         
52 A fruitful combination of the social advantages of teaching and the economic advantages 
of written language can be encountered in blended learning.   
53 (Yates, 1974, S. 124) 
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(re-)finding or looking up information in the text, they are not usually 
tools of memorizing it or reflecting on it. As means of reference, they 
presuppose the unrestricted availability of the text, and imply that a text 
is no longer destined to be taught or remembered, but only to be either 
fully read or first searched and then partially read. 
2.4.6  OVERCOMING DEFECTS OF WRITTEN LANGUAGE 
Overcoming the defects of written language is one (distant) aim of extended 
artificial memory. Plato’s critique of script has not been discussed 
without hindsight. I want to derive from it a number of main requirements 
and major goals of an extended artificial memory system that all 
information systems (to be discussed) will have to be measured against. An 
information system overcoming simple script in texts would have to:  
REQUIREMENT 1: PRESENT PROPOSITIONS ONLY INSOFAR AS THEY CAN BE UNDERSTOOD BY 
THE READER.  
Each textual statement would thus have to be related to the knowledge of 
the reader. In order to achieve this, one would need a system that does not 
only contain the text to be read, but also the actual knowledge of the 
reader.54  
Text should further …  
REQUIREMENT 2: ALLOW THE READER TO ADVANCE BEYOND ITS SURFACE INTO THE FIELD 
OF THE AUTHOR’S KNOWLEDGE.  
Not only would the system have to comprise each reader’s knowledge, it 
would also have to contain the knowledge of the author, so that the reader 
could deepen his knowledge of the author’s thoughts as far as these 
thoughts reach, and not only as far as they are presented as written 
language. This would allow the reader to question the author’s thoughts 
beyond what is presented at reading.  
For the author …  
REQUIREMENT 3: THE TEXT SHOULD DO MORE THAN REMINDING THE AUTHOR OF WHAT HE 
ALREADY KNOWS. IT SHOULD BE A CREATIVE TOOL. 
Moreover, as if all this were not enough …  
REQUIREMENT 4: THE TEXT SHOULD HELP TO BUILD UP A MEMORY STRUCTURE IMPROVING 
INSTANTANEOUS KNOWLEDGE.  
Text should, on the other side, … 
                         
54  The reader of this thesis is asked to pardon the author for sweeping away nearly all 
knowledge management systems with his first requirements. It is as simple as it is sad: All 
current knowledge management systems ignore Plato’s critique of written language, and do 
not seriously try to design written language systems tackling the problems of written 
language. 
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REQUIREMENT 5: SUPPORT INSTANTANEOUS, THOUGHT-ACCOMPANYING AND THOUGHT-
COMPLEMENTING INFORMATION RETRIEVAL.  
I know that to most readers these requirements must appear lunatic. They 
strive for nothing less than a technological combination of the advantages 
of the culture (traditional technologies) of dialogue and the advantages of 
the culture of script. (They are, however, not as fantastic as, say, the 
struggle for artificial intelligence and its absurd promises and forecasts 
from many decades ago, which, it is fair to say by now, has totally, but 
successfully failed into a few useful machine learning algorithms. Another, 
related attempt also failed 55, this time not at all successfully, though: 
expert systems. Terry Winograd disclosed the similarity of these two 
attempts when he wrote calling a program an 'expert' is misleading in 
exactly the same way as calling it 'intelligent' or saying it 
'understands'.56 I’ll discuss this in some detail later.) 
  
                         
55 It is fair to say that the vaunted potential of expert systems has never been realized. 
(Davenport & Prusak, 1998, S. 126). 
56 (Winograd & Flores, 1986, S. 132) 
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2.4.7  MNEMOTECHNICS 
We heard Plato talk about the importance of exercising memory. We might 
therefore be tempted to think that mnemotechnics hold the key to knowing. 
Oral language culture developed an art of practicing memory, ars memorativa 
(a.k.a. mnemonics). As texts were not on hand, or, for the longest time, at 
least not in sufficient numbers, other signs than letters and words were 
used for remembering. In this respect, one can distinguish roughly between 
visible and invisible signs. The Greek poet Simonides of Ceos established a 
mnemotechnic that made use of visual-spatial-verbal structures as memory 
aids. Simonides is the first known advocate of a Greek tradition of ars 
memorativa that must have reached farther back in time. 57  The first and 
simplest form of mnemonics was perhaps given by associating a to-be-
remembered word with a visual imagination, whereby a visual symbol, a 
logograph or ideograph, is created in mind, which could also easily be 
externalized if needed. Wherever such symbols of imagery were applied, a 
very simple, more or less idiosyncratic form of pictographic, imaginative 
script was developed.  
The mnemonic system of Simonides of Ceos is called method of loci. 
Simonides found that things are easier to remember if one places them at 
locations, not actually in reality, but merely in mind. The mental 
locations should be well known, in close neighborhood to each other, and 
directly next to each other, but also sufficiently distinct as to be able 
to remember them individually. These locations could then be visited in 
mind (or even in reality), one by one, in the intended (or reverse) 
sequence, finding the things that were placed at the locations. 
Elaborations of the method of loci recommended improving results by 
fantastic arrangements at the loci, by adding, for example, very emotive 
images (such as a splendid crown or a devil etc.). Furthermore, remembering 
should be exercised repeatedly visiting the locations in mind.58 The method 
of loci is still known today. Its techniques have become scientifically 
researched memory improvement strategies: emotional and visual elaboration, 
besides frequent repetition. The method of loci uses a very general 
principal: signs (the locations) and symbols (the imagination of things 
placed at them). The more modalities are being involved, the likelier it 
will become that the to-be-remembered words or things will indeed be 
remembered. Each modality acts as a sign layer of its own, together forming 
a multimodal, multilayered association network that benefits from being 
able to be accessed from different directions. The location signs and 
emotional signs can be very effective. However, this should only appear 
impressive to the psychological amateur or the self-fascinated memory 
artist (or the experimenting memory researcher), because such ars 
                         
57 Readers interested in the history of ars memorativa will benefit from reading Frances A. 
Yates’ The Art of Memory (Yates, 1974) . 
58 (Yates, 1974, S. 10) 
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memorativa is restricted by the potential number of signs available. Due to 
a limited number of location signs and emotive signs, the number of things 
to be remembered at any one time is limited, too. As soon as one starts to 
reuse signs, confusion is likely to occur. The same is true for any 
mnemonic technique using simpler / shorter signs to denote complex 
information (e.g. a letter-code for complex sequences of numbers). This 
works only as long as the number of information complexes to be denoted 
does not surpass the number of signs available. The practical applicability 
of all mnemonic techniques of this type is therefore limited to sporadic 
(demonstrational) use of a small number of signs for a small array of 
things or secondary-signs (like longer number strings). Sign-substitution 
is nonetheless astonishing because of the therein-obvious human capacity of 
chunking (lower-order) information for (higher-order) signification. Still, 
substituational indexation is applicable only to a limited extent, because 
of the polysemy stemming from reusing signs. Spatially static reference 
systems, on the other hand, have yet another disadvantage: If an element 
happens to be added into a to-be-remembered sequence, one of three things 
can happen. First, an additional location would have to be added 
(destroying the natural organization of the locations). Second, one 
location-sign would have to denote two or more different things (a form of 
homonymy). Third, the new thing would have to be inserted into the location 
sequence (potentially causing considerable recoding costs). None of these 
solutions is anyway attractive. Thus, a supposed advantage (sequenced 
recollection) can easily turn into a disadvantage (unsequencable encoding). 
Yates cites an additional disadvantage of the method of loci, which may 
come as a surprise:  
The formation of the loci is of the greatest importance, for 
the same set of loci can be used again and again for 
remembering different material. The images which we have 
placed on them for remembering one set of things fade and 
are effaced when we make no further use of them. But the 
loci remain in the memory and can be used again […] 
(Yates, 1974, S. 7) 
But as well as the direct remembrance of things fades and is therefore to 
be supported by signs, the remembrance of the association between the signs 
and the things is also destined to decay, especially so as the signs are 
being reused (which strengthens only the signs as such in memory). - Even a 
simple imaginative, iconographic sign (a visual elaboration), used to 
remember a sign (such as a word) rather than a naturally visible object, 
does improve recollection only at a long-term cost. If applied to remember 
abstract words or abstract issues [abstrakte Sachverhalte], it becomes 
ambiguous (homographic) relative to its original sense and relative to any 
newly assigned sense. All classic ars memorativa (besides repetition) 
remains limited because of its inner mechanisms. The practical use tends to 
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be (domain-)restricted and short-termed, applicable only in special cases 
(memory games or necessarily seldom occasions in which a limited set of 
information has to be quickly learned and/or quickly reproduced (without 
being able to take notes). No ars memorativa, however, could ever replace 
natural language’s towering memory function, especially given the powerful 
means of transcription of oral language. Even the seemingly trivial 
technology of writing and using a list uses to surpass the effectiveness of 
any ars memorativa, practically endlessly extending memory. Language 
itself, it appears, is the greatest human ars memorativa. But why then did 
Plato object the idea of script? If it was not for any special mnemonic 
technique (something that wouldn’t be worthwhile considering any further), 
was it because script would seduce people to stop reusing language by 
rethinking thoughts, that is by repeating what one knows. Script appears 
physically dead and therefore impossible or difficult to reorganize. In 
remembrance, however, one is able to bethink what one knows, practicing 
knowledge means to vary it, to network it, to refine it, to ever further 
infer from it and thus enrich it. The availability of text turns dynamic 
memories into static signs, leading to the double-mistaken conclusion that, 
first, signs themselves are not vivid (i.e., not recipient-language-
technology as introduced in this thesis) and that, second, the thoughts 
that generated these signs are as static as the signs make them appear, 
while they are actually as vivid as interpreted signs are. Knowledge 
preservation is founded in reproductive thinking, not in script production 
(which may count as productive thinking). Closing this short critique of 
the art of memory, it should not remain unmentioned that even today the 
role of artificially arranged knowledge representation as memory aids, as a 
general mnemonic technique, is grossly overrated, while the mnemonic power 
of the seemingly simple natural language is grossly underrated. 59 General 
critique of ars memorativa is not new. The author is not the first to come 
up with it. Yates cites Albertus Magnus’ critique of the metaphorical-
imaginative mnemonic language of the antique rhetoricians in order to 
support her own doubts:  
But might it not have been easier to remember all this 
through the actual facts (propia) rather than through these 
metaphors (metaphorica)? We salute Albertus Magnus across 
                         
59 A typical example of the Zeitgeist can be found in (Reinmann & Eppler, 2007), which list 
a plethora of knowledge visualization (and thus, at least supposedly, also imagination) 
techniques, that, certainly, all may become valuable under particular circumstances for 
particular purposes, but which are certainly all not geared for general use of knowledge 
practicing. Mainly because of their small sign repertoire (usually some predefined 
locations, some shapes, colors, lines, etc.). These supposedly mnemonic techniques rely on 
the same superficial sensationalism as any classic ars memorativa. The more often and the 
more of these tools one uses, the less effective they become as mnemonic tools, up to total 
uselessness and even harmfulness, because the rather arbitrary visual arrangement, the 
artificial emphasizing and separating, tends to turn into a mere distraction from the main 
things, namely the language signs and their meaning, and the interdependencies between the 
former and the latter and between the former amongst each other and the latter amongst each 
other. 
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the ages for having had worries about the classical art of 
memory so like our own. 
(Yates, 1974, S. 65) 
Yates adds that images can be valuable memory aids and that a few images 
may suffice to memorize a lot (a dense form of indexation, with all the 
problems mentioned by me before). Furthermore, Yates remarks that 
metaphors, even if less concrete, can be emotion-filled and therefore 
easier to remember than the to-be-remembered thing (providing a kind of 
affective reference system, which would be, of course, loaded with problems 
as only a small number of emotion-filled metaphors are available, which 
limits their general usability as mnemonic tools). The once popular idea of 
ars memorativa transformed into an occult art 60 , as soon as printing 
letters took effect, only to, in the end, be rejected as exactly such, an 
occult and antiquated matter. 61  Today, ars memorativa is still alive in 
form of, in general, ineffective, overgeneralized experimental findings of 
memory research (such as to visualize or emotionally charge the to-be-
remembered thing) and in form of some similarly misguiding recommendations 
by the science of knowledge management. Popular strategies and 
recommendations to memorize things focus on memorizing particular things 
for limited purposes, they do not look further ahead; they do not envision 
wisdom as the goal of their practice, wisdom that is created by creative 
reflections, by (re-)examining one’s thoughts in (daily) practice (instead 
of letting them rest in a once written state), or, in other words, by 
productive reproductions. The only human technology that seems capable of 
serving this broader goal is the general sign system of natural language, 
from which most other sign systems (e.g. mathematical, logical notations 
etc.) were derived. 
  
                         
60 (Yates, 1974, S. 127f) 
61 (Yates, 1974, S. 159) 
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2.4.8  HISTORIC ORIGIN OF ARTIFICIAL MEMORY  
In order to make better use of natural language, one would have to answer a 
seemingly simple question: How does natural language relate to memory? Ars 
memorativa, especially the method of loci and its likes, creates an 
imaginative scenario. The to-be-remembered things are assigned to separate 
memories. This does not just improve remembrance; it actually creates an 
artificial memory (a term first used in ars memorativa). Assigning the to-
be-remembered thing in itself does not yet constitute artificial memory. 
Artificial memory is only created by the arrangement of signs or symbols to 
form new constellations, together with their denotations. These 
constellations deviate from what was originally experienced in that they 
arrange the assigned (to-be-remembered) things in the memory structure of 
the sign system, and vice versa. It is easy to see the artificial 
arrangement of (say, originally unordered) things by the method of loci, 
but it is much more difficult to see and understand the arrangements 
effectuated by the tokening use of human natural language. Generally 
rejecting the technologies of ars memorativa, I still have to recognize the 
powerful general cognitive principal manifested in them, that of artificial 
memory, a memory and thought system established by the co-structural 
mapping of a sign array and an array of experiences denoted and 
restructured by it. It is important to notice that this is different from 
fantasies, which combine experiences into new artistic memories, but do not 
necessarily establish any co-structural sign system. It is also different 
from any alleged singular or basic (language) sign, which is perceived to 
tokenize the world in an isolated manner. Such independent signs may exist, 
but they would not yet form an artificial memory. As the core function of 
an artificial memory is in the parallelization of a sign structure and an 
experiential structure, however, artificial memory will comprise a wide 
range of human cognitive technologies, harvesting given (language) 
structures to encompass a plethora of inrushing episodic experiences, 
constructing new artificial memories, and thereby re-, co-, and destructing 
originally episodic experiential memories.  
2.4.9  LANGUAGE BEING (NOT REPRESENTING) THOUGHTS  
In our discussion of ars memorativa, we have won the idea and notion of 
artificial memory, based on co-structural cognitive technologies, 
restructuring experiential memories (and, consequently, also being 
restructured by experience), explicitly and purposefully given in the art 
itself, but, as I presumed, also, only this time implicitly, given in 
natural language. This suggests the idea of individual artificial memory as 
the major (knowledge) structure formed by language. Language is normally 
perceived in a very different way, though: as a collection of more or less 
complex signs, each having a single or a number of static meanings (a 
lexicon), used to express or understand a thought, following syntactical 
rules, which represent another part of the language. Given some idea to be 
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expressed, the necessary lexemes are looked up in the cognitive lexicon, 
arranged, and modified according to the syntactical rules of the respective 
language. In this model, there is a language with its signs, their 
meanings, and the language production rules, on one side, and something to 
be expressed or understood on the other side. It is a model of direct 
translation or conversion of a given thought using a tool named language. I 
have to admit that I believe that this model has many fundamental 
shortcomings. Some become obvious when we begin to contrast the traditional 
view of language with some alternative or side views of language. An 
alternative view of my own, however, will depend on a further elaboration 
demonstrating language to be a multitude of cultural cognitive (artificial 
memory) technologies realizing (not just translating) special processes of 
thought. It goes without saying that, in this thesis, especially as a non-
specialist, I am unable to provide anything but a short, incomplete and 
more or less superficial critique of the traditional idea of language. I 
still do not want to shy away from such a critique, because I have the 
impression that at the bottom of many linguistic theories there is the same 
old idea of distinguishing and extracting la langue from la parole (which 
will be discussed in the next section). An idea that I find unappealing and 
misdirecting, even more so as it resembles and probably even strongly 
influenced another common differentiation, namely that between knowledge 
(in the sense of la langue) and knowing (in the sense of la parole). The 
latter distinction, however, is of great theoretical importance to this 
thesis. 
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2.4.10  QUESTIONABLE SEPARATION OF SPEECH AND LANGUAGE  
We first have to deal with a historically important idea of the linguist 
Ferdinand de Saussure, important because it split the language topic into 
several areas of science or perhaps even into several sciences. I am 
talking about his distinction of la langue and la parole, in other words, 
between language and speech: 
Die Sprache besteht in der Sprachgemeinschaft in Gestalt 
einer Summe von Eindrücken, die in jedem Gehirn nieder-
gelegt sind, ungefähr so wie ein Wörterbuch, von dem alle 
Exemplare, unter sich völlig gleich, unter den Individuen 
verteilt wären. Sie ist also etwas, das in jedem Einzelnen 
von ihnen vorhanden, zugleich aber auch allen gemeinsam ist 
und unabhängig von dem Willen der Aufbewahrer. Insofern kann 
das Vorhandensein der Sprache dargestellt werden durch die 
Formel 1 + 1 + 1 … = I (gemeinsames Vorbild). 
(Saussure, 1967, S. 23) 
The mathematical formalization sums up instances of personal vocabularies 
into a single, supraindividual common vocabulary. This appears to be very 
dubious: Is it possible that even only two people share the exact same 
vocabulary? This position is unrealistic to such an extent that it can only 
be defended and understood by claiming that there are different (partial) 
languages and thus different vocabularies that one does or does not share 
with each other. Such partial or specific languages could be separated by 
factors such as school of thought, region, class, profession etc. Another 
obvious problem of this formalization is that it is not open to change. The 
slightest variation of vocabulary would have to establish a new language 
and, correspondingly, a new language group [Sprachgemeinschaft] to fit into 
the equation. Furthermore, individual language development is excluded from 
the view, because the 1s in the equation are probably meant as full 
vocabularies, not vocabularies developing (in children or second language 
learners). Thus, this and any idea of language as a common vocabulary 
raises at once the three fundamental problems of, first, language 
demarcation, second, cultural language evolution, and, third, individual 
language development. All three problems are united in one aspect: they can 
only be understood as processes of language application, in groups, in 
historic and individual development. Saussure establishes a prototypical 
language as an object of study, deliberately excluding any dynamic, any 
social and individual aspect of language. In Saussure’s formula, a single 
individual equals a single language, but this is misleading. To support the 
idea of a language group, the language group must be thought of as an 
abstraction of people who overlap in a particular vocabulary, not as people 
who fully match in a vocabulary. The presence of additional language 
vocabularies, however, is likely to affect the one commonly shared 
vocabulary needed for defining the language group. The overlapping is 
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unlikely to separate the vocabularies in a clear-cut manner. Homonymy and 
synonymy, for example, will appear individually, depending on the 
availability, use and reuse of language signs in the vocabularies available 
to the individual. Thus, the idea of a language group and the formulation 
of it sharing a single vocabulary are fundamentally conflicting and, thus, 
downright paradox. The only remedy would be to seek refuge in yet another 
abstraction of language: understanding it as supraindividual, in the sense, 
of course, that it cannot be valid in any single case. Nonetheless, one 
would have to give up Saussure formula and simply state and claim I (the 
prototypical vocabulary). One might think that Saussure’s I is, after all, 
something to work with. However, a de-socialized, de-historized, de-
individualized and de-developmentalized science of language or grammar has 
a huge problem: in all its nomothetic dealings, it must either shy away 
like hell from any empirical meat or abstract it beyond all recognition. It 
can only work with paradigmatic examples of language, such as well-built 
sentences, in order not to spoil the impression of la langue. In all its 
theories, it will be doomed to search for rules and language realizers as 
abstract and static as it is itself and is to remain as long as it sticks 
to Saussure’s definition and idea of language as an abstract object of 
study. In other words, this science is in a hopelessly self-restricted 
position, similar to, say, behaviorism. Instead of following linguistics on 
its theoretical main path, therefore, I think it to be far more interesting 
and revealing to follow some of its side paths (and aberrations it has 
caused), where it is confronted with the realities of language (use) that 
it otherwise tries to abstract away.  
An alternative to a very common vocabulary, such as a full national 
language, is a small-group or individual vocabulary. It is quite 
understandable that until recently personal and small group vocabularies 
did not attract too much attention in linguistics, because it would have 
been difficult to capture the relevant language artifacts before they could 
be individually recorded or derived from so-called user-generated, digital 
content. Grimm’s dictionary took more than a lifetime to create. A 
specific, manually annotated corpus was not reasonable before the advent of 
computer technology, and not fully usable before the development of refined 
relational databases with their powerful query and manipulation languages. 
The age of print simply did not have the tools to record and analyze a 
multitude of individual vocabularies, because at that time it took a 
multitude of individuals to record, analyze, and replicate a single 
vocabulary. The image of language must have been dominated by the artifacts 
and tools then available to deal with language, that is to say, by books. A 
dictionary, a treatise, or an encyclopedia was all one could strive for 
reasonably. The former tools of language predefined the idea of language, 
and they continue to have an ideological effect long after they ceased to 
limit language analysis in practical terms.  
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2.5 BEYOND TRADITIONAL LINGUISTICS AND KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT 
2.5.1  SIDE PATHS OF LINGUISTICS 
At all times have our tools of insight determined our understanding of the 
things of the world. That is why, in science, one has to attempt to create 
new tools of perceptual and, consequently, intellectual extension, such as 
prototypes (as was chosen for this thesis), as means of improving 
understanding. This can be observed in … 
2.5.1.1 Computer Linguistics 
In Computer Linguistics 62, huge corpora are automatically recorded. These 
corpora provide far more syntactical variations and examples than were 
possible to take into consideration in classical treatises on grammar. They 
show a by far more variable use of language than could have been 
constructed from traditional syntax rules. This is made easy by 
automatically calculating probabilistic indicators, separating likely from 
unlikely phrases, having regard to constituent word and compound frequency. 
Thus, a continuum between a new type of probabilistic, context-free grammar 
and the traditional, catholic rule-based grammar was created, in-between 
covering richer frame-based approaches.  
2.5.1.2 Computer Lexicography 
Computer lexicology 63  represents an important extension of print-based 
lexicography; there is no pressure to filter lexemes in order to keep a 
selection of lexemes printable anymore. In addition, there can be far more 
cross-references and other types of information, which had to be omitted 
before. A computational dictionary has literally no limits. Only the right 
holders (publishing companies) are preventing a total integration of all 
historic human efforts of creating dictionaries. Instead, new, machine-
readable resources are being created, such as, for example, WordNet 64 , 
which relates lexemes, concepts, and synonyms spanning different word 
categories, besides including some semantic thesaurus relations.  
2.5.1.3 Limits of Computer Linguistics and Computer 
Lexicography 
Computer linguistics and computer lexicography are but extensions of the 
traditional means of the science of language. They extent rules and 
lexicon, but they do not overcome the basic limitations of the conception 
of language as an abstracted object of study. Still, both represent 
important steps into the right direction, as they can be applied in 
                         
62 See (Bod, Jannedy, & Hay, 2003) for an accessible introduction into the field. 
63 See (Kunze & Lemnitzer, 2007). 
64 See (Fellbaum, 1998). 
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individual language studies and recordings. They, hence, strongly 
influenced the Artificial Memory prototype. However, computer linguistics 
and computer lexicology did not yet arrive at the idea of individual 
language and individual grammar, in terms of their social and individual 
development. Indicators such as conditional probability (joint probability) 
of words are still void of dimensions of developmental change, as are, to 
the best of my knowledge, all grammars, be it computational or hand-crafted 
ones. The final state of post-language computer linguistics or one facet of 
a post-linguistic cognitive science would be the real-time tracking of 
syntactical and lexical aspects in language performance across different 
dimensions of change, focusing on language-based thinking. That we do not 
yet have the means for it, should not restrict us from seeing (and stating) 
this clearly and from striving to gradually overcome the limitations of 
today’s conceptions of language and language sciences. I have already 
pointed out the parallels between the traditional notion of language (la 
langue) and the traditional idea of knowledge. The concept of a language 
dictionary is only one step away from the concept of an encyclopedic 
dictionary; the idea of a catholic set of grammar rules is not too far away 
from the idea of a limited set of inference rules, and probably for the 
same reasons. If the current subject of language ought to turn into a 
subject of language-thought, it would represent the same subject that the 
current subject of knowledge ought to turn into, were it to overcome its 
comparable limitations of a static and de-individualized conception. In 
other words, the future means of individual knowledge management might (I 
would even argue will) be the same as the future means of language-based 
cognitive science, as much as the current means of knowledge management 
(printed documents) formed the basis of current linguistics. The attempts 
to overcome traditional linguistics are thus to be found in language 
science as well as knowledge (i.e., often synonymously: information) 
science. 
2.5.2  TOWARD NEW VOCABULARY 
2.5.2.1  Linguistics: Language Acquisition Recording  
An interesting exception from the rule is given by the leader of the Media 
Laboratory of the MIT, Deb Roy. He recorded more than 230.000 hours of 
audio and video in his private home to cover the language acquisition of 
his son. Each of his son’s language utterances was recorded and documented, 
including a number of context variables (Roy, 2009). From these recordings, 
Roy can mine interesting data, e.g. how a single word is slowly acquired, 
with its pronunciation gradually improving and its usage/meaning becoming 
more specific. 
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2.5.2.2  Knowledge Management: Life-Recording 
Roy’s method resembles roughly the known idea of life recording, a long-
term and life-accompanying recording of an individual’s perceivable 
acoustic (spoken language) and vision fields (as well as digital 
artifacts). Life recording creates a life-log(-file). Life recording tools 
are called life recorders. There are (limited) special video life 
recorders, photo life recorders, audio life recorders, and social life 
recorders. Social life recorders record activities (not necessarily 
language-based) in social networks, keeping a kind of diary or historic 
log-file. The idea of life logging is originally based on a rather 
simplistic view: 
Digital storage is cheap and plentiful. Why not keep a 
record of everything we have encountered? Digital storage 
can hold not only conventional kinds of information but also 
pictures, photographs, music – even films and full-motion 
video. 
(Jones & Bruce, 2005, S. 5) 
Thus, life recorders often pride themselves of the number of information 
object types they may store: supports 25 item types […] but arbitrarily 
many could be added. 65  The dominant access technology was originally 
thought to be query/search technology: sources are monitored, and their 
metadata are integrated along with the full text of each item to enable 
optimal search.65 The trend toward technically less literate, consumption-
oriented users on the Internet, however, has led to dominantly visual, hot-
media access tools such as photo(-enriched) time-lines and fast motion 
movies of pictures, or slide shows. These modern-day life-logs archive 
activities by their digital artifacts. They deliver behavioristic records, 
because they do not perceive the past as alterable memories, but as 
immutable, historic artifacts. They are therefore also not understood and 
designed as dynamic information manipulation tools, but as static 
information accumulation, retrieval and representation tools.66 Hence, they 
differ considerably form the technological conception of the Artificial 
Memory prototype, as I will demonstrate in chapter 5 of this thesis. 
Another, less obvious, but nonetheless important difference is to be found 
in the restriction of life recorders to perceivable information. For a 
life-recorder, it is not relevant what one thinks, but only what one 
perceives (more precisely, what one is presented with) or expresses. Not 
                         
65 (Gemmell, Bell, Lueder, Drucker, & Wong, 2002) 
66  One of the most advanced Life Recorders is Microsoft Research’s MyLifeBits project, 
popularized by Gordon Bell (Bell, 2007). The project is discontinued [personal notice by 
Gordon Bell]. The last notion of MyLifeBits stressed its memory-support function, following 
a keep everything strategy, though, not distinguishing between attended and unattended 
information, that is not distinguishing between potentially memorized information and 
clearly unmemorized peripheral information. - Another example of a life recorder is Forget-
Me-Not (Lamming & Flynn, 1994), which states a memory-support function.   
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all what is thought, however, is also being expressed, and life recorders 
do nothing to support and encourage thought expression. Even social 
networks tend to limit thought expression to social communication (i.e. 
commercially exploitable content). In most cases, however, a life recorder 
will not even overlap with a thought recorder, as recording what is 
perceived does not reflect how it was perceived. For this, life recorders 
would have to support powerful content-enrichment and content-manipulation 
functions. 
2.5.3  TOWARD NEW SYNTAX  
2.5.3.1  Linguistics: Linear Unit Grammar 
An interesting theoretical work is provided by the late linguist John 
McHardy Sinclair, a renown pioneer of computer linguistics. His last book, 
on Linear Unit Grammar (Sinclair & Mauranen, 2006), appeared in 2006. It is 
based on an analysis of everyday spoken language, which is rather uncommon 
for a grammar, as spoken language is considered defective and saltatory, 
just normally not properly and completely built and, therefore, not 
appropriate to be used in the definition of a proper grammar. This opinion 
means that the normative character of a given grammar is allowed to define 
what is proper to be taken for any new grammar to be defined, which, of 
course, results in an endless perpetuation of the same old (idea of) 
grammar. Sinclair deviates from this linguistic-science schema. He creates 
a classification system for chunks of spoken language, called linear units. 
Linear units split and reconstruct the flow of expressions of spoken 
language in a form that is indispensable to be able to apply an automatic 
syntactical analysis. Hence, Linear Unit Grammar is derived from applied 
computer linguistics, far from any theoretical ivory tower. It bridges, for 
the first time, the gap between the analysis of discursive speech and 
heavily standardized written language. In other words, it reintegrates la 
parole and la langue. Aware of himself breaking a scientific taboo, in 
order to avoid ignorance and minimize critique, the late linguist Sinclair 
uses rather simple, convincing examples. He also writes in a very 
conciliatory tone; as when he stresses that his grammar is only a 
supplement to the existing models, or when he mentions the high inter-rater 
reliability when having speech segmented into linear units (as, basically, 
the impression of compound-ness or chunked-ness is the only criterion for 
segmentation). This gives the impression, as if Linear Units were, in an 
inter-individual effective way, rule-based or normative, that is in any 
case within the agreed limits of the linguistics of supraindividual 
language. This impression, however, is misdirecting, taking into account 
what Sinclair is actually doing. Even if complexes of (rearranged) Linear 
Units show syntactical structures, as known from single-language research, 
Linear Units are, in essence, individual language performances (in language 
expression as well as in language interpretation) opening the floodgates to 
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ambiguity. For the Linear Units of the speaker do not have to match the 
Linear Units of the listener, thus destroying the idea of a nomothetic 
science of language. To make this clear, the reader may imagine a simple 
word categories pattern: Adjective-Noun1-Noun2 (say, tacit knowledge 
management). Depending on whether the adjective is referred to Noun1 only 
(tacit knowledge | management) or to a compound of Noun1 and Noun2 (tacit 
knowledge-management), one could end up with 2 or 1 linear units. This is, 
by the way, not about language-semantic or language-syntactic differences, 
it is about perceptual differences, and we are not only speaking about 
inter-rater reliability, we are also speaking about intra-rater 
reliability. The boundaries of Linear Units cannot be fully explained by 
any syntactical, syntacto-semantic or any other surface-form-based rules, 
they are, as I will argue, individual memory-perceptual (ecphoric) units, 
which tend to not be perfectly reflected in the syntactical (marker-based) 
or prosodic (stress-based) structure of language and which anyway may 
differ from person A to person B and from time A to time B. Therefore, in 
(memory-perceptual) Linear Units, personal structural language 
interpretations do replace or subordinate, and not just supplement, 
language rules, demonstrating to all of linguistics that without this step 
(individual language segmentation or, in a broader sense, individual 
language interpretation) unambiguous language analysis and explanation are 
impossible. The Linear Unit Grammar is consequently not a typical grammar 
of the shared language science, it is, at its core, a cognitive analysis, 
leading up to cognitive categories of language production units and 
language interpretation units. The core construct of Linear Units is to be 
understood as a missing (or rather ignored) individual link between 
language manifestations and the language thoughts they were derived from or 
that are derived from them. The Linear Unit Grammar’s deceptive-seductive 
packaging signals the difficulties Sinclair must have faced when developing 
his empiricist theory. On a higher level of reflection, Sinclair’s 
theoretical case gives some meat to what Martin Kusch calls a communitarian 
epistemology of scientific knowledge. Sinclair clearly had some problems 
feeding his excellent knowledge back into his community of linguists.  
2.5.3.2 Knowledge Management: Artificial Intelligence 
In knowledge management, human natural language syntax was reduced and 
abstracted into formal (logical) language rules and syntaxes, somewhat 
similar to their reduction into syntax rules in rule-based grammars of 
traditional linguistics. The consequences were similar, too. Dogmatic (i.e. 
pedagogical) grammars blind out the historic-cultural and developmental 
changeability and variety of syntactical forms (using diachronic 
linguistics as a fig leaf). Logics, on the other side, blind out the 
respective changeability and variety of language-thought. This dependence 
of logics from natural language is not a common conviction of logicians. 
They, on the contrary, tend to think of language syntax as an insufficient 
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realization of logics. Not unlike grammarians who tend to see spoken 
language as insufficient (not well-built) realizations of proper 
grammatical language. The logician John Sowa sees this clearly when he 
points out:  
Instead of assuming that NL semantics is based on formal 
logic, I believe that all of mathematics, including formal 
logic, is based on a subset of the same semantics we use in 
using ordinary language. To use Wittgenstein's terminology, 
mathematical notations and rules of inference are 
specialized “language games”. They use a *subset* of the 
mechanisms that people use when they talk and listen. 
(Sowa, 2009) 
I would even extend this view, as Jerry Fodor does, and state that the 
semantics of thought is prior to the semantics of language. 67  In his 
representational theory of mind (RTM), Fodor thinks of this relation to be 
performative, while I would rather see it as historic-evolutionary and 
individual-developmental, basing this view on the nature of the underlying 
memory mechanisms, as will become clear in chapter 3 of this thesis. Fodor, 
(this shall only be mentioned here in parenthesis, for it represents a 
common misunderstanding) believes that … 
It is a very bad idea to confuse psychology with semantics: 
psychology is about what goes on in heads. Semantics is 
about constitutive relations between representations and the 
world (between representations and what they represent). 
THERE IS, AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, NO SUCH THING AS A 
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY OF MEANING (just as there is, as a 
matter of principle, no such thing as an epistemological 
theory of meaning; and for reasons that are not dissimilar). 
(Fodor, 2008, S. 198) 
Fodor here thinks of semantics as of Tarski-dyads39. This is an idea of 
conservative logicians that Sowa rightly criticizes, for, in the practice 
of ontological engineering, this idea has proven to be as unrealistic as 
the idea of a rule-based objective language. In ontological engineering, 
endless debates and disagreements use to arise when working on a common 
definition, and, after a common ontological definition or standard was 
found, it uses to be interpreted in different ways, often, ironically, with 
people believing that they share the same definition and ideas. Signs have 
to be interpreted. They, hence, establish a relation of thirdness or 
higher-ary relations, not of dyads. There is, as a matter of fact, no such 
thing as a non-psychological theory of meaning, as the nature of the 
                         
67 (Fodor, 2008, S. 198) 
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relation between sign and significatum is its instantiation in an 
interpretation. For reasons that are not dissimilar, all theory of meaning 
has to be epistemological. In this thesis, I therefore argue (contrary to 
Fodor) that it is a very good idea to combine psychology with semantics, as 
I have tried to show that the very principle of separating psychology and 
semantics, of separating language performance and interpretation from 
language artifacts, is a misdirecting, obsolete historic principle. Rule-
based grammars and formal logics, without any doubt, have their great 
merits, but this should not stop us from acknowledging their given and 
future limitations. So far, any attempt to understand natural language by 
automatically translating it into logics has failed, for different reasons. 
First, as with grammar, the de-individualized, de-contextualized sign layer 
appears as ambiguous (another word for differences in interpretation 
between individuals, being reflected in conflicting rules and concepts 
applicable at the same time). Second, there is no appropriate general 
logical structure available to automatize or reproduce natural reasoning. 
There cannot be a complete grammar, and there cannot be a complete logic. 
There is, of course, no lack of general formalizations for different 
aspects of natural language expressions: argumentation logics, deontic 
logics, epistemic logics, probabilistic logics, predicate calculus, multi-
valued logics, fuzzy logics, quantifier logics, modal logics and so on, and 
so forth. All these endeavors are quite interesting and instructive, in the 
same way that specific theories of grammar are interesting and instructive, 
the latter highlighting aspects of language generation, and the former 
stressing aspects of knowledge generation.  
I have stated before that I am trying to stay away from the main paths of 
linguistic theorizing, as I perceive them to stick to an outdated model of 
objective language (and this thesis anyway could not host such a 
discussion). For a similar reason I will try to stay away from the main 
paths of logic, as I perceive them to stick to an outdated model of 
objective knowledge (and this thesis anyway could not host such a 
discussion). What I am interested in are not the sweet spots of over-
generalized (i.e. artificially consistent) theorizing, but the sore spots 
of theoretical failure and impotence at the very points where language and 
knowledge systems and theory have to face cultural and individual reality. 
The practical problem of whatever variety of logic is that for any relevant 
(non-tautological, not yet axiomatically pre-given) logical inference, its 
axiomatic rules have to be applied onto an actual knowledge base (here, 
ontology), which has to conform to the logic’s syntax used in order to be 
interpretable. Translating natural language syntax statements (thoughts) 
into a logical (artificial) syntax, presupposes knowledge of the logical 
syntax and the ability to express the knowledge in question in this syntax, 
without devaluating it by an eventual reduction. Any particular logic, 
however, represents, as such, ways of thinking and expression that have to 
be learnt first. 
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2.5.3.2.1 Manual Ontology Engineering 
Expert knowledge is normally considered the most valuable (ontological) 
knowledge. Experts, however, have little time to learn syntax of logic. 
Unfortunately, natural language syntax cannot automatically be transformed 
into logical syntax (as remarked before). Therefore, neither are language 
artifacts of experts available to inform the respective axioms and ontology 
of logic, nor are experts likely to start contributing their knowledge in 
the form needed for machine reasoning. For expert knowledge-systems to 
work, therefore, domain experts must be interviewed by logic experts in 
order to have the domain experts’ knowledge translated by the logic 
experts. Historically, this led to some serious restrictions 68 : Expert 
systems cover only a narrow domain of expertise (as broadening of the 
domain increases the costs or decreases the level of completeness of 
knowledge covered). Another problem is the limitations faced when trying to 
express facts and relations in a formal language. The translation of a 
relatively short natural language proposition into a logical form often 
results into a great number of logical propositions or a relatively complex 
statement that can be difficult to read, interpret and understand. In other 
words, translating a set of formal propositions back into natural language 
propositions, in order to have the expert check the correctness of the 
formalization, is often not possible, so that the whole process is not 
without hazards. The logic expert might easily formalize the domain 
expert’s statements incorrectly, without anybody noticing. The 
plentifulness of formal propositions should not belie the fact that all 
formal languages work on the principle of semantic/syntactic reduction of 
natural language statements, notwithstanding the possibility of formal 
languages here and there surpassing the set of syntactic constructs 
available in natural language (for example by combining naturally known 
basic operations into new, artificially complex operations). Without proper 
and efficient back-translation, however, an evaluation of the discrepancies 
between reductionist formalizations and the underlying richer natural 
language expressions is practically impossible.  
Another, more general problem is posed by implicit learning generating 
implicit knowledge being used implicitly by experts. Ikujiro Nonaka 
introduced the term tacit knowledge into knowledge management. 69  A term 
originally coined by the philosopher Michael Polanyi. Davenport and Prusak 
believe that: 
                         
68 (Buchanan, 1982, S. 283), mentioned in (Winograd & Flores, 1986):   
Buchanan, […] lists some characteristics of problems that are suitable, 
including: 'Narrow domain of expertise; limited language for expressing 
facts and relations; limiting assumptions about problem and solution 
methods; little knowledge of own scope and limitations’. 
69 See (Nonaka I. , 1994). 
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[…] tacit, complex knowledge, developed and internalized by 
the knower over a long period of time, is almost impossible 
to reproduce in a document or database. 
(Davenport & Prusak, 1998, S. 70) 
The idea of an unbridgeable gap between tacit and non-tacit knowledge, 
however, conflicts with Markowitsch’s (Markowitsch, Dem Gedächtnis auf der 
Spur., 2002, S. 143) conviction that explicit and implicit recall do not 
reflect distinct memory systems, but rather represent different levels of 
consciousness. 70  In their popular SECI-Model 71 , Nonaka and Takeuchi, 
theorize tacit knowledge transfer as either by socialization (tacit 
knowledge to tacit knowledge transfer by observation and copying of 
behavior) or by externalization (verbalization of expressible tacit 
knowledge). Only the latter option is available in the dialogue between 
domain expert and logic expert. Externalization of implicit knowledge, 
however, presupposes reflection by self-contemplation or discussion, 
neither of which would be affordable or appropriate in a knowledge 
formalization interview. Externalization also requires a good command of 
language and introspection (self-observance), which is certainly not at the 
avail of all domain experts. I have discussed before [see 1.1.7 Wicked 
Problem, p. 13] the notion of design as discussion. Collective remembering, 
collective reflection, and collective reasoning are part and parcel of 
group decision-making and group design by collectives of experts. In my 
humble opinion, the collective creations and inferences of experts 
represent a level of complexity and system dynamics that cannot (easily) be 
emulated by simply formalizing individual experts’ knowledge and reasoning 
from individual belief systems. Automating decision-making by expert 
systems more or less restricts reasoning to individual (or aggregated, i.e. 
pseudo-collective) ontology reasoning, thus only inappropriately imitating 
the possible social dynamics of collective human reasoning. Roger Schank 
points out another deficiency of expert systems:  
Expert systems do not learn, indeed cannot learn, because 
they are systems of rules and not systems of experiences or 
cases. 
(Schank, 1999, S. 225) 
Undeniably, the idea of translating expert knowledge into the logical form 
of axioms and ontology echoes the belief of persistent and immutable 
                         
70 (Markowitsch, Dem Gedächtnis auf der Spur., 2002, S. 143):  
Expliziter und impliziter Abruf stellen keine eigenständigen 
Gedächtnissysteme dar, sondern sind Abrufformen auf unterschiedlichen 
Bewusstseinsebenen. 
71 See (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). 
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knowledge, freezing acts of knowledge in the same way that written language 
freezes acts of language. A static dictionary and a static grammar may 
simply appear as incomplete or inappropriate, whereas a static expert 
system will appear erroneous:  
Who would have respect for someone who consistently made the 
same errors and never improved? Nevertheless, rule-based 
expert systems must have this property. 
(Schank, 1999, S. 230) 
Logic experts might think that it is possible to add new rules to a rule-
based expert system and to extend the corresponding ontology (schema and 
data) by repeating the interview with the domain expert. The domain expert 
would just have to provide new insights. From this procedure, however, one 
would not learn which beliefs were given up in the meantime. For this, the 
domain expert would have to check all prior formalizations with regard to 
their belief-status. This does not only pose the before-mentioned problem 
of back-translation of formal language into natural language, but would 
also represent an (increasingly) inefficient procedure. The expert’s 
belief-system represented by rules and ontology cannot simply be continued 
by adding new rules and new knowledge, though. For soon enough conflicting 
states would arise.  
An even more fundamental objection would be raised if one understood 
learning not as something final, something of the past, as in lessons 
learnt, but, rather, as information that defines the creative potential of 
an individual to design or infer further new knowledge in the future. A 
consistent logical system can automatically draw all possible conclusions 
from facts given at any time. Most of these inferences use to not be 
perceived as useful or reasonable: conclusions such as, say, that atoms are 
part of clocks 72 , which result from long, de-contextualized chains of 
automatic reasoning uncommon in human reasoning; or inferences derived from 
                         
72 This is an example used by Helbig, who clearly saw the limits of automatic reasoning as 
set by (perceived/cognitive) functional contexts (Helbig, 2001, S. 54):  
So kann man zwar feststellen, daß die Unruh Teil des Uhrwerks ist, das 
Uhrwerk Teil der Kichturmuhr, letztere wieder Teil des Kirchturms und 
dieser Teil der Kirche. Man würde aber nicht sagen, daß die Unruh Teil der 
Kirche ist (obwohl das im formalen Sinne gelten mag). Das Beispiel zeigt, 
daß die Transitivität der PARS-Relation über größere Zusammenhangsketten 
verlorenzugehen scheint (Fading-Effekt). Wichtig dürfte auch die Forderung 
sein, daß zwischen Teil und Ganzem kognitiv zusätzlich ein bestimmter 
Funktionszusammenhang bestehen muß. Dies erklärt auch, warum man 
gewöhnlich keine PARS-Beziehung zwischen einem Makrokörper (z.B. einem 
Baum) und einem Mikroteilchen (z.B. einem Proton) herstellt, obwohl das 
physikalisch zweifelsohne zutrifft. 
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underspecified upper-level ontology types such as, say, that Mozart is a 
thing.  
Other inferences might not even be perceived as true, as they will 
contradict with knowledge not yet, not completely, or not correctly 
formalized. Furthermore, I can say, based on my own experience of 
ontological engineering, that categorizing or instantiating something new 
(as examples of generating formal knowledge) will cause more than just an 
addition of a piece of new knowledge and belief into an ontology. It may 
create a productive area of tension between the neighboring ontology 
objects, provoking further ontological additions that cannot be gained 
through (automatic) inferences. A good example for this is Aristotle's 
method of Genus and Differentiae. Given a Genus (a supertype of the 
category to be defined) and a Species (the subtype that is being defined), 
the Differentia is a property or attribute that distinguishes the species 
to be defined from other species of the same genus. Now, oftentimes, the 
Differentia is not obvious right away. One has to think about what features 
of the Species do actually contribute to it being subcategorized by the 
Genus. The Differentia is therefore not directly inferable from the 
ontology. It is given in the form of a question, i.e. a productive language 
technology that stimulates processes of remembrance, thinking and judging. 
The Genus creates a field of siblings for the Species. The Species’ 
Differentia has to be a sufficiently distinct feature to justify the 
Species’ stand-alone existence. Sometimes a whole system of Differentiae 
and their corresponding Species may become unstable by the addition of the 
Species to the respective Genus. In the same way as we have found writing a 
text to be a genuine creative process, ontology engineering is, too. A 
knowledge and belief state, as reflected in ontology at a certain point of 
time, may be more or less stable, resulting in the ontology to be more or 
less stable in relation to the state of knowledge it ought to represent. 
The logic expert translating/formalizing pieces of new knowledge and adding 
them to the ontology may or may not start and support a reflective-creative 
process together with the domain expert. If the logic expert and domain 
expert neglect creative reflections on the state of the ontology during the 
interview, chances are that the domain expert would (later) come to 
different conclusions than the expert system, because the expert might 
stabilize her views outside of the interview with the logic expert, perhaps 
during solving a problem or writing a book. If, however, the logic expert 
tries to stabilize the domain experts’ knowledge and ontology by 
stimulating a creative-reflective process, the endeavor may soon become 
quite inefficient (as it is somewhat doubtful that a knowledge state can 
ever become fully stable). The domain expert’s knowledge does not only rest 
on what she actually knows, but also on her capacity to re-stabilize and 
develop her knowledge in problem situations that trigger (and inform) a 
process of reflection that cannot be emulated/substituted by automatic 
inferences from an unstable ontology. Not all new knowledge is logically 
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inferred, some is simply experienced, and knowledge itself can be re-
experienced (remembered and re-perceived) to be re-formed. Ontological 
engineering (a way of philosophizing or, more generally, learning) 
embraces, but is not restricted to ontological reasoning. It cannot 
astonish that expert systems and, in a broader sense, artificial 
intelligence systems failed and keep failing whenever the rules of the game 
and its facts are initially unknown, unstable, and social. At least not 
unless they are artificially stabilized by (social) dogmatization, the same 
way language artifacts (such as, for example, scientific or religious 
theories) are dogmatized to shield them from deviating interpretations. 
Ironically, dogmas change, too, for dogmas must be interpreted (which is 
often a rather slow, generational task), too. Artificial intelligence 
experts, of course, have tried different ways of tackling the wicked 
problem of formalizing knowledge and thereby automating thinking.  
2.5.3.2.2 Automatic Ontology Learning 
At present, one popular method is automatic ontology learning. Staab 
(Maedche & Staab, Ontology Learning for the Semantic Web, 2001), for 
example, argues that the proliferation of ontologies depends on 
constructing domain-specific ontologies quickly and cheaply (hence 
implicitly confirming the logics community’s general problem of ontology 
engineering or ontology creation). Ontology learning could be arranged from 
free text, dictionaries, reverse engineering of ontologies from database 
schemata, or XML documents. Defining mapping rules between these structures 
would allow importing and reusing existing ontologies. Staab thinks that 
syntactical relationships between terms yield considerable descriptive 
power to induce the semantic hierarchy of concepts related to these terms. 
Verbs are to be modeled as relations. In my own words, the idea is simply 
that of an ontology engine (as an analogy to a search engine). That is 
instead of collecting documents and indexing them into search words and 
search phrases, the ontology engine collects propositions (derived from 
syntactic surface-patterns) into a huge database and lets one query it. The 
database cannot be considered an ontology anymore, as it may and will 
contain conflicting statements and ambiguities (one should not forget the 
heterogeneous contexts the information is taken from and the general 
ambiguity of language artifacts). Statistical means (as with search 
engines) and common-sense rules, however, could be applied to generate a 
formally consistent ontology from the data, excluding unlikely (i.e. 
infrequently found) facts and avoiding categorical circularity. It is said 
that Google is about to extend their infrastructure and search results with 
such an automatically learnt ontology. There is also the popular success of 
IBM’s Watson 73 , using IBM’s Unstructured Information Management 
Architecture (UIMA), which creates a huge, automatically learnt ontology, 
constantly enriched by automatic Annotators, modules that discover new 
                         
73 See, e.g., en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Watson_(computer) (accessed on 27.08.2012). 
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types from language resources. To a technically naïve person, Watson must 
appear as an intelligent machine. Watson can answer supposedly difficult 
questions, which would normally require expert knowledge. It can acquire 
new facts automatically. It has a natural language interface (one can ask 
it questions and gets answers). The technologies used are not in any way 
new or surprising: crawlers, parsers, pattern recognition, data mining, 
semantic querying, inference-engine, parallel processing, result ranking 
etc. It is their combination together with a huge knowledge base, that 
causes Watson to appear as a breakthrough into a new dimension, because the 
scope of Watson’s knowledge somehow surpasses that of any single expert. It 
is ontology at Internet-scale. Another semantic or fact search engine of 
Internet-scale is Wolfram’s Alpha, which also makes heavy use of automatic 
ontology learning. I think that these two examples of knowledge computing 
based on automatic ontology learning are indeed very valuable contributions 
to the finding of simple, stable facts. Keyword-based search falls short at 
fact question answering: it delivers links, not answers; and it cannot 
handle circumscriptions and synonyms, which should pose no problem to 
semantic query engines. Fact queries, however, represent only one out of 
many forms of query. While search engines decontextualize keywords for 
indexation, knowledge engines decontextualize facts. With search engines, 
the document allows for a re-contextualization of an individual keyword or 
keyword phrase. With knowledge engines, such a re-contextualization is not 
included, because the fact will normally represent an aggregated or data-
mined concept. The idea of (quick) automatic ontology learning is not to 
try to finally understand natural language text, so that a fact could be 
understood in its specific field of ideas (its context), but to collect 
information whenever a supposedly unambiguous, simple to parse syntactic 
structure allows for it. A fact-learning engine would normally only look 
for phrases like A is a kind of B, or A is part of B, or A was born on B. 
The rest of the con-text has to remain unused, as it cannot be interpreted 
by simple semantic-syntactic patterns anymore. Therefore, fact engines do 
not replace search engines, and they do not even solve all their problems. 
I will demonstrate this shortly by reporting a personal experience that 
strongly influenced my view of search technology. When working as a 
consultant for PricewaterhouseCoopers, I observed that many of my 
colleagues would not use the organization-wide search engine, even though 
it allowed a universal search across thousands of internal project 
databases and delivered a high number (indicating good document recall 74) 
of relevant results (indicating good document precision75). The reason was 
that in Consulting documents are often re-used, serving as templates for 
the creation of new documents. For example, some slides of customer 
presentation A will be used as the foundation of a new customer 
                         
74  Document Recall is calculated as the ratio of the number of found relevant documents 
divided by the number of relevant documents in a document corpus or database.  
75 Document Precision is calculated as the ratio of the number of found relevant documents 
divided by the number of found documents.  
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presentation B. Others slides from A will be omitted. Anyway, new slides 
and changes will be added to B. Now, reading a few top-ranked presentations 
about topic XYZ would familiarize one quickly with most of the frequently 
re-used slides. However, after some time, the proportion of new information 
relative to known information would become too small to continue 
efficiently anymore. Thus, PricewaterhouseCoopers’ search engine did not 
provide means of learning relevant information in an efficient way, at 
least not beyond commonly available information. For that to improve, it 
(as any search engine) would have had to know what its users (already) 
knew. Fact engines do not provide means of learning information in an 
efficient way either, as they omit the (syntactically) complex thought/fact 
and skip infrequent simple thoughts/facts if they cannot be found in the 
form of a syntactically interpretable statement. Thus, neither does 
automatic ontology learning replace thorough ontology engineering, nor does 
it replace reading the original texts, or offer an easier or more efficient 
way to access them. Fact engines do not replace search engines. Quick 
automatic ontology learning adds but an admittedly usable brick on top of 
the text technology stack, without, however, actually confronting the many 
before-mentioned fundamental problems of text and ontology at its base. The 
questions one cannot ask are the questions that search engines and fact 
engines do not answer. The question of how one can know more and improve 
one’s knowledge, is the question neither one can answer. The question of 
what another person thinks or would think, or, more generally, of what is 
thought and would be thought, may be answered in some aspects, but the 
fact-information has to remain doubtful, as it is incomplete, 
decontextualized, and will often be obsolete 76. Quizzing simple, general, 
stable facts, however, has become easier by automatically learnt 
ontologies. Regarding the method of creation, automatic ontology learning 
has a counterpart in Douglas Lenat’s Cyc project77. The Cyc ontology is a 
very huge and very sophisticated handcrafted ontology of common knowledge 
(meaning that logic experts and domain experts were the same people). It is 
said to be the world’s largest body of knowledge represented in logic. And 
it was quite expensive to produce 78 . As common knowledge ontology, it 
presupposes stability of facts and rules. Cyc is criticized in the AI 
                         
76 Tom Mitchell, a famous machine-learning expert, for example, recently admitted (Mitchell, 
2012) that his NELL (Never-Ending Language Learner) ontology learning tool has even 
problems in deciding who is the present president of the US. Not that this were a difficult 
problem to solve for a machine-learning expert, but it reflects the low semantic 
dimensionality and the effects of de-contextualization of beliefs collected by extraction 
patterns and machine learning algorithms. 
77 For an overview, see en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyc (accessed on 28.08.2012).  
78 Börner (Börner, 2005), for example, notes that … 
The Cyc project was funded over 20 years with $25 million Artificial 
Intelligence research dollars. It is a 600 person per year effort that 
assembled a knowledge base containing 3 million rules of thumb that the 
average person knows about the world, plus 300,000 terms or concepts nodes 
(a typical person is assumed to have about 100 million concepts). 
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community for not having delivered any useful applications. It lacks the 
variety of automatically learnt facts of Internet-scale ontologies, which, 
in turn, lack its (micro-)theoretical/logical depth. Cyc did not fulfill 
the dream of natural language understanding. It cannot just start learning 
from texts or conversation. But combining simplistic automatic ontology 
learning and Cyc could certainly improve automatic fact learning (e.g. by 
local/micro-theoretical consistency and plausibility checks) and help to 
represent (more complex) facts in more complex (i.e. adequate) 
structures 79. The fundamental issues would not disappear, though. Neither 
methodology is capable of offering an alternative to domain-expert ontology 
engineering. That is to say that they do not provide a solution to 
knowledge (base) management and the use of knowledge bases in expert/AI 
systems. They, therefore, do also not overcome the practical and 
theoretical problems of written/objective language.  
2.5.3.2.3 Semantic Annotations80 
Another idea of deriving at machine-readable knowledge bases, i.e. 
knowledge bases in a formal syntax, in order to achieve machine 
intelligence on the Internet, is to formalize natural language Web texts, 
by having them manually annotated 81 with metadata. A Semantic Web crawler 
could then read the well-structured metadata without having to try to 
understand the actual natural language text. From my theoretical point of 
view, annotations are language interpretations and their artifacts. 
Consequently, different interpretations in annotations had soon to be 
perceived as mistakes, categorized, for example, into too general 
classifications, miss-classifications, and missing classifications. 82  The 
missing classifications are due to eclectic annotations: Some documents 
will not be annotated at all, and perhaps no document will be fully 
annotated (formalized). Therefore, there have to be dark spots. Texts 
result from language performances. One can assume (for the ease of 
argument) that texts do reflect knowledge structures. Annotations would 
then reflect knowledge structures, too. Manually annotating texts to gain a 
knowledge structure, however, can never be an efficient way of creating a 
formal knowledge base, as knowledge structures that are expressed are 
                         
79 Doug Foxvog (Foxvog, 2011) remarks that … 
It [Cyc] distinguishes linguistic components from the classes, relations, 
and individuals which they may denote. A single word/phrase may denote 
multiple terms in the ontology and a single term in the ontology may be 
denoted by multiple words and/or phrases.  
This structure allows for recognizing cases of synonymy and homonymy that are very 
difficult, if not impossible to learn automatically. 
80 This section is based on (Ludwig & O'Sullivan, Deploying Decision Support Systems Using 
Semantic Web Technologies., 2010), a paper that I originally prepared at the Digital 
Enterprise Research Institute in Galway in 2005. 
81 See, e.g., (Handschuh & Staab, 2003).   
82 (Erdmann & et al., 2000) 
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likely to be expressed, on average, more than once. Instead of annotating 
texts, it would be more effective and more efficient to annotate 
(formalize) knowledge structures directly, maybe supported by reading a 
text, if memory needed to be aided. An annotation is a reference structure, 
referring a natural language word or phrase to a corresponding formal 
concept or statement. If the metadata (i.e. the formal data describing the 
natural language text) is already given, one does not first have to create 
it. It would suffice to select it or even apply it automatically (which 
presupposes natural language understanding, though; that is it is not 
feasible without errors and ambiguities). To escape the inefficiencies of 
annotation, the idea of a semi-automatic annotation83 was quickly born, and 
greeted with understandable skepticism: 
Will […] metadata have to be annotated manually, or will 
they be derived automatically? A fashionable answer to this 
dilemma is semi-automatic annotation, i.e. a combination of 
automatic derivation and manual annotation. But unless the 
exact division of labor between manual and automatic 
processes is specified, it is difficult to judge the 
feasibility of this approach. 
(Quantz & Wichmann, 2004) 
An automatic pre-annotation will need evaluation and (manual) verification 
of the metadata referenced. A manual annotation, on the other hand, might 
use techniques such as auto-complete or auto-suggest of inputs, generating 
(parts of) metadata automatically during search or direct expression. In 
other words, no single annotation can be fully automated in semi-automatic 
annotation. The promise of semi-automation can only be one of increased 
efficiency per annotation (if it wants to avoid the drawbacks of fully 
automated annotation). The ratio of knowledge structures referenced in 
annotation to knowledge structures expressed (in the underlying ontology), 
however, is likely to be greater than one. The inefficiency of annotations 
increases by this factor. This does not even take into account that 
creating an ontology by annotations, per se, consists of a double workload: 
first writing and then annotating (which prevents most text authors from 
annotation in the first place). To be fair, the early Semantic Web 
movement, an incarnation of the AI movement in the Internet age, initiated 
by Tim Berners-Lee84, had dreamt of being able to search the World Wide Web 
semantically. They did not perceive of annotating as of a means of ontology 
engineering. However, for several reasons, it turned out to be unrealistic 
to think that a few central standardized ontologies could provide the means 
to formalize the knowledge encapsulated in all of WWW’s documents. First, 
the annotator is forced to become an ontology engineer, if he is not to be 
                         
83 See (Erdmann, Maedche, Schnurr, & Staab, 2001). 
84 (Berners-Lee, 1998) 
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limited by the limited views of a few centralistic engineers and their 
ontologies or ontology schemata. Second, using an existing ontology (schema 
and/or data) would presuppose that the annotator knows about the ontology 
(perhaps even selecting it from a choice of alternative ontologies first), 
has access to the ontology, understands the ontology, shares the ideas and 
beliefs expressed in the ontology, is able to extend the ontology if 
needed, and is able to combine the ontology with other (prescribed) 
ontologies as needed. Due to these practical problems, it became clear that 
many decentralized ontologies would (have to) be created in different 
knowledge-domain communities. Accordingly, soon, manual (and, of course, 
semi-automatic) ontology-mapping 85  and ontology management systems 86  were 
perceived as important infrastructural components to manage distributed 
ontologies. Merging different ontologies poses the same (often-
insurmountable) problems as creating a shared ontology. Ideas and 
convictions do not always and do not even often match. It became clear (and 
I think Plato/Socrates would have appreciated it,) that ontology management 
systems ought to support forms of actual debate.87 The embedding of such a 
debate in trying to agree on ontologies for Web document annotations, 
however, was unfortunate, because the idea of annotations on the Web never 
took off. It was flawed from the beginning (creating annotations, as I have 
tried to explain) to the end (using annotations). To use annotations in 
order to query/search documents, as Stefan Decker had pointed out 88 early 
on, one has to actually know and understand the ontology (schema/data) used 
for indexation in order to be able to formulate a semantic query. Unless 
one is happy to be reduced to a keyword-search-box interface, which reduces 
semantic search to keyword search, though. Now, I think that, logically, 
any (Web) ontology used for annotation or indexation has to resemble or 
actually be a personal (or fully personally shared) ontology, in order to 
be used in semantic queries. The seemingly paradox consequence would be 
that this, more or less, reduces semantic querying to self-annotated (pre-
interpreted) resources, because only if a text is annotated (interpreted) 
in the way one implicitly interprets it in one’s semantic query, one would 
be able to use one’s own semantic knowledge structures as tools for 
reliably selecting external resources (from the Web). In all other cases, 
we are thrown back to forms of a more or less ambiguous matching of 
language artifacts. Therefore, it cannot astonish if we learn that semantic 
querying based on annotations lives on in combinations of personal ontology 
management and personal document management, namely in personal semantic 
wikis 89  and personal semantic desktops 90 , while the bulk of Semantic Web 
                         
85 See, e.g., (Maedche, Motik, Silva, & Volz, 2002). 
86 See, e.g., www.artificialmemory.net/artificialmemory.aspx?ID=4902 (accessed on 
29.08.2012) for a selection of different ontology management systems.  
87 For an early example of a Web ontology discussion tool, see Tadzebao (Domingue, 1998).  
88 (Decker, 2002) 
89 For an overview on (Personal) Semantic Wikis see en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semantic_wiki 
(accessed on 29.08.2012). Semantic personal knowledge management using the Artificial 
Memory prototype was discussed first in (Ludwig, O'Sullivan, & Zhou, Artificial Memory 
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research moved on to Linked (Open) Data 91. The latter promises quick wins 
(as does automatic ontology learning), working around (or, rather, 
ignoring) the unsolved problems of ontology engineering that stem, as I 
have argued, from a traditional misconception of language that seems to be 
effective in conceptions of document technology and Artificial 
Intelligence. Linked Data does not require annotations, because it reuses 
existing databases (which are, basically, technically enforced, 
artificially stabilized, and therefore, in practice, often very problematic 
ontologies 92 ). Thus, knowledge management is given up in favor of data 
management. In the same way that huge collections of simple facts by 
automatic ontology learning can be useful, linking (integrating) data can 
be useful. But the lack of actually knowing (the meaning) of the data will 
have to be concealed in endless simplifications, more or less arbitrary 
standardizations, abstract data aggregations (perhaps using artificial 
descriptive measures), or in de-labeled, bird’s eye view visualizations. 
All of these de-semanticized outputs and respective systems will have their 
merits, but all of these outputs, at the same time, will restrict and have 
to redefine their use in natural-language-based cognitive-technological 
substitution processes. Information technology enforces its (or, more 
precisely, others’) structures and functioning due to a lack of ontological 
correspondence. Technological usability, at its core, is an ontological 
endeavor. Intended technological functions are based on actuation 
correspondence, often to be best achieved by natural-language-based 
parameterization. 
2.5.3.2.4 Artificial Intelligence 
The dominant vision of the Artificial Intelligence movement within the 
information sciences is an autonomous, intelligent agent, acting as if 
human. A typical presentation of these ideas can be found in Stan 
Franklin’s artificial minds (Franklin, 1997). However, after decades of 
research, there is, to the best of my knowledge, no generally intelligent 
agent software achieving anything beyond the ELIZA effect93. The term Eliza 
effect goes back to Joseph Weizenbaum’s 1966 chatterbot Eliza 94 . Eliza 
mimicked a psychotherapist, by presenting phrases as answers to user 
                                                                            
Prototype for Personal Semantic Subdocument Knowledge Management (PS-KM)., 2004). A recent 
discussion of personal knowledge models using semantic technologies can be found in 
(Völkel, 2010).  
90 See, e.g., Leo Sauermann’s Ph.D. thesis (Sauermann, 2009), who, together with Stefan 
Decker, is a pioneer of semantic desktop research. 
91 See, e.g., en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linked_data (accessed on 29.11.2012). 
92 Static databases are known for serious issues because users tend to use fields 
(concepts/properties) for other information than originally intended if things change; or 
they re-use obsolete fields for new purposes without this going noticed; or they introduce 
unstructured, inconsistent metadata into data fields, which prevents the information from 
being filterd and aggregated. A basic idea of semantic technology is (or, rather, was) that 
of bridging the information-technological gap between knowledge in structured databases and 
knowledge in unstructured documents.  
93 See en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ELIZA_effect (accessed on 30.08.2012). 
94 See en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ELIZA (accessed on 30.08.2012). 
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inputs, phrases that would pretend empathy and taking the perspective of 
the computer user. The software, basically, is a swindle, parodying a 
psychotherapist, without any serious attempt to understand the text input. 
Weizenbaum, however, noted that Eliza induced delusional thinking. Well, 
the delusional conclusion of actually talking to somebody is easy to 
understand, as Eliza used sophisticated natural language statements (not 
actually produced by the program) that were interpretable and consequently 
interpreted, which, as I argue, is a cognitive-technological process of 
commonly very strong correspondence. The Eliza effect is, therefore, but a 
natural language-technology effect, which is not actually a weakness, but 
an essential strength of humans and an amazing thought-creating memory-
effect of language (artifacts). The people communicating with Eliza showed 
empathy with the writer of the phrases (Weizenbaum) and took his 
perspective. That this was a more or less pre-thought dialogue between 
Weizenbaum and whoever was to read his language-thoughts, did not become 
obvious because Weizenbaum made strong use of questions in order to avoid 
being questioned. One is fully entitled to attribute intelligence to the 
creator of questions such as Do you think coming here will help you not to 
be unhappy?93. The misattribution is simply due to being deceived about the 
true origin of the phrases, creating a form of animism that I have marked 
before as demonstrating the generalization potential of processes of shared 
attention and shared intention to naturally occurring processes and their 
naturally causative objects [see 2.1.5 Determinants of Technology, p. 19]. 
This time, however, the animism refers to artificial objects and processes, 
which leaves the original creator in the dark. Weizenbaum’s own and others’ 
misconception of the Eliza effect was that they attributed Eliza to create 
the delusion, while it was actually created by Weizenbaum in a cognitive-
technological substitution-process. The conception of the Eliza effect is 
mistaken at the same level as the misconception of people communicating 
with Eliza. Any language (or, more generally, cognitive-technological) 
artifact capable of creating a technological process of correspondence, 
created or could have created this illusion before. Generalizing this, one 
might simply name it artificial epistemic uncertainty (instead of calling 
it Eliza effect). We do not know who really wrote the euphoric newspaper 
article about the latest generation of insecticides that allegedly will 
help stop the hunger in the world’s poorest countries. We may be tempted to 
assume it comes from an editor of the newspaper, while it is more likely 
that it stems from the PR-department or PR-contractor of an agrochemical 
enterprise. We do not know who really wrote the text that the radio speaker 
pretends to originate, and that most people will believe to be his own. And 
we do not know who thought up the table calculation function that lets us 
sum up the numbers in a column. To computer-illiterate people it will 
appear as if the computer just does it. In a digitized world, a world in 
which cognitive-technological substitution-processes and artifacts are 
reflected digitally, that is to say, in a (near-)future world generating an 
Internet of things and functions, society should require that any artifact 
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apt of raising cognitive-technological processes ought to be marked 
epistemically as to enable to track back who enabled or intended the 
respective cognitive-technological processes, not only direct-causatively, 
but along the complete historic causal chain. 
With regard to content technology, for example, text should indicate where 
it was taken from and who originally authored it, or, even better, it 
should be transcluded 95 instead of being copied or cited. The interesting 
idea of transclusion does not have to be limited to content. Web Services 
can be seen as a form of functional transclusion. Complex networks of Web 
Services can be built. However, there are problems to this, as Fensel 
observed: 
Web services can be accessed and executed via the Web. 
However, all these service descriptions are based on semi-
formal natural language descriptions. Therefore, the human 
programmer must be kept in the loop, and the scalability as 
well as economy of Web services are limited. Bringing them 
to their full potential requires their combination with 
Semantic Web technology. 
(Fensel, 2003, S. 126) 
The idea of Semantic Web Services is to describe the modular functions 
given by Web Services in a machine-readable form (as a formal ontology), so 
that they can be discovered, parameterized, orchestrated, and executed 
automatically.96 This is very similar to the society of task-specific, more 
or less autonomous agents that Marvin Minsky imagined 97 , inspired by 
Selfridge’s Pandemonium theory (Selfridge, 1959). Instead of a stimulus-
driven bottom-up process, however, the orchestration of Semantic Web 
Services is an instruction-driven top-down process that has to start with 
the expression of a formal intention at one point. It represents, in terms 
of the cognitive-technological model introduced in this thesis, a formal-
language-based cognitive-technological actuation process. Semantic Web 
Services are, indeed, services. - The problem with AI agents is that it is 
unclear how artificial, non-living agents, without natural drives, should 
                         
95  Ted Nelson’s original conception of hypertext included the technology of transclusion 
(Nelson, 1995), i.e. binding small pieces of text/other digital artifacts into different 
hypertext documents, in a way that when a transcluded content element changes, it will 
change in all respective documents). In modern Internet technology, transclusion is only 
given as rectangular frames within web pages; it is not part of the technology-
infrastructure of the Internet/WWW, and, thus, cannot be used efficiently for epistemic 
marking. I think it is a misfortune that the great societal importance of epistemic markers 
for enabling eusocially corrective, de-manipulative actions is overshadowed, in particular, 
by the ambitions of a pre-digital copyright industry, and, in general, by strong resistance 
from private organizations which are used to disguise their activities by lobbying and 
marketing. The chains of cognitive-technological processes need to become visible in 
content and functional technologies before the eusocial senses of justice, of empathy and 
cooperation can be applied effectively.      
96 See (Fensel, Triple-based Computing (DERI Research Report 2004-05-31), 2004). 
97 See (Minsky, 1988). 
Extended Artificial Memory 
[89] 
acquire intentions and goals if they were not first given to them (at least 
in a basic form). If agents were given goals, however, it would be wrong to 
consider them autonomous. In the worst, they will become cognitive-
technological substitution-processes out of control, originated from 
abstruse, shortsighted ideas of inventors. Traditional AI agents are 
technological risks, and not something one should strive for. They give up 
the actuator-substitutor correspondence of the technological double-
process, which can give way into a harmful (substitution) process. The 
autonomy of such a process is just another artificial epistemic 
uncertainty, which unmasks AI as a form of animism, irrespective of whether 
one considers symbolic, connectionist or another strain of AI. Keeping 
correspondence up is also a challenge to Semantic Web Services. Whether a 
particular sub-service is available, or not, whether an alternative service 
would still be acceptable, whether the result of the Semantic Web Services 
substitution process can match the expectations, all these questions and 
their answers need be reflected in actuator-substitutor correspondence, to 
keep the technological double-process intact. Semantic Web Services (or, 
more generally, goal-given systems of interacting agents) are defined as 
self-contained, self-describing, semantically marked-up software resources 
that can be published, discovered, composed, and executed across the Web in 
a task driven automatic way 98. In the use cases of Semantic Web Services 
(SWS) research, the task is normally dealt with as a given task, meaning 
that the task is pre-formalized by the researchers, even if the contrary is 
claimed:  
[…] the Customer specifies its request in natural language 
and the request is translated into machine-readable form and 
processed […] automatically. 
(Stollberg & et al., 2004)  
In consideration of the limitations of natural language processing, what 
this claim actually does, is that it ignores all problems of ontology 
engineering (to which I have tried to give some prominence). A SWS/AI 
researcher might admit the discrepancy between claim and fact, but, at the 
same time, stress that it is good scientific custom to isolate a problem 
(i.e. SWS) and to deal with it in isolation of other problems. This would 
be correct, given that the problems can be separated without changing the 
nature of the problem, which I doubt. The reason why the problem of 
formalizing a task and executing a task cannot be separated is that the 
essence of a task-driven technological process is it being task-driven, 
which presupposes a high degree of correspondence between an actuator 
process and the corresponding substitution process, which, in turn, 
presupposes a certain degree of ontology-based synchronicity. Thanks to 
programming languages, it is not (anymore, or, at least, not all too) 
                         
98 (Stollberg & et al., 2004) 
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difficult to design a technological substitution process to deliver the 
programmer’s knowledge and to act out the programmer’s thoughts. The 
difficulty of designing tools enabling cognitive-technological substitution 
processes is to have these processes act according to other people’s 
knowledge and thoughts, in cognitive-technological double-processes of 
close correspondence. Therefore, the problem of SWS (more generally, AI-) 
automaticity should not be separated from the problem of ontology 
engineering. It is a big step forward, but not enough, to have things act 
as one wants or as one thinks others want them to act. The gist of 
artificial intelligence (functional substitution) and artificial knowledge 
(content) is to conduct substitution processes and present content as 
expected; that is in accordance with the memory states and, based on these, 
states of thought and will of the actuator. AI services, therefore, must 
indeed be dialogues. Optionally, they may as well substitute dialogues, 
which is a less obvious, but more powerful option; an option, however, that 
would require accessing the actuator’s memory structures and inferring 
potential responsive thought structures. AI, thus, is really about creating 
the knowledge and intelligence of an actuator in artificial forms. Today’s 
programmers can create and momentarily invoke artificially intelligent 
processes, following the programmer’s path of thoughts as given at the 
moment of their expression; but the tools programmers create are not 
artificially intelligent, not even for themselves. Software-code text does 
not automatically update to reflect the programmer’s thought and memory 
changes. At present, artificial intelligence is restricted in two ways: 
first, to the programmer, and, second, to the moment of creation and 
enduring correspondence-able [korrespondenzfähig] conduction of the 
respective software-enabled substitution process. That software sources are 
given as normal (though very formal and formally restricted) text, raises 
the same difficulties and offers the same advantages as any other written 
language artifacts. One accomplishment of the Semantic Web Service idea is 
to stress the importance of formalizing program/service descriptions for 
better service mechanization. In this thesis, so far, I have re-framed the 
problem of artificial intelligence in such a way that it leads me to 
believe that it has to be tackled from the side of artificial content, 
regardless of whether the actuator is a programmer dealing with programs 
(i.e. creating artificial intelligence tools), or some other actuator 
corresponding with other content. Substituting technological dialogues, 
which I identified as the core challenge and main chance of artificial 
intelligence, would require a formal, explicit memory of any eligible 
actuator at any time. In other words, if we are willing and it proves to be 
possible to equate explicit memory (which is to some degree explicit 
artificial memory) to ontology, the problem of AI would demand for up-to-
date personal ontologies. This brings us back to the problem of ontology 
engineering. And it reminds us of attempts of language acquisition 
recording and life-recording that we have discussed before [see 2.3.1]. 
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2.5.3.2.5 Controlled Natural Language 
An alternative to ontology engineering assisted by logic experts are 
approaches of Controlled Natural Language (CNL)99:  
Controlled Natural Languages are subsets of natural language 
whose grammars and dictionaries have been restricted in 
order to reduce or eliminate both ambiguity and complexity. 
(Davis, Handschuh, Cunningham, & Tablan, 2006) 
Logic syntaxes tend to make heavy use of short abstract symbols (primarily 
for logical operators) that have to be learnt and remembered in order to be 
able to read a logic statement. The short operator symbols are thus easy to 
read by logic experts (who will use them frequently), but not by domain 
experts (who would use them infrequently). However, if symbols are 
translated/translatable into natural language expressions, and if 
syntactical structures of logic notation are aligned with natural language 
syntax structures, then it is easier for the domain expert to read and 
express them. In this case, a computable form is gained by an exact mapping 
of natural language statements to logic statements. Thus, CNL becomes a 
formal notation for logic. Even though the natural language statement has 
to be parsed and interpreted (due to the discontinuation of logical syntax 
markers in CNL and due to possible degrees of freedom in the syntactical 
structure of CNL), translating back (by reverse mapping) from the 
computable form gained by parsing and interpreting the original natural 
language statement, an independent natural language statement can be 
generated for translation verification by the domain expert, without any 
intervention by a logic expert needed. The approach of CNL is similar to 
formalizing familiar/natural diagram types to make them machine-
readable/machine-interpretable. Controlled Natural Language does not solve 
the problem of reductionism in logics. It still has to be learnt in order 
to avoid misinterpretations on the side of the domain expert. And it does 
not tackle the problems of synonymy, polysemy and homonymy prevailing in 
human natural language expressions. Neither does it imply any usable 
presentation form of complexes of CNL statements. Even if it seems possible 
to present CNL statements as sequential text, the specific (restricted, 
reduced, verification-demanding, interactive) form of CNL statements makes 
it unlikely that they will be used in the context of or even instead of 
normal (rich) human natural language text. It seems more appropriate to use 
CNL in task-specific or presentation-specific human computer interfaces, 
i.e. in command forms (for instructional text) or diagrammatic (e.g. 
tabular, hierarchical, graph) forms (for diagrammatic reasoning and 
knowledge representation).  
                         
99  See (Sowa, Controlled Natural Languages For Semantic Systems, 2009) for a broader 
discussion.  
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2.5.3.2.6 Visual language 
Formalized visual language is a type of CNL. Syntactical structures are 
supported by visual structures (instead of using symbolic-character 
markers). Natural language is allowed in form of labels of spatial entities 
(e.g. shapes, fields, frames, 2D/3D objects) representing syntactical 
entities (e.g. subject, object, predicate, quantifier, operator/connecting 
words etc.). Current UML diagrams in software development, for example, are 
aimed at bridging the gap between software engineers (logic experts) and 
requirement engineers or subject matter experts (domain experts), forming a 
kind of project ontology. UML diagrams represent specific (partial) 
ontology schemes that are instantiated in specific (partial) graphical 
interfaces. Because of their purely diagrammatic origin, their late 
formalization, and their limited domain of application, they are not 
normally recognized as an instance of CNL, and, therefore, not normally 
associated with problems of ontology engineering and static language 
artifacts. Argumentation Support Systems100 are further interesting examples 
of visual CNL. Complex debates, forming networks of arguments and counter-
arguments, of supportive and non-supportive evidence, of supporters and 
opponents, are difficult to track in free sequential text. Their 
visualization in graphs (nodes-and-links diagrams) by natural-language-
labeled nodes and natural-language-labeled links demonstrates a simple 
triple-structured CNL. Visual triples of node-link-node structure represent 
controlled-natural-language subject-predicate-object structures. Semantic 
triples are often-used structures that can be matched with propositional or 
predicate calculus. 101  If graphically represented entities and relations 
come unlabeled, iconized or expressed in spatial complexes, the naturalness 
of visual CNL will suffer and visual CNL will start resembling a graphical 
logic notation. Charles Sanders Peirce’s existential graphs (and their 
different successors) are examples of such a graphic notation, which is 
supposed to be visually intuitive. The differences between a visual CNL and 
a graphic notation may appear marginal at first glance. Both graphic 
formats may show labels and shapes. In case of a graphic notation, however, 
the meaning of the shapes goes beyond marking vocal language entities and 
syntactical structures. A graphic notation cannot be read in the way a 
                         
100 See (Kirschner, Buckingham Shum, & Carr, 2003).  
101  However, Hermann Helbig, an expert in natural language processing, had some serious 
doubts about being able to, in general, formalize natural language statements by simply 
relating them to predicate logic (Helbig, 2001, S. 86):  
Dieses Vorgehen hat aber verschiedene Nachteile logischer Art: 
1. Stelligkeit: wegen der unterschiedlichen Anzahl von Konstituenten, die 
zu einem Verb treten können, müßten die Verb-Relatoren variable 
Stelligkeiten besitzen, was in der Logik nicht zulässig ist. 
2. Stufigkeit: wegen der sehr häufig vorkommenden Referenzen auf Satz- 
bzw. Gliedsatzinhalte müßten deren logischen Bedeutungskonstrukte durch 
Namen benennbar sein, die wieder als Argumente von Relationen auftreten 
dürfen. 
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visual CNL is read, which, in the main, enables de-sequential, dynamic 
reading patterns; it has to be visually interpreted, integrating natural 
language labels and a distinct visual object layer. Graphic or spatial 
arrangements can simplify perception and internal computation, offering the 
chance of an intelligent, shared use, as Andy Clark puts it: 
Human language is itself notable both for its open-ended 
expressive power and for its ability to reduce the 
descriptive complexity of the environment. Reduction of 
descriptive complexity, however achieved, makes new 
groupings available for thought and action. In this way, the 
intelligent use of space and the intelligent use of language 
form a mutually reinforcing pair, pursuing a common 
cognitive agenda. 
(Clark, 2008, S. 65)  
In a hierarchical organization of labels, for example, the spatial 
relations could directly express category membership, without any explicit 
verbalization needed. The category tree is a graphic notation forming a 
word-associative field, re-arranging (and reducing) sequential verbal 
syntactic structure of natural language propositions into an overview that 
can be used to traverse pathways of category sub-, cross- or co-membership. 
The crucial advantage of de-sequential (de-verbalized) word-arrangements is 
that new (sequential) relations become obvious (such as those between 
siblings / co-members of a category) and, therefore, also associable. 
Graphic notations, thus, have a high creative potential. The momentary 
(i.e. existing only during the graphic representation) artificial co-
structure between a natural-language-word structure and a particular 
semantic spatial structure can lead up to a perceptively restructured field 
of word-to-word-associations and a correspondingly restructured sense-
field. The depicted category hierarchy (and any similar graphic notation), 
therefore, forms a momentary, perceptible artificial memory. This co-
structural artificial memory is not imaginative, as were those artificial 
memories created by ars memorativa, but directly experiential. Compared to 
artificial memories created by mnemotechnics, their function is not 
restricted to improved remembrance. The representation of semantic spatial 
relations in a graphic notation may result in the implicit creation of new, 
meaningful (and more or less useful), discoverable spatial relations. In 
that reflective-creative respect, graphical notations resemble text. In the 
method of loci, it is necessary to imagine locations and their spatial 
sequence, which represents the sequence of the things that are to be 
remembered. Loci can be learnt. A category tree, as an example of a useful 
graphic notation, is not to be learnt by imagining a particular tree with 
branches, as a variation of the loci in the method of loci. It would be 
impossible (or at least very inefficient) to accommodate such a concrete 
image to fit the different requirements of category hierarchies. A good 
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graphic notation is learnt by understanding the syntacto-semantic values of 
its spatial organization (a kind of graphic-notation literacy). An instance 
of a graphic notation, that is a graphic using the notation, does not 
represent a learnable (memorable) graphical unit. The effect of reading 
(and interpreting) the graph is on both the word-field and sense-field 
level, and not on any graphic level. There would be no (or little) use in 
memorizing graphs. Graphic notations are a combination of framed 
sequentially written language (labels) and syntacto-semantic visual 
relations. They are not iconographic or pictorial (such as most proprietary 
infographics), even if they make use of icons and non-character symbols to 
thin out the natural language proportion in a graph in order to increase 
its reading efficiency (by increasing the effort needed to learn the 
notation, though). By now, we understand that the main purpose of visual 
language, be it visual CNL or graphic notations, ought to be the formation 
of inner language-based artificial memory, besides serving as a text-like 
(although desequentialized, networked, spatially organized) outer memory-
aid. One should not forget that visual language, like vocal or sequentially 
written language, depends on codification. The difference between, on one 
hand, visual, depictive art (even if involving written language elements), 
which often mimics or abstracts complex situational or sequential visual 
perceptions, and, on the other hand, visual language is that depictions 
are, first and foremost, directly, experientially perceptible and 
interpretable, whereas the meaning of visual language has to be perceived 
indirectly, by means of the spatially organized language, which makes the 
formation of co-structural engrams more likely. In practice, this 
difference often uses to blur, demanding for semantic fusion 102 of visual 
language elements and pictorial elements, which may involve complex memory- 
and thought-processes to resolve conflicting interpretations or to make 
sense in the first place. The fundamental cognitive difference between both 
forms of visualization is not normally understood and taken into 
consideration. And so, supported by a general tendency for using eye candy 
to attract and keep attention, what I call visual language, more often than 
not, is destroyed by integrating numerous images and relaxing the 
necessarily strict semanto-syntactic spatial organization of graphic 
notations, thus rendering the results unusable for efficient, learnt 
technologies of artificial memory creation and memory aiding. Even though 
Robert E. Horn, who is one of the few people who dealt specifically with 
integrating language and images (what he calls visual language), remarks 
                         
102 A term coined by Robert E. Horn (Horn, 1999, S. 97) in his book on visual language:  
We know a lot about cognitive processes involved in making meaning, but we 
do not understand fully how semantic integration takes place in thought. 
[…] How does the brain combine all the different elements of the message 
to create an integrated meaning? I call the process of making meaning out 
of the tight integration of words, images and shapes 'semantic fusion'. 
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that without an integration with words and/or shapes, images are only 
conventional visual art, not visual language […] (Horn, 1999, S. 7), visual 
language, in my definition of visual CNL and graphic language notations, 
best exists without an integration with images, at least if it were to be 
understood as an advanced tool for language-based artificial memory, aimed 
at overcoming the restrictions of sequential text. Horn’s visual language, 
in contrast, is a hot medium, with images and written language occupying 
the visual sense, leaving less room for memory re-structuring by indexical 
language-co-structuring. His visual-language diagrams can be better 
representations […] because the indexing of this information can support 
extremely useful and efficient computational processes (Horn, 1999, S. 
124). It seems that the usefulness of integrating images and written 
language lies primarily in avoiding pictorial ambiguity for improved visual 
inference, which is a form of pre-language(-indexed) and language-
independent thought. This leaves us with a more visual visual language (for 
visual inference and visual memory-indexation) and a more language visual 
language (for language inference and language memory-indexation). 
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2.6 LANGUAGE-KNOWLEDGE STRUCTURES 
2.6.1  SEMANTIC NETWORKS 
2.6.1.1 Common Semantic Network Components 
Helbig characterizes terms [Begriffe] by three components103: 1. a word or 
phrase label. 2. A set of relations to other terms. 3. A perceptual (in 
most cases: visual) pattern. Semantic Networks comprise component (1) and 
(2), but not (3). Neural networks do model component (3), but not (1) and 
(2). 104 A combination of (1), (2), and (3) in knowledge representation is 
still missing and would be, according to Helbig, a great leap forward. The 
meaning of (2), the set of relations amongst terms, is left unclear. Are 
these relations between (1), words (forming vocal patterns), or are these 
relations between (3), perceptual patterns. If the relations can be labeled 
(termed), they must be between (3), as a relation-term (perhaps a verb or a 
property name) has itself a meaning. However, what would be the relation 
between a term and the semantic relation that binds it to another term. If 
one were not to invent yet another term (which simply would perpetuate the 
problem of relations between terms), one would have to admit (eventually) 
that it can only be (or have the meaning of) a direct relation between two 
words by a direct relation of their concepts. Hence, words can be directly 
associated or indirectly associated. Consequently, there must be a word 
field of semantically directly associated words and a word field of 
semantically indirectly associated words. Correspondingly, there must be a 
sense field of directly and indirectly associated word senses corresponding 
to directly and indirectly related words. If two words were directly 
                         
103 (Helbig, 2001, S. 19):  
Begriffe und ihre Beziehungen zueinander sind wesentliche Strukturelemente 
des kognitiven Apparates und damit auch der Bedeutungsrepränsentation 
natürlichsprachiger Informationen. Ein Begriff lässt sich im allgemeinen 
durch drei Komponenten charakterisieren: 
1. ein Wort oder eine Wortgruppe, die den Begriff bezeichnen und die ihn 
nach außen, d.h. in der sprachlichen Kommunikation vertreten (das 
sogenannte Wortetikett); 
2. eine Gesamtheit von Beziehungen zu anderen Begriffen; 
3. ein komplexes Muster perzeptuellen (meist visuellen) Ursprungs. 
104 (Helbig, 2001, S. 19): 
Semantische Netze versuchen gerade die ersten beiden Komponenten zu 
beschreiben. Neuronale Netze sind dagegen sehr gut geeignet, den dritten 
Aspekt zu modellieren. Ihnen fehlt aber weitestgehend die Einbindung der 
ersten beiden Komponenten. Aus der Vereinigung dieser Entwicklungslinien, 
die zur Zeit noch aussteht, ließe sich ein wesentlicher Fortschritt auf 
dem Gebiet der Wissensrepräsentation und der kognitiven Modellierung 
erzielen. 
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(vocally, as a rule) associated, they could correspond to a single sense 
pattern. In this case, the two words represent a single term, as the term 
is defined by it representing a singular concept. At the same time, the two 
words might also represent two separate concepts. Two associated words, 
representing two different terms, implies that their senses are associated, 
too. As long as the two respective sense patterns share qualities (are 
concept-wise interrelated or relatable), the two concepts could be 
differentiated by relational terms, that is they would if the associated 
words would be indirectly related. Now, there are two interesting cases: 
First, two associated words without their concepts being related in any 
way, besides perhaps being evoked at the same time by their associated 
denoting words. One could argue that this conceptual coincidence would or 
could establish a (weak) concept-association, following the Aristotelian 
idea of association by contiguity. Second, two associated words with their 
concepts being directly related (i.e., in a non-differentiable way), 
because differentiability would mean relatability by differentiation. One 
could argue (from a logical point of view) that two different concepts are 
always well differentiable, namely by all their (non-shared) qualities (in 
the sense of property a of concept A not being part of concept B). This, 
however, is a phenomenological and, consequently, cognitive-psychological 
misunderstanding. Such a logical property comparison and relational 
negation is a creative, constructive thought-schema that first has to be 
applied before cognitively taking effect. This means that, de facto, 
cognitively, at any pre-logical or pre-analytical moment of instantiation 
of different concepts by associated words, the differences can only form 
around actual similarities (something both concepts relate to) between two 
concepts/sense-patterns105, if it does not yet exist by prior experiential 
contiguity. Association by dissimilarity is, thus, the same as association 
by similarity. We will later discuss Richard Semon’s unifying concept of 
homophony, which reduced different types of association to a single memory-
mechanism (even rejecting similarity as a form of direct association, as it 
takes effect indirectly only). The impression of similarity may stimulate 
semantic differentiation. However, there are as well concepts that 
associate without explicitly differentiating. Opposition is a good example. 
Hot/cold, wet/dry, dark/white are all antonymous pairs of words and 
concepts that are directly associated (word-wise and concept-wise), forming 
extremes of a more or less gradual continuum. One cannot be understood 
without the other, and, oftentimes, one directly contrasts with the other. 
This special direct-associative quality of neighboring perceptual patterns 
can also be found in, for example, whole-part concepts, or transformative 
processes with distinct (conceptual) states. What is important to note is 
that even though it is possible to differentiate these qualitatively 
                         
105  This would also explain why not all non-analytical judgments seem not to be based on 
exhaustive feature comparison. False sentences, for example, can be quickly rejected, which 
contradicts with Smith’s (Smith, Shoben, & Rips, 1974) Feature Comparison Model. 
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neighboring concepts and connect them by a relation, this relation is not 
distinct in the same way an actual similarity or difference is distinct. 
From a phenomenological point of view, there are qualities of perceptual 
patterns (concepts) appearing at the same time (or nearly the same time) 
which develop a specific emergent quality or tension. It is possible to put 
an abstract relation between the two respective words, saying, for example 
that hot is the opposite of cold. In my experience, this would at the same 
time name and, to some degree, destroy the emergent quality, which can be 
felt well in the direct word-combination hot-cold.  
Summing up, systematizing and thus extending this discussion, one can 
postulate a couple of basic word-related association types between (for the 
sake of simplicity: up to two) concepts. These semantic association 
structures can be considered as basic building blocks of semantic networks 
(representations). 
2.6.1.2 Alternative Building Blocks of Semantic Networks 
2.6.1.2.1 Contiguity Associations 
WORD ASSOCIATION 
A (perceived) word association [see Figure 2: Word Association] is an 
association of contiguity between two meaningful words (that is their 
written and/or verbal symbols). 
  
FIGURE 2: WORD ASSOCIATION 
Due to the symbolic function of individual words, a word association 
establishes a likewise conceptual association of contiguity (given 
reference to two separate concepts). Once experienced, a word association 
may (or may not) form a single conceptual unit or a holistic conceptual 
complex, and it may (or may not) establish a lexical unit. The lexical unit 
comes either as a word compound (single-word complex), which is or is not 
related to a conceptual unit/complex, or as a chunk (separate words-
complex), which, for the moment given, has to be thought of as referring to 
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a conceptual unit - by necessity, as it would otherwise not be different to 
the (contiguous) word association introduced here. 
CONCEPT ASSOCIATION 
Concept association [see Figure 3: Concept Association] means the 
association of words by contiguously experienced, already lexicalized or 
lexicalizable concepts. A semantic network containing a sense field (as 
compared to a word-field-only semantic network representation), might 
establish word associations in as much as the given sense field is 
interpretable as a meaning field, that is in as much as there are words 
already symbolizing the (non-word) sensual impressions given. 
 
FIGURE 3: CONCEPT ASSOCIATION 
2.6.1.2.2 Ambiguity Associations 
HOMONYMY ASSOCIATION 
A homonymy association [see Figure 4: Homonymy Association] here is the 
association that can be established between two distinct concepts that are 
symbolized by the same (homonymous) word or word compound. If this 
distinction were not to be restricted to the conceptual level, at least one 
synonym (for concept A or concept B) has to be found, in order to be able 
to differentiate symbolically between concept A and concept B.  
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FIGURE 4: HOMONYMY ASSOCIATION 
SYNONYMY ASSOCIATION 
A synonymy association [see Figure 5: Synonymy Association] is established 
between two words that refer both to the same concept. This word 
association is concept-induced, while the conceptual homonymy association 
was word-induced. A synonymy association is necessary for a homonymy 
association to become expressed symbolically. Synonymy is often created by 
extending word A to also mean what word B means, while word A has another, 
distinct (but often conceptually related) meaning. The synonym Word B can 
thus be used to distinguish the polysemous word A relative to Concept AB. 
Word A could (at the same time) have the same function relative to word B, 
if it also were to be polysemous. 
 
FIGURE 5: SYNONYMY ASSOCIATION 
2.6.1.2.3 Analytical Associations 
WORD COMPOUND ASSOCIATION 
A word compound association [see Figure 6: Word Compound Association] is 
established between two distinct words that together form a compound word. 
A word association may form a word compound with a single, synthetical or a 
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complex meaning. If the two words are separated again, their individual 
meanings may be reinterpreted to form a new, (slightly) different concept 
unit. Thus, there may be cycles between word compound association and word 
association leading to polysemous (re-interpreted) word compounds, in the 
same way as the compound word as a unit is prone to directly meaning-
induced polysemy (e.g., via generalization, specialization). 
 
FIGURE 6: WORD COMPOUND ASSOCIATION 
CONCEPT COMPOUND ASSOCIATION 
A concept compound association [see Figure 7: Concept Compound Association] 
is established between two words if a complex sensual field in the semantic 
network (representation) is perceivable as a composition of two concepts, A 
and B, which are denoted by word A and B respectively. Word A and word B 
become associable via a conceptual compound that was not established by a 
word association before and is representationally different from the 
temporally distinct concepts of a concept association. 
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FIGURE 7: CONCEPT COMPOUND ASSOCIATION 
2.6.1.2.4 Similarity Associations 
WORD-SIMILARITY ASSOCIATION 
A word-similarity association [see Figure 8: Word-Similarity Association] 
is created between two phonologically similar words and between their 
concepts. It is a word association not created by mere contiguity, but by a 
third, the similarity, the shared word fragment (or a phonological 
similarity pattern if there is no shared word fragment, or if there are 
several shared word fragments). For example, the words doable and doing 
both share the word stem do. They are thus also directly and conceptually 
associable (as in this very example). The word association results from the 
generative power of the shared fragment. If the fragment were directly 
perceivable (as an intermediary), there would be first an analytical 
association established (from word A to the shared word fragment AB), 
before a generative-associative word fragment completion could take place 
(from word fragment AB to word B). The word-similarity association, 
however, is not to be understood as a series of associations, but as an 
actual direct association, that can be analytically bridged by a word 
fragment for explanation. The shared word fragment could be a syllable, a 
single morpheme, or a whole word root. It therefore may or may not have a 
meaning of its own. We will have to deal further with similarity 
associations when discussing the concepts of ecphory and homophony. A 
special case of a word-similarity association would be the association 
between word A and word B, where word B is fully contained in word A. This 
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association is implicitly given in any word compound association (as the 
relation between word AB and word A, and between word AB and word B). A 
double word-similarity association is thus implicitly assumed in each word 
compound association.  
  
FIGURE 8: WORD-SIMILARITY ASSOCIATION 
The word-similarity association, in comparison, is explicit and can be more 
diverse in type, as it is not restricted to being a full word stem of a 
multi-word compound. However, in cases of meaningless syllables, of non-
independent word-roots/morphemes or general syntactical markers, an 
analytical word-similarity association is unlikely to be established. 
Instead, a regular word-similarity association to a similar word with a 
stronger semantic valence (i.e., between overlapping words) appears more 
likely. Word type variations such as that between doable and doing will 
often be perceived as direct word-similarity associations because of a co-
variance pattern (relating do to do and able to ing) to be frequently found 
in other word-similarity associations (e.g., changeable and changing).  
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CONCEPT-SIMILARITY ASSOCIATION 
The concept-similarity association [see Figure 9: Concept-Similarity 
Association] establishes a word association by conceptual similarity. 
Concept is here simply understood as what is symbolized by the 
(phonic/graphemic) words. If, in a simple case, a word in graphemic form 
were to symbolize a word in phonic form, a phonic similarity would become a 
conceptual similarity, not simply a word-similarity. For example, two 
homophones might establish an association between two homographs by 
concept-similarity association.  
 
FIGURE 9: CONCEPT-SIMILARITY ASSOCIATION 
 
The more complex or manifold the meanings of words become, the more points 
of contact and shared properties will be available between them, enabling 
first a conceptual and, subsequently, a word association. It is important 
to bear in mind that the similarity associations are not associations based 
on temporal-spatial contiguity, and they are not analytic associations 
based on any experienceable word- or concept-compound. They are also 
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different from non-associative cognitive operations such as a 
generalization (which one would expect to be based on cognitive 
similarity/overlapping, too). 
2.6.1.2.5 Emergent Associations 
Emergent associations are normally overlooked, even if they seem to be very 
important in the semantic-associative realm. At first glance, they may 
appear as mere contiguity or similarity associations. However, the special 
binding power between them is based on a third quality that is not simply 
shared. They are also not to be confused with Aristotle’s association-
principle of dissimilarity, which is confusing and therefore unusable, as 
it resembles the similarity-principle whenever dissimilarity is relative, 
not absolute. If, however, as in cases of natural oppositions, 
dissimilarity is absolute or nearly absolute, the emergent quality of 
dissimilarity is but one of many possible emergent qualities of opposing 
qualities (or oppositions). At this point, I do not want to develop a 
classification scheme of emergent oppositions, but simply point out the 
fundamental importance of this association type as a basic building block 
of a semantic network (representation). 
WORD-EMERGENT ASSOCIATION 
As word-symbols use to be either vocal or abstract-graphical, word-emergent 
associations [see Figure 10: Word-Emergent Association] the emergence is 
restricted to respective vocal or abstract-graphical phenomena/concepts and 
of far less practical relevance as conceptual-emergent associations [see 
next section]. However, conceptual-emergent associations are often 
accompanied by phonic word-emergent associations. Take the opposition of up 
and down (auf und ab), where the specific phonic-articulatory difference 
between the two words clearly creates a word-emergent opposition (somehow 
also reflecting the concept-emergent opposition of moving or looking up and 
down), which indicates a multi-modal emergent opposition of tension (up) 
and relaxation (down), of opening (up) and closing (down). I guess that in 
gestural sign languages there are far more word-emergent associations than 
in written/spoken languages, due to higher-dimensional gestural symbol 
patterns (including motion and three-dimensional temporal-spatial 
relations). The word-emergent association is productive in that it 
generates an association between the corresponding concepts. This 
conceptual association, however, will not be very strong, at least not 
unless the word-symbol opposition is matched by a corresponding concept 
opposition. Optionally, a word opposition can be denoted by a (more or less 
generic) word-symbol. Associating the word-symbol in-between the emergence-
creating words, however, might destroy the specific word-opposition effect. 
There is a significant phenomenological difference between thinking up 
(and) down and up is the opposite of down, with the latter utterance not 
associating up and down to each other, but each to the verbal phrase is the 
opposite of. 
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FIGURE 10: WORD-EMERGENT ASSOCIATION 
CONCEPT-EMERGENT ASSOCIATION 
A concept-emergent association [see Figure 11: Concept-Emergent 
Association] potentially creates an association between corresponding word-
symbols. As the word-emergent association is a special type of concept-
emergent associations (insofar as we abstract from the symbol-function of 
the word and allow a higher-order, e.g. graphemic, symbol to symbolize the 
words), the basic mechanisms at work are not different at all. There is an 
interesting observation to add, however. In concept-emergent associations, 
the directionality of the association is of great importance (more so than 
on word-emergent associations if they are not matched by a concept-emergent 
association). The transitional emergent effect of up-down is clearly 
different from the transitional emergent effect of down-up. The author 
experiences these particular concept-emergent associations as going from 
tension to relaxation and from relaxation to tension respectively. 
Immediate, non-relational [sic] associative bi-directionality is a 
surprising feature of a principally non-contiguous association type (in 
which it resembles similarity associations, while analytical associations 
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will be bidirectional naturally due to contiguity-based chunking). Many 
conceptual oppositions can be expressed by a single word (word A) being 
affixed to form the opposite word (word B). A common example is the 
opposition of negation (or disappearing, dissolving, reversal etc., as in 
doing and un-doing).  
 
FIGURE 11: CONCEPT-EMERGENT ASSOCIATION 
 
In agglutinative languages, certain affixes function as indicators of 
emergent oppositions. This is due to the possibility of manifold 
instantiations of basic oppositions such as negation or opposite 
movements). Many basic oppositions even (in)form syntactical markers of a 
language, as is the case with gender (male versus female) and number 
(single versus many) and they affect different word types (e.g., in 
Russian, less so in German, verbs are frequently prefixed to express 
oppositions). Languages differ in their cultural-syntactical means to 
instantiate oppositions easily by applying ready-to-use syntactical 
schemata. In a radical interpretation, even spatio-temporal oppositions 
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such as before-now and now-then (in future) are of the concept-emergent 
association type, for example in the sense of morphologically evolving from 
(before-now) and evolving into (now-then). 
2.6.1.2.6 Syntacto-Semantic Word/Concept Association 
SYNTACTO-SEMANTIC WORD ASSOCIATION 
The last of our basic associative building blocks is called syntacto-
semantic. It establishes a symbol and/or concept relation by a distinct 
third. This could be, for example, a syntactical marker, a prepositional 
phrase or verb phrase (in linguistic terminology), all interconnecting two 
symbols word A and word B. In Figure 12, the interconnecting unit is called 
relation word. In some special cases, it does not even need a relation 
word, as when in Russian the verb being is often omitted altogether. Still, 
there is a relation present even in these shortened Russian sentences, 
which are built according to a specific syntactical schema (expressing that 
A is a B, and not that B is an A). A syntactical schema corresponds with a 
conceptual schema. Even if the relation word is left out, the relation 
concept is not. The relation symbol(s), if present, do not have to be 
between word A and word B. In principal, any order is possible, restricted 
only by the schematic/syntactical (language) conventions in place, which 
normally help to avoid syntacto-semantic ambiguity. There does not even 
have to be a single relation word only. A syntactical schema may comprise 
several relation words, syntactical markers etc. in a single syntactical 
schema. In one langue a suffixal number-marker relating an adjective to a 
noun will be concatenated to both, adjective and noun, while in another 
language only one of them will be changed, and in a third language no 
explicit relation-indication is needed or there are no means to express 
number at all. Cultural schematic conventions can take many forms. The 
picture is considerably complicated by the possibility of multiple 
superimpositions of syntactical schemata, adding several conceptual 
dimensions at once to the associative constellation of word A and word B. 
This can be accomplished, for example, by affix serializations or special, 
semantically high-dimensional syntactical markers. It is, however, crucial 
to understand that any syntactical schema has to correspond to a conceptual 
schema, and that any number of relation words have to be arranged according 
to their specific syntactical schema(ta). Syntactical markers or 
syntactical words or any relational words (e.g. verb phrases) all seem to 
have one thing in common: they enact a semantic schema by filling word 
variables into a syntactic word(-symbol) schema/template. They are symbol-
triggered modifications (usually specializations) of basic conceptual 
associations (between concept A and concept B, in our example).  
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FIGURE 12: SYNTACTO-SEMANTIC WORD ASSOCIATION 
SYNTACTO-SEMANTIC CONCEPT ASSOCIATION/BLENDING 
In the same way, in which the syntactical schema is simplified in Figure 
12, the semantic schema is (over-)simplified, too. The great variability of 
relation word templates even for but two words to be relationally 
associated is reflected in the great variability of conceptual blending 
that is brought about by the instantiations of word templates. There could 
be much said about the conceptual effects of relation word phrases like is 
a(n) in sentences like This doctor is a God (in short form: God doctor) or 
This doctor is a butcher (in short form: butcher doctor). Conceptual 
blending was analyzed and described as a number of very basic cognitive 
operations by Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner (Fauconnier & Turner, The 
Way We Think - Conceptual Blending and the Mind's Hidden Complexities, 
2002). They see conceptual integration/blending as pervasively at work 
behind the many innovative and imaginative capacities of cognitively modern 
human beings106. 
                         
106  (Fauconnier & Turner, The Way We Think - Conceptual Blending and the Mind's Hidden 
Complexities, 2002, S. 111) 
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We hope to show that the study of blending, like chemistry, 
has the potential to change our view of the world, subsuming 
many disparate phenomena for which we had partial 
descriptions, connecting them, and branching out to discover 
new phenomena we had not seen. Many phenomena for which we 
had partial descriptions - categorization, mathematical 
invention, metaphor, analogy, grammar, counterfactual 
thinking, event integration, various kinds of learning and 
artistic creation, global insight integrating vital 
relations like cause and effect - are products of the same, 
well-defined imaginative operation.  
(Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, S. 90) 
 The conceptual templates mirror cognitive operations of conceptual 
integration. Basic conceptual integrations do not have to have 
corresponding syntactical schemata. However, most conceptual integrations 
are complex cultural relational concepts, such as marriage, employment, 
trading etc. These depend on highly abstract language concepts. Applying 
(e.g., reading/hearing) a syntactical schema (say, A is married to B) 
filled in with two words (the names of two persons, A and B) may trigger a 
complex conceptual integration (or thought) process, resulting in the 
belief that A is the father of B’s children, that A and B live together, 
that A and B know each other etc. This type of integration is relation-
word-associative in the sense that it cannot be triggered by the mere 
conceptual contiguity of the words person A and person B and/or their 
respective concepts. It cannot be directly associative. Other conceptual 
integrations, however, are non-relational. A conceptual blending based on 
similarity, that is, in Fauconnier’s and Turner’s terminology, a conceptual 
blending based on analogical mapping, does not depend on a relational 
association. A similarity association [see Figure 9, p. 104] produces a 
fragment concept and, possibly, a fragment word, namely if a word 
preexisted denoting the fragment concept (forming a word(-symbol)-concept 
complex). There is, however, a remarkable special case. In word-similarity 
associations, the fragment concept is a word-fragment. If it is a 
syntactical marker / morpheme with an attached or attachable semantic 
conceptual fragment, the word similarity association will generate or 
strengthen a syntactical schema. Reusing the shared word fragment across a 
number of word-associations will weaken the relative co-occurrence 
frequency of any non-fragmentary word or word part in the word association. 
This helps increasing the schematicity of fragment words and hierarchically 
built fragment word complexes (i.e., complex syntactical structures). The 
individual acquisition and social evolution of syntax are thus based on 
similarity associations, or, in other words, analogical mappings and, 
subsequently, abstractions potentially generating syntacto-semantic 
relational associations. Fauconnier and Turner regret that … 
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Analogical mapping per se is not part the theoretical 
apparatus; nor is it viewed as part of the child's learning 
apparatus. So, paradoxically, although the child may be 
equipped with vast analogical capacities in all kinds of 
domains, the view of formal linguistics has been that the 
learning of grammar does not involve analogical mapping. 
Rather, to learn the grammar is to induce a productive 
system (the formal grammar) on the basis of innate a priori 
constraints (the universal grammar). Perceived analogy will 
be a by-product of that system, not one of its theoretical 
concepts nor, surprisingly, a means for the child to 
apprehend that system. 
(Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, S. 13) 
Extending Fauconnier’s and Turner’s idea a bit and re-focusing on our 
typology of basic semantic associations, one could say that the analogical 
capacity, that is the capacity to form similarity associations and 
resulting syntactical schemata, is to be understood as a precondition for 
word-based relational-associative conceptual blending/integration. A 
primitive developmental pattern can be theorized: First, contiguity 
associations establish the basic reference between word and concept where, 
in a concept association, word A is concept A, and concept B has no word B. 
At that stage, the word A – concept B association is established, even 
though concept B is the same as word B, because it represents word A as 
well as it is represented by word A. The (usually) vocal word or language-
modality, however, is easily producible by humans in a less disturbing and 
more quality-rich manner than gestures are, whereas the visual modality is 
dominant (always present) in experience. Vocal utterances begin to carry 
visual meaning. Frequent, naturally relevant visual concepts such as number 
and gender begin to form conceptually productive/integrative syntactic 
templates by word-similarity associations. Concept fragments from concept 
similarity associations are being named by fragment concept words, 
potentially gradually creating layers of higher-level abstractions. 
Conceptual- and word-co-occurrences form highly integrative conceptual- and 
word-compounds (complexes) or less integrative (interpretable) conceptual 
and word chunks, which become complex units of syntacto-semantic word-
association and complex conceptual integrations. Analytical associations 
allow for (re-)interpretations of communicated or learnt complex 
words/concepts. Concept-emergent associations work similar to similarity 
associations in that they produce syntactic templates based on words 
denoting basic emergent qualities (e.g., in affixes/markers for negation). 
Ambiguity associations invoke critical reflections needed to disambiguate 
cases of homonymy and synonymy intentionally.  
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2.6.1.3 New Substructures of Semantic Networks 
The complexity gained by relational associations as instantiations of 
syntactical templates consists in a gradually formed relational-associative 
semantic network around relationally associated concepts and words, with 
reifications of these relational associations to express conceptual 
blendings on (ever-)higher levels of expression. Contiguity associations, 
on the other hand, form a complex hierarchy network of compounds and 
chunks, which expresses, not least, staggered meaning specifications in the 
sense of conceptual filtering / slicing and dicing. Similarity 
associations, besides generating syntax, form different levels of 
abstraction. In case of a concept-similarity association, the fragment 
concept word’s independence from the related concept words will often lead 
to a totally dissimilar word being used for the abstraction/similarity 
fragment concept. The similarity-association-induced abstraction hierarchy 
is not to be confounded with the contiguity-association-induced 
compound/chunk hierarchy, even though both are similar in defining more 
general/specific senses, in the first case by conceptual abstraction, in 
the latter case by conceptual cross-sections. 107  These considerations are 
illustrated in Figure 13 (p. 113), which shows how different basic 
association types constitute four major semantic word-structures and 
tentatively depicts their interworkings. Here we see how our analysis of 
the standard semantic network component set of relations to other terms, 
which let us to define a set of different association types as alternative 
building blocks of semantic networks, has brought about a rather different 
conception of semantic networks. This semantic network conception 
represents a significant extension to the standard semantic network model 
in that it identifies largely independent substructures, their forming and 
gradual increase in syntacto-semantic complexity.  
 
                         
107  We’ll later have to discuss this peculiarity that in ontological practice has very 
puzzling effects and to the best of my knowledge is not understood by ontology engineers 
(as it is only indirectly addressed in ontological modeling). In ontology engineering, the 
chunk hierarchy is normally addressed in class hierarchies, while, in some cases at least, 
the abstraction hierarchy is addressed by allowing instances of classes to be classes of 
instances. But there is no coherent practice (or understanding), so that abstraction levels 
and compound/chunk levels get mixed up regularly.   
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 FIGURE 13: BASIC ASSOCIATION TYPES AND RELATED MAJOR SEMANTIC STRUCTURES 
2.6.1.4 Insufficiency of the Common Semantic Network Model  
Helbig’s components of terms (words (1), relations (2), perceptual 
patterns/concepts (3)) reflect the components of semantic networks.  
A semantic network is a directed labeled graph composed of a 
set of nodes and a set of unidirectional edges, and each has 
a name. Nodes represent concepts, instances of concepts and 
property values. Edges represent properties of concepts or 
relationships between concepts. 
(Gómez-Pérez, Fernandez-Lopez, & Corcho, 2004, S. 52) 
Words form the labels of semantic graphs. Concepts are symbolized by nodes. 
Unidirectional edges represent relations. By now, we can start working out 
some fundamental weak points of semantic networks as alleged reflections of 
knowledge structures:  
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1. Word associations are not modeled, for labels and their outer word 
structure are not separate structural components of the semantic 
network.  
2. Word complexes are not modeled, for labels and their inner word 
structure are not separate structural components of the semantic 
network. 
3. Word similarity relations, consequently, are also not modeled by 
semantic networks. 
4. Concept associations (conceptual contiguity) are not modeled, because 
the model is strictly relational. Sequentiality is thus not an 
inherent structure of the semantic network model. 
5. Concept complexes are not modeled, for this would demand for a 
modeling of reification (abstraction/instantiation of node-edge-node 
triples or node-edge fragments, in order to use them in higher-order 
triples or double-fragments). 
6. Concept similarity modeling is hampered by the non-conceptual status 
of edges, which are said to represent properties (as if properties 
were not concepts, too). As edges are not relatable as concepts 
representations, they cannot be modeled as full terms. Concept 
similarity modeling is further hampered by the idea of unidirectional 
edges.  
7. Analytical associations are made difficult, as word 
compounds/complexes are not defined with respect to their inner word-
structure and inner concept-structure.  
8. Emergent associations are disturbed by a relational representation 
with labeled edges. Even though it is possible to represent emergent 
associations in a common semantic network model, the experienced 
semantics of this model would be inappropriate. Emergent associations 
generate a semantic paradox: were semantic network model and semantic 
network representation identical (using labeled edges), they would 
differ [sic] in meaning, because the modeled meaning can only be 
generated in a representation that differs from the relational-
descriptive model. This is but a special case (and complication) of 
the more general problem of meaning that Fauconnier and Turner point 
us to: 
[…] we take the construction of meaning for granted. Or 
rather, we tend to take the meaning as emanating from its 
formal representation, the picture, when in fact it is being 
actively constructed by staggeringly complex mental 
operations in the brain […] 
(Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, S. 5)  
I think these are already enough points of criticism to demonstrate the 
insufficiency of common semantic networks. They render semantic networks 
rather unusable for language-knowledge representation and language-
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knowledge management. All simple (graph-like) triple-based language-
knowledge notations suffer from these problems. To be fair, some of these 
issues108 have been addressed in one way or another in ontology engineering 
based on advanced (first-order logic) logic notations like those of common 
logic 109 . That these problems are based on phenomenologically (and, very 
likely, also cognitively) distinct association types, is, in my experience 
and to the best of my knowledge, not acknowledged/understood in IT. They 
use to surface as specific or domain usability problems, and appear to the 
ontology engineer as totally unrelated problems. Accordingly, they are not 
tackled as a fundamental language-knowledge representation problem area 
demanding for an integral modeling- and representation-solution for 
language-knowledge. Further cognitive-psychological research is needed to 
verify and elaborate this new basic semantic network model. In chapter 3, I 
will try to illuminate the basic memory mechanisms at work and the memory 
systems involved. In chapter 5, the provisional experimental realization in 
the Artificial-Memory-system will be discussed.  
                         
108 Cyc, for example, allows to separate labels from concept nodes (see footnote 79, p. 73), 
which, in principal, makes inter-label relations possible. Reification is a concept 
supported by RDF (Resource description framework). For RDF see en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Resource_Description_Framework (accessed on 07.09.2012). Common logic uses special markers 
for relating labeled concepts as literals. In notations used in Computer Lexicography, word 
compound/complex structures will be represented. These structures, however, are (to the 
best of my knowledge) not being used for knowledge representation. They are restricted to 
language analysis.  
109 See en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_logic (accessed on 07.08.2012). 
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2.6.2  MENTAL SPACES 
It is not uncommon to talk about complex conceptual units. Fauconnier 
(Fauconnier, 2006), within his framework of cognitive linguistics, for 
example, discusses mental spaces, which are described as small conceptual 
packets constructed as we think and talk, for purposes of local 
understanding and action. A mental space is said to consist of elements and 
relations activated simultaneously as a single integrated unit.110 The idea 
of mental spaces reminds us of common semantic network structures, for they 
are constructed as we think and talk, and they are structures of elements 
and relations. Their definition goes beyond simple word semantics, however. 
Mental spaces are conceptual packets (sub-networks), demarcated 
(instantiated) dynamically by simultaneous activation (blending). 
Fauconnier mentions that it has been hypothesized that at the neural level, 
mental spaces are sets of activated neuronal assemblies and that the 
connections between elements correspond to coactivation-bindings.111 This is 
a commonly held belief, usually accompanied with a reference to Hebbian 
learning / Hebb’s law and, sometimes, extended by the idea of cortical 
columns as basic functional (abstractive-integrative, consolidating, 
computing, hierarchy-forming etc.) brain modules. 112 Language plays a very 
important role in mental spaces and respective conceptual blending, despite 
the fact that conceptual packets are not limited to semantic packets. 
Fauconnier and Turner introduce the concept of a stable, organizing frame, 
as the structural component of a mental space:  
An organizing frame provides a topology for the space it 
organizes; that is, it provides a set of organizing 
relations among the elements in the space. 
(Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, S. 123) 
The organizing frame appears as an abstracted knowledge structure. Mental 
spaces are blended or compressed into different types of conceptual 
integration networks. A typology of different networks is derived from 
different constellations of organizing frames of mental spaces involved. 
Four main types of integration networks are being distinguished: Simplex, 
Mirror, Single-Scope, and Double-Scope. These network types are generated 
by association between two mental spaces a time.  
A simplex networks, connects the two input spaces through Frame-to-values 
organization [as in father-John, daughter-Su]. 113  It is worthwhile 
considering the example given to illustrate the Simplex. There is, in our 
terms, a threefold association within and between the word compounds 
father-John and daughter-Su. Father and daughter each denote abstract 
                         
110 (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, S. 104) 
111 (Fauconnier, Mental Spaces, 2007, S. 351) 
112 See, e.g., (Hawkins & Blakeslee, 2005). 
113 (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, S. 122) 
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roles. The word compound father-John is a short form of a syntacto-semantic 
word association: John is a father. In it, both concepts are compounded 
(blended). The word compound daughter-Su is as well a syntacto-semantic 
word association, even though it is only indicated by hyphen-ation, i.e. 
only given in a contiguity-association-like pattern. The third association, 
between both word compounds, is one of explicit contiguity, strengthened by 
a comma separating the two phrases. It could be interpreted as a mere list, 
with no affordance for conceptual integration at all. However, 
interestingly, it establishes a strong word-emergent and concept-emergent 
quality, evoked by the semantic opposition father-daughter. The emergent 
concept and word it provokes is the syntactic schema a of b, or, in our 
case, father of daughter. The conceptual blends of, first, father and John, 
and, second, daughter and Su, can be further integrated in the inter-blend 
conceptual blend evocable by the sentence John is the father of daughter 
Su. Thus, we have analyzed and explained the simplex network as a possible 
composition and associative sequence of more basic association types we 
have introduced earlier. There is, however, an important conceptual 
extension in the idea of the Simplex. It stresses the very productive 
function of abstractions (which we identified as being derived from 
concept-similarity associations). Abstractions, if blended with or 
instantiated in lower-level (more concrete) conceptual entities, allow for 
a quick and efficient extension of limited (concrete) mental spaces. In our 
example, we would not really know more about John and Su than their names, 
if we had not learnt a lot through a combination of semanto-syntactic and 
concept-emergent blendings. Now, we can start hypothesizing about many 
properties of John and Su: their individual ages, a third person (the 
mother) connecting both, possible inherited similarities, feelings for each 
other, legal duties and responsibilities, etc. Fauconnier and Turner call 
the role-value blending of the Simplex a vital relation. When Fauconnier 
and Turner give us their short example of a Simplex, they trust our 
capability of interpreting it as intended by them. The syntacto-semantic 
structures they use and the semantic opposition they create they must have 
thought generally intelligible. Thus, one could argue that language as 
communication technology rests on vital relations as (provoking) conceptual 
blendings (conceptually integrative associations) and abstract mental 
spaces (abstract concepts) being shared and being reconstructable by 
language symbols. In other words, vital relations are basic associative 
(semantic) correspondence structures. Other vital relations identified by 
Fauconnier and Turner (besides Role) are Change, Identity, Time, Space, 
Cause-Effect, Part-Whole, Representation, Analogy, Disanalogy, Property, 
Similarity, Category, Intentionality, and Uniqueness.114 A simple test (that 
I would suggest) for identifying a vital relation (type) is to denote the 
mental spaces (concepts) to be integrated by a minimal (not formerly 
learnt) syntacto-semantic word compound (that is one that comes without any 
                         
114 (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, S. 101) 
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indicative relation word or only with a general syntactic marker indicating 
that two mental spaces are to be related). If it is possible to get to the 
intended conceptual integration, one could speak of a vital relation, even 
if there are several interpretations possible (as is usually the case in 
direct conceptual integrations, which are not specified by an explicit 
relation-word-concept). That any non-relation-word-containing word-compound 
is at all understandable and usable in language-symbol communication is 
very astonishing (and thus worthwhile illuminating).  
It should not remain unmentioned, even though we have no time to further 
discuss it here, that reconstructing vital relations from minimal syntactic 
structures would be a litmus test for artificial (general) intelligence 
systems, far more so than the Turing Test, which is prone to deception, as 
became clear from my discussion of the Eliza effect [see p. 86]. Artificial 
intelligence has to imitate vital analogical information processing and 
learning, which goes beyond, but does not exclude symbol manipulation. 
Basic, vital (often literally bodily, temporal, spatial, etc.) relations or 
vital cognitive-integrative operations, as we might call them, guarantee 
that language-technology maintains a semantic (technological) 
correspondence structure. The usability of productive language is a shared 
meaning-constructive and not a shared referential phenomenon.  
In the case of role-value, the conceptual-integrative tendency can be 
somewhat clarified by considering the associative history of the concepts 
involved. One could ask, for example, why the mental space of father is not 
(normally) enriched by the mental space of John? So that we could say Tom 
is a John, when we mean that Tom is a father. The directionality of role-
value integration can be understood by seeing that father is an abstraction 
space (similarity extract/pattern) of particular instances of sexually 
mature male (human) animals. As John is indicated by his forename to be a 
male (human) animal, John is identified as a potential father. The 
potentiality being that father was abstracted from the likes of John and is 
still in force, forming an abstraction-level(-hierarchy). There is, 
therefore, an analogy (or similarity) association between the father space 
and the John space, with the abstraction hierarchy defining the direction 
of conceptual integration. This (non-obvious) integrative-associative move 
within a simplex network creation process is actually an instance of a 
single-scope network, another type of conceptual network introduced by 
Fauconnier and Turner:  
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A single-scope network has two input spaces with different 
organizing frames, one of which is projected to organize the 
blend. Its defining property is that the organizing frame of 
the blend is an extension of the organizing frame of one of 
the inputs but not the other. 
(Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, S. 126) 
The simplex network is not an independent network type, and the single-
scope network can best be understood as the result of a specific semantic 
association history. The asymmetry of the blending, the fact that the blend 
inherits only one of the frames is the earmark of source-target metaphors. 
The single-scope network is contrasted with the double-scope network, in 
which frame and identity properties are brought in from both inputs, 
generating a creative conceptual blending. In word compounds (and likewise 
relational phrases), the syntactical frame of word order often clearly 
indicates the to-be direction of integration. Only if the double-scope 
conceptual blending were not susceptible to changing directionality, a 
double-scope network would appear to be a sufficient category. If there 
were cases of direction-dependent differentiation of double-scope network 
results (which seem very likely to the author), further terminological 
differentiation of double-scope networks would become necessary.  
The last major conceptual integration network category, mirror networks, is 
defined as follows:  
In a mirror network, there are no clashes between the inputs 
at the level of organizing frame, because the frames are the 
same. 
(Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, S. 125) 
Mirror networks perform compressions over the vital relations of Time, 
Space, Identity, Role, Cause-Effect, Change, Intentionality, and 
Representation. The four network types, Simplex, Single-Scope, Double-
Scope, and Mirror, can be described by their effective frame pattern. In 
the Simplex, a (dominant) frame and no frame is given. I have shown that 
this is not true, but, for the sake of comparison, we will leave it as it 
was defined. The Single-Scope has a dominant frame and a subordinate frame. 
The Double-Scope has two dominant frames (i.e., none at all). The Mirror 
has a single (shared) frame. It seems that in conceptual blending, 
organization frames play a decisive role.  
Vital relations let us create manifold conceptual integrations in the form 
of a compact compound/chunk hierarchy, without introducing lengthy 
(nominalized) verbal relation-word complexity, which, by the way, is also 
based on vital relations at the borderlines between subject and predicate, 
predicate and object, etc. The abstraction-hierarchy plays an important 
role by providing conceptual schemata determining the possibility of 
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direction (dominant space) in conceptual integration networks. Simple 
syntactic schemata are needed to define which possible direction 
integration takes. In summary, the cognitive-linguistic conceptual blending 
theory of Fauconnier and Turner blends well with (and is, to some degree, 
even corrected and extended by) the basic thoughts about semantic network 
components and processes and language-technology described so far in this 
thesis. Blending is, of course, not totally new or unique, as are most 
concepts and ideas in linguistics and cognitive science. Wolfgang Wildgen 
reminds us that … 
Die Operationen, die von Langacker construal, von Lakoff 
mapping, von Goldberg fusion, von Fauconnier blending 
genannt wurden, enthalten im Kern das Problem einer 
Verbindung zweier Inhalte, wobei das Ganze mehr (durch 
Emergenz neuer Strukturen) und weniger (durch Selektion) als 
die Summe der Teile ist. 
(Wildgen, 2008, S. 200) 
However, even before cognitive linguists started theorizing about 
conceptual blending and conceptual compression, the emergent properties of 
arrangements of mental spaces and the important role of some special 
(vital) word-relations were described in the (discontinued, to my 
knowledge) linguistic theory of word-fields [Wortfeldtheorie]. 
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2.6.3  WORD FIELDS  
Word field theory originated with Jost Trier, as a mere sidetrack of his 
diachronic studies of language (Trier, 1931). Trier studied the development 
of the meanings of sets of words occurring during longer periods of time. 
This seems important, because Trier must have observed historic changes of 
individual word meanings and how these changes formed new sense fields 
(topic fields) [Sinnbezirke (Sachfelder)], and how a given sense field 
underwent changes when the words covering it (word blanket, word mosaic 
[Wortdecke, Wortmosaik]) changed their meanings. Trier’s comparative 
diachronic-interindividual perspective is somewhat analogous to the 
comparative synchronic-interindividual perspective taken in this thesis for 
conceptualizing individual, word-field artificial memory systems. Trier’s 
conception was probably influenced by Wilhelm von Humboldt’s comparative 
international language theory. It is applied intra-nationally by diachronic 
splitting, though. There is, in simple terms, an analytic-segmental 
progress from differing language-national (word-field) views [Weltsichten] 
to differing national-historic (word-field) views [Zeitsichten] to 
differing individual-contemporary (word-field) views [Ansichten]. A basic 
language-thought [Sprachgedanke], that is a word-induced or word-related 
conceptual integration or association, represents the smallest possible 
word (/-sense) field. Starting with an example of this smallest unit, Trier 
remarks that … 
Kein ausgesprochenes Wort steht im Bewußtsein des Sprechers 
und Hörers so vereinzelt da, wie man aus seiner lautlichen 
Vereinsamung schließen könnte. Jedes ausgesprochene Wort 
läßt seinen Gegensinn anklingen. 
(Trier, 1931, S. 1)  
The examples Fauconnier and Turner (2002) give are typically based on two 
preexisting mental spaces joint together by sequenced representation of 
written concept-labels. There is a subtle but very significant difference 
between the language-thought Trier describes and those used by Fauconnier 
and Turner. Trier refers to a single word only, one evoking the memory of 
an opposite concept (without this concept being named before). Fauconnier’s 
exemplary language-thoughts are concept-integrative, whereas Trier’s 
exemplary language-thought is concept-disintegrative. According to Trier, a 
singular word lets its word-sense activation spread into its antonymous 
sense(-word) [anklingender Gegensinn]. The idea of conceptual integration 
conceals a bit that there are, besides centripetal, associative-integrative 
forces, also centrifugal, associative-disintegrative forces at work in 
language-thought. Any particular word-sense is limited (at least in a 
temporary experiential manner, i.e. in the universal antonymy of existence 
versus nonspecific nonexistence). This limitation means that there always 
has to be a more or less specific limiting experience/sense. The 
individually experienced word’s centrifugal associative power is not 
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counterweighted by a succeeding word’s centripetal associative power. 
Trier’s focus on a single word allows him to demonstrate inter-conceptual 
associations that are not actually presented:  
Dies Begriffsfeld gewinnt keine körperlich wahrnehmbare 
Erscheinungsform in äußerer Lautung, deswegen ist es aber 
nicht weniger wirksam, nicht weniger einwirkend auf den Sinn 
des Wortes, nicht weniger dem Bewußtsein zugänglich. 
(Trier, 1931, S. 4) 
Trier here uses the word Begriffsfeld as opposed to Wortfeld [word field]. 
Begriffsfeld denotes the sense-field created by a word field. A word-sense 
field [Begriffsfeld] is not the same as a perceptual sense field 
[Sachfeld]. People normally use language to describe perceptual sense 
fields. Therefore, this important differentiation tends to escape their 
attention, as we will see. Trier’s word-sense field gains presence even 
without all corresponding words being presented or becoming conscious. It 
is a sense-field structured by words. A perceptual sense field is 
different. The colors of the rainbow, for example, form a specific 
perceptual sense field of distinctive color perceptions, provided normal 
eyesight. Franz von Kutschera describes the effect of different changing 
word fields covering the colors of the rainbow:  
Die Farbwörter (z.B. „rot“, „orange“, „gelb“, „grün“, 
„blau“) bilden ein Feld. Es sind einstellige Prädikate 
erster Stufe, und der zugeordnete Sinnbezirk ist der der 
Farbigkeit. Fügt man z.B. das Wort „violett“ hinzu, so 
werden die Bedeutungen von „rot“ und „blau“ eingeengt, und 
streicht man das Wort „orange“, so werden die Bedeutungen 
von „rot“ und „gelb“ erweitert. 
(Kutschera, 1973, S. 72)  
This statement is interesting because it uses a number of color words to 
remember a certain perceptual sense field, namely the colors of the 
rainbow. It moves on to describe the effects of changes in the color word 
field and corresponding color word-sense field. This serves as an example 
of Kutschera’s definition of word fields: 
[…] daß es sich bei den Wörtern eines Feldes in der Regel um 
Prädikate (im logischen Sinn dieses Wortes) derselben 
Kategorie handelt. Und man kann hinzufügen, daß die 
Bedeutungsabhängigkeit zwischen den Wörtern des Feldes u. a. 
darin besteht, daß die Bedeutungen anderer Wörter erweitert 
bzw. eingeengt werden, wenn man ein Wort eliminiert, bzw. 
hinzufügt, und daß sich die Bedeutungen anderer Wörter 
verschieben, wenn man die Bedeutung eines Wortes verändert. 
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Diachronisch gesehen wandelt sich also die 
Bedeutungsstruktur des Feldes als eines Ganzen. Das 
ausgesprochene Wort steht vor der zum Feld sich ordnenden 
Fülle seiner Nachbarn. Es hebt sich von Ihnen ab und ordnet 
sich ihnen doch an bestimmter Stelle ein. 
(Kutschera, 1973, S. 72)  
In these citations, there is no clear differentiation between perceptual 
fields [Wahrnehmungsfelder] and word-sense fields [Begriffsfelder]. A color 
word, however, can be part of many different word-sense fields. The 
national colors, the colors of the rainbow, revolutionary colors, Web 
colors etc. Kutschera gives the ontological interpretation of a single 
[sic] color-word-sense field identical with a natural perceptual color 
field, which is probably due to his education as a logician. This 
impression is strengthened by his claim that words forming a word field 
belong to the same category. Trier’s word fields are rather pragmatic, as 
becomes obvious from his critique of dictionaries: 
Die Wörterbücher […] lassen aber den wahren Wortgebrauch gar 
nicht erkennen, da sie sich um die sogenannten Synonyma, 
d.h. um die begrifflich nächstbenachbarten Worte und erst 
recht um die übrigen zum gleichen Feld gehörenden Worte 
nicht oder nicht ausreichend bekümmern können und so oft an 
den bezeichnenden Eigenschaften eines Werkes oder einer Zeit 
vorbeigehen. 
(Trier, 1931, S. 24) 
Trier’s entities of research are writings of individual authors [Werke]. 
Their specific word usage [Wortgebrauch] is said to become understandable 
only if the sense-limiting words and field-associative words [begrifflich 
nächstbenachbarte Worte; zum gleichen Feld gehörende Worte] are uncovered. 
This is something that lexeme-oriented dictionaries would not normally 
accomplish. However, the picture is not all clear:  
Die Begriffsbildung mit Hilfe der Worte ist ein gliedernder 
Klärungsvorgang aus dem Ganzen heraus. Dabei spiegelt die 
Sprache nicht reales Sein, sondern schafft intellektuelle 
Symbole, und das Sein selbst, das heißt das für uns gegebene 
Sein, ist nicht unabhängig von Art und Gliederung der 
sprachlichen Symbolgefüge. 
(Trier, 1931, S. 2) 
Trier’s clearly sees intellectual differentiation [ein gliedernder 
Klärungsvorgang] by word fields [sprachliches Symbolgefüge], but he does 
not perceive of word fields as complex mental spaces or, in other words, 
language-knowledge structures. In the above citation, Trier directly links 
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being [Sein] and language. This thinking is also manifested in his 
misdirecting and frequently criticized115 metaphoric idea of a word blanket 
[Wortdecke] or word mosaic [Wortmosaik] covering the perceptual realm (or 
the realm of being / reality).  
In a modern interpretation of word fields, however, Horst Geckeler moves 
word-fields closer to conceptual fields by extending the word-sense field 
definition to a (more constructive) word-phrase- and word-compound-sense 
field, differing from single-word word-collocation fields:  
Die Wortfelder sind nicht identisch mit Begriffsfeldern. 
Jedes Wortfeld ist ein Begriffsfeld, aber nicht jedes 
Begriffsfeld muß ein Wortfeld sein, denn ein Begriffsfeld 
kann auch ein terminologisches Feld sein. Jedes Lexem 
entspricht wohl einem Begriff, aber nicht jeder Begriff wird 
notwendigerweise nur durch ein [sic] Lexem wiedergegeben. Es 
kann auch durch eine Fügung, die mehrere Wörter umfasst, zum 
Ausdruck gebracht werden.  
(Geckeler, 1971, S. 200) 
Geckeler also individualizes word fields as knowledge structures 
[Wissensbesitz]:  
Zutreffend scheint uns die neueste Formulierung von H. 
Schwarz den Sachverhalt darzustellen: "Die sprachlichen 
Gliederungen, innere wie äußere, also auch die Felder, sind 
dem Sprachbraucher vertraut, sind sein Wissensbesitz, mit 
dem er sicher umgeht, dessen er sich aber nicht bewußt ist. 
Daher vermag er auch nicht aus dem Stegreif über sie 
Rechenschaft abzulegen." 
(Geckeler, 1971, S. 123) 
Geckeler furthermore cites Weisgerber, who continued the work on word field 
theories for some decades, stressing the presence of an intermediate 
language layer between language and real thing:  
“Es gibt keinen unmittelbaren Bezug vom Lautzeichen zur 
Sache; immer geht diese Verbindung durch eine geistige 
                         
115 Horst Geckeler notes (Geckeler, 1971, S. 142):  
Die kritische Literatur zur Feldtheorie kommt geradezu einmütig zu dem 
Schluß, daß der Mosaikvergleich der sprachlichen Wirklichkeit nicht - oder 
höchstens in besonderen Einzelfällen - entspricht. So schreibt S. Ullmann: 
'The neatness with which words delimit each other and build up a kind of 
mosaic, without any gaps or overlaps, has been greatly exaggerated.' 
Extended Artificial Memory 
[125] 
'Schicht' hindurch, die inhaltsbezogen als 'sprachliche 
Zwischenschicht' zu fassen ist.“  
(Geckeler, 1971, S. 108) 
According to Geckeler, this word(-phrase/-compound)-sense layer is further 
differentiated by Weisgerber:  
[…] Weisgerber [hat] die Frage der Beziehung zwischen 
Wortfeldern und Einheit des Wortes in konsequenter Anwendung 
inhaltsbezogener Prinzipien gelöst: durch Auflösen der 
'Bedeutungsklumpen', d.h. durch Aufteilung der Homonyme 
(besser: der Homophone) in getrennte Einheiten, die in 
verschiedenen Wortfeldern funktionieren. 
(Geckeler, 1971, S. 112) 
Contrary to my initial characterization of word-sense-field (conceptual) 
associations as centripetal, as compared to centrifugal word-induced 
conceptual integrations, Geckeler stresses the coherence of word field 
associations: 
Die Wortfelder sind keine Assoziationsfelder. Assoziative 
Felder sind zentrifugal, sie breiten sich unkontrollierbar 
aus, wogegen Wortfelder zentripetalen Charakter haben. Ein 
Wortfeld stellt ein lexematisches System dar, dessen 
Strukturierung aufgrund der Bedeutungsunterschiede seiner 
Glieder gegeben ist.  
(Geckeler, 1971, S. 199) 
This special coherence may explain why it is at all possible to use 
homonymous words without mixing up the different word-sense fields they 
relate to. The word-sense field [Begriffsfeld] is a distinctive, closed 
word(-phrase)-semantic context. Presenting a single word of the field with 
a word of another field will redintegratively activate the respective word 
fields and lead to a semantic re-segmenting not only of the two word senses 
directly involved, but potentially also of the bordering word senses of the 
respective fields. Trier/Weisgerber’s linguistic field theory of word 
fields thus stresses the functional importance of word(-phrases) for the 
shaping of mental spaces. Trier (1931, S. 2) noted that the structure of 
the whole (field) would determine the single word’s sense [vom Gefüge des 
Ganzen her empfängt das Einzelwort seine inhaltliche begriffliche 
Bestimmtheit]. All signifying is signifying in the (word) field and by 
virtue of a word field [daß alles Bedeuten ein Bedeuten im Feld und kraft 
eines Feldes ist] 116 . These are actually very radical thoughts for their 
time, with far-reaching theoretical consequences. The conception of 
                         
116 (Trier, 1931, S. 19) 
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holistic (or compositional) word meaning contrasts sharply with the 
traditional conception of atomistic, semantically isomorphic word meaning, 
which fields like symbolic logic and lexicography use to build upon. 
Polysemous words and polysemous synonyms indicate the multiplicity of word-
sense fields sharing the same words and [sic] the same referents. Of 
course, this, in principal, had bothered logicians before, as is obvious in 
the problem that Ludwig Gottlob Frege posed. Frege famously differentiated 
between word intension [Begriffsinhalt or Sinn] (referent properties and 
connotations given in a specific reference) and word extension 
[Begriffsumfang or Bedeutung] (the real-world referents). Intension clearly 
refers to the conceptual layer or intermediate language-layer described in 
cognitive linguistics and Trier-Weisgerberian word field theory 
respectively. A specific referent can be conceptualized (perceived or, more 
generally, experienced) into different word fields. Morning star and 
evening star, both referring to planet Venus, are the examples of referent-
sharing (referentially synonymous) words with differing intensions. A 
statement about word A (of word-sense A) may be true, while the same 
statement using the co-referring word B (of word-sense B) may be false. All 
referencing (or interpreting), however, is experientially bound 
(cognitively). The semantic Frege problem is not a lexical or ontological, 
but a cognitive-psychological problem. Intension, mental spaces, word 
fields, meaning schemata, you name it, are not just by or in definition. 
They are individual, experientially formed knowledge structures, partly 
replicated culturally, often vitally (inter-)related or embodied. George 
Lakoff broadly characterizes this as the new view:  
The new view is that reason is embodied in a nontrivial way. 
The brain gives rise to thought in the form of conceptual 
frames, image-schemas, prototypes, conceptual metaphors, and 
conceptual blends. The process of thinking is not 
algorithmic symbol manipulation, but rather neural 
computation, using brain mechanisms.  
(Lakoff, 2006) 
If the merely symbolic(-propositional) structure of logic does not 
represent embodied reasoning, what could? If the endless subtleties of 
interpretation, the numerous pitfalls of polysemy, synonymy, and homonymy 
are directly relatable to individualized, complex mental spaces, how are 
information technology for knowledge management, for automatic reasoning 
and for communication to react? The (somewhat bold) answer given in this 
thesis is: by (extended) artificial memory, namely by expression of 
individual mental spaces in their word-field organization, enhancing 
universal language-technology by a universal individual mnemonic tool, 
based on a progressive and progressing understanding of semantic networks. 
  
Extended Artificial Memory 
[127] 
2.6.4  SENTENCE FIELDS 
Remarkably, Trier related the word-sense field with the, if I may say so, 
sentence-sense field:  
Schlichte Beobachtung eigenen Sprechens und Hörens klärt 
deutlich genug darüber auf, daß ein in einem Satz 
ausgesprochenes Wort seinen Sinn nicht allein aus dem 
Zusammenhang des Satzes empfängt, daß der Satz nicht das 
allein Wirkliche ist, von dem aus das tote Einzelwort Leben 
erhält, daß vielmehr hier ein zweites Wirkliches mitspricht, 
nämlich das System des objektiven in der Sprache 
überlieferten und dem Sprecher und Hörer gegenwärtigen 
Ganzen des Begriffsfeldes. 
(Trier, 1931, S. 4) 
We already noted that the word field is not structured only by single 
lexemes, but could comprise word compounds and word phrases/word 
collocations. Distinct word-senses blended into new sense-units thus 
correspond to the respective word(-phrases) sequenced into larger string 
units or word chunks. Word fields extend into phrase fields by means of 
concept- and symbol-blending conducted in parallel. The de facto chunking 
of words (Linear Units, as we got to know them) often clearly refer to 
distinct individual conceptual memory-units. However, this is not true in 
all or even most cases. Chunking practice (we’ll get to this in more detail 
later) demonstrates another important case: conceptual blending in word-
fields (as is also implicitly indicated by the two-word/concept examples 
frequently chosen by Fauconnier and Turner) tends to happen between two 
distinct word-senses corresponding to two consecutive word(-phrases). In 
consecutive-type word chunks there is thus an inner structure demarcating 
two word-phrases of (usually) distinct word senses and their word-sense 
fields. The bipartite [sic] consecutive-type word chunk is the precursor to 
the semantically unitary word chunk. There is a simple test for this. The 
reader may isolate a few word(-phrase) chunks of his own (by reading or 
active language production). In analyzing these chunks, one will find that 
one is normally able and prone to split them into two [sic] coherent 
consecutive (unitary or, again, analytically bipartite) sub-chunks. Word-
field based language-thought is Linear-Unit-consecutive (which the reader 
should not consider a natural given, especially not in complex visual 
thinking, which is very difficult to stimulate and direct by means of 
language utterances, which is the reason why we need visual models and is 
the reason why the author sometimes engages in diagrammatic thinking and 
diagram production for this thesis). The analysis of individual dynamic 
patterns of bipartite (Linear-Unit-based) word-sense-integration in 
language perception and language production contrasts with a syntacto-
symbolic-linguistic, hierarchical-analytical approach to language analysis 
based on word-type and phrase-type structures of language symbols. There is 
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no language analysis possible or reasonable disregarding the sub-symbolic 
cognitive processes of, in particular, bipartite chunk-sense structuring 
and, in general, word-sense integration, at least not if we restrain from 
interpreting language as la langue. Horst Geckeler, in his critique of 
transformational generative grammar, cites the structural semanticist 
Eugenio Coseriu, who conceives of word fields as content-differentiating 
words standing in opposition to each other117: 
'Struktur' bedeutet für die TG ausschließlich 
'syntagmatische Struktur', d.h. kombinatorische Struktur. 
Die TG ist sich darüber nicht im klaren, daß, wie es E. 
Coseriu formuliert: 'Una lengua no es sólo un conjunto de 
reglas de constitución sintagmática, inmediata o mediata, 
sino también, y ante todo, un sistema de paradigmas 
functionales.' Bevor man sich also entschließt, eine 
Semantik der syntagmatischen Strukturen auszuarbeiten, ist 
es notwendig, zuerst eine Semantik der paradigmatischen 
Strukturen aufzubauen. Die Wortsemantik muß der Satzsemantik 
logischerweise vorausgehen. 
(Geckeler, 1971, S. 229f)  
In other words, and reminding us of the basic association types and related 
major semantic structures we differentiated in chapter 2.6.1.3 in Figure 
13, we have to construct the compound/chunk hierarchy (sequence structure) 
[Wortsemantik] before we can understand (or make understandable) the 
relational semantic network structure associated with predicative-
relational sentence structures [Satzsemantik]. Language is a system of 
functional paradigms (conceptual arrangements/oppositions) [un sistema de 
paradigmas functionales]. In Figure 13, the syntagmatic structures (if 
indicated by syntactic markers) are derived late from word-similarity 
associations forming syntax schemata that enable, subsequently, the 
syntacto-semantic associations forming the relational semantic network 
[Satzsemantik]. While a syntagmatic analysis of language seems possible at 
first glance, it cannot truly reflect existing knowledge structures unless 
it has knowledge of the individual compound/chunk structure involved in 
language pragmatics. Syntagmatic analysis is also blind to the power of 
word-similarity associations to form new, sub-syntagmatic structures and 
thus to the true extent of syntax schemata effective. It is important to 
note that the predicative, sentence-wise integrative word-sense-field is 
                         
117 (Geckeler, 1971, S. 192f):  
Ein Wortfeld ist in struktureller Hinsicht ein lexikalisches Paradigma, 
das durch die Aufteilung eines lexikalischen Inhaltskontinuums unter 
verschiedene in der Sprache als Wörter gegebene Einheiten entsteht, die 
durch einfache inhaltsunterscheidende Züge in unmittelbarer Opposition 
zueinander stehen. 
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not usually prone to word chunking and not strictly bound by bipartite 
concept integration. The sentence-predicate is a syntax schema of varying 
and individually growing complexity. The schematic complexity is indicated 
in multi-place predicates (especially three-place and higher-place 
predicates). These cannot just be given or acquired at once, but have to be 
constructed from word-similarity patterns, which may comprise (large/multi-
partite, contiguous) chunk-sequences. The predicate (schema) represents a 
vital relation, for it expresses actions and events attracting a multitude 
of different actors and undergoers, stressing its general schematic 
character and its broad syntacto-semantic effects. It is thus naturally 
prone to form larger contiguous, rather infrequent conceptual associations, 
with limited temporally integrative or conceptually compressive tendencies. 
The predicative sentence-sense-field is less likely to be matched by a 
corresponding word sequence field (vector) to form a lasting word chunk 
field unit than, say, more static, static-object-oriented noun-phrase-sense 
fields. Therefore, the very episodic nature of sentence-sense-fields 
implies a severe construction error or language-technological insufficiency 
in semantic networks: they do not become addressable by a word-phrase-
vector. That is, sentence-sense fields tend to remain isolated and not to 
form a functional word field. The sentence-sense-field is more or less 
limited to the sense-opposition generated by antonymous predicates and the 
active-passive meta-schema where appropriate. Sentence-structure-
maintaining reifications do not solve the problem (they are too complicated 
to be remembered, therefore mostly limited to temporary pronominal 
recursions, and too inefficient to be conceptually decrypted). Chunking by 
shortened nominalized-predicate phrases demands for a string 
transformation, which can be helpful. Reification leaving out predicates 
altogether is possible when the predicate expresses a vital relation, in 
which case it should be possible to omit it in a sentence-sense-reflecting 
word-compound/word-chunk transformation.  
The sentence is conceptually productive in that it manages to break the 
stricter, bipartite sequentiality of word chunk sequences. Sentence 
predicates instantiate higher-ary conceptual relationships by multi-place 
syntax schemata. This comes at a cost, however. Word-wise, the predicative 
sentence does not affect the comparably closed word field to the same 
extent as word chunks do. Semantically, sentences form small islands, 
whereas words and word chunks form huge continents. The set of sentential 
instances/particulars of a predicate schema (i.e., sentences sharing the 
same predicate) does not form a conceptually direct-associative sense 
field. Same-type sentence-fields are linked syntactically. Their indirect-
associative, schematic inter-relations seem to drive (a certain type of) 
analogical thinking. One does not have a problem varying a particular 
predicative schema by filling in different variables, not just arbitrarily, 
but also in the sense of real remembrances. There is an automatically 
formed, non-experiential, that is artificial memory of sentence fields. 
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Word fields, on the other hand, are formed direct-experientially. Their 
artificiality consists in their cross-experientially constructed word-sense 
fields, grouped around words and word chunks. Word fields and single 
sentence fields are concept-artificial memories. Inter-sentence fields, by 
contrast, are syntacto-semantic artificial memories. The centripetal 
tendency of intra-word-field associations, that is word-field-productive 
artificial-memory thought, must appear as a centrifugal tendency if 
compared to the centripetal tendency of inter-sentence associations, that 
is syntacto-semantically, analogically productive artificial-memory 
thought. Geckeler’s characterization of word field associations as 
centripetal is correct, insofar as they are viewed in the wider context of 
cross-sentential, syntacto-semantic artificial-memory thought. These realms 
of association are not strictly separated, though. The collocational range 
of (originally) non-predicative phrases may well include predicate-phrases, 
and the collocational range of (original) predicate-phrases may well 
include non-predicative phrases, always provided a high degree of relative 
co-occurence. Predicate-inclusion becomes immediately obvious in sequences 
of template- plus variable-sharing sentences. Peter visits the church + 
Mary visits the church stresses visits the church. Peter drives to work + 
Peter drives to town, on the other hand, will rather stress Peter drives. 
The exact conceptual structure of a sentence field thus also depends on 
chunking (and context). However, one would be mistaken not to think of a 
sentence as a mediated, relational, syntactic structure. The intricacies of 
complex sentences can only be understood if we admit their syntactic 
placeholder structure, which fundamentally breaks the strictly sequential 
word-associative structure of word chunks, by allowing de-sequencing 
insertions and complex relational arrangements. What we really encounter in 
word-chunk-dependent interpretations of sentences are different [sic] 
predicate patterns, namely differing in degree and structure of their 
variability. A syntacto-semantic sentence-instance can be frozen 
(conceptually compressed), partly or even fully (temporarily or 
permanently). The latter (i.e., the fully frozen sentence-instance) would 
be dubbed a reification. The former might be dubbed a partial syntax de-
schematization. The potentially (even likely) de-sequential, higher-
dimensional conceptual arrangement and resulting more complex conceptual 
blending within sentence fields does not have to give rise to word-
chunking, though, as the particularity of sentential blending will often 
best (or only) be reflected in a (partial) re-formulation and thus also new 
[sic] interpretation of the resulting conceptual field. Re-wording and re-
schematizing the dynamically changed sentence-induced conceptual field is a 
highly creative cyclic concept-driven mental activity.  
In discussing Plato’s criticism of written language, we noted that writing 
is a creative activity [see 2.4.5, p. 55]. By studying word and sentence 
fields, supported by an extended semantic network model, and in conjunction 
with Fauconnier’s conceptual blending theory, we were able to theorize more 
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clearly the underlying mechanisms at work. However, for a deeper 
understanding of language-knowledge structures and the dynamics of language 
technology, it appears to me that we have to turn to a very basic cognitive 
mechanism, the discussion of which I have deliberately avoided so far in 
order not to complicate the picture: MEMORY.  
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3. TECHNOLOGY MEMORY 
3.1 WHAT IS MEMORY? 
Memory is a word with many word senses. It does not matter whether we 
consider the colloquial or the scientific word usage. One is forced to 
commit to a specific word sense if one wants to avoid creating ambiguity or 
avoid having to (constantly) disambiguate. Memory, as I consider it in this 
thesis, denotes a human, brain-based, sensation-information replication- 
and variation-system. It follows, along general lines, the definition given 
by Rainer Sinz as cited by Hans Joachim Markowitsch:  
Unter Gedächtnis verstehen wir die lernabhängige Speicherung 
ontogenetisch erworbener Information, die sich 
phylogenetischen neuronalen Strukturen selektiv artgemäß 
einfügt und zu beliebigen Zeitpunkten abgerufen, d.h. für 
ein situationsangepaßtes Verhalten verfügbar gemacht werden 
kann. Allgemein formuliert, handelt es sich um 
konditionierte Veränderungen der Übertragungseigenschaften 
im neuronalen 'Netzwerk', wobei unter bestimmten Bedingungen 
den Systemmodifikationen (Engrammen) entsprechende 
neuromotorische Signale und Verhaltensweisen vollständig 
oder teilweise reproduziert werden können. 
(Markowitsch, 2002, S. 74)  
This definition is special in several respects. It defines memory as a 
process [sic] of learning-dependent storing that leads to system 
modifications (engrams) [sic] leading to full or partial reproduction [sic] 
of behavior. In short, it is a process of information encoding into engrams 
and information decoding from engrams. A view, I totally agree with. In a 
behavioristic fashion, however, the definition restricts memory to nervous 
motor signals and behavior. This limits the information encoded to original 
motor signals (because of the claimed reproductive nature of the memory 
process). This contrasts sharply with the mentioning of general ontogenetic 
information in the first sentence, thus creating a contradiction. Another 
issue with this definition is that it envisions engrams as changes to 
transmission characteristics in the neural network, while a more modern 
interpretation would probably stress the engrammatic structural changes 
enabled by cortico-synaptic plasticity of the human brain. I guess the 
reason why the distinguished memory researcher Hans Markowitsch cites this 
definition despite its shortcomings is because of its core idea: memory is 
a process of information reproduction. Markowitsch further cites W.H. 
Burnham to stress the functional role and psychological nature of 
reproduction:  
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Burnham (1903) […] formulierte […] seine Gedanken zur 
Bildung von Gedächtnis folgendermaßen: Normales Gedächtnis 
ist durch einen kontinuierlich fortschreitenden 
Organisationsprozess gekennzeichnet - einen physikalischen 
Organisationsprozess und einen psychologischen Prozess der 
Wiederholung und Assoziation. Damit sich Ideen als bleibende 
Gedächtnisspur manifestieren können, muss Zeit vergehen, bis 
diese physikalischen und psychologischen Prozesse zum 
Abschluss gekommen sind. 
(Markowitsch, 2002, S. 55) 
Burnham refers to memory as a replication process, too. His memory-
replication is a dynamic (associative) replication of ideas, marked by two-
sided organization: physical organization and psychological organization. 
The idea of memory as a replication and organization process is associated 
with a memory theorist who is not widely known: Richard Semon (1859-1918), 
a German biologist, zoologist, and explorer. 118  Markowitsch writes about 
Semon:  
Von ihm [Richard Semon] stammen zahlreiche Einsichten in die 
Arbeitsweise unseres Gedächtnisses, die bis heute Bestand 
haben und teilweise erst jetzt - im Zusammenhang mit der 
modernen Hirnforschung - verstanden und nachvollzogen werden 
können. 
(Markowitsch, 2002, S. 84) 
This statement is surprising from a leading, down-to-earth memory-
physiologist for a theorist who published his ideas more than 100 years 
ago. Much of what we know about Semon’s life goes back to Daniel L. 
Schacter’s book Forgotten Ideas, Neglected Pioneers: Richard Semon and the 
                         
118 Schacter (2001, S. 248f) gives a short summary of Semon’s background:  
Richard Semon was born in Berlin on August 22, 1859. His father Simon was 
a stockbroker; his older brother Felix became a prominent laryngologist in 
England, received a knighthood in 1897, and was appointed physician to 
King Edward VII in 1901. Semon was awarded his Dr. Phil. for zoological 
work at Jena in 1883, and earned his Dr. Med. in 1886. During this period, 
Semon studied with some of the most prominent scientists of the day, 
including the noted biologist Ernst Haeckel; Haeckel's emphasis on the 
theoretical unification of divers biological phenomena had a particulary 
strong influence on Semon. After receiving an associate professorship at 
Jena in 1891, Semon led a successful biological expedition to Australia 
from 1891 - 1893 (Semon, 1899). He left Jena in 1897 for personal reasons, 
and established himself as a private scholar in Munich. It was during this 
period that Semon published his two books on memory: Die Mneme (1904) 
(translated into English as The Mneme in 1921) and Die mnemischen 
Empfindungen (1909) (translated as Mnemic Psychology in 1923). Mnemic 
Psychology is devoted completely to the analysis of human memory. 
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story of Memory (Schacter, 2001), in which Schacter describes the 
scientific failure and tragic death of Semon. Scientific psychology did not 
take up Semon’s ideas, even though Semon’s term engram [Engramm] somehow 
managed to become a generally accepted technical term in memory research. 
It is also part of the definition given by Sinz cited by Markowitsch and 
introduced earlier. Some of Semon’s ideas were reintroduced into 
psychology. Markowitsch, for example, mentions that … 
Tulving (1983) […] reintroduced the term 'ecphory' to 
describe the process by which retrieval cues interact with 
stored information to effect the creation of an image or a 
conscious representation of the information in question. 
(Markowitsch, 2000, S. 475) 
Engraphy and ecphory are two core terms of Semon’s memory theory. They 
represent stages of the mnemic 119  process, which is a process of partial 
sensation replication and variation. Tulving’s pupil Schacter comes to the 
following conviction:  
Semon's theory of memory had virtually no influence on the 
subsequent direction of memory research, and for this reason 
should be characterized as an anticipation, and not a 
foundation, of modern theory. 
(Schacter, 2001, S. 165) 
In his book, Schacter discusses at length why institutional memory 
psychology (engaged in Ebbinghaus-style experimentation and theorization) 
did not adopt Semon’s ideas:  
Semon's belief in the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics, his analogy between the mechanisms of 
memory and of heredity, and his proclivity for inventing new 
- and frequently bizarre - scientific terminology can be 
traced back to Haeckel. 
(Schacter, 2001, S. 30) 
Ernst Haeckel, a popular biologist and strict Darwinist, was teacher and 
friend to Richard Semon. Semon strongly supported the Lamarckian doctrine 
of the inheritance of acquired characteristics, which, in the end, proved 
wrong. In his theory of memory, Semon decided not to re-use common terms as 
technical terms, because of their misleading connotations. Thus, he 
invented some new terms, which was not such a bad idea after all, given the 
                         
119 A mneme is defined as a replication or variation of a sensation by ecphorization, that 
is, it is defined as re-activation of an (engraphically-generated) engram into a 
simultaneous (sub-)conscious complex. Mnemic means by a mneme or starting with a mneme.   
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problems that are caused by polysemy (as admitted by Tulving). Schacter 
further remarks that Semon … 
[…] was blind to the theoretical importance of a number of 
important phenomena, such as interference effects, the role 
played by attentional processes in selecting input for 
storage, and coding operations that actively direct the flow 
of information through the memory system."  
(Schacter, 2001, S. 179) 
I would like to add that Semon was also not and could not be aware of the 
important role of priming in recognizing, remembering, and acting. 
According to Schacter, things on the positive side are: 
Semon conceptualized engrams as unified complexes, comprised 
of 'emergent components' that fuse to form a qualitatively 
unique whole. 
(Schacter, 2001, S. 167) 
With his idea of engrammatic blending, Richard Semon, to some degree, 
anticipates the psychological field-theoretical approaches, such as 
conceptual blending, word fields, or Kurt Lewins field theory of life space 
(to name just a few), which all can and have to be theorized as (or rather 
based on) engrammatic fields. Clearly differentiating between a storage 
level and a reproduction level allowed Semon to define certain memory 
aspects in terms of memory dynamics: 
He went on to propose that the term association and ecphory 
must be clearly distinguished: 'the fact of the binding-
together of engram-components, which alone deserves the name 
of association should, logically, be sharply distinguished 
from this ecphoric process through which the fact itself is 
revealed. Briefly, association is the result of an engraphy 
disclosed on the occasion of an ecphory. This state of 
affairs does not seem to have been clearly apprehended up to 
now, and usually 'association' has been employed in two 
senses, first, quite correctly, as the complete union of 
engrams of mnemic sensations […]; secondly, also, as the 
process whereby this union becomes apparent. This 
inconsequent phraseology is the source of numerous 
misunderstandings and fruitless discussions (1923, p. 325)'  
(Schacter, 2001, S. 168) 
Semon redefined association as engrammatic association only, that is, as 
association on the level of engrams. Thus, Semon successfully overcame the 
Aristotelian taxonomy of associations, which does not include this 
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differentiation and thus prevents us from recognizing the dynamic interplay 
between engrammatic associations versus engraphic associations (or, in 
Semon’s terms: simultaneous complexes). This was only possible because … 
Richard Semon offered a comprehensive theoretical analysis 
of retrieval phenomena at a time when the prevailing 
approach was largely atheoretical.  
(Schacter, 2001, S. 139) 
Semon's own conception of the retrieval process, freed from 
the intellectual shackles of associationism, was a synthesis 
of several different ideas: redintegration, component-
overlap, and homophony. […] But Semon went beyond 
redintegration to articulate a view of the retrieval process 
that sounds much like modern theories in which feature 
overlap between retrieval cue and memory trace is granted a 
major role in the retrieval process (cf. Flexser & Tulving, 
1978; Kintsch, 1974): 'Resemblance, that is to say, partial 
coincidence between the components of an actual group of 
excitations and those of any previous engram-complex, causes 
ecphory120 of the latter through the former (1923, p 326)' 
(Schacter, 2001, S. 168) 
Semon’s view of the memory process let him assume that (under normal 
conditions) each memory reproduction would result in the creation and 
modification of engrammatic complexes. 
[…] numerous studies that have been reported in the past 
decade or so substantiate Semon's claim that the act of 
ecphory modifies the state of the memory system. 
(Schacter, 2001, S. 173) 
Some modern research supportive of this view has been 
reported by Gardiner and Klee (Klee & Gardiner, 1976) in 
their studies of memory for remembered events. These 
authors, much like Semon, posited that 'Each act of 
remembering itself […] constitutes a new event in episodic 
memory (Klee & Gardiner, p. 471).' 
(Schacter, 2001, S. 174) 
Schacter lists … 
[…] three of the most striking propositions advanced by 
Semon: his multiple-trace theory of repetition, his 
                         
120 Ecphory here can be roughly translated with memory retrieval. 
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contention that each act of ecphory establishes a new 
engram, and his insistence that memory performance is 
critically dependent upon the internal and external 
conditions of ecphory. 
(Schacter, 2001, S. 190) 
… concluding that …  
[…] there can be little doubt that Semon's analysis of 
memory was full of possibilities; it contained myriad 
innovative features that pointed the way toward some 
exciting and then unexplored theoretical vistas. 
(Schacter, 2001, S. 179f) 
Now, it seems to me that there is a very important aspect to the work of 
Semon that goes unmentioned and unnoticed by Schacter. Semon’s greatest 
weakness, his Lamarckism, appears to have actually been his greatest 
theoretical strength, because it let him see and conceptualize memory (in 
its advanced human form) as a psychophysiological process of replication 
and variation of sensory information, somewhat similar to the Darwinian 
process of evolution of life by replication and variation. Why does this 
matter? Well, it is quite important to find the right level of abstraction 
in theorizing about memory in order to understand its technological 
effects. Memory is only the second replication-variation system to be found 
in nature. It is also a secondary replication system, as the memory process 
is embedded in the process of life. Semon believed that there is a direct 
connection between engrams and the genome, as it is called today. This was 
clearly false.  
Genes mutate/recombine and their allelomorphic information is further 
instantiated by germ cell fusion and subsequent cell division, at least in 
sexual reproduction. Survival and sexual reproduction are the basic 
conditions of the natural preservation and evolution of a species. 
Selection of the fittest individuals (i.e., surviving individuals) is thus 
combined with individual sexual selection and individual fertility. 
Different species have evolved to rely on these three basic prerequisites 
to different degrees, accounting for the great variety of biological sexual 
reproduction strategies found. Phenotypic expressions of genes, resulting 
in a cascade of phenotypic traits of living beings, however, do not 
influence the information content of the genome. In a recent scientific 
debate, the evolutionary psychologist Steven Pinker (The false Allure of 
Group Selection, 2012), argues against group selection. Pinker sees 
individual selection as the basis of evolution. In short, he stresses the 
individuality of mutations/recombinations and their crucial importance for 
Darwinian fitness and, thus, evolution. Pinker faces some opposition in 
comments by scientist who correlate natural selection with different 
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phenotypic traits favoring group survival, even at the cost of individual 
reproduction rates. I think this debate misses a crucial point and can 
learn from a reinterpretation and application of Richard Semon’s core 
ideas. Let us reframe this debate a bit. Of course, as is mentioned in the 
debate, mathematically, any phenotypic trait (and even any other 
environmental or contextual feature) can be correlated with (individual) 
evolutionary success and may affect survival, sexual selection and 
fertility. And, for sure, this will delude the crucial mechanism of 
individual reproduction at the bottom of the causal chain. We started this 
thesis with introducing human eusocial technology as memory-based co-
processual effectuation. This helped us to see the difference between a 
natural pseudo-technology such as a spider net (production) and an 
acquired, memory-based predictive technology process. The sexual 
preferences of a peahen, her compelling appreciation of a peacock’s 
impressive shimmery-colorful feathering, are phenotypic traits that can 
probably be traced back along a biological developmental chain, to specific 
gene expressions. It is thus genetically encoded. The ethologist Konrad 
Lorenz famously demonstrated (filial) imprinting (of birds) during a 
critical period, which I would characterize (for our purpose) as the 
introduction of a perceptual, (to be) learnt variable into a genetically 
anchored, rather static (nervous) behavioral program that is otherwise only 
influenced by predefined behavioral stimuli and the simple learning 
mechanisms of sensitization and habituation. There are only few animal 
species that we imagine having free imaginative (replicating) and extensive 
creative (varying) memory to their avail. Human(-like) memory, however, may 
strongly influence genetic sexual selection by a technological selective 
process. One could try to imagine the sexual preference of a human female 
for a natural group leader as being part of a genetic program, but this 
becomes impossible with well-liked millionaires, public servants, fellow 
believers, programmers, architects etc., which may all gain or lose 
attractiveness depending on specific historic-societal conditions. These 
are certainly not naturally motivated prototypes of female sexual interest. 
In other words, memory is able to vary preferences or decisions normally 
based on these preferences, namely by semantically associating and 
motivating learnt categories with basic impulses, emotions and drives. 
Nowadays, human fertility is influenced by reproductive medicine. Infertile 
men and women are no longer sentenced to evolutionary extinction. Soon, 
even total lack of natural fertility will no longer be an obstacle for 
reproduction at all, as germ cells can, in principal, be created from stem 
cells or re-coded by denucleation and subsequent renucleation. The creative 
potential of human memory, understood as an information reproduction and 
variation system, is directly accountable for such things as reproductive 
medical practice. Using less advanced technologies, humans have influenced 
natural evolution by plant and animal breeding for millennia. I think I do 
not even have to talk about the myriads of survival technologies culturally 
accumulated and taught by humankind. The crucial step in evolutionary 
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development is the essentially nonhereditary, cognitive-technological self-
advancement of life through memory. The dawn of synthetic biology 
demonstrates how the memory replication system finally turns its 
information variation capacity toward the primary, genetic information 
replication system of life itself, which is disquieting given the huge 
technological risks involved in this step and the present lack of meta-
technological processes and tools supervising and orchestrating human 
technological processes properly. Synthetic biology is more dangerous than 
an atom-bomb – says no less than Craik Venter121; and I would add: it is an 
evolutionary atom-bomb based on memory. The secondary information 
replication system starts to vary directly the primary information system, 
thus further suspending Darwinian evolution, possibly to a degree not even 
imaginable today. From this perspective, a scientific discussion of 
individual versus group selection appears a bit surreal, rather irrelevant, 
and narrowly focused. The one crucial human trait of evolution is 
replicative/variational memory. A classification of evolutionary effective 
traits would therefore first have to differentiate between memory-mediated, 
technological and memory-independent, immediate genetic-evolutionary traits 
and different complexes of both, as can be found in learnt motivational 
structures. Defining both natural evolution and memory evolution as 
interdependent information replication and variation processes can help us 
to see clearer the outstanding evolutionary importance of memory. 
Functional technology depends on the replicative-predictive capacity of 
memory to detect and record changes of informational states effectuated by 
actions. Semantic memory allowed for the co-structural artificial memory 
system of natural language to trigger and parameterize content-
technological and functional-technological processes in symbolic manner, 
non-imitatively. Semantic memory further enabled the persistence and 
manipulation of replicative informational structures.  
Semon’s original conception of memory as a replication system of mnemes 
(Semon, Die Mneme, 1904) is a precursor to Richard Dawkins’ meme-
replicator, introduced in chapter 11 of his book The Selfish Gene (Dawkins, 
1976), where all the following citations were taken from. Dawkin apparently 
did not and probably still doesn’t know of Semon’s astonishing work. 
Dawkin’s meme-concept falls far behind the precision and elaboration of 
Semon’s mneme-concept. Dawkin (1976) writes that  
[…] memes should be regarded as living structures, not just 
metaphorically but technically. When you plant a fertile 
meme in my mind you literally parasitize my brain, turning 
it into a vehicle for the meme's propagation in just the way 
that a virus may parasitize the genetic mechanism of a host 
cell. And this isn't just a way of talking – the meme for, 
                         
121 (Venter, 2012) 
Extended Artificial Memory 
[140] 
say, "belief in life after death" is actually realized 
physically, millions of times over, as a structure in the 
nervous systems of individual men the world over.' 
Dawkin sees his meme in his mind, but (also?) as a structure in the nervous 
system [sic]. In the same chapter, Dawkin abstracts the informational 
content of his meme:  
The survival value of the god meme in the meme pool results 
from its great psychological appeal. 
Thus, the mental (conscious?) meme or nervous structure now somehow has 
psychological appeal (how and to whom?) and is an abstract (?) information 
item (meme in the meme pool) shared across individuals, too. Dawkin may be 
a great biologist, but he gets himself into further trouble when talking 
about self-copying memes. Does he mean self-copying nervous structures? Or 
self-copying abstract information structures, or self-copying mental 
(conscious) states? Dawkin also speaks of unconscious memes, which 
presupposes that there are also conscious ones, besides the neural 
structures. Does he think the latter are conscious, or unconscious? Dawkin, 
furthermore, talks about evolving memes (memes will then evolve); he speaks 
of copies of memes (the longevity of any one copy of a meme) etc. In short, 
it becomes very clear that Dawkin gets it all mixed up, and I therefore 
restrain from analyzing it any further. It is only a pity that the term 
meme was popularized despite its superficiality later on by other authors. 
The best, I think, we can do with it is to use it as a term denoting an 
abstract information structure that is instantiated in different sub-
structures affected by the memory process and by memory-technological 
effectuation processes. Now, as a meme-philosopher, Dawkin may have failed, 
but as a biologist, he clearly stated the gist of the matter: 
Whenever conditions arise in which a new kind of replicator 
can make copies of itself, the new replicators will tend to 
take over, and start a new kind of evolution of their own.  
 Dawkin understands that there is, besides the genetic life-system, another 
replicator system and that this exhibits an evolutionary process of its 
own. The reader will soon be introduced to the mnemic replication process 
as defined by Richard Semon. However, before going into details, more has 
to be said about memory as a replication system. One may ask oneself: Why 
does the author of this thesis stress replication so much? Are there not 
more than enough and better-established and, thus, probably more important 
memory-theories? Theories talking about episodic and semantic memory, 
different sensory memories, working memories, perceptual and elaborated 
memory, behavioral memory, implicit memory, fact memory, face and object 
memory, priming memory, recognition memory, number memory, declarative and 
non-declarative memory, short-term and long-term memory, and so on and so 
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forth, to name but a few. Memories have been differentiated across many 
features: especially temporal features, content features, and functional 
features, and often organized in dichotomies. This seemed and seems 
justifiable because of the numerous selective memory disorders (and memory 
dissociation paradigms) that memory researchers have managed to identify. 
Memory disorders and dissociation experiments can affect (and, mostly 
dually, dissociate) whether and how long some aspect can be stored and 
retrieved in a certain way. There can be no doubt that the brain-correlate 
of the memory process is the working of a distributed, complex nervous 
system, featuring specialization and localization of engrams and engraphic 
and ecphoric functions in different cortical areas and interconnecting 
brain structures. Now, following the tracks of Semon, it appears to me 
that, first, all of these so-called memories are indeed of importance to 
the central replication/variation-memory process, but do not represent 
memory-processes of their own, at least not in the replication/variation 
process sense. The memories I have listed above are actually on different 
abstraction levels resulting in wildly overlapping semantic structures. The 
crucial question that today’s memory research does not answer to my 
satisfaction reads: What is the defining function of memory? Or, in short: 
What is memory? It cannot be sufficient and totally misses the point, as I 
have tried to show, if we just define memory as any (informational) system 
in the brain that takes an input and is somehow affected in its output 
function / connection strength by it. This would mean that each and every 
neuron would represent a memory or even several memories (matching the 
number of its input-output functions) of its own. This does not mean that 
individual neurons and neuron groups would or could not form the 
physiological basis of the memory process; it just means that the 
fundamental information replication/variation function of the neuron does 
not simply represent or translate into the replication/variation function 
of the memory process under discussion. The excellent bottom-up memory 
research of Eric Kandel may be titled memory research, but it researches a 
very different memory than the human replication memory process. The memory 
performance of aplysia is fundamentally different from the memory 
performance of creatively thinking humans. Any theory of a system of 
multiple interrelated memories would functionally only be justified if the 
memory-sub-processes or memory-sub-systems would represent independent 
replication/variation systems of their own. Otherwise, one will have to 
characterize them as sub-processes, structural components or abstract 
dimensions/aspects of the replication/variation memory process, in order to 
avoid confusion and functional defocussing. Technology-enabling 
replication/variation memory may actually be a chance for today’s 
heterogeneous memory research to integrate its diverse research findings 
and its diverse multi-memory theories on a single, relevant process and 
abstraction layer. This cannot be a realistic goal of this thesis, though, 
but I will at least try to exemplify the research-integrative potential of 
this memory process whenever possible. The said integrative power results 
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from the multidimensionality of perceptual-mnemic variation in the memory 
process, which binds and varies the dimensions of sensory modality and 
abstractness, experiential/attentional temporality and epistemicity, and 
syntacticity/semanticity, which will be detailed in chapter 4.3.1. 
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3.2 MEMORY REPLICATION/VARIATION 
Genetic evolution works by creative defects, going through life cycle’s 
probation period. Mnemic evolution works by engraphically effective, 
multidimensional integration. Its acid tests are technological 
correspondence and communicability.  
3.2.1  IMPORTANCE OF MEMORY PROCESS 
Schacter notes that …  
Most important, we have now come to believe that memory is 
not a single or unitary faculty of the mind, as was long 
assumed. Instead, it is composed of a variety of distinct 
and dissociable processes and systems. 
(Schacter, 1996, S. 5) 
This is of course true in perhaps the same sense that one could come to 
believe that a car is not a single unit of driving, but composed of 
distinct and dissociable processes and systems. However, neither the car 
system as a whole, nor its components and the sub-processes involved in a 
driving car can be understood if perceived as functionally independent, 
dissociable processes and systems. Most important, therefore, is that we 
come to understand the natural and possible artificial technological 
composition of the overall system to serve its perceived functional goals. 
3.2.2  MEMORY PROCESS 
The following memory process description is based on Richard Semon’s books, 
but it does not try to be an exact replication of Semon’s thoughts. I will 
try to provide an interpretation, integrating own lines of thought and 
different results from contemporary memory research. If not marked 
differently, the technical terms are those used by Richard Semon. 
3.2.2.1 (Original) Engraphic Process 
Semon starts his memory process by describing the stimulation of the 
sensory organs [Reiz], which ends a primary state of indifference [primärer 
Indifferenzzustand], leading to a (nervous [energetischer Vorgang in der 
reizbaren Substanz]) stimulus excitation [Reizerregung], building up a 
stimulus sensation [Reizempfindung]. While the stimulation of the sensory 
organs endures, the corresponding sensation is related to its stimulus by 
the stimulus excitation in a synchronous phase [Synchronphase]. The 
synchronous stimulus excitation [synchrone Reiznachwirkung] may endure 
after the stimulation of the sensory organs ends [akoluthe Reiznachwirkung: 
unmittelbare, an die snychrone anschließende Reiznachwirkung], which 
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relates the stimulation of the sensory organ to the stimulus sensation in 
an asynchronous phase [akoluthe Phase]. 
Die Erregung (bzw. Empfindung) während ihrer synchronen und 
ihrer akoluthen Phase zusammen bezeichne ich als 
Originalerregung (bzw. Originalempfindung).  
(Semon, Die Mnemischen Empfindungen, 1909, S. 26) 
The, as we might say, purely perceptual or sensory stimulus excitation is 
named original stimulus excitation [Originalerregung] and the purely 
perceptual sensation is named original stimulus sensation 
[Originalempfindung]. Semon defines the process of original stimulus 
excitation and original stimulus sensation independent of any specific 
sense organ and sensory quality.  
It is a general, highly dynamic sensory process. According to Semon, due to 
the asynchronous endurance of stimulus excitation, a constant or 
oscillating single stimulus sensation may arise despite of a repetitive 
stimulation of the sensory organs. The asynchronous phase demonstrates a 
stimulus-excitation-integrative and stimulus-sensation-integrative sub-
function of memory. A simultaneous (original) stimulation complex 
[simultaner Reizkomplex] will create a simultaneous (original) stimulus 
excitation complex [simultaner Erregungskomplex]. Due to asynchronous 
excitation continuation, a simultaneous stimulus excitation complex will 
integrate with still effective asynchronous stimulus excitation complexes 
or, more precisely, with their still asynchronously active portions. The 
overall stimulus activation complex [kulminierende simultane Erregungen] at 
any particular point of time will therefore comprise different synchronous 
sensory stimulations and their subsequent synchronous or asynchronous 
stimulation activities. This means that stimulus sensation concurrency does 
not reflect sensory stimulation concurrency, especially if we assume 
modality-specific latencies of synchronous and asynchronous excitation 
phases. Semon raises an important question:  
[…] die Grundfrage, wie bei den aus verschiedenen Pforten 
einströmenden und in topographisch verschiedenen Teilen des 
Organismus kulminierenden simultanen Erregungen der 
simultane Erregungskomplex als ein geordnetes 
zusammenhängendes Ganzes, also, soweit er sich in 
Empfindungen manifestiert, als ein geschlossenes 
Nebeneinander von Empfindungen zustande kommt.  
(Semon, Die Mneme, 1904, S. 119)  
Semon is aware of the Gestalt-quality [geschlossenes Nebeneinander] of 
concurrent stimulus sensations. He believes … 
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[…] daß sich alle Tatsachen der simultanen Assoziation von 
selbst aus der an sich als gegeben hinzunehmenden 
Grundtatsache ergeben, daß die organische Substanz auf eine 
Anzahl gleichzeitig auf sie als Reize wirkender Einflüsse 
mit einem gesetzmäßig geordneten zusammenhängenden 
Nebeneinander von Erregungen antwortet, und daß dieser 
simultane Erregungskomplex als solcher engraphisch wirkt. 
(Semon, Die Mneme, 1904, S. 123)  
 The integrated and ordered original stimulus excitation complex is thought 
to be engraphically effective. Semon’s original stimulus excitation complex 
is similar to the sensory memory of present-day memory research. Visual 
persistence, for example, resembles asynchronous stimulus excitation. 
George Sperling (Sperling, 1960) enriched our knowledge about the iconic 
buffer by showing that even a complex of (up to) twelve spatially ordered 
visual stimuli (letters) is kept available as a whole for a short period of 
time to a process of attention, which directs and focusses the 
transformation of stimulus excitation into stimulus sensation, which, in 
turn, greatly improves the engraphic effect of the excitation complex 
attended. Semon did not detail the effects of attention, something that 
Schacter rightly criticized. Semon, however, was aware of them, as he, at 
one point, mentions the focus effect of attention [Fokuswirkung der 
Aufmerksamkeit, isolierende Macht der Aufmerksamkeit], which would create 
associative bridges [Assoziationsbrücken]. 122  Semon’s original excitation 
phase is pre-engraphic and pre-ecphoric. Stimulus excitation continuation 
is not memory, at least not as understood by Semon; it is rather a lawfully 
excitation-pattern-forming and Gestalt-forming integrative process, 
partially cumulating in a direct-perceptual stimulus sensation complex. 
There are conflicting research findings as to whether the sensory buffer 
may comprise categorical information. 123  However, for example, the 
integrative work of the iconic buffer (that is, low-level visual 
processing) seems to be restricted to creating and binding basic perceptual 
features such as brightness, position, color, contour, size etc. Semon’s 
epistemically original and, more generally, pre-ecphoric sensations are, 
per definition, limited to such aspects. Semon would certainly not have 
accepted the letters in Sperling’s letter block (stimulus sensation 
complex) as original sensations. Complex letter shapes are learnt units, 
engraphically built on occasion of former original sensory stimulations and 
sensations. In their pre-ecphoric (direct-perceptual) excitation form (as 
in Sperling’s experiments), the letter’s stimulus excitation complex is 
best not called letter or letter-shape, as this deludes an important 
                         
122 (Semon, Die Mnemischen Empfindungen, 1909, S. 125) 
123  Merike (Merikle, 1980), for example, supports the idea of categorical aspects 
encompassed in sensory memory, which is contradicted by Kehrer (Kehrer, 1985) and is also 
not in accordance with later research results of Sperling. 
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epistemic distinction, distinguishing between an (episodic-)engram-
activating stimulus-related excitatory state and an original, purely 
stimulus-based excitation state. Of course, any nervous excitation state is 
based on a nervous structure that can (and has to) be perceived of as a 
basic form of (relatively) primitive (direct-perceptual?) memory. This is 
phylogenetically programmed and prenatally and postnatally self-organizing, 
involving sensory stimuli, too. However, these perinatal and infantile 
sensory-stimuli’s engrams are very likely not mediated by the structures 
that form the replication/variation memory process discussed here. One 
could hypothesize a gray area where the most complex primitive-memory 
structures are also (perhaps even first) being encoded as very simple, 
compositional sensation engrams, before being incorporated into or 
separately acquired by the primitive-memory stimulus-processing/-
integration system. In any case, original-sensation-excitation 
integration/processing-depth is certainly a developmental (lifetime) and 
sensory-experiential variable. 
The original sensation complex is largely defined by the temporal structure 
of the sensory stimulation and the specific intra-integrative and inter-
integrative characteristics of the sensory modalities involved. Mechanisms 
of (uncontrolled) outer attention, neglected by Semon, are important in 
temporally structuring and content-wise defining the original excitation 
complex. This complex can be behaviorally effective, especially in form of 
reflex actions. It certainly represents a phylogenetically older, pre-
memory [sic] nervous adaptive system for reflex-like ways of acting and 
instinctive behavior, which are direct-perceptually, non-mnemically 
parameterized. The Semonian original excitation complex and, as I would 
add, its immediately related original sensation behavior, are, in a way, 
the cognitive-system realizers of hot media. McLuhan’s ingenious basic 
categories of hot and cool media, which to many may appear dated and 
unfounded, might mark (to some extent), indeed, the borderline between two 
stages of cognitive evolution: pre-mnemic and post-mnemic. They also mark, 
to some degree, the borderline between two forms of cognitive existence: 
perceptual-reactive and technological-active, or, in other words, stimulus-
impulsive and thoughtful-predictive. A hypothesis we gain from this 
separation is that the gradually developed human and higher-animal capacity 
of conscious-predictive thought is directly intertwined with the 
development of the variation/replication memory-system. The relatively 
primitive (or fundamental) cognitive operations of uncontrolled or 
impulsively controlled outer attention appear as functions of pre-ecphoric, 
primitive(/fundamental)-memory (/early processing) integrative memory 
capacities. 
According to Semon, original simultaneous (synchronous-asynchronous) 
excitation complexes are engraphically fixated into corresponding original 
engram complexes. In his first mnemic law (law of engraphy), Semon states: 
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Kurz gefaßt ergibt sich uns daraus die folgende These, die 
ich als den ersten mnemischen Hauptsatz oder den Satz der 
Engraphie bezeichnen will: Alle gleichzeitigen Erregungen 
(in unserem Falle manifestiert durch Empfindungen) innerhalb 
eines Organismus bilden einen zusammenhängenden simultanen 
Erregungskomplex, der als solcher engraphisch wirkt, d. h. 
einen zusammenhängenden und insofern ein Ganzes bildenden 
Engrammkomplex zurückläßt. 
(Semon, 1909, S. 146)  
A succession of varying, simultaneous complex excitation states [Sukzession 
von simultanen Erregungskomplexen] is transformed into a succession of 
associated (interconnected) engram complexes [Sukzession von simultanen 
Engrammkomplexen]. The engraphic succession is reflected in the succession 
of singular, momentary stimulus sensation complexes [Sukzession von 
simultanen Empfindungskomplexen]. The successive engrammatic associations 
[Sukzession von Engrammkomplexen] are accompanied by simultaneous 
engrammatic associations between specific engrams (or specific engram sub-
complexes) forming specific successive engram complexes. Semon gives the 
example of differentiating individual voices in a polyphonic piece of 
music.124 Simultaneous (and successive) engrammatic associations [simultane 
Engrammassoziationen] are created between modality-specific engram 
complexes [Assoziation zwischen Engrammen gleicher Reizmodalität] and, 
within a single modality, between engrams integrating specific stimulus 
qualities [Reizqualitäten] (such as the before-mentioned single voices, or, 
more generally, any Gestalt- or Ganz-structure). Thus, Semon, in principal, 
describes the engraphic act as creating a multi-dimensional engrammatic 
associative structure of stratifications of successions and complexes, 
progressing from individual, unimodal to increasingly complex, multimodal 
engrams. 
  
                         
124 Semon (1909, S. 126) notes:  
Ein wirklich musikalischer Mensch, dem ein polyphones Musikstück 
wiederholt vorgespielt oder vorgesungen worden ist, vermag nach einiger 
Zeit den Ablauf jeder einzelnen Stimme für sich innerlich zu reproduzieren 
oder auch singend oder spielend wiederzugeben. Diese Fähigkeit, zu der gar 
keine anderweitige musikalische Schulung erforderlich ist — wenn es sich 
um zweistimmigen Gesang handelt, so ist ein Kind dazu imstande — , ist nur 
unter der Voraussetzung erklärlich, daß die Tonfolgen innerhalb jeder 
Stimme enger assoziiert sind als von einer Stimme zur anderen. 
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3.2.2.2 Ecphoric Process 
The end of engraphy starts the secondary state of indifference or, in other 
words, latency state of the engram [sekundärer Indifferenzzustand; 
Latenzzustand des Engramms]. Schacter summarizes it as follows: 
The secondary state of indifference signifies a period of 
latency in which the behavior of the organism is 
indistinguishable from its behavior in the 'primary' state 
of indifference. There is, however, a critical difference. 
The organism now has the potential to respond to certain 
stimuli - those that gave rise to the new engram - in a 
manner that it could not prior to the engraphic act. 
(Schacter, 2001, S. 122f) 
Semon describes the next crucial step in the memory process, ecphory, as 
the activation of the engrammatic nervous-excitatory disposition: 
Unter Ekphorie eines Engramms verstehen wir die Versetzung 
eines Engramms aus seinem latenten in seinen manifesten 
Zustand oder, anders ausgedrückt, die Aktivierung einer 
Erregungsdisposition, die als bleibende, aber für gewöhnlich 
latente Veränderung im Organismus zurückgeblieben ist. 
(Semon, 1904, S. 187) 
During the mnemic process [mnemischer Ablauf, mnemische Reproduktion], the 
repetition of a specific original stimulus excitation [Wiederkehr der 
Originalerregung] will ecphorize [ekphorieren] its corresponding original 
engram. The sensation that manifests itself is, at its core, a mnemic-
perceptual one. It has the potential to ecphorize originally associated 
engrams or engram complexes, thus fully or, more likely, partially 
reinstating the original sensations as mnemic sensations [mnemische 
Empfindungen]. Ecphory can be based on simultaneous engram associations 
[Ekphorie auf Grundlage der simultanen Assoziation] or be based on 
successive engram associations [Ekphorie auf Grundlage der sukzessiven 
Assoziation]. According to Semon, a mnemic simultaneous sensation complex 
does not have to reproduce the original sensation complex fully. Certain 
modalities can and often will be left out, even though, as Semon assumes, 
all simultaneous sensory qualities are engrammatically interlinked. Another 
important type of ecphory is chronogenous ecphory [chronogene Ekphorie] 
that explains regularly occurring sensations. Semon believes chronogenous 
ecphory to be based on regularly repeating endogenous stimuli, which have 
an engrammatic effect, too, and, therefore, are engrammatically associated 
[chronogene Engramme]. Chronogenous ecphory can explain time-based 
prospective thought (and action). Common ecphoric stimuli will explain 
event-based prospective thought (and action). There is no need to declare a 
prospective memory to explain prospective thought and action. All 
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simultaneous complexes of excitation and sensation are either original-
sensory, sensory-mnemic, or mnemic-mnemic. In the latter case, a mnemic 
sensation will trigger another mnemic sensation, in the absence of any 
corresponding sensory stimuli. Sensory-mnemic and mnemic-mnemic 
simultaneous and successive complexes are engraphically effective, that is, 
any ecphory is engraphically effective. Semon’s engraphic ecphory 
[engraphisch wirksame Ekphorie] goes beyond the common strengthening effect 
of retrieval:  
Semon contended that each act of ecphory establishes a new 
engram-complex comprised of the retrieved information and 
information in the present context: 'each ecphory of an 
engram-complex produces not only a mnemic sensation […] but 
through this creates a new engram which adheres to the new 
engram-stratum (1923, p. 178).' 
(Schacter, 2001, S. 173)  
Schacter cites modern memory research supporting this view:  
Some modern research supportive of this view has been 
reported by Gardiner and Klee (Klee & Gardiner, 1976) in 
their studies of memory for remembered events. These 
authors, much like Semon, posited that 'Each act of 
remembering itself […] constitutes a new event in episodic 
memory (Klee & Gardiner, p. 471).' 
(Schacter, 2001, S. 174)  
Semon’s engram stratum [Engrammschicht] reveals a specific mnemic or 
sensory-mnemic sensational episode. Semon stresses the variation potential 
of the ecphoric-engraphic mechanism: 
[…] daß der hochentwickelte Mensch imstande ist, durch 
simultane Ekphorie von Engrammen verschiedener 
Engrammschichten jedes Element seines individuellen 
Engrammschatzes mit jedem anderen neu zu assoziieren, somit 
unzählige neue Engrammkombinationen zu bilden. 
(Semon, 1909, S. 167) 
The ecphoric-engraphic mechanism for engram combinations 
[Engrammkombinationen] (mnemic engram complexes combining engrams from 
different engram strata) seems to be fundamental to conceptual integration. 
Semon furthermore characterized simultaneous engrammatic associations 
similar to conceptual blendings:  
Von all diesen verschiedenen Bestandteilen [des 
Emfindungskomplexes] erscheinen bei der mnemischen 
Reproduktion unter gewöhnlichen Verhältnissen bestenfalls 
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Bruchstücke der eindrucksvollsten Komponenten wieder, und 
diese Bruchstücke nennen wir dann assoziiert. Eine viel 
sinngemäßere Auffassung aber ist es, nicht diese Bruchstücke 
für assoziiert, sondern sie als gemeinsame Bestandteile, als 
Höhenpunkte eines zusammenhängenden simultanen Empfindungs-
komplexes anzusehen.  
(Semon, 1909, S. 152) 
Hence, Semon’s memory theory of mnemes offers numerous theoretical 
integration points (and even bears some resemblance) to Fauconnier’s 
cognitive linguistics. One could say that engram combinations form second 
order engrams (meta-engrams) of a mnemic-integrative nature. Engram 
combinations are, however, not (and perhaps even never) strictly mnemic, as 
mnemic simultaneous excitation and sensation complexes will normally also 
comprise original sensory or sensory-mnemic percepts as key ingredients or, 
at least, contextual elements. Accordingly, it should not be difficult to 
integrate findings of modern source memory research and of research on 
(implicit) context memory into Semon’s theoretical framework. Contextual 
stimuli have an ecphorizing effect [Ekphorie durch partielle Wiederkehr des 
Originalreizes]. The context is part of a largely sub-sensational (sub-
/near- or pre-conscious) engraphic and ecphoric simultaneous excitation 
complex. 
One of the intellectual achievements of Semon’s theory is that it reduces 
engram associations to a single general (quasi-physiological) association 
type. Semon’s forming of engrams is thus very much in accordance with 
Hebbian learning. Semon, however, manages to embed the dynamics of the 
creation, activation, and evolution of engram associations into the 
dynamics of the central memory function of information replication and 
variation. This allowed him to explain different phenomena by general 
memory-mechanisms and processual developments. The following citation gives 
an example for this by showing how Semon views associations of contrast 
(Aristotelian associations of dissimilarity) [Kontrastassoziationen], which 
also play an important role in word field theory:  
Nun ist der individuelle Engrammschatz eines jeden von uns 
förmlich gespickt mit solchen simultan assoziierten 
kontrastierenden Engrammpaaren. Kontraste wirken schon in 
Form von Originalempfindungen besonders lebhaft und werden 
leicht mit Lust- und Unlustbetonungen versehen. Sie gehören 
infolgedessen zu unseren eindrucksvollsten Erlebnissen und 
werden schon von früher Jugend an als besonders kräftige und 
eng assoziierte Engramme im individuellen Engrammschatz 
eines jeden erzeugt und durch unablässige Wiederholung 
verstärkt und weiter entwickelt. Begünstigt wird dieser 
Vorgang noch durch die Art und Weise, wie besonders der 
Kulturmensch die Sprache, diesen großen Sammel- und 
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Verdichtungsapparat der Assoziationen, zu handhaben und 
seinem Nachwuchs zu übermitteln pflegt. Ein wenig 
systematisieren da schon die meisten Mütter und Wärterinnen, 
wenn sie das Kind in der Bereicherung seines Wortschatzes 
bewußt unterstützen und ihm, wenn er ein Eigenschaftswort 
aufgeschnappt hat, das 'Paar' dazu lehren; zu klein — groß, 
zu heiß — kalt, zu schnell — langsam usw. usw.  
(Semon, 1909, S. 188) 
Semon here takes an explicit developmental perspective that considers 
contrast associations as common simultaneous associations, stressing that … 
So schafft uns Erfahrung und Sprachgebrauch ungezählte 
Engramme von gepaarten Kontrasten, Engramme, bei denen 
natürlich das Manifestwerden des einen Paarlings den anderen 
prompt zu ekphorieren vermag. 
(Semon, 1909, S. 189) 
This allows him to conclude: 
Die […] simultane Assoziation der einzelnen Engramm-
komponenten hat sich […] als die einzige ergeben, die 
überhaupt vorkommt. 
(Semon, 1909, S. 189) 
Semon goes even one step further by maintaining that …  
[…] ebenso gibt es nur eine einzige Grundform der Ekphorie, 
diejenige durch mehr oder weniger partielle Wiederkehr der 
energetischen Situation, die engraphisch gewirkt hat, bzw. 
des Erregungskomplexes der engraphisch gewirkt hat, mag nun 
diese Wiederkehr in Gestalt von originalen oder von 
mnemischen Erregungen erfolgen.  
(Semon, 1909, S. 189-190) 
We know that perceptual salience (reflecting vital relevance) directs 
uncontrolled outer attention. There is very likely a similar mnemic-
salience mechanism directing uncontrolled inner attention, as expressed in 
willful/intentional mnemic associations. Markowitsch emphasizes the strong 
link between memory and affective information: 
[…] brain research that showed that those regions involved 
in the processing of affective information are also involved 
in the processing of memory information. The visceral brain 
(MacLean, 1952) or the 'rhinencephalon' (Macchi, 1989; 
Nieuwenhuys, Voogt, & van Hizen, 1988) were early labels for 
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what today is termed the 'limbic system' and most frequently 
associated with memory encoding […] 
(Markowitsch, Neuroanatomy of Memory, 2000, S. 465)  
For Semon, affective information is but another engram of an engram 
complex, an engram, though, that stems from a non-sensory (or, more 
precisely, inner-sensory), endogenous source, the stimuli of which are not 
directly perceptible to an outsider. Therefore, Semon would not consider 
the frequently found affective directionality of thought (motivational 
thought structure) as anything else than an instance of the general 
mechanism of ecphory. An affective state functions as an ecphoric influence 
(besides many other sensory- and mnemic-ecphoric influences), 
notwithstanding the enormous ecphoric effectiveness of strong affects, as, 
for example, conveyed in vivid visions of very hungry and very thirsty 
people. Engrams under constant ecphoric influence will associate with other 
engram complexes infectiously, potentially contextualizing (motivating) 
streams of thought. It is, however, important to note that Semon’s ecphory 
breaks with the idea of association strength, (the main associative 
principle of associationism). Constellations of ecphoric influences 
relative to engrammatic-associative structures determine ecphory. Kurt 
Lewins field theory (or topological psychology), which is said to be the 
background paradigm of modern motivation research (Herber & Vásárhelyi, 
2002), can be easily translated into mnemic processes. 
Die Lokomotion wird durch eine Kraft bewirkt, die aus der 
Beziehung von mindestens zwei Regionen im Lebensraum 
entspringt (z.B. dem Bedürfniszustand einer Person und der 
Attraktivität oder Valenz einer bestimmten Zielregion im 
„Umweltsektor” des Lebensraumes). Es können auch mehrere 
Kräfte gleichzeitig – gleich- oder gegensinnig – wirken und 
eine bestimmte Veränderungsresultante ergeben. Diese 
(resultierende) Kraft ist definiert als Stärke und Richtung 
der Tendenz zur Veränderung, die an einem bestimmten Punkt 
des Lebensraumes ansetzt.  
(Herber & Vásárhelyi, 2002, S. 32) 
In Semon’s terms, an affective state [Bedürfniszustand] ecphorizes and 
maintains a related engram, a target region of the life space [Zielregion 
im Umweltsektor des Lebensraums]. Lewin’s momentary life space, his 
psychological situation [der in strukturierter Weise gegenwärtige Bereich 
des Lebensraums 125 ] can be interpreted as the fluid simultaneous complex 
that is dynamically created by the ecphoric effects of its mnemic, its 
endogenous and exogenous ecphoric influences. Psychological locomotion 
[psychologische Lokomotion] combines physical and psychological locomotion. 
                         
125 (Lewin, 1969 (1936), S. 45) 
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Lewin distinguished between quasi-physical, quasi-social, and quasi-
terminological locomotion. 126  These types of locomotion do not establish 
independent processes of life-space locomotion, though, but rather describe 
different situations in which various epistemically distinguishable 
ecphoric influences and their corresponding engrammatic structures become 
effective due to the outer realities of individual physical and social 
environments, and the inner reality of engrammatic environments. One might 
add that individual personality factors would represent a fourth, likewise 
mnemically effective reality, providing the affective stimuli that drive 
ecphory in form of sensations of thinking and acting. The easy 
combinability of Kurt Lewins’ and Richard Semon’s theories may well be 
based on a shared principle of conceptual economizing:  
Die Begriffe, die wir in diesem Buche entwickelt haben, 
beziehen sich auf den gesamten psychologischen Lebensraum, 
d.h. auf Person und Umwelt. Sie gestatten die Behandlung 
aller Lage- und Zusammenhangsprobleme des Lebensraumes und 
seiner Teile. Sie sind ebenso auf quasi-physikalische wie 
quasi-soziale und quasi-begriffliche Tatsachen anwendbar. 
(Lewin, 1969 (1936), S. 210) 
Topological psychology, reinterpreted in terms of the memory 
replication/variation process, would represent an important extension to 
Semon’s memory theory, as Lewin focused on consecutive simultaneous 
complexes [psychologische Situationen], linked by locomotions according to 
diverse influences of psychological and non-psychological origin, thus 
spanning across different engrammatic structures. The goal of dynamic 
psychology to construct a dynamic representation of the individual and her 
environment [dynamische Darstellung von Person und Umwelt127] reminds us of 
the technological double-process, which combines affective and mnemic 
influences, instantiating the actuator process, with frequently (but not 
exclusively) exogenous influences on the substitution process, stemming 
from physical and social reality etc. In a way, one could characterize the 
technological actuator process as a set of ecphoric influences (and a 
related engrammatic structure) that precede over or somehow subdue other 
ecphoric influences provided by the substitution process. Lewin would 
probably have characterized the actuation process as a contiguous 
psychological space [zusammenhängendes psychologisches Gebiet], glued by a 
shared (ecphorically effective affective-engrammatic, as we might add) 
                         
126 (Lewin, 1969 (1936), S. 223):  
Man kann quasi-physikalische, quasi-soziale und quasi-begriffliche 
Lokomotionen unterscheiden. 
127 (Lewin, 1969 (1936), S. 43) 
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valence, engaging the individual in a process of psychological and (often 
also of) physical locomotion. 
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3.2.2.3 Multiple Traces & Homophony 
Semon invented a new term, homophony [Homophonie, Empfindungsdeckung] to 
denote the homologous sensory-mnemic sensation that makes an appearance 
when a stimulus excitation becomes ecphorically effective to form a single, 
integrated sensory-mnemic simultaneous sensation complex. Homophony, as a 
phenomenon, becomes obvious during two-stage recognition, when familiarity 
turns into recollection, or when there is the sensation of difference 
between sensory percept and the mnemic sensation it ecphorizes:  
Den gleichzeitigen selbständigen Ablauf der mnemischen und 
der neuen Originalerregung haben wir demnach auf dem Wege 
der Introspektion durch zwei sehr charakteristische 
Reaktionen erkannt: die Reaktion des Wiedererkennens und die 
Reaktion des Unterschiedempfindens. 
(Semon, Die Mneme, 1904, S. 209)  
Homophony, according to Semon, is in force between mnemic sensations, too. 
Engrams in different engrammatic strata referring to the same (original) 
stimulus effectuation (that is, its perceptive-primitive memory engram, as 
I would add) are activated on the return of the original stimulus 
(excitation). 128  Semon assumes that the engrammatic episodes are not 
inextricably fused [keine unentwirrbar verschmolzene mnemische Erregung129], 
but are distinguishably homophonic [entwirrbares Miteinanderklingen129]. The 
important point here is that Semon introduces a multiple trace theory of 
repetition: associations are not just strengthened, but new engrams are 
created. 130  Ebbinghaus’ saving method 131  [Ersparnismethode], however, 
demonstrated that recall performance somehow benefits from relearning or 
re-experiencing. Benefit only being understandable if we consider 
Ebbinghaus’ forgetting curve in the first place. Recall failure has two 
                         
128 (Semon, Die Mneme, 1904, S. 226): 
Wir haben nun schon früher (S. 116—119) als ein allgemeines mnemisches 
Gesetz erkannt, daß, wenn zwei Erregungen koordiniert in einem Organismus 
auftreten, sie auch koordiniert engraphisch aufgenommen und fixiert 
werden. Es ist selbstverständlich, daß die Erregungen p1(mn [mnemisch]) 
und p2(or [original]) hiervon keine Ausnahme machen, wenn sie nach ihrem 
Ablauf als Engramme in das Latenzstadium ein- bzw. zurücktreten. Werden 
sie durch eine erneute Wiederholung des Originalreizes wiederum 
ekphoriert, so müssen sie natürlich auch wiederum koordiniert und nicht 
homogen verschmolzen als eine homophone mnemische Erregung p1(mn) + p2(mn) 
manifest werden und sich in dieser Form zu der neu aufgetretenen 
Originalerregung p3(or) gesellen. Es findet also jetzt die dreifache 
Homophonie p1{mn) + p2{mn) + p3(or) statt. Dasselbe findet bei der 
dritten, vierten bis n-ten Wiederholung statt. 
129 (Semon, Die Mneme, 1904, S. 227) 
130 See (Semon, Die Mneme, 1904, S. 231). 
131 See (Ebbinghaus, 1885). - The savings method uses relearning to express the time saved 
as a percentage of the original learning time. 
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faces: non-ecphory and erroneous ecphory. Within Semon’s memory framework, 
non-ecphory can be explained by lack of suitable ecphoric influences (inner 
and outer memory cues, if you will) or, possibly, by engraphic failure or 
engram decay, the latter not at all being excluded by a multiple-trace 
theory of repetition. Erroneous ecphory can be explained, first, by all the 
reasons for non-ecphory, provided an additional inappropriate engram 
stratum responding to ecphoric influences present, or, second, by engram 
association bifurcation or, in fact, multifurcation [Engrammassoziations-
vergabelung]. According to Semon, successively associated engrams 
(belonging to one engram stratum or episode) sharing the successively 
associated engrams of another or several more strata offer either 
alternative mnemic association pathways or integrative [sic] association 
pathways.132 Non-original mnemic successions involving different engrammatic 
strata (episodes or simultaneous complexes) could thus easily appear as 
erroneous reproductions. The multifurcation principle offers a sound 
memory-theoretical explanation for word-similarity associations and 
concept-similarity associations, which played a decisive role in the 
development of syntax schemata and abstraction hierarchies in our new 
semantic network model. Ebbinghaus’ experimentation paradigm of exact 
reproduction as a measure of memory performance is misleading us (and has 
been misleading generations of memory researchers) in that it diagnoses 
erroneousness of reproduction, where we actually encounter and ought to pay 
attention to the core mechanisms of mnemic variation. I have already 
stressed the outstanding importance of word similarity for the development 
of syntax schemata and, therefore, language production. Conceptual 
similarities, on the other hand, create abstractions (by engrammatically 
fixating mnemic-associative multiple-trace engram complexes anew). 
Abstractions take centre stage in different types of inference: as analogy 
between different instances, as information creatively infused (blended) 
into an instance in abduction or logically infused into an instance in 
deduction, and as generalizations in inductions. In other words, 
                         
132 (Semon, Die Mneme, 1904, S. 145): 
Höre oder lese ich z. B. das berühmte Goethesche Gedicht: »Über allen 
Gipfeln ist Ruh« zuweilen in der ersten, zuweilen in der zweiten Fassung, 
so prägt es sich mir in folgender alternativ dichotomischer Form ein:  
 
Diese alternative Dichotomie läßt sich nicht durch gleichzeitiges Hören 
oder andere engraphische Einflüsse, wie diejenigen des obenerwähnten 
zweistimmig werdenden Musikstücks, in eine simultan assoziierte verwandeln 
i. Wo aus irgendeinem Grund eine Simultanassoziation der Aste einer 
Dichotomie (oder Trichotomie) unmöglich ist, da bleibt dieselbe dauernd 
eine alternative. 
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syntactically and inferentially effective and creative multifurcation is 
not a weakness, episodic decay, as which it must appear in any sort of 
exact-replication-type memory experimentation, but, on the contrary, a 
recipe for successful memory variation and, thus, human creativity and 
human intelligence. Exact mnemic replication and mnemic variation are 
mutually exclusive and, at the same time, closely interdependent [sic]. How 
is this seemingly contradictory claim possible? Well, exact replication 
seems only possibly if there is an exact replication of original 
stimulation (exact re-experiencing) or if there is a chain of mnemic 
ecphoric influences reactivating the original engrammatic stratum (exact 
remembering). Replication of experiential variation (partially or similarly 
re-experiencing) would require a new original encoding if the 
repeated/similar experiential parts did not become ecphorically effective. 
This, of course, would allow no variation besides simple re-sequencing of 
partial exact mnemic replications. Memory would appear as an endless 
recording and always single-voice mix tape. Introducing separate (episodic) 
engram strata and homophony, however, gives a different picture. Partial or 
similar (enough) re-experiencing leads to simultaneous activation of all 
suitable engram strata. Furcation (putting aside special cases of ecphoric 
engram integration) indicates that, as a rule, only a single engram stratum 
is ecphorized to the level of mnemic sensation and subsequently effective 
mnemic (engrammatically associative) engraphy, at a time. A single mnemic 
sensation gaining the upper hand resembles a more or less planned action 
crossing the Rubicon toward action performance, which lets us assume that 
acting is also based on perceptive and mnemic ecphoric influences, and thus 
likewise represents an ecphoric memory process. Richard Semon’s memory 
theory is, thus, compatible with the common coding (of perception and 
action) theory introduced by Wolfgang Prinz133. In perception, a perceptive 
ecphoric influence ecphorizes an engram (from a specific engram stratum, 
besides activating other engrams from other strata, too) to homophonous 
perceptive-mnemic sensation, which creates a mnemically derived co-
perceptual ecphoric influence. I would name this predictive effectuation of 
(as the case may be, sequentially) neighboring engrams of the ecphorized 
and probably also, though to a lesser degree (because often not or not yet 
further supported by ecphoric influences), of co-activated engram-
complexes. The phenomenon of mnemic-perceptive differentiation (which was 
one of the phenomena used by Semon to infer homophony in the first place) 
marks a situation that likely promotes an act of mnemic-perceptive engraphy 
of an abstraction (similar mnemic-perceptive structure) engram. What we 
learn from this is that seemingly mere episodic perception is, indeed, 
rather an intertwined process of mnemic-perceptive ecphory and engraphy, a 
highly creative process of co-structural (stimuli-engraphic and mnemic-
ecphoric-engraphic) automatic abstraction. It is, in contrast, also a 
process of ongoing chunking, because abstractions function like pieces of a 
                         
133 See, e.g., en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_coding_theory (accessed on 29.11.2012).  
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puzzle: they permit a process of homophony poor in conflicting sensations 
(breakdowns of homophony, so to speak). Perception is being mnemically 
organized. Abstraction gradually provides the right (i.e., 
perceptively/ecologically valid) granularity of further episodic engraphy. 
Abstractions (or, in less complex, more episodic terms: segments or 
substrings) effectively reduce the number of (perceptive-integrative) 
engrammatic associations needed to encode perceptive-mnemic experiences, as 
they (likely) form higher-level complex/episodic engram chunks (associated 
or associatively integrated abstractions/segments). Basic stimulus 
integration mechanisms therefore contrast with mnemic integration 
mechanisms. In individuals with an increasingly structured (rich in 
abstractions and chunks) engram repertoire, the former are more and more 
replaced (or covered) by the latter. Original-stimulus engraphy makes room 
for mnemic-perceptive engraphy. Analytical abstracting or segmenting, on 
one hand, and synthetic complexing or chunking, on the other hand, are 
likely kept in balance by the tradeoff between a better reflective, 
perceptive-mnemic (homophonous) fit of smaller engrammatic units and a 
better predictive, mnemic-perceptive fit of larger engrammatic units. 
Reflective fit increases Darwinian fitness by correct space-time focused 
evaluation, whereas predictive fit increases fitness by correct space-time 
extended evaluation. Even though complex/chunk engrams (referentially) 
integrate smaller abstractive or original-perceptive engrammatic units 
(which becomes obvious in their intentional analysis), they nonetheless 
represent fully autonomous engrammatic units with experientially distinct 
engrammatic associations across all perceptive-mnemic episodic engram 
strata in which they became mnemic-engraphically (homophonously or purely 
mnemically) effective.  
Schacter links recognition to Semon’s process of ecphory: 
Semon simply characterized recognition as a sub-type of 
ecphory; […] Semon hypothesized that each act of 
recognition, just like any other ecphory, functions to 
establish a new engram-complex. 
(2001, S. 178) 
In Semon’s memory theory, there is no need to declare a separate 
recognition memory, as recollection as well as any form of episodic 
remembrance or, even, thinking and acting, can be well explained within the 
memory process framework. Familiarity before recollection, a possible first 
stage of recognition, could be linked to the presence of mnemic excitation 
(as compared to more or purely perceptive-original stimulation) before it 
crosses the Rubicon, turning into a mnemic-ecphoric influence 
(recollecting/ecphorizing associated information/engrams from different 
related episodic information/engram strata).  
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Semon, of course, did not know of priming and its huge importance for 
memory performance. In priming experimentation, the prime stimulus 
presented first influences a later memory-related cognitive process. The 
target stimulus follows the prime. Positive priming decreases the target’s 
processing time. Negative priming increases the target’s processing time. 
The prime can be subsensational (i.e., subconscious), from a different 
sensory modality and more or less directly (engrammatically) associated. 
Priming therefore takes many different forms, such as (target) word 
priming, (target) action priming, attention (action) priming, emotional 
priming, perception priming, repetition priming etc. As the priming effect 
goes back to a (prime) stimulus, within Semon’s memory framework, stimulus 
excitation is the first candidate possibly accounting for priming. 
Primitive/perceptive (pre-episodic integrative) memory engram sensitization 
may account for simple perceptual (sensorial) priming, in which (in the 
visual modality) items with a similar form are primed. There is evidence 
that rejects the idea of a direct correspondence between familiarity and 
perceptual priming, which is in agreement with our explanation of 
familiarity in recognition based on a perceptive-ecphoric mechanism: 
There is other evidence that undermines any presumed 
correspondence between familiarity in recognition and 
perceptual priming (e.g., Snodgrass, Hirshman, & Fan, 1996; 
Wagner, Gabrieli, & Verfaellie, 1997). Jacoby's process 
dissociation procedure retains the idea of two independent 
processes, and the idea that similar processes may operate 
in recognition and in perceptual priming. But the contrast 
now is between controlled and automatic processes, and it is 
assumed that recollection is a controlled process and 
familiarity is an automatic process. 
(Gardiner & Richardson-Klavehn, 2000, S. 236) 
By now understanding the ecphoric influence of the inner affective state 
directing mnemically progressing ecphory, it would be right to characterize 
mnemic ecphory (i.e., ecphory in turn influenced by an ecphorized stimulus) 
as a perceived controlled process (recollecting), whereas the early phase 
of ecphoric excitation of multiple (abstracted, chunked, or direct 
episodic) engrams must appear as automatic. We may therefore differentiate 
between an automatic and controlled phase of ecphory, reflecting automatic 
familiarity and controlled recollection. The presumed sensitization effect 
of perceptual priming must have a counter-part in ecphoric priming, which 
subsumes all non-perceptual priming effects. The distinguishing feature 
(or, rather, prediction) between perceptual and ecphoric priming is that 
the former is non-associatively similarity-based, while the latter will 
affect multiple traces of abstracted, chunked or direct episodic engram 
strata. Ecphoric priming is therefore here conceived as ecphoric-influence-
based multiple-trace sensitization. This could be experimentally tested 
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(controlling effects of inner attention directed by ecphoric priming). 
There is supportive evidence showing […] that perceptual and semantic kinds 
of priming occur in different cortical regions […] (Mayes, 2000, S. 435). 
Markowitsch points us into a similar direction. 134 Interestingly, there is 
evidence for context-dependency of a prime’s effectiveness. Jeffrey Toth 
points out that … 
Another example of context specificity is provided by 
Oliphant (1983), who showed that words presented as part of 
the instructions for an implicit test may produce no priming 
on that test (see also Levy & Kirsner, 1989; MacLeod, 1989). 
(Toth, 2000) 
Within the (by now somewhat extended) Semonian memory process framework, 
there could be a simple explanation for this: not each word is effective as 
a prime, because if the word stimulation happens within an ecphorically 
effective mnemic homophony, predominantly only the momentarily 
corresponding engram unit (word chunk) ought to be effective as a prime, 
activating (multiple) chunk-unit-related traces only. This, too, could be 
tested experimentally. I would further predict that words heading a word-
chunk (especially at the beginning of a sentence and if not yet pre-
contextualized) are more prone to producing a rather general, single-word-
specific priming effect than postpositionally embedded members. 
Furthermore, as discussed earlier, perceptive-contextual ecphoric 
influences may hamper ecphory of similar episodes and episodic ingredients 
if they belong into (i.e., engrammatically associate) another context, 
because ecphoric influences are supposed to be holistically effective, 
which, in our case, would have less explanatory power, though, because it 
merely prefers contextual engram strata, but does not necessarily exclude 
engram strata out of the current context. Disturbing contextual ecphoric 
influences, however, may well neutralize the sensitization effect 
established out of context.  
This brings us to another major type of priming: negative priming. Negative 
priming appeared first in the Stroop color naming task, in which the color 
of a color word (denoting a different color) is to be named quickly. Color 
naming here takes longer and is error prone (falsely naming the word’s 
                         
134 (2000, S. 469): 
[…] cortical regions surrounding the primary sensory regions, above all 
the unimodal nonprimary cortices, have been suggested as controlling 
priming (Nielsen-Bohlman, Ciranni, Shimamura, & Knight, 1997; Ochsner, 
Chiu, & Schacter, 1994; Seeck et al., 1997). Results from an 
electrophysiological study suggest the regions involved in priming are 
even more widespread and may include polymodal areas as well (Zhang, 
Begleiter, & Projesz, 1997). 
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color). The color word interferes with color naming. The color word itself 
is not a classic prime, though, as it is presented at the same time as the 
target color to be named. The negative effect, however, is increased when 
the color to be named is the color word’s color in the trial before. It is, 
of course, not reasonable to assume a habituation effect here. On the 
contrary, we can assume a normal sensitization effect and normal automatic 
engram activation. A possible explanation for experimental negative priming 
is inhibition:  
Whether a response slowing or speed-up results when the 
prime distractor becomes the probe target depends on the net 
effect of excitatory and inhibitory components. When the 
inhibitory effect exceeds the excitatory effect, response 
slowing will be found and vice versa. When both effects are 
equal in size, no priming effect will result. 
(Mayr, 2005, S. 13) 
One of the surprising capabilities of humans is quick, deliberate 
prospective acting. In reaction time experiments, one is asked to react in 
a certain way to a certain stimulus. If one intends to follow the 
instruction, the stimulus gains a kind of action valence. Intention to act 
during an experiment, however, is not exactly an inborn endogenous 
stimulus. Charging a stimulus-response is an effort, linking the will to 
participate in the experiment with the prospective stimulus and the 
prospective action. The test person learns to associate stimulus and action 
and then sets itself into a state of stimulus expectation and preparedness 
for action. As a rule, in an experiment, learning to react does not take 
the form of unintentional, (learnt) reflexive reaction. It is, so to speak, 
not a stimulus-action engram complex automatically/inherently (i.e., not in 
controlled mnemic-ecphoric fashion) crossing the Rubicon from perception to 
action.  
We have already linked chronogenous ecphory in form of prospective thought 
to endogenous ecphoric stimuli. During an experiment, it seems, intention 
functions as a sustained ecphoric influence, referencing (engrammatically 
co-associated with and thus keeping activated) the stimulus-action engram 
association established during instruction. In reaction time experiments, 
as experimenters and experienced test subjects know well, the first trials 
exhibit rather slow reaction times. The jointly ecphorically effective 
intention and stimulus influences seem to but mnemically ecphorize the 
associated action engram, resulting in a rather slow reaction. The test 
subjects will experience this as conscious reactions, with stimulus and 
action perception temporally separated. Within a few trials, however, given 
stable instructions, the reaction time will improve considerably and 
stimulus and action may be perceived as quasi-simultaneous. The threshold 
to action-engram activation seems to drop below the mnemic-ecphoric level. 
Odmar Neumann has characterized this as direct (action) parameter 
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specification. 135  It can be demonstrated by masking the action-associated 
stimulus by another stimulus associated to a dissociating, different- or 
no-action instruction. Depending on the instructions given, to a test 
subject, reacting to a masked stimulus without becoming aware of it seems 
to be a mistaken reaction. The longer the stimulus onset interval between 
masked and masking stimulus becomes, the higher the error rate will be, 
which seems plausible, as automatic, stimulus-influenced ecphory will have 
more time to progress. If the test person is instructed to react quickly as 
well as correctly to the perceived stimulus, it has to suppress its 
tendency to react automatically to the masked stimulus. Instead of relying 
on automatic motor-action ecphory, controlled, mnemic motor-action ecphory 
has to be chosen. In a similar experimental paradigm, Ludwig (Ludwig, 
1996), incidentally observed that misguided reactions slow down reaction 
times in the following trials, before, after a few trials, they recover 
again. It is as if the will to react quickly is at a disadvantage after a 
mistaken reaction. In the reaction error case, the automatically ecphorized 
motor action and the perceived stimulus do not match the stimulus-action 
engram motivated on occasion of the instruction. They form a simultaneous 
complex, resulting in a novel, non-instructional (contrary) engram 
association between the stimulus percept engram and the motor action 
engram. This, however, is not motivated (encouraging automatic motor 
ecphory/action), but demotivated (inhibiting automatic motor 
ecphory/action). Subsequent masked (same) stimulus presentations will 
automatically activate both, the instructional stimulus-motor engram 
association and the non-instructional engram association, creating an 
intentionally conflicting automatic engram ecphory increasing the threshold 
to action. After a number of correct reactions, the presence of the 
intentional ecphoric influence, entertained during the experiment as the 
want to react quickly, will be strengthened mnemic-ecphorically (i.e., 
under the impression of correct reactions), while the inhibiting 
(disliking) ecphoric influence will gradually lose its potency (not be 
mnemically strengthened, disadvantaging the activation of the corresponding 
engram association). This creates an opportunity for new mistaken 
reactions, which, if occurring, would again strengthen the (slower) 
controlled mnemic-ecphoric reaction type, by reestablishing the dislike of 
false reactions as an ecphoric influence. The net result of this may well 
be the effect known as response priming, in which the masked stimulus seems 
to function as an ambiguous prime, having a positive effect on reaction 
time in case of congruency between masked and masking stimuli, and a 
negative effect in case of incongruence. This view, however, seems to 
conceal the dynamics of the memory-process involved. Negative ecphoric 
priming is probably a more complex and dynamic phenomenon then positive 
ecphoric priming. This also seems to be reflected in the somewhat ambiguous 
                         
135 See, e.g., (Neumann, 1990). 
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experimental results regarding negative priming in general, as reported by 
Mayr.136  
The theoretical explanation presented here could be tested, for example, by 
tracking the cyclic effect of erroneous reactions in negative priming 
together with their (to be) assumed specificity introduced by specific non-
instructional associations in combination with their automatic activation 
(priming). One would expect a dissociation of the strength of the response 
prime effect for different instructional responses as a function of the 
rate of actual corresponding mistaken reactions. Mayr’s own experimental 
research on negative priming supports or, at least, seems to be compatible 
with our (extended Semonian) interpretation of the somewhat puzzling and 
thus theoretically challenging set of phenomena related to it: 
The retrieved prime response might interfere with response 
selection in that the prime response hampers the selection 
among response alternatives. This may take time, which would 
explain a negative priming reaction time effect, but it may 
also lead to the wrong response selection every so often, 
which would account for the error effect of negative 
priming. 
(Mayr, 2005, S. 118)  
In this thesis, I do not consider priming to denote a mere strengthening 
effect of memory retrieval. Automatic homophonous activation of engram 
complexes and other, sequential engram associations from multiple traces by 
mnemic, perceptive or complex mnemic-perceptive ecphoric influences is an 
integral sub-process of the main replication/variation memory process. I, 
therefore, see no reason to expect priming to involve a separate priming 
memory. The popular theoretical practice of inventing memory instances for 
dissociable memory effects is questionable. It leads to rather problematic 
statements like the following:  
                         
136 (Mayr, 2005, S. 13):  
Excitation was supposed to be a slowly and passively decaying process, 
whereas inhibition was assumed to be a more labile and strategic component 
influenced by task demands. Tipper and Cranston (1985) assumed that 
participants are able to deliberately maintain a selection state when 
response selection is difficult (such as when the probe display requires 
selecting between two objects). Inhibition would stay active and prevent 
fast responding to the suppressed object. On the other hand, when the 
probe target is easy to select or does not require a selection at all, the 
selection state is abandoned, and inhibition vanishes quickly. 
Consequently, only the excitatory component remains and is revealed by 
facilitated responding as was found in probes without selection 
requirement.  
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The next system is the priming system in which the 
unconscious encoding of information results in a higher and 
successful recognition rate, even when only some details are 
presented (cf. word-stem completion tasks). 
(Brand & Markowitsch, 2010, S. 149) 
Unconscious encoding of information into a priming (memory) system would 
either dissociate the priming effects from consciously encoded information 
(which seems impossible) or it would imply that consciously encoded 
information is additionally encoded unconsciously (i.e., in a separate 
store system). The question then would be why we have to store anything 
consciously at all. This is, by itself, a good question, but it would be 
difficult to relate it to priming. Sensitization of an existing neuronal 
engram (complex/sequence) due to its signal activation, on the other hand, 
offers a rather simple, well-researched memory mechanism for the 
preferential treatment that comes with priming. It would imply, however, 
that engram activation is a necessary, but not yet a sufficient criterion 
of mnemic consciousness, as the associatively spreading effect of 
(ecphoric) priming is not (fully) reflected by conscious associations. 
Priming would nevertheless represent a form of learning or encoding 
(sensitization), but based on given [sic] engram complexes. This is 
consistent with long-lasting priming effects:  
Schacter, and Stark (1982) found very little 'forgetting' in 
a word-fragment completion task between 1 hour and 7 days 
after initial presentation of the studied words. These long-
lasting priming effects may be regarded as examples of 
perceptual learning rather than as episodic memory in the 
usual sense (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981). 
(Brown & Craik, 2000, S. 102) 
However, I do not think that perceptual learning is, in general, the right 
term for priming learning, for, in principal, any ecphory, be it mnemic, 
perceptive or (homophonously or non-homophonously) combined, will produce 
this effect. In a certain sense, though, it is accurate to characterize 
priming learning as perceptual learning, because unimodal perceptual 
priming (activation) must be the only or primary learning form of the 
perceptive-primitive (early sensory processing) memory. It is interesting 
and important also to consider the temporal aspect of priming learning. 
Schacter summarizes Eric Kandel’s differentiation between short-term and 
long-term memory as follows: 
Kandel and colleagues have provided persuasive evidence that 
Aplysia’s short-term memory is based on an enhanced release 
of neurotransmitter at the junction of synapse between a 
neuron that receives the noxious stimulation (a sensory 
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neuron) and a neuron that is involved in withdrawing the 
gill (a motor neuron). As a result of stimulation, a 
chemical messenger travels more easily across the gap that 
separates one neuron from another. The long-term memory 
involves a process known as protein-synthesis and appears to 
be accompanied by the growth of new synapses. They conclude 
that “on the cellular level the switch from short-term to 
long-term facilitation is a switch from a process-based 
memory to a structural-based memory.”  
(Schacter, 1996, S. 83) 
Adopting these basic forms of neuronal learning for priming learning, one 
may assume that there is a process-based short-term and a structural-based 
long-term form of both perceptual priming learning and ecphoric priming 
learning. One has to ask whether the activation of multiple traces in 
ecphoric priming would not establish a qualitatively different form of 
learning than non-ecphoric perceptual priming. I have already mentioned co-
structural (stimuli-engraphic and mnemic-ecphoric-engraphic) automatic 
abstraction. As abstraction encompasses multiple traces, ecphoric priming 
is very much a candidate mechanism for unconscious, automatic abstraction 
learning, whereas conscious, differentiating abstractions must be mnemic-
ecphorically mediated, by engraphy of new simultaneous complexes 
[Simultankomplexe] into corresponding engram complex/sequence associations. 
Priming-based abstraction using engraphically [sic] associated 
(sequenced/complexed) engrams may provide the nuts and bolts needed for 
chunking. Chunking is, on one hand, a form of meta-level engraphy, mediated 
ecphorically, by homophonously, chunk-wise structuring the mnemic-sensory 
simultaneous complex. Chunking, on the other hand, may also denote the 
(original) forming of a chunk engram, which may well be characterized as a 
form of prime-based abstraction. As far as I see, in theoretical practice, 
these two (very) different meanings of chunking tend not to be 
distinguished, though. Chunking as meta-level ecphory/engraphy is falsely 
perceived as the chunk-creating act itself. This, however, is only true in 
the sense that higher-level chunk-abstractions are based on inter-chunk-
associations engraphically established through homophonous (meta-level) 
chunking. Homophonous chunking does not only provide the new inter-chunk 
associations potentially forming novel higher-order chunks, it is also the 
mechanism turning the chunk-abstraction into an abstraction-enhancing 
prime. The multiple-traces-based chunk-abstraction uses not to have a 
direct stimulus-counterpart (because else it would not have needed a 
creative abstraction at all, but just a, so to speak, summarizing 
complexing of an engram stratum). It cannot simply be directly matched by 
an ecphoric influence / ecphoric prime. The ecphory of a chunk-abstraction, 
meta-level chunking, must be a process of effectively inhibiting lower-
level competing priming activation. This is thinkable, for example, by an 
efficient type of inter-chunk-level inhibition between chunk-abstractions 
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engrammatically overlapping on a lower level. Multi-level abstraction 
fields would thus effectively prevent an ecphoric-prime activation from 
otherwise spreading uncontrollably across multiple (rather, countless), 
historically highly inter-related (episodic) engram strata. Chunked 
homophonous ecphory appears to function as a mechanism for channeling 
ecphoric priming. A chunk-abstraction engram is to be seen as a unit of 
conscious structuring; it is an elementary mnemic unit. An original 
stimulus engram is a unit of pre-conscious stimulus excitation and sub- or 
lower-conscious mnemic-ecphoric structuring. Its prime-based activation can 
be direct (bottom-up), by an appropriate stimulus-ecphoric influence, or 
indirect (top-down), by the activation of a hierarchically more or less 
distant abstraction. A mnemic ecphoric influence will take effect on a 
mnemically structured associative engram level. A stimulus excitation, 
however, will always first have to take effect as an ecphoric prime 
(bottom-up). If it falls into the excitatory region of chunks within the 
(momentarily activated) simultaneous complex, it is incorporated 
homophonously, perhaps slightly varying or deepening the actual mnemic 
sensation, without, however, changing its mnemic-ecphoric or mnemic-
engraphic structure. If it, on the other hand, falls into the currently 
inhibited engrammatic region of chunks within the momentary simultaneous 
complex, it could be fully suppressed, or it is strong enough to provoke a 
bottom-up ecphorization of a competing chunk, thus inhibiting other 
mnemically activated engrams, causing a sensory-based (bottom-up) change in 
the simultaneous complex. If it falls outside of any inhibitory or 
excitatory engrammatic region of currently active chunk-abstractions, it 
may well have a bottom-up effect, too, activating a superordinate chunk-
abstraction engram that may or may not rise to the sensational level. 
According to our extended Semonian theory of memory, there ought to be a 
direct and constant nervous activation chain between the perceptual priming 
of the sensorial engrams of primitive (early perceptual) memory and the 
chunk-abstraction layers and multiple episodic traces associating them in 
varying complexes and sequences. Theoretically, more conventionally 
speaking, sensory memory and (episodically constructed) long-term memory 
are always directly interlinked through the mechanism of perceptual 
(endogenous and exogenous sensorial) priming. Sensorial activation of 
stacked abstraction-units will depend, first, on a suitable (sensory) 
stimuli pattern, and, second, on the local inhibitory and excitatory 
nervous situation exerted by prior ecphory, which we by now may well 
identify with the (still somewhat enigmatic) creation of a stable, 
stimulation-independent (chunk-)abstraction- and (chunk-)trace activation.  
Changes of comparably stable (compared to mere priming-activation) mnemic 
sensational or sub-sensational states are normally associated to the 
mechanism of (outer) attention or the experience of thought, which, in 
turn, can be associated with concepts such as psychological situation (Kurt 
Lewin), simultaneous complex (Richard Semon), and short-term or working 
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memory (Alan Baddeley)137, or, more generally speaking, consciousness. These 
concepts can be characterized by a pattern span or digit span. Baddeley 
(Baddeley, 2000, S. 80), for example, describes a short-term visual memory 
store that is limited to one pattern, with performance on that pattern 
being a function of its complexity. The pattern (complex) or digit 
(sequence), or, simply, memory span is determined by the sensory modality 
involved, or, in the multimodal case, their particular combinations. George 
A. Miller famously related it to the magical number of seven, plus or minus 
two chunks138. The number, however, is of no concern to us here. A memory-
span chunk is not a stimulus- or content-quality, but, as I have suggested, 
the activation of a chunk-abstraction within a simultaneous complex that is 
typically created by stimulus-ecphoric and mnemic-ecphoric influences being 
effective simultaneously. One could argue that the maximal chunk span (on 
any specific abstraction layer) equates memory span, because no chunking 
trace could exceed memory span. This also limits chunk-abstraction span to 
memory span minus one (measured in consecutive length in case of chunk-
abstractions) or to the integer of memory span divided by two (measured by 
possible variable gaps in case of abstractions in form of variable 
schemata)139. Consciousness (or working memory or simultaneous complex etc.) 
indicates an abstract-integrative function, creating engrammatic traces of 
chunked complexity and sequentiality. Consciousness creates a perceptive-
mnemic and a mnemic-associative momentary meta-reality for the biological 
system. While stimulus excitation could only just be said to represent 
stimuli140, the perceptive-ecphoric and thus engrammatically effective unit 
                         
137 See, e.g., (Baddeley, 2000). 
138 See (Miller, 1956). 
139 In the latter case, a span of three would put an exception to the rule, as it offers the 
opportunity of two variables and not just one variable. 
140 Thomas Metzinger (Metzinger, 1999, S. 68) talks about mental presentations: 
Mentale Präsentate sind spezifische innere Zustände, die die aktuelle 
Präsenz eines bestimmten Sachverhalts bezüglich der Welt oder des Systems 
anzeigen. 
Pain is an example that Metzinger uses for a mental presentation, expressing a system 
state. There are, indeed, very strong endogenous sensations that offer little room for 
abstraction. Metzinger contrasts these presentations with mental representations referring 
to mental representations [mentale Repräsentate] and mental simulations, which are mental 
representations of a contra-factual situation [mentales Repräsentat einer kontrafaktischen 
Situation]. Consciousness is characterized (Metzinger, 1999, S. 97) as … 
Die Inhalte phänomenalen Bewußtseins sind Meta-Repräsentate, die für ein 
System eine Teilmenge der gegenwärtig in ihm aktivierten mentalen Simulate 
und Präsentate abbilden. Das, was alle bewußten inneren Zuständen 
miteinander gemein haben, ist die Tatsache, daß sie durch eine 
einheitliche Metarepräsentationsfunktion erfaßt werden.  
Metzinger (Metzinger, 1999, S. 156) further describes mental self-simulation as the mental 
representation of a contra-factual state of the system as a whole [das mentale Repräsentat 
eines kontrafaktischen Zustands des Systems als Ganzem]. Metzinger’s ideas about mental 
models of self could be easily translated into the extended Semonian memory framework, 
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of consciousness and subsequent engrammatic fixation is the chunk-
abstraction. Its associative features stem from its integration into 
multiple engrammatic traces, and its analytical features stem from its 
abstraction from multiple engrammatic traces.  
Synthetically/analytically differing, separate chunk-abstractions can be 
(seemingly) activated by homomorphous stimulus excitation, as is intra-
individually demonstrated in homophonous words and phrases. It is less easy 
to see, how, inter-individually, homomorphous stimuli activate 
synthetically differing chunk-abstractions, especially if we (again taking 
words as an example) cannot consider the stimuli to represent homonyms. The 
representational, communicative-technological effectiveness of the meta-
representational system depends largely on the synthetic-analytic 
correspondence structure between the actuator’s and the substitutor-
actuator’s engrammatic structures. Shared experiences, inter-individually 
analogous momentary simultaneous complexes will create comparable memory 
traces, creating comparable abstractions, creating comparable chunking 
(interpretation, if you like). Late Wittgensteinian language games 
represent engrammatically shared moments and thus create the foundation for 
shared language-based abstractions etc. Wittgenstein, however, other than 
Semon, did not develop a coherent theoretical framework demonstrating the 
cognitive processes involved.  
In neuropsychological terms, working memory (i.e., the simultaneous 
complex) can be dissociated from long-term memory (i.e., abstractions and 
their episodic traces).  
Neuropsychological Evidence: Amnesic patients such as the 
classic case HM (Milner, 1966) showed grossly impaired LTM, 
together with preserved span. Such patients also showed 
preserved recency, and if intellectually otherwise intact, 
normal performance on the Peterson Short-Term Forgetting 
Task (Badeley & Warrington, 1970). 
(Baddeley, 2000, S. 81) 
The grossly impaired LTM here refers to anterograde amnesia. LTM is 
actually not impaired, as this would necessarily create retrograde amnesia. 
Anterograde amnesia is characterized by impaired episodic encoding 
                                                                            
interpreting mental presentations as primitive-memory-level integrations and mental 
representations as chunk-abstractions, with the simultaneous complex as a meta-
representational function contra-factually (i.e., mnemically) associating (predicting) 
inner and outer states into a model of self(-expectation). An integrated Semon-Lewin-
Metzinger framework, which I can only hint at in this thesis, would provide a very 
attractive theoretical framework of the self, knowledge and motivation structures, 
describing possible ways of artificially extending all three of these aspects in a single 
replication/variation memory framework. 
Extended Artificial Memory 
[169] 
(engraphy), sometimes suddenly caused by damage to the medial temporal 
lobe, as indicated in … 
[…] Squire and Alvarez's (1995) hypothesis of medial 
temporal lobe (MTL) amnesia, which states that fact and 
episode memories are initially stored in the MTL, but 
through gradual reorganization storage is transferred for 
very long-term maintenance to neocortical structures such as 
the anterolateral temporal cortex.  
(Mayes, 2000, S. 429) 
Fact memory could be translated into chunk-abstraction (i.e., in terms of 
Thomas Metzinger, representational) memory structures. Episode memories 
equal memory traces (of simultaneous complexes). Episodic chunking, 
however, would rather suggest a reference structure than a separate and 
independent initial MTL store. One would therefore think that … 
The hippocampal complex […] acts as a temporary 'indexer' 
linking together traces in other cortical areas. Over time, 
with repeated exposure to and retrieval of information, 
direct cortico-cortical connections are established that are 
independent of hippocampal function, a process known as 
consolidation. 
(Hodges, 2000, S. 451) 
This would explain why damage to the neurophysiological structure 
facilitating engraphy impairs engraphy without impairing ecphory. This is 
also to some extent supported by the reverse dissociation where … 
[…] patients with damage to temporal neocortical regions, as 
in semantic dementia, sparing the medial temporal cortex, 
have the reverse pattern, with better memory for both recent 
personal experiences and recently encountered or reinforced 
general knowledge (Graham & Hodges, 1997; Hodges & Graham, 
1998; Snowden et al., 1996b). 
(Hodges, 2000, S. 451) 
Ecphoric priming learning, the idea of chunk-abstraction through 
simultaneous activation of multiple episodic traces, does not require new 
memory traces to be created episodically. It, thus, cannot surprise to 
learn that  
There is also accruing evidence that it is possible to 
acquire some new semantic information in the absence of a 
functional hippocampal system (Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997; 
Kitchener, McCarthy, & Hodges, 1998); this slower, and more 
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limited, form of direct cortical learning probably depends 
upon multiple stereotyped exposures. 
(Hodges, 2000, S. 451) 
Hippocampal learning of chunk-traces contrasts with neocortical learning of 
chunk-abstractions. In the extended Semonian memory theory, this 
neocortical memory encoding system is solely based on ecphoric priming 
learning. Frequent exposure (of adequate stimuli) will gradually build up a 
direct-associative field demarcating the new chunk-abstraction and thus 
increase the likelihood of its active mnemic ecphory verifying it as 
neocortically learnt (e.g. in a completion task). The link between episodic 
encoding (engraphy) and consciousness is less clear. If subjects have to 
work on a secondary task while encoding or retrieving lists … 
[…] the finding is that division of attention has a strongly 
negative effect on later recall and recognition when the 
secondary task is performed during encoding, but relatively 
little effect when performed during retrieval (Baddeley, 
Lewis, Eldridge, & Thomson, 1984; Craik, Govoni, Naveh-
Benjamin, & Anderson, 1996; Kellogg, Cocklin, & Bourne, 
1982). 
(Brown & Craik, 2000, S. 103) 
Undivided, focal attention and, associated therewith, full consciousness 
seem to be pivotal to subsequent episodic encoding, but they do not depend 
on the encoding system (both, thus, cannot be equated). As the cognitive 
state of chunked consciousness implies a reference to neocortical 
(engraphic) engrams, the episodic encoding system must hold such a 
reference, too, but independently, as the impairment of the MTL system does 
not hamper consciousness. There is a double dissociation between episodic 
encoding and consciousness in that … 
In contrast [to the famous case HM], a second class of 
patient appeared to show the opposite pattern with digit 
spans of 1 or 2 items, very poor Peterson performance, and 
little or no recency, coupled with apparently normal LTM 
(Shallice & Warrington, 1970). This double dissociation 
strongly supported a separation of LTM and STM.  
(Baddeley, 2000, S. 81) 
Well, again, this rather supports dissociation between episodic encoding 
and consciousness, not between alleged LTM and STM. What is astonishing is 
that, on one hand, focal consciousness is clearly needed for episodic 
encoding, and, on the other hand, it is maintained that a short digit span 
should not hamper episodic encoding. The limitation of LTM (episodic 
encoding) to 1 or 2 memory items (which would be normal LTM of abnormal 
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STM, as an abnormal STM cannot reproduce a normal LTM), however, would, in 
my opinion, rather indicate that the associative span of consciousness is 
directly reflected in the associative span of episodic memory traces, so 
that any particular memory trace would reflect a momentary simultaneous 
complex. This window or span of (chunked) consciousness becomes the window 
or span of replicative mnemic-associative (-predictive/-simulative) traces. 
The capacity of consciousness (i.e. of whatever biologically instantiated 
system behind it) seems to limit the capacity of 
(factual/perceptive-ecphoric) prediction and (contra-factual/mnemic-
ecphoric) simulation140, both of which are essential to intelligent 
behavior. However, consciousness has to have a special, focal, attentional 
quality in order to induce engraphy. Otherwise engraphy remains 
fragmentary, resulting in short, low-span traces, with little overlapping 
between memory traces and, hence, little opportunity to ordered mnemic 
ecphorization, decreasing memory performance. Outer attention may be 
paraphrased as fixation of a given stimulus excitation (and its changes). 
While perceptual priming is obviously very fast, ecphoric priming, on the 
other hand, has to progress through hierarchical layers of abstractions, 
top-down activating inactive missing components and inhibiting disturbing 
lower-level components that are activated bottom-up. This seems necessary 
so that perceptual priming can turn perception into a predictive mode, in 
which activation spreads along multiple chunk-related memory traces. 
Outwardly attending (often involving motor activity) creates the stimulus 
excitation stability needed for chunking a strongly stimulus-influenced 
simultaneous complex and for any predictive priming and perceptive ecphory. 
Inwardly attending creates the sensation excitation stability needed for 
mnemic-simulative and intentional ecphory. 141  Sudden attention shifts, 
masking a given stimulus/sensation (activation), will prevent activation 
from reaching higher levels of abstraction and multiple related engram 
traces. This conception of attention-based stimulus persistency and its 
effect on priming-activation and ecphory is, in general, in agreement with 
the levels of processing approach of Fergus Craik and Robert Lockhart: 
                         
141 Otto Selz (Selz, 1924, S. 11) rightly stated: 
Eine der wichtigsten Lösungsmethoden der reproduktiven (gedächtnismäßigen) 
Aufgabelösung ist die intellektuelle Operation des B e s i n n e n s.  
Otto Selz believed that knowledge complexes (which are similar to Semon’s simultaneous 
complexes and ecphorized memory traces are awakened by bethinking [durch Besinnen erweckter 
Wissenskomplex]. 
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Craik & Lockhart (1972) proposed that incoming stimuli were 
processed to different levels, or depths, within the 
cognitive system, from 'shallow' or sensory levels to 'deep' 
or meaningful levels of analysis. 
(Brown & Craik, 2000, S. 94)  
Meaningful, here, however, may be misleading, as it seems to reduce the 
chunk-abstraction hierarchy to language-semantic relations. There are, 
however, also conceptual (often unimodal) abstraction hierarchies, and non-
successive (non-chunk-type) abstractions, resembling syntax schemata, but 
not limited to them; abstractions, thus, that Roger Schank would label 
(higher-level) scripts or (lower-level) scriptlets142. 
The lower, shallow levels of processing may be driven 
predominantly by perceptual inputs (bottom-up or data-driven 
processing) and the higher (deeper) levels driven either by 
the same perceptual inputs, or activated 'top-down' by 
expectations and intentions (Norman, 1968). 
(Brown & Craik, 2000, S. 94) 
One might want to comment here that limiting top-down processing to 
expectation and intention misses the point of expectations and intentions 
both being incorporated into memory traces engrammatically, and of 
intentions playing an endogenous-sensory and engrammatic-ecphoric double 
role, which I have already discussed in its memory-process dynamics when 
delving into motivation.  
A further difference between sensory and conceptual codes is 
that sensory codes are likely to be reused in many different 
combinations, just as the 26 letters of the alphabet are 
recombined to form many different unique words; conceptual 
                         
142 Roger Schank (Schank, 1999, S. 129) distinguishes these two terms as follows: 
The problem with the old conception of scripts was that too much of what 
could be defined generally, and of what is likely to be stored in a 
general fashion in memory, was defined specifically as a part of a 
particular scriptlet. When one takes away from $AIRPLANE everything that 
could have been defined generally, only things specific to $AIRPLANE […] 
are left. These are what I now call scriptlets. 
Even though scripts or scriptlets, if reflected upon and labeled, appear as sequences of 
elements or consecutive memory traces, their origin is best be thought of as one of 
abstraction across multiple similar memory traces, whether implicitly (via joint priming) 
or consciously (perceptive- or mnemic-ecphorically). Script(let)s are variable abstraction 
schemata, organized more or less hierarchically. They form, so to speak, the syntax of 
thinking and acting.  
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codes, on the other hand, are more usually specific 
differentiable (Moscovitch & Craik, 1976).  
(Brown & Craik, 2000, S. 94) 
Sensory codes can be equated to original stimulus engrams, that is, to use 
the respective term of Thomas Metzinger, mental presentations [mentale 
Präsentate]. An important question is, in how far higher-level abstractions 
do indeed reuse (refer to) sensory codes/mental presentations. According to 
the extended Semonian model guiding us here, one would expect higher-level 
abstractions (abstract representations) not to refer directly to lower-
level sensory presentations (original or non-ecphorically integrative 
stimulus engrams). They seem to exert a strong influence on ecphory 
(providing, for example, the syntax of thought and action) without, 
however, having the conscious imprint of sensory stimuli. The course of 
thinking (and acting), as it was first researched by the Würzburg School 
(of psychology of thinking) under Oswald Külpe and further elaborated by 
the ingenious Otto Selz, is clearly dominated by schematic anticipation 
[schematische Antizipation], and not by direct associations between rather 
elementary mental presentations, as was a long-held belief of psychological 
associationism. 143  The simultaneous complex, as we have noted before, is 
increasingly chunked. New memory traces are mostly constituted by chunk-
abstractions. The depth of processing is not just a vertical depth of 
meaningful analysis (or synthesis, respectively), but also a horizontal 
depth of schematically productive and associatively reproductive priming 
and ecphory, which is not sufficiently characterized by cognitive 
processing 'top-down' by expectations and intentions. The subsequent 
                         
143 Otto Selz (1924, S. 12), with respect to reproductive thinking / task solving, states: 
Das Aufgabebewußtsein verhält sich also zu dem zu aktualisierenden 
Wissenskomplex wie das Schema eines Komplexes zu dem vollständigen 
Komplex, und der Vorgang des Besinnens, welcher den Wissenskomplex wieder 
ins Bewußtsein hebt, stellt sich als Unterfall einer 
i n t e l l e k t u e l l e n  O p e r a t i o n  d e r  
K o m p l e x e r g ä n z u n g dar. 
The intellectual operation of complex completion is similar to Semon’s mnemic ecphory 
(using a variable abstracted schema). This similarity (amongst others) allows an easy 
entanglement of both theories, and it stresses the congenial theoretical achievements of 
Semon and Selz. Otto Selz relates the (top-down-effective) complex completion to a reflex-
like reaction [reflexoide Zuordnung], offering a surprisingly stable scaffolding for memory 
reproduction, especially as compared to the alleged diffuse reproductive tendencies of 
associationistic theory. Selz (1924, S. 13) then, ingeniously, places the diffuse 
reproductive tendencies into another, namely bottom-up-effective (pre- and sub-ecphoric, so 
to speak) realm:  
Im Rahmen der konkurrierenden aufgabengemäßen Prozesse gelten dann 
allerdings jene Gesetzmäßigkeiten, welche die klassische 
Assoziationspsychologie durch ihre Theorie der diffusen Reproduktionen zu 
erklären suchte. 
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assumption that the more deeply or meaningfully the information is 
processed, the more well retained the information will be 144 , therefore, 
seems to be an inappropriate generalization, as engraphy is linked to 
engrammatically effective simultaneous complexes, which do not have to 
reflect any of the information at all, even if some experimental settings 
aim to create favorable conditions. However, while we ought to reject its 
general prediction concerning retention, we, nonetheless, ought to approve 
that the levels-of-processing (LOP) view […] emphasizes the role of mental 
operations in memory, particularly encoding processes144, as it is pivotal 
to understand that there is nothing like an automatic or direct translation 
of information into (episodic) memory traces. Chunking likely creates a 
situation of mnemic-ecphoric association (associative remembrance). 
Stimulus information and memory information are joined to form individual 
memory traces. The engraphically effective part is the mnemic-perceptive 
simultaneous complex. 
Chunking and mnemic-associative ecphory do not always need bethinking 
[Besinnung] in order to come to being. Expert perception and expert 
behavior do differ markedly from novice perception and novice behavior. 
There is a kind of experience-based acceleration and automation of 
perception and action. Otto Selz (1924), for example, describes how through 
trying-out behavior (many trials) [Probierbewegungen], after some time, it 
is no longer necessary (and not even advisable) to bethink the means of 
achieving a specific action goal. The numerous episodes of actions leading 
to the goal state wanted are abstracted in a way that they directly link 
the given (problem) state to the desired goal state. The expert simply has 
to focus on the goal, while the intermediate action steps (the problem 
solving method) will be performed (ecphorized) automatically [automatische 
Lösungsmethode]. The automatic ecphorization of problem solving 
methods/actions remains subsensational and, therefore, will no longer be 
engraphically effective anymore. This permits more other perceptive and 
ecphoric influences to enter the simultaneous complex, potentially forming 
new (more) complex memory constellations and traces, coordinating actions 
on higher abstraction levels. Goal-directed schematic anticipation 
gradually transforms into an abstracting compression of chains of ordered 
thinking and/or actions. Ideally, this compression increases the scope of 
information that can be successfully chunked. Learnt specific automatic 
reactions resemble inherited automatic reflexes, but are fundamentally 
different with regard to their ontogenetic or memory development. Different 
types of conceptual compression (sub-types of conceptual blending mentioned 
by Fauconnier145, such as cause-effect compression, metonymic compressions, 
and compression of disanalogy into change) play a crucial role in thinking. 
                         
144 (Brown & Craik, 2000, S. 94) 
145 See (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002). 
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During his emigration years in the Netherlands, Otto Selz influenced the 
chess psychologist Adrian D. de Groot, who, on one hand, influenced Allen 
Newell and Herbert Simon, two important pioneers of artificial 
intelligence, and, on the other hand, inspired research on expert knowledge 
and expert intuition. One of the latest theoretical approaches stems from 
Fernand Gobet: the two-stage process of expertise acquisition. In an 
extensive review of experimental research, Guida et al. propose … 
[…] that, in terms of brain activation, expertise 
acquisition in WM-related tasks is a two-stage process that 
starts with a decrease in activity and ends with functional 
brain reorganization. 
(Guida, Gobet, Tardieu, & Nicolas, 2012, S. 42)  
With practice, the elements that have been bound gradually begin to 
stabilize in LTM, first as chunks and then as high hierarchical chunks: 
knowledge structures. 146  This is described as a profound cognitive 
modification that occurs only at a late phase of expertise acquisition.147 
Cognitive templates and retrieval structures are said to be highly 
hierarchical structures that can incorporate chunks. They constitute a 
phase of expertise that is superior to the use of simple chunks.148 Guida et 
al. remark that no functional reorganization has been observed in less than 
5 weeks.149 They claim that chunking theory offers a good explanation of the 
decrease in activation in WM-related tasks149, because … 
[…] if one can represent the same amount of information in 
WM with larger chunks, then the number of chunks (or the 
percentage of chunks) in WM necessary to represent this 
amount of information decreases. This could easily explain 
why the brain activity in WM regions decreases. 
(Guida, Gobet, Tardieu, & Nicolas, 2012, S. 46) 
With expertise, however, … 
[…] the involvement of LTM occurs in two ways: (a) in terms 
of semantic memory knowledge used to encode the incoming 
information, and (b) in terms of transfer of the incoming 
information into episodic memory. […] the incoming 
information can be rapidly linked to knowledge structures, 
either retrieval structures or templates. […] experts only 
need to activate the knowledge structures that have been 
                         
146 (Guida, Gobet, Tardieu, & Nicolas, 2012, S. 57) 
147 (Guida, Gobet, Tardieu, & Nicolas, 2012, S. 43) 
148 (Guida, Gobet, Tardieu, & Nicolas, 2012, S. 45) 
149 (Guida, Gobet, Tardieu, & Nicolas, 2012, S. 46) 
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associated (via cues or slots depending on the theory) with 
the incoming information to form an episode. 
(Guida, Gobet, Tardieu, & Nicolas, 2012, S. 54f) 
Now, it is very clear that this up to date two-stage theory, which is 
broadly backed by experimental findings, is very similar to and well 
compatible with the extended Semonian theory of memory, as applied by us 
upon the Selzian theory of specific reactions [Theorie der spezifischen 
Reaktionen] before. The Selzian theory (of productive and reproductive 
thinking), however, has an interesting additional aspect (missing in the 
two-stage theory). It describes two opposing ways of abstracting 
(means/methods to solve a problem): reproductive (means) abstraction 
[reproduktive Mittelabstraktion] and accidental (means) abstraction 
[zufallsbedingte Mittelabstraktion]. So far, in our discussions, 
abstraction has been based on structural similarities or overlapping of 
memory traces, present in stimulus situations promoting abstractions. Otto 
Selz, though, considered abstraction in the context of experimental tasks. 
A question to be answered (often two words to be interlinked by a third 
word, e.g. a shared top-category) is an anticipation schema with a missing 
(variable) element. If the answer is known, the variable (means) is 
reproduced by actualization [Mittelaktualisierung], or, in our words, it is 
ecphorized. Abstraction, on the other hand, means abstracting the missing 
link from an existing similar memory trace. If this is possible in a 
reproductive manner (i.e., by ecphory), it is called reproductive 
abstraction; if it is not possible on the given engrammatic basis, but 
happens on occasion of an accidental new experience, it is called 
accidental abstraction. 
Infolge der starken und langdauernden Nachwirkung 
ernsthafter Problemstellungen können bei der 
zufallsbedingten Mittelabstraktion, wahrscheinlich aber auch 
bei der reproduktiven Mittelabstraktion die Einfälle in 
einem Augenblick auftreten, in dem wir gar nicht mehr an das 
Problem dachten. Hierdurch wird der von genialen 
Persönlichkeiten oft berichtete gänzlich passive, 
eingebungsartige Charakter mancher Einfälle verständlich. 
Die Vorgänge der 'Inspiration' finden hier teilweise 
Erklärung. 
(Selz, 1924, S. 27)  
Selz wants to show that …  
[…] gerade die konstanten gesetzmäßigen Zuordnungen der 
geistigen Operationen und die Wiederkehr der gleichen 
Auslösungsbedingungen die Voraussetzung der Entwicklung, der 
Entstehung neuer Operationen und neuer geistiger Produkte 
Extended Artificial Memory 
[177] 
bilden. So entstehen durch die konstanten, gesetzmäßigen 
Zuordnungen der allgemeinen Operationen der 
Mittelabstraktion und der Mittelaktualisierung zu bestimmten 
Auslösungsbedingungen die neuen speziellen Lösungsmethoden 
und neuen Geistesprodukte, welche die Träger der geistigen 
Entwicklung sind. 
(Selz, 1924, S. 30)  
Selz clearly saw the (memory) variation mechanisms given by different 
(means) abstractions (which, in a very general sense, could also be named 
conceptual blendings). Selz, furthermore, clearly distinguishes two 
epistemic pathways to memory variation, the solution-ecphoric, given a 
sensational (not yet engrammatic) task complex, and the task-ecphoric, 
given a sensational solution complex: 
 […] denn dieselbe doppelte Entstehungsmöglichkeit der 
Zuordnung von Ziel und Mittel ist überall gegeben, wo die 
Beobachtung von Naturvorgängen die Entdeckung von 
Lösungsmethoden auf dem Gebiete der Wissenschaft und Technik 
oder die Beobachtung ästhetischer Wirkungen die Entdeckung 
künstlerischer Ausdrucksmittel herbeiführt. Immer kann 
entweder eine gegenwärtige Problemstellung zur reproduktiven 
Verwertung f r ü h e r e r Beobachtungen als Lösungsmittel 
oder umgekehrt eine gegenwärtige Beobachtung zur Entdeckung 
der Lösung eines früher gestellten Problems führen. 
(Selz, 1924, S. 23) 
The schematic-incomplete task complex determines (motivates) thinking 
(abstractive mnemic ecphory). The later, non-schematic solution complex, 
however, is being determined (motivated) by the ecphorized, i.e. by then 
already engrammatic, task complex. This is different from the before-
mentioned chronogenous ecphory by endogenous stimuli. Solution-based task-
ecphory, it seems to me, is a considerable achievement of the memory 
process. It underpins its ability to reinstate a former, non-completed 
anticipation schema if the right conditions for means abstraction (from 
experience) are met. One could describe task-ecphory as the capacity of the 
memory system to first form an incomplete (question-like) schema, keep it 
by means of engraphy, and later instantiate it, on the occasion of an 
experience matching and completing the schema. Creative thinking, in part, 
becomes a matter of asynchronous outer stimulation, where the wealth of 
individual knowledge (engrams) does not suffice for a task solution. There 
is, hence, a growth of knowledge caused by perception, where the knowledge 
created is not inherent in the stimuli. It is constructed in a task-
ecphoric manner as a mnemic-perceptual simultaneous complex 
[Simultankomplex aus mnemischen und sinnesreizgebundenen Empfindungen]. The 
characteristic of inspiration [sinnesreizgebundener Einfall] to take over 
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can be interpreted as attention abruptly switching from outer stimuli to a 
mnemic schema being completed by perceptive-ecphoric sensations in the 
simultaneous complex. Whether a text (or any piece of language-artifact) is 
an inspiration (and not only generally informative) to the reader or 
listener, does not so much depend on the text’s content (signs), but on its 
matching with the individual’s incomplete, motivated task schemata. The 
more curiosity we have, the more questions we will ask. The more questions 
we ask, the more inspiration we will find. The more we know about the 
questions of others, the easier it will be to be inspiring. The more 
knowledge we have about the questions and the knowledge of people, the 
easier it will be to inspire people by matching their questions to the 
knowledge of others. Questions here are not restricted to questions as in 
question sentences. In a way, any form of motivated thought and engrammatic 
schema is an incomplete, solution-ecphoric or task-ecphoric question. Otto 
Selz imagined schematic anticipation without means actualization 
[Mittelaktualisierung] to be an incomplete schema in need of means 
abstraction [Mittelabstraktion], but he also saw the possibility of goal 
abstraction 150  and of means creation by trying-out behavior 
[Probierbewegungen]. Selz thus introduced the productive mechanisms (i.e., 
memory variation mechanisms) of, first, situation-variant direct ecphory 
(actualization), second, abstracting ecphory (abstraction), and, third, 
mnemic-associative or attention-based variation of (mnemic-ecphorically 
effective) thought and (rather perceptive-ecphorically effective) action 
(probing, trying-out). Ill-defined or over-constrained problem 
representations and solution representations may all impede problem 
solving. The basic memory variation mechanisms at work in overcoming 
insufficient problem representations and solution representations, however, 
are the same: ecphory, abstraction, and probing. A technological system 
supporting memory variation will have to address these mechanisms. 
  
                         
150 (Selz, 1924, S. 28): 
Durch die Herbeiführung wertvoller Wirkungen kann der Zufall nicht nur der 
Entdeckung von Lösungsmethoden dienen, sondern er kann auch erst die 
Zielsetzung selbst herbeiführen, indem sich nachträglich eine 
Determination auf die willkürliche Herstellung des ursprünglich 
unbeabsichtigt eingetretenen wertvollen Erfolges richtet. 
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3.2.2.4 Simultaneous Complex 
So far, we have dealt with the dynamics of engraphy and ecphory, including 
effects of positive and negative priming, of chunk-abstraction (hierarchies 
or knowledge and retrieval structures) and of chunking (of stimulus 
excitation). And we have taken schematic anticipation into consideration, 
with means-actualization and synchronous (task-ecphoric) and asynchronous 
(solution-ecphoric) means-abstraction. We did not really focus on the 
dynamics within the mnemic-perceptual simultaneous complex, though. How is 
the conscious/sensational flow controlled? Sensory stimuli, if activating 
chunk-abstraction engrams, create a wider, dynamically extending 
perceptual-mnemic activation field, as do mnemic-ecphoric stimuli. There 
are, as basic types of sensational, episodically/engraphically-effective 
changes (in a first approximation) … 
1. Endogenous and exogenous, bottom-up stimulus-ecphoric influences 
resulting in sudden conscious change (change within stimulus focus) 
2. Endogenous and exogenous, salient bottom-up stimulus-ecphoric 
influences provoking stimulus shifting motor action (change of 
stimulus focus) 
3. Complex, stimulus- AND mnemic-ecphoric influences, ecphorizing 
matching (homogenous) engram complexes / engram traces bottom-up AND 
top-down (mnemic-perceptive chunking) 
4. Mnemic-associative, top-down or lateral influences, ecphorizing from 
engram strata (episodically) related to current mnemic sensations 
(mnemic-associative interstitial) 
5. Reproductive, top-down mnemic-schematic (incl. reproductive language-
syntactic) influences directly ecphorizing (the Selzian actualizing) 
for completion of schematically-bound sensations from an existing 
engram trace (schematic-reproductive completion) 
6. Productive, top-down mnemic-schematic (incl. productive language-
syntactic) influences ecphorizing (the Selzian abstracting, 
Fauconnier’s blending) for completion of schematically-bound 
sensations from a similar engram trace (schematic-productive completion) 
7. Co-reproductive complex ecphorization of, for example, a morpheme-
concept (here meaning that a morpheme-chunk-activation triggers a 
morpheme-concept complex/chunk-abstraction ecphorization); other 
common co-reproductions are logogram-morpheme, logogram-morpheme-
concept 151 , logogram-concept, concept-logogram, concept-morpheme-
logogram, logogram-action, action-logogram, morpheme-action, concept-
action etc. The trigger-chunk and co-reproductive complex will 
normally be activated within mnemic-perceptive chunking. This mnemic 
coproduction differs from mnemic-associative reproductions by the 
mechanism of triggering a (mostly multi-modal) complex chunk-
                         
151  Concept here means just any other chunk-abstraction component than the specified ones 
(i.e., others than graphemes, morphemes, actions). 
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abstraction. The abstraction of the complex chunk from associative 
chunk traces marks the transition from mnemic-associative ecphory to 
(sub-mnemic) triggered, co-reproductive ecphory. (triggered co-
reproduction)  
As we have already discussed (1)-(6)., we will focus for a moment on (7) 
(triggered co-reproduction). Co-reproductive complex chunks differ from 
stimulus integration or unimodal chunks in that a (usually) multimodal 
chunk-complex cannot be integrated into a single sensation of Gestalt-
quality (and an alleged neurophysiological equivalent). Unimodal ecphoric 
influences of co-reproductive complexes therefore tend to affect the 
modality-specific complex-component only. This component, however, is 
normally ecphorized in its co-reproductive complex. A word has no meaning 
associated; it is rather a meaningful or semantic unit. A homophone of this 
word is just another meaningful unit sharing the same phonemic 
chunk-component. Ecphorizing the morpheme only (which is absolutely 
possible) and then associating its meaning would be a misleading 
characterization of the process occurring, because, as a rule, no meaning 
is (mnemically) associated in such a case. One rather shifts from the 
(mnemic) morpheme chunk to a complex unit triggered by it, as the morpheme 
turns into an integral complex-component, mnemically overshadowed by the 
holistic complex. - The original chunk-abstraction of the complex from 
episodic traces is also better not to be dubbed an association (of 
meaning), as the only associations given are episodic ones, resulting in 
original associative engram traces. These, however, are hardly what uses to 
be said to be associated meaning. The nature of the co-reproductive complex 
implies that the meaning of a meaningful unit is best characterized as the 
multiple episodic traces it forms with other chunks (outer 
engrammatic-associative meaning) and, additionally, the multiple episodic 
traces that its individual (multimodal) components form when they are 
(mnemically) not part and parcel of a meaningful unit or the changes are 
non-engraphic (i.e., for example, induced by stimulus integration). The 
latter would be the case, for example, when logogram variations of font 
types are learnt, or when we get to know the happy- and angry-face 
variations of a person. The sign-property of a meaningful-unit is 
mnemically non-associative. That, for example, a concept is said to be 
indicated by a morpheme, has its reason, likely, in the common role of the 
morpheme being the trigger of the meaningful chunk. The concept could as 
well trigger the morpheme and thus function as its symbol. Homogenous 
trigger-components (components that are also part of other meaningful 
units) are frequently found (same logograms, morphemes, gestures, etc.). 
Ecphoric influences have to affect multiple components to avoid more or 
less randomly triggering partially homogenous co-reproductive chunk-units. 
The sign-character is not a static property of any component. A sign-effect 
exists only during ecphory, through ecphoric influences activating a 
specific, triggering co-reproductive component. If a co-reproductive unit 
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is ecphorized by multiple ecphoric influences, affecting several or all 
components of a co-reproductive complex chunk, there will be either a 
variable sign constellation or no specific sign at all (as the meaningful 
chunk is ecphorized as a whole). Mnemic ecphoric influences are as 
effective in co-reproductive chunk ecphorization as is stimulus excitation. 
This memory-process-oriented theoretical treatment of the sign (relation) 
has, of course, far-reaching theoretical consequences for semiotics. 
Consequences we have to leave aside in this thesis, though. We are, for 
now, interested in the effects of co-reproduction on the simultaneous 
complex. The co-structural artificial memory system of natural language 
seems to be somehow based on the co-episodic engraphy of co-reproductive 
chunk-components in the simultaneous complex. In our dealings with semantic 
networks, we differentiated between word association and concept 
association. The co-reproductive integration of word and concept combines 
word association and concept association into a single semantic 
association. The ecphoric influences effective in the simultaneous complex, 
however, do not only evoke co-reproductive chunks. If component-types are 
not (yet) co-reproductive (say different transitional face movements 
between laughing and being serious again, which we know well but have no 
words for), there will soon be new co-reproductive chunk-abstractions to be 
won from episodic engrams integrating varying co-reproductive chunks by 
blending in new/additional conceptual chunks from different mixed engram 
traces. The result is polysemy. The word field is, to some extent, 
automatically organized by experience in that it creates polysemous 
variations chunking and further integrating (via chunk-abstraction) the 
simultaneous complex. The frequent polysemous variations of word-
constituents in word compound meanings as well as frequent peculiar, not 
purely combinational compound meanings, too, indicate how co-reproductive 
concept-perceptual episodes and their specifics are further chunk-
abstracted integrating non-co-reproductive contextual information. The co-
structural fabric [Gewirk] of language is thus highly polysemous on 
different levels of co-reproductive word and concept integration. The co-
reproductive specificity of individual language-signs (words, short 
phrases, etc.) is rather low. There is thus a good chance of 
misunderstanding in communication based on (short) language triggers 
(only). Co-reproductive chunking by conceptual triggers will create new co-
reproductive episodes potentially accessible by corresponding language 
triggers. Co-reproductive chunking by language triggers will create new co-
reproductive episodes accessible by corresponding conceptual triggers. 
Episodes of co-reproductive units thus create (mostly modality-specific) 
trigger fields. Language-based trigger fields, however, tend to be 
ambiguous (due to polysemy and homonymy), as I have shown. Very specific 
mnemic conceptual triggering or conceptual mnemic ecphorization (if the 
memory trace was not formed co-reproductively), on the other hand, can be 
highly effective. Bower reports that … 
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Paivio [Allan Paivio] found that the imagery-arousing value 
of a word was the most potent determinant of its rate of 
learning […] Pavio found that pictures of common concrete 
objects (or presentation of the objects themselves) were 
even more effective items for learning that were their 
names. 
(Bower, 2000, S. 25) 
This, certainly, cannot astonish us anymore. It is also right that inner 
verbalization [Versprachlichung] can be contra-reproductive. Intentionally 
creating a co-reproductive field (by sententially describing) stimulates 
often more general (somewhat homophonous) co-reproductive chunks with 
productive and reproductive tendencies of their own. This will result in a 
description comprising successions of conceptual components, which are 
likely to differ from the original conceptual episode. This may be less 
obvious to the person describing, as her simultaneous complex may 
mnemically still include and re-encode (only co-reproductively enriched) 
the original conceptual episode. If, however, artifacts of the graphemic or 
morphemic components of the complex would function as triggers of co-
reproductive ecphory, it is likely that (knowingly or unknowingly), the 
higher-order chunk-abstractive character will trigger (intra-individually 
and inter-individually) more general (prototypical) or even false co-
reproductive chunks (in terms of their conceptual components). One could 
characterize this as construction, which is different from the Selzian 
production and reproduction. Sir Frederic Charles Bartlett famously 
demonstrated a similar type of generalization152, by adding small illogical 
propositions into a story text that had to be retold. These absurdities 
were probably not even engramatized, as the respective co-reproductive 
chunks of the simultaneous complex will have mnemically ecphorized similar, 
but probably more sound conceptual engram traces, the later retelling 
(rather description) of which may appear as changing the story. 
Reconstruction (of a story, which normally consists of multiple episodes) 
works differently. Abrupt content changes are difficult to retell in the 
correct order because of the lack of engrammatic overlapping between the 
respective episodic engram traces. The episodic memory trace of a 
simultaneous complex is limited to the present moment [Jetztzeit or 
Gegenwartsfenster] 153 . A story’s event order may considerably differ from 
the event order of the retold story, especially if the memory traces do not 
                         
152 See his book: Remembering (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1932). 
153 Thomas Metzinger (2009, S. 61) writes about Jetztzeit (the consciously present moment):  
Übrigens gibt es auch eine Obergrenze für das, was wir bewusst als 
innerhalb eines einzigen Augenblicks stattfindend erleben können: Es ist 
fast unmöglich, ein musikalisches Motiv, den rhythmischen Teil einer 
längeren Gedichtspassage oder einen komplizierteren Gedanken, der mehr als 
drei Sekunden dauert, als eine einheitliche zeitliche Gestalt zu erleben. 
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overlap or not overlap in a mnemic-distinctive way (and are thus not 
mnemically associable). This demonstrates (mnemically random) 
reconstruction rather than (original engraphic) construction. Now, the 
retelling is engraphically effective itself. A seemingly random mnemic 
reconstruction has to be based on (randomly, non-reproductively) suitable 
mnemic-ecphoric influences, binding the story episodes anew. Some mnemic-
ecphorically accessible extraneous engram traces (fictitious engram traces, 
so to say) will probably be inserted into the reconstruction. Some original 
traces, on the other hand, will not be re-membered into the reconstruction. 
The engrammatic reconstructed version, in any case, will be more likely to 
be ecphorized in its correct order (that is, in its mnemically salient 
reconstructed, but originally false order) than the original story, which 
still has a less overlapping original order of memory traces than the 
reconstruction. Neisser notes: 
Frederic Bartlett (1932) criticized standard research 
methods in memory as irrelevant to human life. 
(Neisser & Libby, 2000, S. 315) 
I hope that I managed to demonstrate that the extended Semonian memory 
theory is fit to incorporate findings from the ecological study of memory 
(as well as from classical experimental memory research). High-granularity 
memory distortion appears to be the result of constructive (chunking) 
processes, while low-granularity memory destruction appears to be the 
result of reconstructive (mnemic-associative) processes. 
We have already explained word-associations and concept associations, and 
all other (more complex) semantic-association types can be easily described 
in terms of the memory mechanisms responsible for changes in the 
simultaneous complex. I finally want to turn the reader’s attention to the 
question of how we position ourselves with respect to the memory dichotomy 
of episodic and semantic memory as popularized by Endel Tulving. Both seem 
to be integral to the simultaneous mnemic-perceptive excitation and 
sensation complex (simultaneous complex) [simultan mnemisch-perzeptiver 
Erregungs- und Empfindungskomplex]. Mandler had his doubts about this 
dichotomy: 
[…] it is questionable whether these two kinds of memories 
represent different systems with different rules or laws 
governing their operation. At the simplest level, episodic 
memories draw on semantic knowledge (a point that is not 
disputed). But semantic memories also have personal, 
episodic characteristics. 
(Mandler, 2007, S. 239) 
Co-reproductive chunking will create more or less chunked episodes (memory 
traces), which will serve as raw material for further co-reproductive 
Extended Artificial Memory 
[184] 
chunk-abstractions or polysemous variations and become part of the 
associative engram field activated during priming and perceptive or mnemic 
ecphory. Co-reproductive chunk-abstractions are often word-chunk 
abstractions (forming of word compounds), which potentially increases 
engraphic efficiency. Variations of polysemy are, as we have seen, 
variations through a kind of one-sided assimilation or blending of not yet 
(fully) co-reproductive components, potentially resulting in (overall) 
ambiguous conditions for triggering. It seems more appropriate to speak of 
chunks and episodes of co-reproductive chunks than to speak of semantic and 
episodic memory as distinct forms of knowledge. Both engram types are 
highly interrelated: co-reproductive, cross-modally integrated 
(engrammatically instantiated) engrams are episodically associated in 
memory traces. Semantic knowledge is as episodic as episodic knowledge is 
semantic. Co-reproductivity alone does not define semantic knowledge, which 
consists in mnemic-associatively or perceptive-ecphorically chunking of or 
into a simultaneous complex. Only the creation of episodes is a reasonably 
dissociable mechanism. An important weak-point of co-reproductive chunks is 
that they do not form sound hierarchies on any specific trigger-level (e.g. 
phonemes, graphemes, logograms, morphemes, word-chunks, but also all other 
concepts), especially because of different mechanisms leading to trigger-
ambiguities of polysemy, homonymy, and synonymy. The co-structural 
artificial memory provided by language-trigger components in co-
reproductive chunks is, therefore, as difficult to express unambiguously in 
language symbols, as it is to reconstruct it by language symbols. There is, 
a fundamental flaw in the working of the (co-reproductive) language system, 
if you will. It does not only concern memory research, it is not even 
merely a matter of written language (and only somewhat mitigated by 
conversation). It is a fundamental problem of the memory process and of 
memory structure. It is, as I have shown, a constant epistemic challenge, 
present in mnemic (reconstructive) as well as perceptive (constructive) 
information. Co-reproductive (multi-modal) units or trigger structures are 
the main episodic building blocks of human knowledge, whether in simple 
motivational structures (linking intention-sensation engrams to other-
modality concepts) or in advanced complex symbolic language structures. The 
eusocial and, more generally, any technological process depends on our 
capacity to co-reproductively create homophonous simultaneous complexes 
and, based on this, effective technological anticipation schemata. The 
correspondence structure is thus a property of mnemically, schematic-
anticipatorily associated co-reproductively chunked simultaneous complexes, 
(which ought to be and schematically even need to be often tested by 
stimulus-ecphoric influences). That it does not suffice to create only a 
highly abstracted type of (constructive) homophony, is explained, first, by 
the double-technological character of communication, where symbols 
(output/input parameters) have to function as working triggers to keep the 
(social) technological process alive and as intended. And, second, in non-
cognitively mediated natural substitution processes (i.e., with 
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substitutors not being substitutor-actuators), the output parameters 
(expressions/actions) still have to generate or influence the schematically 
anticipated effects and thus have to be well-adjusted, that is, they have 
to be in accordance with a supposed stimulus world. Co-reproductive 
unambiguity thus translates into technological correspondence. In the 
following chapter, based on the basic technology- and memory-theoretical 
ideas synthesized so far, I am going to introduce and sketch an innovative 
theoretical and (software-)experimental approach (that awaits further 
theoretical discussion and further experimental elaboration): extended 
artificial memory.   
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4. EXTENDED ARTIFICIAL MEMORY THEORY 
4.1 EXTENDED MIND 
In a number of articles and books {e.g. (Clark & Chalmers, 1998), (Clark, 
2003), (Clark, 2008) }, the philosopher Andy Clark has entertained the idea 
of extended cognition and extended mind: 
If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions 
as a process which, were it to go on in the head, we would 
have no hesitation in accepting as part of the cognitive 
process, then that part of the world is (for that time) part 
of the cognitive process. 
(Clark & Chalmers, The Extended Mind, 1998) 
This argument has faced vehement opposition, for example by Robert D. 
Rupert, who argues against the extended view: 
Argument from Demarcation: The systems-based principle of 
demarcation provides the only plausible criterion of 
demarcation in the field [cognitive sciences]. The systems-
based principle places human cognition inside the organism, 
either entirely or in the main. Therefore, we should, 
provisionally, reject the extended view. 
(Rupert, 2010, S. 45) 
Rupert instead proposes an embedded view:  
An alternative to the extended view takes human cognition to 
rely heavily on the environment but, nevertheless, to be 
bounded by the human organism. According to this embedded 
view, typical cognitive processes depend, in surprising and 
complex ways, on the organism's use of external resources 
(McClamrock 1995, especially part two), but cognition does 
not literally extend into the environment. 
(Rupert, 2010, S. 5) 
I fully support Rupert in that a state is cognitive if and only if it is a 
state of whatever makes up the organismically bounded system. 154  In the 
technological process, the substitution process is, to some extent, 
reflected and anticipated in the (cognitive) actuation process, but seems 
organismically separated. With regard to eusocial technology processes, 
however, the human substitutor establishes the substitution process in a 
cognitive process, too. In so far, from a social perspective, cognition 
                         
154 (Rupert, 2010, S. 46) 
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could indeed be said to be extendable (namely into distributed cognition). 
The schematic-anticipatory control and activation structures of actuation 
are not any different in cases of non-cognitive substitution processes. The 
input parameters are signal-like or symbolic perceptive-ecphoric influences 
triggering co-reproductive chunk-abstractions, resulting in more or less 
homophonous or corresponding simultaneous complexes (information stages of 
actuation). From the actuator’s perspective, in a technological process, 
there is no fundamental difference between extending cognition socially and 
not extending it. To the actuator, any close technological correspondence 
will act like an extension. To understand this, we have to consider the 
nature of co-reproductive chunk-complexes. They integrate whatever 
(endogenous or exogenous stimulus) sensations happen to exist in the 
simultaneous complex. The natural integrity of the cognitive system and the 
body creates a phenomenal/mental self-model that includes, by and by, the 
exogenous (esp. visual) sensations 155  of the body (and its artificial 
extensions). Basic body movements, for example, are normally not any longer 
understood as the technological processes they indeed represent. They do 
not show the variability of typical schematic-anticipatory actuation 
processes anymore, at least unless we suffer from shaking hands or tired 
legs that we do not manage to actuate automatically. In a way, one could 
argue that any motoric actuation extends or not extends (whatever one may 
think) the cognitive apparatus, in that something happens outside of the 
head, perceptive-ecphorically informing the cognitive apparatus along an 
anticipatory actuation schema. This is true at least for motoric actuations 
that are anchored episodic-engrammatically (i.e., non-reflexes), be they 
automatic or sensational-ecphoric. However, I want to lead the reader one 
step further, to an even more radical philosophical and psychological 
thought: The cognitive apparatus extends (or not extends) itself within 
itself. How is this possible? Well, the basis of technology, of extension 
(or not-extension) is the mnemic-ecphorically active actuation schema. 
Whether this ecphory results into a motoric (stimulus-world-changing) 
actuation or not, is not important at all, as long as the active 
anticipatory actuation schema is kept in homophony (i.e., as expected) in 
the upcoming simultaneous complexes. For this, however, purely mnemic 
ecphory does suffice. The memory process uses to instantiate in itself 
enormous numbers of distinct technological processes, mnemically 
ecphorizing engrams in a substitution process that informs simultaneous 
complexes as intended. The mnemic ecphoric effect depends on the memory 
                         
155 Thomas Metzinger (Metzinger, Subjekt und Selbstmodell, 1999, S. 171) points to the fact 
that not all self-models have to be conscious/mental: 
Ein Selbstmodell verkörpert also das Wissen, das ein System intern über 
sich selbst gewonnen hat, in einer nicht propositionalen Form. Dieses 
Wissen über sich selbst muß nicht mit der Koinstantiierung von 
Selbstbewußtsein einhergehen, also in Form von mentalen Modellen gegeben 
sein, die noch einmal durch eine Metamodellierungsfunktion erfaßt werden.   
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traces acquired by the organism so far (as in the Selzian task-ecphoric 
means abstraction) and can be as variable as any outward-directed actuation 
process (integrating perceptive-ecphoric influences). The extension is thus 
a part of the memory process itself and affects the simultaneous complex. 
Andy Clark’s idea of extended cognition based on his parity principle (a 
process which, were it to go on in the head, we would have no hesitation in 
accepting as part of the cognitive process) is misleading. It does not 
picture the integration of the anticipatory schema and mnemic, perceptive 
or mnemic-perceptive ecphoric influences into a simultaneous-complex 
correspondence structure of more or less homophony or (in-)effectiveness.  
The individual cognitive extension into any substitution process depends on 
a technological actuation process frame, which cannot be fully split off or 
substituted. Even in the social cognitive extension of eusocial double-
technological processes, the primary actuation process is but (partially, 
substitutionally) mirrored, not split off. And also the Selzian 
asynchronous, solution-ecphoric means abstraction depends on an ecphoric 
re-instantiation of the (by then mnemic) incomplete (task) schema (with its 
anticipatory, determining tendencies [determinierende Tendenzen] again in 
power). Without these determining tendencies, one would soon be lost by 
multiple ecphoric influences mnemic-associatively constantly 
de/re-structuring the simultaneous complex in a more or less random 
fashion 156 , 157 , or the determination would be left to currently present 
stimulus-ecphoric influences, as appears to be the case in most (non-human) 
animal-behavior. Extended mind thus appears not to be a question of 
systemic extension (i.e., extended view versus embedded view), but rather a 
question of synchronous and asynchronous extension of determining 
tendencies in (schematic) chunk-abstraction instances and engram complexes 
(after episodic task-engraphy). The information of these extensions by 
mnemic- or stimulus-ecphoric influences is an important epistemic 
distinction, though. Other directions of extended determination are 
sketched out by the structure of schematic abstraction hierarchies. A lot 
more ought to be said about the theory of extended mind, but there is no 
space left in this thesis to do so. 
  
                         
156 (Hark, 2004, p. 93) summarizes this aspect as follows:  
By favouring those associative bonds which are in line with the goal of 
the subject, determining tendencies were thought to rule out irrelevancies 
and prevent chance stimuli from distracting the course of thought 
processes, thereby giving direction to the course of thinking. 
157  An impression of how this could be like is given by Jill Price (Price, 2008), who 
suffers from a very rare hyperthymestic syndrome, which allows her to easily remember every 
detail of every day of her life since her early childhood, at least as long as it was of 
interest to her (basically talks with family members and friends, news, TV shows etc.). She 
often finds herself thrown into episodes of reminiscence that she cannot control and set 
her into different emotional states.         
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4.2 WHAT IS EXTENDED ARTIFICIAL MEMORY? 
The original idea of artificial memory in ars memorativa denotes an 
engrammatic weave [engrammatisches Gewebe] of one mode (e.g. visual loci) 
that is engrammatically associated to another engrammatic structure or a 
specific memory trace (e.g. an engrammatic sequence of named concrete 
objects). The engrammatic association (through mnemic-perceptive 
manipulation of engraphically-effective simultaneous complexes) consists in 
episodes (memory traces) of new co-reproductive chunk units. The pre-
existing engrammatic weave (e.g. the well-known network of loci) allows 
triggering the co-reproductive chunk units by means of (one of) the pre-
existing engrammatic networks or episode traces. What is produced here is 
an artificial memory trace binding (at least partially) pre-existing 
structures into a correlational structure. Spoken language is probably the 
most frequent form of co-structural artificial memory. Interestingly, other 
than in the case of the loci, the supposedly pre-existing structure here is 
actually rather being co-developed, as it is given by the self-
organizational structures of word-similarity abstractions (creating 
syntacto-semantic, mnemically productive schemata) and hierarchically 
organized (and conceptually blended) word-contiguity compounds/chunks. This 
co-developmental, co-structural artificial memory weave consists itself of 
co-reproductive units. Analogically, the visuo-spatial loci of spoken 
language are the hierarchical/staggered contiguity fields, the schematic-
syntactical fields of words / phonemic fragments / word positions, and 
simple (i.e., simultaneous-complex) propositions158. Not all, especially not 
complicated (written) sentence propositions, induce a single simultaneous 
complex. They spread across different simultaneous complexes and, thus, 
different memory traces that can or cannot be mnemically integrated into a 
correct reproductive sequence. In addition, the co-reproductive language 
units of sentence-like-strings may be mnemic-ecphorically active, 
potentially creating a conceptually richer, integrated, and/or different 
picture than given by the co-reproductive language units considered in 
isolation. The simultaneous complex inspired by a sentence or a multi-
sentences text, therefore, does not engraphically re-present the co-
reproductive sentence (components) itself. The multi-momentous 
sentence/text string can thus often not be re-membered, which does not stop 
it from being mnemic-associatively and engraphically effective. In our 
dealings with the sentence field [see chapter 2.6.4, p. 127ff], we have 
already pointed out other reasons why sentences are difficult to recollect 
and appear isolated (less engrammatically associated than word chunk-
abstractions) amongst each other.  
The co-reproductive units of spoken language are difficult to express fully 
co-reproductively (e.g. by expressing visual concepts in visual visual 
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language 159 ). Besides, many are of abstract nature, standing on top of 
multiple levels of conceptual blendings in a hierarchy of conceptual 
abstractions. Therefore, the expression is usually restricted to spoken or 
written words. (Individual) polysemy, homonymy, synonymy, conceptual 
abstractions, chunking, and lack of knowledge of the knowledge of others 
all impair the technological effectiveness of spoken and written words in 
double-technological processes, as has been discussed by me in some detail 
in chapter 2. In chapter 3, we learnt that this is due to the insufficient 
qualities of language-symbol stimuli/engrams as ecphoric influences 
correctly triggering co-reproductive meaningful units in (communicative) 
technological processes. This culminates in the disadvantages of written 
language; as was first indicated in the Platonic-Socratic critique of 
script [see chapter 2.4.5, p. 55ff] and has been true ever since - up to 
the most current developments in semantic technology and AI [see chapter 
2.5.3.2, p. 73ff]. If language symbol artifacts function as really no more 
than stimuli that perceptive-ecphorically activate engrammatic components 
that trigger co-reproductive engrams enriching simultaneous complexes, and 
all this embedded in a productive memory-technological process of 
syntactic-schematic anticipation, how - in the world - are we to deal with 
them? Is it ok that there are widely differing interpretations of texts and 
words? Or that people believe they understand each other when they, in 
fact, do not and, unknowingly, even often cannot understand each other? Is 
it alright that we engage in technological processes that start 
substitution processes that are destined to decouple and, thus, at best, 
become ineffective, because the language artifacts steering the mechanical 
logic soon cease to correspond to any (existing) anticipation schema or the 
(individual or social) original anticipation schema changed in intention 
and/or structure. In short, do we have to rethink (language) technology? To 
some this may seem farfetched. I will therefore give a simple example 
illustrating the possible design consequences:  
4.2.1  AN EXAMPLE 
Imagine a traffic lights system. It steers a complex social activity: 
traffic. The traffic light gives the illusion of a technological process to 
the car driver, because the driver has an anticipation schema of his own 
(driving at a green light or stopping at a red light). However, this is a 
secondary technological process, as the driver cannot actuate the traffic 
light. At an otherwise empty crossroad, the driver may want to start a 
technological process changing her light from red to green. A pedestrian 
sometimes will find a button to influence the traffic light system in an 
intended way. A driver cannot. In some countries, though, the traffic light 
system will sense the driver’s car and set the traffic light to green (for 
the driver). This, however, does not always meet the intention of the 
                         
159 See chapter 2.5.3.2.6 on Visual language (p. 83ff) 
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driver. When an old person crosses the road and takes more time than usual, 
both may want (technologically anticipate) the traffic light to stay red 
for the driver and green for the pedestrian as long as the crossing takes. 
If a young child runs onto the crossroads, the mother (and not only the 
mother) may want (technologically actuate) all traffic lights for all 
traffic lanes to turn red immediately. If, as a pedestrian, early in the 
morning, when commuters are on their way, somehow I cannot influence 
(actuate) the traffic light to turn green for me, it would be nice to know 
that a large number of commuters are on their way to work and they need to 
/ ought to move on quickly to avoid a jam (epistemic mark of the traffic 
light state). The traffic light system, in a traditional technology design, 
may be a simple regulatory system steered by successions of time intervals 
set by traffic specialists. As a mere tool serving multiple technological 
processes by multiple people, it would (best) be steered by a very 
different kind of regulatory system, one that regulates synchronous and 
asynchronous actuation processes, directly in touch with the people it may 
affect and serve. Of course, it would be out of question to create such a 
system for traffic lights alone. In chapter 4.3.6, I will line out how 
cooperative extended artificial memory system agents may serve this and 
many other purposes.  
4.2.2  ARTIFICIAL MEMORY EXPRESSION 
Imagine, however, this would be a universal basic regulatory system, not 
only steering traffic lights, but cars, light switches, communication 
devices, heaters etc. The effectiveness and availability of countless 
technological processes might improve. Out of the question? Well, the idea 
of semantic web services (see chapter 2.5.3.2.4, p. 86ff) may have fallen 
short of our expectations, but it points into the right direction. Remotely 
informing an Internet of servicing things and effectuation processes does 
not pose a fundamental problem. Not the means of effectuation of traffic 
lights (the switches, if you will), but their orchestrated (semantic) 
servicing defines their overall technological value. If we want to unleash 
the technological potential of (mechanical/digital) tools, we have to start 
thinking about actuation processes and their synchronous and asynchronous 
unambiguous representation and orchestration. We, indeed, have to radically 
rethink technology, namely, as I argue, as a dynamic process of a dynamic 
memory and as socially extended, negotiated and orchestrated cognition, 
making use of a huge number of empowering and substituting tools. The only 
(original) interface of all technology is the memory process itself. Its 
individually coherent representation ought to provide all semantics needed 
to steer all technological processes, irrespective of whether synchronously 
or asynchronously. I mentioned before that artificial intelligence would 
require a formal, explicit memory of any eligible actuator at any time.160 
                         
160 See chapter 2.5.3.2.4 . 
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Now, intelligence can only become artificial by artificial memory being 
expressed and processed, as it contains the main engrammatic components of 
the actuation process: engrams instantiating anticipatory schemata and 
engrams of more or less co-reproductive units of (mostly) chunk-
abstractions (stemming from various sensory modalities and 
abstraction/integration levels) associated or directly integrated by these 
schemata. I will only discuss this explication with regard to natural 
language symbols. Visual visual language or any sub-symbolic, non/other-co-
reproductive conceptual chunks-abstractions cannot be dealt with in this 
thesis. The basic idea of artificial memory explication is to (more or 
less) exclusively and regularly express artificial memory component 
instances into an artificial memory (information) system. This ought to 
happen in a thought-accompanying manner and should not be thought-
disruptive (i.e., the expressive actions ought to be automatic, co-
reproductive, not mnemic-associative or indirect). The engraphically-
effective, sensational portion of the simultaneous complex should not be 
changed by the motoric expressions themselves 161 . It is not necessary to 
always express complete simultaneous complexes (e.g. full propositional 
statements or other complete episodic chunk sequences), that is, it is, so 
to speak, not necessary to textualize each and every simultaneous complex, 
as not every simultaneous complex is of interest or represents a 
sufficiently distinct episodic variation. Extended artificial memory (i.e., 
in the first place, artificial memory expressions into artifacts) is not a 
complete replication of all engrammatic structures, but of its co-episodic 
top- or chunking-structure: artificial memory. The process most akin to 
artificial memory expression might be freeform and visual note taking. The 
former uses to be based on keywords or key-phrases, the latter on visual 
abstractions. That is, both refer to mostly co-reproductive chunks by 
expressing written/spoken language symbols or visual sketches). Freeform 
note taking is popular as pen-and-paper buffer 162 , a working memory 
extension, as well as as long-term memory cue. The free form expression, 
however, poses a referential problem: it is not, to use a technical term, 
normalized. 163  A chunk in the context of note A is re-expressed in the 
context of note B, instead of being referred to by note A and note B from a 
central database. De-normalization and information fragmentation are 
                         
161 Even though drawing cannot be dealt with in this thesis, I want to bring to the reader’s 
attention that Leonardo da Vinci seems to have developed an ingenious way of sketching with 
his right hand and, at the same time, blindly, writing in mirror script with his left hand, 
as is indicated by his notebooks. Speech-to-text technology (probably in combination with 
eye-tracking tools for text placing) would make this an interesting and accessible way of 
expressing co-reproductive units in a multi-modal, symbol-rich way. Moreover, Eric Kandel  
has recently (Kandel, 2012) taught me that the painters of the Vienna Modern Era [Wiener 
Moderne] developed a technique of sketching without turning the eyes away from the real 
object. This innovative non-interruptive way of blind sketching could be imitated by 
augmenting the sketch onto the real object using augmentation technology.    
162  As mentioned by Clark in (Clark & Chalmers, The Extended Mind, 1998), who also 
introduces an interesting example of note-based extended memory.  
163  In relational database management, normalization describes a strategy of reducing 
duplicated data.  
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closely interlinked and would pose a problem to data unification (merging, 
e.g., note A and note B), which is a precondition of coherent artificial 
memory representation, as most artificial memory components are used cross-
contextually. The extended artificial memory system has to overcome 
problems of information fragmentation across different syntax or 
information-organization types, across multiple User Interface components, 
across different file types of different applications (on different 
devices), across different physical locations, different storage media or 
databases, across any types of information scraps (incl. notes), across 
professional and private social situations etc. - all splitting up personal 
information. The artificial memory artifacts ought to be understood as 
belonging into an individual universal data store capable of unifying 
representation.  
4.2.3  ARTIFICIAL MEMORY EXTENSION 
Most software tools nowadays include databases and processes dealing with 
artificial memory artifacts. But they decouple the artifacts from their 
originators. For technological effectiveness, however, the actuation-
information determining effectuation has to consist in references to the 
latest (expressed) actuation parameters, which are (per definition of the 
exclusiveness feature of extended artificial memory) to be found in 
extended artificial memory or a negotiated orchestrated aggregation of 
several extended artificial memories. Extended artificial memories (and 
their aggregations) provide a basic information layer interconnecting 
servicing (software or digitally controllable/accessible) tools, 
irrespective of whether they are used for functional or content 
technologies. This, of course, implies a radically different software 
system design than, say, organizational IT, app stores, digital clouds, the 
Internet, the WWW etc. currently have to offer. Their alleged human-
centeredness revolves around centering human artificial memory artifacts on 
(organizational or central) software tools, whereas the human-centeredness 
of the extended artificial memory system-design would center servicing 
tools on the artificial memory artifacts constituted by technological 
actuation processes. So far, artificial memory artifacts are locked into 
and fragmented across an army of systems, though. It seems to me that we 
need a fundamental reframing of information and knowledge management, 
starting from extended artificial memory systems as the basic means of 
expression and informing; an intermediate information layer for (any) 
communication, tool use, and other technological processes, situated 
between engrammatic and ecphorized artificial memory and its extensions 
into artifacts used for actuation, on one hand, and engrammatic and 
ecphorized artificial memory and its extensions into artifacts used for 
effectuation during substitution. Yes, the extended artificial memory 
system idea translates every substitution process (e.g. a tool-based 
process) back into its original (tool-function-creating, descriptive) 
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actuation form and thus creates a (more or less synchronous) double-
technological situation that could indeed be said to extend technological 
cognition socially. The correspondences of the two (double-technological) 
processes depend on the synchronicity between actuation and its extension 
into the intermediate extended artificial memory system and the usual 
correspondences between actuation and substitution processes. As the 
extended artificial memory systems involved (in the double-technological 
process) would provide a de-contextualized integrated representation of 
artificial memory on both sides (actuation and substitution), the 
technological process can become subject to meta-technological processes 
of, for example, disambiguating parameters, of matching actuator and 
substitution processes, of asynchronously adjusting the technological 
process and substituting technological dialogues. These meta-technological 
processes all aim at increasing the efficiency of technological processes. 
The meta-technological processes, for their part, are effective only 
insofar as we understand the workings of technological processes and the 
use of (extended) artificial memory components and their structures for 
improving technological processes. And insofar as we manage to improve the 
process of non-disruptive, transparent thought-accompanying and ever less 
partial expression of co-reproductive units of artificial memory. 
Interdisciplinary cognitive science has a crucial role to play in the 
technology of the future. The current visions of related fields (such as 
Human Computer Interaction, Usability, Software Design, Artificial 
Intelligence, Machine Learning etc.), as far as I got to know them, are 
theoretically too short-sighted, as they don’t advance to the nature of 
technology, as I have tried to lay out here. I think we need a new start, 
binding the different scientific frameworks, insights and tool sets into 
the cross-scientific and cross-theoretical technology-framework of extended 
artificial memories.  
The rest of this thesis shortly outlines some of my humble theoretical and 
practical attempts to actually step into the direction of extended 
artificial memory, which represents the basic theoretical idea that was 
gradually prepared from the technology side (in chapter 2) and from the 
memory side (in chapter 3), to finally be outlined here. These attempts 
considerably helped shaping my understanding of the wicked problem we are 
facing in universally supporting knowledge management processes. This often 
happened through countless subtle observations during prototype usage that 
cannot be included into this thesis, though, but would deserve a separate 
publication and further experimentation. Much of the following thoughts 
await advancement and improvement through (solution) discussion and further 
solution development cycles. 
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4.3 THEORETICAL SKETCHES FOR EXTENDED ARTIFICIAL MEMORY  164 
4.3.1  DIMENSIONS OF MEMORY VARIATION 
We have found memory variation to be one of the main features of the 
(human) memory-process. The ways of memory variation (by the seven 
mechanisms summarized in chapter 3.2.2.4) become more obvious if we start 
distinguishing multiple (largely) independent dimensions of memory 
variation. The flexibility of the memory system lies in the episodic-
engraphic associability and the cognitive faculties of blending of memory 
chunks and schematic or sequential abstraction from memory traces.  
(1) Modality (intra-modal versus cross-modal) 
For endogenous and exogenous sensory modalities, we have the dimension of 
intra-modal and cross-modal engrammatic associations. This dimension has a 
spoke structure, with a co-reproductive hub integrating different 
modalities episodic-engraphically, whereas intra-modal integration can 
happen either through early perceptive integration or through late 
(possibly preliminary) indirect episodic-associative integration.  
(2) Spatio-Temporality (sequential complex versus 
simultaneous complex) 
Temporal variation means that two sensations are experienced either as 
sequential or simultaneous and are therefore either episodic-
engrammatically associated or blended/integrated. Sequential association is 
temporally ordered (before – after), while simultaneity, especially in 
intra-modal integration, uses to evolve Gestalt-relations (e.g. parts-
forming-a-whole, a-part-of-a-whole, a-whole-to-one-of-its-parts, etc.). The 
ease of mnemic-ecphoric reversibility of sequential associations (that is 
mnemically ecphorizing a before-engram of a memory trace by means of the 
(isolated) mnemic sensation of an after-component first, seems, to some 
extent, to depend on the modality under review. It is, for example, easier 
for the visual modality than the auditory modality.  
(3) Abstraction (schema-abstraction versus chunk-abstraction) 
Regularities between sequential and simultaneous, intra-modal or cross-
modal memory traces can be schematically abstracted (by partial 
similarities) or holistically chained as (combinatory) chunk-abstractions. 
This is a similarity-based process, either homophony-based during 
ecphorization or, perhaps (also), automatically progressing with the help 
                         
164 The theoretical sketches presented here, indeed often are sketches that support thinking 
visually and were used in presentations, e.g. (Ludwig, Artificial Memory - Eine kurze 
Einführung in Struktur, Aufgaben und Erfolgskennzahlen., 2009), before. I leave them as 
they are to increase the accessibility of an otherwise rather complicated subject that, for 
this reason, unfortunately, necessitated some wordiness.  
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of priming-activation. Abstraction is directly engrammatically 
constructive. It differs from memory-distorting ecphoric construction165, as 
there the construction is based on existing chunks, which expresses a form 
of imperfect homophonous chunking. 
(4) Syntacticity (sequencing, marking/agglutinating, 
interrelating) 
Syntacto-semantic variation takes three basic forms:  
1. sequence or order/constellation (as, e.g., in verb arguments orders 
or the subject-object order of propositions with implicit predicates) 
2. syntactic markers/entities (as the affixes / bound morphemes of 
agglutinative languages, or as in the action-markers of a computer 
icon system {for example, the iconographic save-marker on a save-
picture icon showing a picture}) 
3. relational syntactic structure (e.g. predicate structures, which 
might also be interpreted as a combination of 1st and 2nd, where the 
predicate is a marker 
All syntacto-semantic variations are based on schema-abstractions by 
similarity-associations (of word/symbol parts, concept parts, and 
sequences). The productive dynamics of syntacto-semantic variations seem to 
be strongly varied and can be complicated by nesting of multiple syntactic 
schemata. The variables of syntactic schemata use to be chunks and chunk 
sequences/complexes. We cannot really enter this area in this thesis, 
though. Suffice it, therefore, to mention that syntactic schemata can be 
ecphorized and applied on mneme-structures of the simultaneous complex or 
(fully or partially) function as a mnemic-ecphoric influence. Syntactic 
markers, on the other hand, might ecphorize a syntactic schema in the first 
place (as when completing an incomplete sentence), or the syntactic schema 
is ecphorized first by a perceptive-ecphoric memory trace (as when we vary 
a sentence by using its syntactic schema productively. As said, many things 
are possible with syntactic schemata. In this thesis, I can only provide 
the general memory-process theory (terminology) for their description, not 
the actual (process-)descriptions. In this respect, it appears to me that 
many linguistic theories could (and should) be reformulated and unified by 
applying the extended Semonian memory-process theory. Fauconnier’s 
conceptual blending theory has already demonstrated the potential of a 
cognitively oriented unification framework.  
(5) Epistemicity (mnemic-ecphoric versus perceptive-ecphoric) 
Ecphory relies on existing chunks, but the ecphoric influences can be, in 
the extreme cases, either all mnemic-ecphoric or all perceptive-ecphoric. 
There is a middle ground (as experienceable in bistable pictures, where 
                         
165 See my description of high-granularity memory distortion in chapter 3.2.2.4 Simultaneous 
Complex.  
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small mnemic or perceptive influences can rapidly change the ecphorized 
chunks and thus also the engraphically-effective chunk-units). On this 
broad middle ground (be it ambiguous or unambiguous), perception influences 
mnemic-associative recollection and mnemic-associative recollection 
influences perception (e.g. by attention changes) in a way that is likely 
to produce simultaneous complexes comprising clearly distinct mnemic-
ecphorically and perceptive-ecphorically influenced sensations in ever new 
engraphically-effective variations.  
Epistemicity is of special interest to us here. One’s own extended 
artificial memory representations (stimuli) are exceptional perceptive-
ecphoric influences, as they ought to relate to their respective co-
reproductive entities. They should not be subject to interpretation due to 
trigger-based ambiguity. They, so to speak, feed back into (or reflectively 
extend) the memory process and may help anticipating mnemic-associative 
variations perceptively. Extended artificial memory thus supports mnemic-
ecphoric processes, by mnemic-perceptive co-ecphorization and perceptive-
mnemic anticipation.  
Two ecphoric influences provided, there are four basic sequential 





More or less homophony will create three variations of ecphory with respect 
to the four epistemic combinations: 
a. complete homophony (identity [Übereinstimmungsempfinden]) 
b. incomplete homophony (difference [Unterschiedsempfinden]) 
c. non-homophony (distinctiveness [Verschiedenheitsempfinden]) 
If the ecphoric influences activate engrams that relate to co-reproductive 
units, they could trigger either  
i. no co-reproductive unit (component-ecphorization only) 
ii. a single unit  
iii. different units 
All four combinations of ecphoric influences in all three variations of 
homophony are possible in all three cases of co-reproduction. 
No-co-reproduction will simply leave things at the componential level. A 
single unit may still vary by different degrees of homophony, insofar as 
the components can be completely homophonous or non-homophonous (i.e., 
referring to different components of a single unit). And they could be 
incompletely homophonous even in the single-unit case, in that a 
componential difference is felt without any impairment of joint triggering. 
Extended Artificial Memory 
[198] 
A complication of the basic epistemic memory variations of independent 
ecphoric influences can be found in cases where one influence helps create 





A mnemic (mnemically ecphorized) sensation (or sub-conscious excitation) 
(mneme [Mnem]) could ecphorize an engram that is engrammatically associated 
in a shared memory trace. Epistemically, this represents a mnemic-to-mnemic 
progress, resulting in a corresponding mnemic-mnemic variation 
(colloquially often called thought, idea, knowledge, recollection or 
association etc.). If a co-reproductive mneme includes an actuation (let’s 
say: a movement), it may evoke or more or less directly cause a sensorial-
ecphoric influence. This is the mnemic-to-sensorial progress. If the 
mnemic-to-sensorial progress manages to generate a stable co-reproductive 
unit that is triggered by the sensorial-ecphoric influence (be it in a 
mnemic-sensorial or sensorial-mnemic variation), it is likely to be 
integrated into the mental self-model. If the resulting sensorial-ecphoric 
influence is rather variable and becomes integrated into a deterministic 
schema, the mnemic-ecphoric influence (of the mnemic-sensorial variation) 
makes an appearance as an (intermediate) epistemic action 166  or an 
(immediate) pragmatic action. The effect of an epistemic action is similar 
to the effect of a mnemic association (mnemic-to-mnemic progress), because 
the result of a mnemic association varies due to engram-association bi- and 
multifurcation. 167  I would argue that the Selzian determined bethinking 
[Besinnung], controlled inner attention, is, indeed, epistemic action, too. 
Epistemic action, however, is normally only associated with controlled 
outer attention (physical actions such as eye-movements). An outer 
epistemic action may be a supplementation or even replacement of an inner 
                         
166 The term epistemic action was introduced by David Kirsh and Paul Maglio (Kirsh & Maglio, 
1994, S. 3f): 
Epistemic actions - physical actions that make mental computation easier, 
faster, or more reliable - are external actions that an agent performs to 
change its own computational state.  
[…] we use the term epistemic action to designate a physical action whose 
primary function is to improve cognition by: 
1. reducing the memory involved in mental computation, i.e., space 
complexity; 
2. reducing the steps involved in mental computation, i.e., time 
complexity; 
3. reducing the probability of error of mental computation, i.e., 
unreliability 
167 See chapter 3.2.2.3 for a definition of bi-/multifurcation. 
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epistemic action (mnemic association) whenever it refers to extended 
artificial memory representations of the respective multifurcations.  
The sensorial-to-sensorial progress, if not being mnemically conveyed, 
depends on uncontrolled/vital attention-directing mechanisms (e.g. a 
blinking light automatically refocusing attention to a certain spot where 
another sensorial-ecphoric influence (e.g. a background figure) can take 
effect. Early perceptive (dis-)integration or priming might establish 
further variants of progressive dependency between sensorial-ecphoric 
influences. Ecphoric priming168 would be a way in which a sensorial-ecphoric 
influence may affect the success of an otherwise independent mnemic-
ecphoric influence (sensorial-to-mnemic progress). However, sensorial-to-
mnemic progress can also simply mean that a mnemic influence is created by 
prior sensorial ecphorization.  
The mnemic-to-mnemic progress is (1) predictive, (2) imaginative (or 
probing) or (3) constructive in that the resulting mnemic-mnemic complex 
(I) may or (II) may not or (III) may not correctly be matched by a 
simultaneous or later stimulus situation. Outer epistemic actions (mnemic-
to-sensorial progress) will produce similar predictive, imaginative, and 
constructive effects if they are informed by an appropriate extended 
artificial memory system. Furthermore, with extended artificial memory 
systems, sensorial-to-mnemic progress, by ecphoric priming or simply by 
ecphorization of to-be mnemic influences, can induce complex mnemic 
situations, as would be given in rich (thoughtful) mnemic simultaneous 
complexes. 
The epistemic mechanism of extended artificial memory systems is that they, 
as far as possible, supplement, support or replace endogenic memory 
variations due to controlled inner attention and to inner (mnemic) 
associations with exogenic memory variations due to controlled outer 
attention and outer associations. This epistemic mechanism enriches 
simultaneous complexes, thus improving memory reproduction and memory 
variation. 
  
                         
168 See chapter 3.2.2.3 for a definition of ecphoric priming. 
Extended Artificial Memory 
[200] 
4.3.2  (SIMPLIFIED) MEMORY-PROCESS VISUALIZATION 
In order to have an easier access to the following ideas about extended 
artificial memory, and to summarize the major sub-processes of 
replication/variation memory visually, I am adding Figure 14: Visual Model 
of Replication/Variation Memory. The yellow area within the head depicts 
the simultaneous complex (subconscious and conscious parts of it). Beyond 
that, there is the basic epistemic distinction between mnemic and sensorial 
processes. Mnemically caused processes (processes caused by mnemes: 
ecphorized non-a-priori/engraphic engrams in the simultaneous complex) are 
represented in the white area of the head; exogenous, sensorially caused 
processes are represented outside of the head, so, as if they were entering 
the head through the eyes.169  
 
 FIGURE 14: VISUAL MODEL OF REPLICATION/VARIATION MEMORY 
 
In (1), the sensorial information process is shown. It becomes effective by 
sensorial ecphorization and (low-level) perceptual/sensorial priming (of 
primary memory) and (high-level) ecphoric priming (of episodic-engraphic 
memory). Endogenous sensorial information (e.g. by affective-ecphoric 
influences) is indicated separately by a dotted line. In (2), mnemic 
information is shown. Mnemic information can go back directly to effective 
ecphoric influences (3) of the simultaneous complex, or it is mediated by 
mnemic associations (4), which are bound to engrammatic associations. 
Ecphoric priming also influences mnemic ecphorization, in the form of 
multiple-trace activation and/or subsequent sensitization of engraphic 
                         
169 This is, of course, NOT to mean that they were not cognitive processes. 
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engrams. In (5), episodic-engraphic engram association (or complexing) is 
shown. These engrams form the basis of mnemic ecphorization, probably 
mediated by a process of more or less 170  automatic chunk- and schema-
abstraction (6). 
  
                         
170 Karl Bühler famously distinguished between rule consciousness [Regelbewußtsein] and the 
rule itself (Bühler, Tatsachen und Probleme zu einer Psychologie der Denkvorgänge, 1907, S. 
43f): 
Nicht dieses an eine Regel denken, sondern das Denken einer Regel oder in 
einer Regel ist Regelbewußtsein. Der Gegenstand des Regelbewußtseins ist 
nicht die Regel, sondern der Tatbestand, das Objektive, das sie 
bezeichnet, auf das sie anwendbar, aus dem sie vielleicht abgeleitet.ist. 
Wir könnten, wenn wir eine Unterscheidung Husserls aufnehmen wollten, 
sagen: Das Regelbewußtsein ist ein Gedanke, in dem bestimmte Gegenstände, 
die der Logiker als Gesetze bezeichnet, adäquat gedacht werden. 
Acquiring rule consciousness is probably difficult or impossible by consciousness of the 
rule alone. Rule consciousness is based on abstraction engrams, whereas consciousness of a 
rule is based on memory traces reflecting (or abstracting) the mnemic effects of a rule. 
Consciousness of rules, however, could create conditions helping to imitate the effects of 
rules or conditions that help to acquire rule consciousness / engrammatic abstraction. 
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4.3.3  BASIC MEMORY-PROCESS PROBLEMS IN EPISTEMOLOGICAL 
CONSIDERATION 
As the memory-process system is the host of the technological (actuation, 
often also substitution) process, the basic problems that can arise are of 
special interest to us. Through their embedding into technological 
processes, these problems may affect effectiveness and ineffectiveness of 
schematic-anticipatory technological processes. This is certainly not a 
complete list of basic problems, but it gives a first idea of what 
different types of problem situations may arise, all impairing memory 
reproduction and memory variation (production). We will later discuss how 
these problems could be mitigated by an extended artificial memory system.  
4.3.3.1 Mind Misloads 
SENSORIAL MIND MISLOAD BY UNCONTROLLED ATTENTION SHIFT 
  
FIGURE 15: SENSORIAL MIND MISLOAD 
Mind misloads are caused by false (non-intended non-anticipated) sensory 
stimuli gaining influence. In the simplest case (that we are going for 
here), this will be caused by uncontrolled attention shifts, directing the 
receptive field of the sensory organ away from the relevant stimuli. In 
Figure 15, this is indicated by a flashlight attracting attention away from 
the relevant exogenous stimulus (the clock needed to know the time). 
MNEMIC MIND MISLOAD BY UNCONTROLLED THOUGHT SHIFT 
In Figure 16, mind misload (remembering a flashlight instead of the time) 
is caused mnemically by an uncontrolled shift of thought toward an 
irrelevant (i.e., not intended in schematic-anticipatory fashion) 
engram(-complex). The irrelevant mnemic sensations fill the mnemically 
influenced simultaneous complex. There can be many indirect causes for 
this. Perceptive-ecphoric influences (e.g. sensations of hunger or thirst 
grabbing inner attention) or mnemic-associative ecphoric influences due to 
irrelevant engrammatic associations or abstraction structures not (yet) 
deterministically suppressed.  
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FIGURE 16: MNEMIC MIND MISLOAD 
4.3.3.2 Mind Overloads 
SENSORIAL MIND OVERLOAD BY STIMULUS OVERLOAD 
Mind overload is a condition, where the relevant information is available, 
but not effective due to simultaneous information rendering it ineffective. 
Many simultaneous stimuli (stimulus overload) may prevent the relevant 
stimulus from taking effect, as indicated in Figure 17. The clock (to tell 
the time) is not seen, even though it is present as an unattended and, 
therefore, ecphorically non-effective stimulus. 
 
FIGURE 17: SENSORIAL MIND OVERLOAD 
MNEMIC MIND OVERLOAD BY THOUGHT OVERLOAD 
The same scenario can be stated with respect to a mnemic-ecphorically 
influenced simultaneous complex, in which, due to a limited 
memory/simultaneous-complex span, the given relevant engram (telling the 
time) is not ecphorized to the sensational level, as indicated in Figure 
18. 
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FIGURE 18: MNEMIC MIND OVERLOAD 
4.3.3.3 Mind Underloads 
SENSORIAL MIND UNDERLOAD BY STIMULUS DISTANCE 
Mind underload is given when relevant information is, in principal, 
indirectly available. In Figure 19, dealing with sensorial mind underload, 
this is indicated by a situation where epistemic actions (going home to see 
the time) are needed for relevant information.  
 
FIGURE 19: SENSORIAL MIND UNDERLOAD 
MNEMIC MIND UNDERLOAD BY THOUGHT DISTANCE 
In Figure 20, a situation is depicted, in which, in order to mnemic-
ecphorically remember the relevant information, a number of epistemic 
mnemic-associations have to be tracked back (remembering that one last read 
the time before leaving home).  
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FIGURE 20: MNEMIC MIND UNDERLOAD 
Some mental episodic distances need to be bridged in an epistemic mnemic-
associative reconstructive process of re-membering memory traces 
(chronologically). Other mental distances (to relevant information) can be 
bridged by using one’s artificial memory apparatus (as in the Selzian task-
determined schematic means abstraction). More often than not, probably, 
both types of mental bridging will come into operation, likely also 
including epistemic actions (for episodic reconstruction or means 
abstraction).  
4.3.3.4 Mind Information-Errors 
SENSORIAL MIND INFORMATION-ERROR  
 
FIGURE 21: SENSORIAL MIND INFORMATION-ERROR 
A mind information-error is given when false information is taken for 
relevant information. The right information is not supposed to be present 
(stimulus-wise or engram-wise). A sensorial mind information-error is due 
to a false stimulus (correctly) ecphorizing a false-stimulus mneme. In 
Figure 21, a false time is read correctly. 
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MNEMIC MIND INFORMATION-ERROR 
A mnemic mind information-error is correct mnemic ecphorization of an 
erroneous engram.  
 
FIGURE 22: MNEMIC MIND INFORMATION-ERROR 
4.3.3.5 Mind Construction-Errors 
SENSORIAL MIND CONSTRUCTION-ERROR 
Mind construction-errors are the same as mind information-errors in result. 
In sensorial construction-errors, however, the stimulus-ecphoric influences 
do not ecphorize the right engrams (which are thought to be available). 
This may happen because of misleading homophony, ecphorizing a similar and 
perhaps overly general, but, in effect, false memory trace, which is 
mistakenly assumed correct, though. 
MNEMIC MIND RE-CONSTRUCTION-ERROR 
Mnemic construction-errors are called re-construction errors, because they 
do not re-construct or re-member relevant information correctly. This again 
is due to misleading mnemic ecphorization (re-construction) and mnemic 
association (mnemic association).  
Mind information-errors and mind-construction-errors are as easy to mix up 
as they mix up easily. The former because of, in principal, same results, 
the latter because false information in the first place can still be 
falsely (re-)constructed in the second place. 
4.3.3.6 Mind Ambiguity 
SENSORIAL MIND AMBIGUITY 
Mind ambiguity arises whenever there is no clear ecphoric picture, that is, 
whenever different mnemes are being ecphorized where only a single one was 
expected. Ambiguity is only felt where there are actually conflicting 
mnemes. Ambiguity is thus not the finding [Feststellung] of ambiguity, but 
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the sensation [Empfindung] of ambiguity. In Figure 23, a (single) stimulus 
has an ambiguous effect. 
 
FIGURE 23: SENSATIONAL MIND AMBIGUITY 
MNEMIC MIND AMBIGUITY 
Mnemic ambiguity is a bit difficult to depict, because a single mnemic-
ecphoric influence is supposed to ecphorize multiple conflicting engrams. 
In Figure 24, a ambiguous double-ecphorization and resulting ambiguous 
simultaneous complex is depicted, leaving the single mnemic-ecphoric 
influence aside. 
 
FIGURE 24: MNEMIC MIND AMBIGUITY 
4.3.3.7 Mind Emptiness 
SENSORIAL MIND EMPTINESS (INCOMPREHENSION) 
Mind emptiness is caused by a lack of engrams (chunks, triggers, memory 
traces) that could (or would) answer a relevant ecphoric influence. A 
stimulus will create a more or less original sensation that does not 
ecphorize a meaningful or relevant sensation, though. In Figure 25, this is 
indicated by a stimulus-icon and (original) excitation icon in the 
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simultaneous complex. The question mark is to indicate that there are no 
(meaningful) engrams being ecphorized.  
 
FIGURE 25: SENSATIONAL MIND EMPTINESS 
MNEMIC MIND EMPTINESS (UNKNOWINGNESS) 
With mnemic emptiness, there will be a relevant mnemic-ecphoric influence 
not producing any ecphorization. In Figure 26, this is indicated by missing 
engrams and an accordingly emptied simultaneous complex. This emptiness is 
not to be understood as absolute emptiness, but as emptiness relative to an 
unsuccessful mnemic-ecphoric influence. It is, thus, not knowing anything 
(related) rather than knowing nothing (at all). 
 
FIGURE 26: MNEMIC MIND EMPTINESS 
4.3.3.8 Mind Unabstractness 
SENSATIONAL MIND UNABSTRACTNESS 
Mind unabstractness means that a relevant abstraction (chunk-
abstraction/complexion or schema-abstraction) is omitted, even though the 
information for it is given. Sensational unabstractness refers to ecphoric 
influences stressing (or simply giving) a potential abstraction pattern 
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(e.g. a word-chunk or marked syntactic schema), without, however, the 
abstraction pattern being established by a respective blending.  
An insufficient capacity of abstraction is responsible for mind 
unabstractness. This is different from unabstractness due to a lack of 
cultural support of individual abstraction (as, for example, by missing 
syntactic language features, lack of art/design artifacts, and under-
developed cultural-technological habits).171  
MNEMIC MIND UNABSTRACTNESS 
Mnemic mind unabstractness is found when mnemic-ecphoric stimuli do not 
provoke a (conceptual) abstractive integration of the respective engrams or 
engram complexes. Unabstractness will result in a lack of artificial 
memory. 
  
                         
171 Otto Selz stressed the importance of this culturally acquired (means) abstraction for 
cultural evolution (Selz, 1924, S. 17): 
Vielmehr beruht die kulturelle Fortentwicklung gerade darauf, daß 
prinzipiell sämtliche durch die Arbeit vorangegangener Generationen 
erworbene Mittel zur Verwirklichung kultureller Werte der routinemäßigen 
Aktualisierung zugänglich werden. 
Against this background, it appears astonishing that cognitive sciences did not yet start a 
broad initiative to create a universal systematization system for cataloging artificial 
memory abstractions (chunks-abstractions, syntactic schemata, anticipatory schemata, 
actuation schemata, co-reproductive units etc.). A memory-dimensional index of (socially 
extended) extended artificial memory is the final version of a universal cultural search 
engine (for abstraction of any cultural means, so to speak). Efforts like the 
representation of procedural knowledge in the ACT-R model (Anderson, 1996) or the ideas 
about semantic search (Guha, McCool, & Miller, 2003) can be seen as early preparatory work 
for such an endeavor. This subject would deserve a new science, though, giving current 
search technology a completely new twist. 
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4.3.4  ARTIFICIAL MEMORY EXPRESSION AS TRANSPARENT TECHNOLOGY: CO-
PRODUCTION 
In Figure 27, a basic visualization of an extended artificial memory system 
is shown. As we perceive the eusocial technological substitution process to 
be based on interindividually co-structural artificial memories in form of 
extended cognitions, we illustrate the individual extended artificial 
memory system (which is, of course, a computational system) as just another 
memory-process system, that is, in the visual language of our model, it is 
represented by another head. 
 
FIGURE 27: EXTENDED ARTIFICIAL MEMORY VISUALIZATION 
The extended system’s simultaneous complex is its representational 
function, sensorial-ecphorically stimulating proper simultaneous complexes. 
The extended artificial memory system mimics the organismic artificial 
memory. This is not intended to mean that technological effectuation 
processes of the system would be restricted to cognitive mimicry; it merely 
means that its representational function strives for a due (homophonous) 
organismic ecphorization. Andy Clark had a similar idea in mind when he 
defined transparent technology:  
[…] 'transparent technologies' and what might contrariwise 
be dubbed 'opaque technologies.' A transparent technology is 
a technology that is so well fitted to, and integrated with, 
our own lives, biological capacities, and projects as to 
become (as Mark Weiser and Donald Norman have both stressed) 
almost invisible in use. 
(Clark, 2003, S. 37) 
Invisibility can be interpreted as homophony or high correspondence in 
outward-directed technological processes. Invisibility must be learnt. The 
expression of artificial memory is not a natural gift. Clark remarks: 
The processes by which a technology can become transparent 
[…] include both natural fit (it requires only modest 
Extended Artificial Memory 
[211] 
training to learn to use a hammer, for example) and the 
systematic effects of training. The line between opaque and 
transparent technologies is thus not always clear-cut; the 
user contributes as much as the tool. 
(Clark, 2003, S. 38) 
In our terminology, the earmark of a transparent technological process of 
artificial memory expression and extended artificial memory impression is 
the (learnt) capacity of co-productiveness. A full expression of complex 
co-reproductive artificial memory entities is probably impossible. Symbolic 
co-reproductive units anyway play a key role in human artificial memory. 
The expressible (symbol-)trigger-components of these units are key to their 
memory-reproduction. Now, co-productiveness means that memory production 
(variation) ought to be widely constituted by co-reproductive units and 
their apt expression. In so far, extended artificial memory systems could 
be called intrusive transparent systems, as they pre-suppose (and, in turn, 
support) a literacy of (semantic) expression that enriches the co-
reproductive entities to be expressed. Thought-accompanying expression 
means co-productive active symbolism. Touch/mouse, gestural, spoken and 
written natural language (voice/keyboard), eye tracking, and 
facial-expression human-computer interfaces would ideally all merge into a 
system for artificial memory co-productiveness, establishing new forms of 
an expressive (interactive) existence through new complex co-reproductive 
entities of artificial memory. Supporting an artistry of multi-dimensional 
thought-accompanying co-productivity would very much be a crucial 
educational challenge of technologized societies. By now, as typical for 
peri-postindustrial societies and an IT industry marked by shortsighted 
corporate market capitalism, the evolution of human-computer interfaces has 
been a slow and inefficient process dominated by company interests, on one 
hand, and inflexible and usually rather clue-less public 
organizations/systems on the other hand. Co-productiveness, however, ought 
to be subject to an experimental design and scientific research process, as 
it has an important role to play in establishing effective technological 
processes computationally. Any form of life recording of environmental and 
contextual information (see chapter 2.5.2.2, p. 71) may provide an 
important pool of data correlating to artificial memories and memory 
traces. Life recording, however, can be but a supplement to extended 
artificial memory creation, not a replacement, even though, in part, co-
productiveness could take the form of recordings of unconscious expressions 
and organismic signals instead of conscious expressions. It will be crucial 
to bind these unconscious expressions and signals into representations of 
their co-reproductive units correctly. A notable obstacle to co-production 
is the heterogeneity of human-computer interfaces due to software and 
hardware fragmentation. From a social technology and memory-process 
perspective, one has to get rid of the bad idea that the expression of 
artificial memory (which comprises any form of human-computer interaction) 
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belongs into the realm of any specific servicing software or hardware 
(company). Technological processes of co-productive artificial memory 
expression are the language of the future, partially destroying pre-
computer-era natural languages, partly integrating them into new forms of 
usage (as in controlled/programming languages, or visual and visual visual 
languages). The fragmentation-based specificity of expressions bound to 
individual software and hardware, however, diminishes their technological 
and, thus, social value. Both the interaction and data lock-in of software 
users represent an intellectual lock-in society cannot afford. I think that 
this is the true intellectual property war the Internet generation will 
have to wage in future: It is very much their own intellectual property 
that is at stake here, not the intellectual property of a pre-digital era. 
It is all a question of the design of shared fundamental social 
technologies such as extended artificial memory (network) systems. 
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4.3.5  FOUR BASIC TYPES OF EXTENDED ARTIFICIAL MEMORY 
I distinguish four (closely interrelated) functional sub-types of (content-
technological) extended artificial memory by four types of extension of 
memory-subprocesses: 
1. artificial reflective memory - by extended ecphorization 
2. artificial reproductive memory – by extended remembering 
3. artificial productive memory – by extended endogenic variation 
4. artificial learning memory – by extended exogenic variation 
4.3.5.1 Artificial Reflective Memory: Extended Ecphorization 
In Figure 28, the process of using an extended (artificial memory) system 
for (extended) reflection is shown. Reflection here means that a mnemic 
state is being expressed and reflected by a corresponding representation of 
an extended artificial memory system. 
  
FIGURE 28: ARTIFICIAL REFLECTIVE MEMORY 
There are two basic sub-processes involved: expression (1) and reflection 
(2). Expression starts with an expressible (co-reproductive) sensation a in 
the simultaneous complex (1.1_a). Through a learnt actuation process, this 
sensation is non-intrusively/transparently mnemic-ecphorically expressed 
(1.2_a) and recorded by the extended artificial memory system, which 
translates it into a due representation a’ (2.1_a’). a can be new to the 
extended artificial memory system, or it was stored before, which, for now, 
does not concern us. In reflection (2), the system first generates a 
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stimulus-ecphoric influence a’ (2.2_a’) that creates a co-reproductively 
homophonous-reflective sensational complex (integrating 1.1a and 2.3_a’). 
This reflection complex (a/a’) is engraphically effective (2.4__a/a’).  
One advantage of artificially reflecting sensations is enrichment, as the 
expression (e.g. writing) may cause co-reproductive components (e.g. 
written language symbols) to be integrated into the co-reproductive 
complex. Enrichment may cause co-reproductive reinforcement, as engraphy of 
the simultaneous complex will bind a greater diversity of sensations, 
producing more potential (co-)trigger engram components. Enrichment can 
also mean that the reflection will help solidifying the sensation in the 
simultaneous complex. This can improve mnemic-associative processes 
(bethinking [Besinnung]). As the reflection stimulus may (medially) persist 
beyond its immediate reflective function, universal technological processes 
for working memory extension (into subsequent simultaneous complexes 
emptied of sensation a) may take effect. In the Artificial Memory 
prototype, for example, this is realized by a time-sensitive Last-Visited 
list and a (less time-sensitive) more specific Last-Added list, which both 
function as working memory buffers. The stable spatial arrangement of these 
dynamic lists in the Artificial Memory prototype allows for a 
(technologically) simple fast perceptual re-ecphorization of former 
sensations into later simultaneous complexes. This, of course, is an 
advantage against notes on paper with their specific static locations. 
Perceptually triggered/influenced re-ecphorization is certainly a major 
advantage of artificial reflective memory. Reflectively supported re-
ecphorization normally serves a wider purpose, in an overarching 
technological process (e.g. relating temporally distant sequential 
sensations via their by then spatial-temporally near perceptive-ecphoric 
influences). Artificial reflective memory is prescribed, for example, 
against mind overload by stimulus overload or thought overload, as it helps 
keeping or regaining focus. It may also help in cases of mind underload 
where underload is due to the passing by of recent simultaneous complexes. 
Furthermore, it mitigates the effects of mind misload, irrespective of 
whether they were caused by attention shift or thought shift, as ecphoric 
influences of listed items may easily reinstate a displaced or masked 
simultaneous complex constellation. The buffer function can be anticipated 
in an anterograde or a retrograde fashion: putting something aside for a 
later moment versus wanting to perceptually/easily (without mnemically 
bethinking) re-member a past by item. In any way, artificial reflective 
memory will support thinking through a number of basic content 
technologies.  
In extended artificial memory system usage for artificial reflective 
memory, long-term persistence is of secondary concern. Note sheets (even 
electronic ones) change often and we frequently end up noting something 
twice or more often on different sheets/places, unless we remember on which 
note sheet we took the note, which, however, makes it unlikely that we will 
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re-note what we have in mind (in which way we lose the valuable contextual 
reflective function of re-noting). The extended system strives for data 
normalization (avoiding duplicates, as artificial-memory-based chunking 
does, too), but at the same time it asks for thought-accompanying 
expression (for instating artificial reflective memory). Therefore, 
inputting into the extended system and searching the extended system have 
to be a single process (for reasons of technological transparency). In the 
Artificial Memory prototype, this is solved by an auto-completing named 
entity search, in which the search/query string is also used for direct 
entry of suggested lexical named entities (when search for individually 
existing items was unsatisfactory). If search was successful, but delivered 
a polysemous or homonymous (i.e., identically named) item (the 
disambiguation of which we will discuss later), the respective items can be 
easily duplicated. These exemplary measures help to establish the 
Artificial Memory prototype as both, a normalized data source and an 
extended system creating transient artificial reflective memory (traces). 
Nearly all note taking tools and, more generally, (personal) 
information/knowledge management systems focus on one function or another. 
Either they provide more or less normalized/itemized lists (e.g. top-to-dos 
list, mind-maps, diagram template etc.) or they offer multiple (freeform) 
documents and leave their usage up to the user. This limits their 
applicability to specific usage scenarios and excludes their usage as an 
extended system. 
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4.3.5.2 Artificial Reproductive Memory: Extended Remembering  
In Figure 29, the process of using an extended system for associatively 
remembering is shown. Artificial memory turns reproductive (beyond 
reflection) by ecphorization of an association (memory trace) by, first, 
expressing an association-component and, subsequently, representation of an 
extended association. 
 
FIGURE 29: ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTIVE MEMORY 
The expression of a is the same as with artificial reflective memory. This 
time, however, the extended system retrieves a formerly expressed and 
stored associated entity b’ and representationally ties b’ (2.2) to a’ 
(2.1) in an extended association (d) representation that allows for a 
perceptive association ecphorization (2.3) into a homophonous association 
sensation (f) (possibly integrating the sensation a starting the process, 
if it happens to be still available). The (overall) homophonous association 
complex is engraphically effective (2.5 a/a’-b’). 
Artificial reproductive memory is exogenic re-membering by mnemic-ecphoric 
influence extension. It turns any artificial-memory-based sensation into a 
reminder. A mnemic-ecphoric (re-)association process (being reminded of a 
memory trace) is replaced and, subsequently, supplemented by appropriate 
sensory-ecphoric influences. In principal, extended remembering is useful 
whenever the simultaneous complex does not include mnemic-ecphoric 
influences supporting the ecphorization of potentially relevant memory 
traces (by mnemically bethinking). The extended representation of multiple 
(e.g. sentential) different associations containing a is far easier than 
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bethinking them. The reason for this is the mnemic-associative ecphoric 
mechanism itself: bethinking a might well remember b, but then, given a 
simultaneous complex including a-b, the mnemic ecphoric influences will 
include a, the contiguity complex a-b, and the individual entity b. The 
possibility to ecphorize, say, memory trace a-c is likely to decrease 
because of the likelihood of the additional entities of the simultaneous 
complex to become ecphorically influential. Mind overload is a necessary 
byproduct of mnemic-associative remembering: One is swept away by mnemic-
associatively remembered thoughts. Bethinking something particular across 
multiple memory traces thus benefits from artificial reproductive memory, 
because a technological process of scanning a list of multiple (cross-
episodic) association representations can create a situation where multiple 
(extended) associations get a chance of exerting a mnemic-ecphoric 
influence to prove relevant. Such list studying technology helps 
suppressing flights of remembrances. A precondition of artificial 
reproductive memory is the normalization of associations across multiple 
memory traces: whether a-b was derived from context c1 or c2 is (for the 
time being) of no importance. Therefore, the associations of (extended) 
artificial memory are sequential or relational chunk-abstractions. They 
are, so to speak, more of a semantic network (see chapter 2.6.1) than a 
corpus of texts. This is not to say, however, that a reified association-
chunk could not become part of many unique associations by its (part in) 
chunking of further simultaneous complexes.  
The flipside of mnemic mind overload is mnemic mind underload. Instead of 
losing ourselves in chains of remembrances, we might find ourselves lost in 
unimaginativeness, recognizing a but not recollecting a-b. Extended 
associations may mitigate this type of mind underload. 
In the Artificial Memory extended system prototype, semantic reproductive 
memory is supported by a normalized semantic network (representation). 
Extended remembering is, in principal, offered by a few personal semantic 
systems (e.g. personal semantic wikis, personal computer ontologies, 
personal information management system databases). However, no personal 
information system (besides the Artificial Memory prototype) has ever 
provided this function, because it depends on an explicit strategy of 
artificial reflective memory to create a satisfactory artificial memory 
externalization to draw from. PIM (personal information management) and 
knowledge management, in general, are normally considered a means to an 
end, namely reuse, with a decision to be taken: storing for later use or 
not storing (which is raised as an optimization issue). The importance of 
transparent reflective extended ecphorization as the entry door to 
artificial reproductive memory has been overlooked. The requirement of an 
extended artificial memory system to be a universal (intermediate) 
technological interface is further supported by this fundamental 
interdependency.  
Extended Artificial Memory 
[218] 
4.3.5.3 Artificial Productive Memory: Extended Endogenic 
Variation (Extended Thinking) 
Artificial productive memory is pretty much the same as artificial 
reproductive memory, with one important difference, though. Instead of 
simply representing a given association a’-b’, the association between a’ 
and b’ is first constructed by the extended system, as an extended thought 
(d). a’ and b’ have to be known to the extended system. The thought is 
based on a more or less specific inference rule. Ideally, the inference 
rules represent externalizations of individual variable schema-
abstractions. 
 
FIGURE 30: ARTIFICIAL PRODUCTIVE MEMORY 
Culturally rooted syntacto-semantic schemata and common or, at least, 
culturally desirable (logical) inferential rules may form a basic set of 
inference rules for extended systems. The extended thought can have two 
forms: suggestion or confirmation. A confirmation represents the thought as 
if it were valid. For example, stating that a is a superclass of b (a-b) 
and b is a superclass of c (b-c), given the right chaining rule (repeated 
modus tollens), one could infer that a is a superclass of c (a-c) and, 
therefore, represent the two propositions as a subordination chain of 
a-b-c, even though it has (perhaps) never been thought as such. The 
implications of logical inference systems are different from actual 
associations in artificial memory, though. In our example, one could find 
that there indeed is an intermediate element (additional subordination 
propositions of form b-x and x-c in artificial memory), so that the 
representation a-b-c would have to be changed into a-b-x-c. In artificial 
Extended Artificial Memory 
[219] 
memories, inference (beyond implicit schema- and chunk-abstractions) is not 
a matter of automaticity, but engraphy, namely engraphy of schematically 
organized and mnemic-ecphorically influenced simultaneous complexes. Even 
if all necessary inference schemata and propositions were present in 
artificial memory, the possible conclusions could be absent. Now, 
confirmation means that the extended system represents (logical) 
implications as if they were already engrammatically concluded, thus 
provoking either engraphically effective acceptance (not requiring any 
action) or rejection (to be reflected by corrective action and corrective 
reflective representation). Confirmation is a means to engraphically anchor 
logical consistency, allowing for fast, mnemic-associative conclusions, 
instead of depending on (slower) schematic abstractions. In our example, a 
conceptual compression (a-c) can be abstracted from the chain 
representation. Compressions are important shortcuts of mnemic-associative 
thinking. Thus, extended system confirmation accelerates and promotes the 
construction of engrammatic coherency and efficiency of artificial memory, 
transforming productive into reproductive thinking by perception. Extended 
endogenic variation seems to be of great value to individual human 
thinking. It is, however, very important to stress that the (engraphic) 
effect of extended thought confirmation can only be attained if the 
schematic associations are indeed backed by individual extended artificial 
memory. The representation of a consistent system (e.g. a textbook example) 
that is not directly conceivable by the artificial memory structures of the 
perceiving person will not produce artificial productive memory. Again, as 
with artificial reproductive memory, the dependency of this important 
memory-mechanism on extended ecphorization becomes obvious.  
An extended thought suggestion is a representation that is not accepted by 
inactivity. Suggestions demand additional activity, creating the 
associations suggested. The need for distinguishing suggestions from 
confirmations lies in greater uncertainty of certain extended thoughts. The 
German unbewußt (un-conscious) is a negation of bewußt (conscious). 
Unwetter (bad weather), however, is not a negation of Wetter (weather). The 
syntacto-semantic prefix-schema of negation is thus not always applicable. 
Hence, a respective extended schematic antonymous association (of Unwetter 
and Wetter) would have to be presented as a suggestion rather than a 
confirmation. If a suggestion is found to be inacceptable, it should be 
possible to avoid it for good by rejecting it. 
Extended thoughts are intrusive. There can be many of them, acceptable ones 
and inacceptable ones. Thoughts use to be the result of a thought-provoking 
state of bethinking. Extended thoughts should not provoke memory overload. 
The equivalent of bethinking thus has to be a technological process whereby 
ecphorization by extended thought is regulated. A clear (visual-perceptual) 
separation between extended associations and extended thoughts seems to be 
important in order that artificial productive memory can be generated by 
epistemic actions replacing the more general state of bethinking. In the 
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Artificial Memory prototype system, for example, extended thought 
suggestions are separated by location (according to the type of rule 
applied), representation type (hierarchies etc. for confirmations) and 
color (special color for suggested thoughts).  
4.3.5.4 Artificial Learning Memory: Extended Exogenic 
Variation (Extended Learning) 
Artificial learning memory is similar to artificial productive memory, with 
one important difference, though. Instead of a schematic association of the 
extended system, the extended system communicates with a second-order 
extended system to create an external thought representation.  
 
FIGURE 31: ARTIFICIAL LEARNING MEMORY 
This function of the secondary system is similar to its extended 
reproductive function, only that here the primary extended system functions 
as the artificial memory system and has to represent new (non-extended) 
information (b°). As the extended system ought to mark the difference 
between extended endogenic variation representation and extended exogenic 
variation representation, it will have to analyze the external association 
representation in this respect. The information exchange between the 
primary and secondary extended (computational) systems is not restricted to 
the elements of the external thought (in our example: a’, b°, a°, primary 
association schema, secondary association schema) but may include 
additional information for better disambiguation, filtering, evaluation 
etc. In this thesis, however, we are able to deal with the basic process 
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only, not the (meta-)technological details. External thought ecphorization 
(f) differs from extended thought ecphorization in that the new entity will 
probably need further processing. A new word-compound, for example, would 
necessitate the conceptual integration of two words (i.e., the integration 
of two co-reproductive chunks). According to this, external thought 
engraphy (h) is also more complex than extended thought engraphy. 
Artificial learning memory, however, is far from being an uncontrolled 
process of information. It starts with a particular sensation a and the 
extended system will keep the representation of external associations 
restricted to those that include but a limited amount of new information 
and, hence, can be easily integrated into (the existing) artificial memory. 
New information is limited significantly in two ways. First, concerning the 
external association, it is partial, as some components (a, the association 
schema) are already part of the artificial memory. Second, with regard to 
the simultaneous complex inducing the process, the external thought 
ecphorization (f) is partially homophonous. This means that new information 
is (potentially) linked into a presently relevant context. Extended 
exogenic variation thus presents a form of instantaneously associative 
learning of (therefore) contextually evaluable [sic] information. Normally, 
learning is happening out of context (learning at school or learning by 
reading books, for example). It is obvious that this institutional learning 
model will play a less important role in tomorrow’s digitalized information 
world. The relevancy of instantaneous digital information augmentation 
depends on the capacity of the information system to represent or filter 
reproductive, endogenic-variable and exogenic-variable information 
depending on the individual artificial memories of the people being 
informed and the instantaneous interests given. An intermediate extended 
system for extended remembering, extended endogenic variation, and extended 
exogenic variation could best support augmentation. Extended exogenic 
variations, gained by epistemic actions, can solve many memory-process 
problems. Mind emptiness is avoidable. Mnemes can be tested for mind 
information-errors. Exogenic variations may help decide about ambiguous 
information (providing a second opinion). If the new information is 
restricted to (more) schematic(-associative) information, even mind 
unabstractness may be mitigated. If the extended system is able to filter 
information, mind overload can be avoided by checking new information for 
its capability to function as extended exogenic variations. In Figure 31, 
the exchange between the primary and the secondary system happens on the 
occasion of an expression into the extended system. However, as extended 
artificial memory, the primary system could acquire endogenic and exogenic 
variations independent of a specific situation. It could thus simulate 
future states of knowledge and start, in form of a simulation, integrating 
distant information variations. This offers a multitude of opportunities 
for efficient information processes: e.g. by choosing the right (order of) 
textual/serial information sources, by identifying possible learning paths, 
by pre-collecting relevant information, by foreseeing future memory-process 
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problems, etc. An extended system can, in principal, host and evaluate 
individual learning models and thus assist in a life-long endeavor of 
efficient relevant learning. 
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4.3.6  EXTENDED ARTIFICIAL MEMORY NETWORKING 
We have already mentioned the use of an extended artificial memory system 
(EAMS) as a (potential) unifying universal interface to functional 
(software) services. There are, however, many more scenarios involving one 
or more extended systems. I want to mention a few here to demonstrate how 
extended systems can be arranged to meet many different needs that are 
addressed today by different information systems and communication 
technologies. 
4.3.6.1 Extended Artificial Memory (person + own EAMS) 
This is the main scenario of use of the experimental Artificial Memory 
prototype. It offers an artificial memory extension in the four forms 
described by the four extension mechanisms discussed and depicted. Extended 
exogenic variation is enabled by integrating a bunch of linguistic and 
other information resources.  
4.3.6.2 Extended System Agent (person + different EAMS) 
A foreign AM is a potential information source about a person’s artificial 
memory. The own AM can thus function as an agent communicating with other 
people, potentially gaining new insights (exogenic variations) and passing 
forward information that one oneself would likely have passed forward, if 
there had been an opportunity for personal information. Thus, this comes 
handy if direct communication is not possible. The extended system is the 
natural universal personal agent system because it knows best a person’s 
artificial memory, which includes his or her motives and interests. An 
actuation process taking the form of an agent substitution process depends 
on a satisfactory correspondence structure. The extended system as an agent 
system is, of course, best apt to guarantee ongoing correspondence. Here 
the value of artificial memory externalization becomes obvious again.  
4.3.6.3 Agent Communication (EAMS + different EAMS) 
If there are two extended systems functioning as agents, these agents can 
exchange information to acquire exogenic variations (extract new problem 
solution means, acquire new information, identify potentially erroneous 
knowledge etc.). Inter-agent communication comes handy if both parties are 
not available in person or personal communication is excluded for other 
reasons. 
4.3.6.4 Personally Assisted Agent Communication (person + own 
EAMS + different EAMS) 
Instead of directly interfacing a foreign AM, one could assist one’s own 
extended system agent (or one’s own agent could assist one) in 
communication with a foreign extended system agent. This comes handy if the 
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communication serves an acute and changing purpose. By partial agent-based 
substitution, a personal technological process with a foreign agent can 
turn semi-automatic and, therefore, more efficient. The effectiveness of 
personal instruction of a foreign agent can be improved by one’s own agent 
assisting the process by providing additional actuation parameters. 
Likewise, the own agent may help evaluating substitution parameters. 
Extended system agents can play a crucial role in improving technological 
processes involving other systems, especially other artificial memory 
extension systems.  
4.3.6.5 Agent Assisted Personal Communication (several people 
and their EAMSs) 
The memory-process extending function of extended artificial memory systems 
qualifies them to assist personal communication. Imagine the EAMS of a 
dialogue partner enriching the dialogue partner’s statement with additional 
information addressing one’s own EAMS or/and being directly perceivable. 
This would allow for many useful agent-assisted information and 
communication scenarios. 
4.3.6.6 Agent Groups (different EAMSs united) 
The extended artificial memories of different agents could be aggregated 
into agent groups. This allows for quantifications of artificial memory 
information. Today, information aggregated across different people is often 
associated with opinion polls, elections, audience research, data 
warehousing, social research etc. The reader should understand that all 
this could be substituted by agent groups sharing (limited) relevant 
information. What we nowadays see as vastly different information sources 
are, indeed, artificial memory artifacts and information of accompanying 
life recording (observational data points). Even something like social 
network analysis would present nothing but analytical technologies applied 
upon agent groups and their aggregated information pools. In today’s 
fragmented technological world, artifact aggregation tends to be highly 
domain-specific. The analytical challenges, however, are the same all over 
the place. An important social function of extended systems lies in their 
organization into agent groups and aggregated information pools. One has to 
understand that, in the end, the replication/variation memory-process 
defines social (technological) activities and that its extension therefore 
offers the opportunity for efficient and effective social processes in 
general. Today’s information and technology world is characterized by 
socio-economic organizational structures that can be traced back to pre-
digital informational structures. One of the many challenges humankind 
faces is to overcome organizational information-process limitations. We 
live, so to say, in the Middle Ages of a future digital (extended) 
technology civilization, for will and representation are still bound to 
social organizations and the various belief systems they create. Meta-
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technological functions may turn agent groups into universal inter-
individual regulatory systems (super agents), potentially replacing many of 
today’s socio-organizational regulatory systems. In chapter 4.2.3, we 
discussed meta-technological processes, which aim at increasing the 
efficiency of technological processes. The technological processes 
improving the workings of super agents accordingly may be called hyper-
technological (or social-technological) processes. They aim at an efficient 
regulation of multiple interindividual technological processes. 
Informational aggregations of agent groups should not be imagined as static 
aggregates, but as virtual/referential aggregations receptive to 
informational changes of subordinated agents. 
4.3.6.7 Agent Group Communication (person/EAMS - agent group) 
As super-agents, hyper-technologically enhanced agent groups, may steer 
functional technological processes (e.g. the traffic lights), they may as 
well serve as virtual unified interfaces and information channels toward 
the respective aggregated agents. The exact processes are subject to hyper-
technological design and may depend on the purposes aggregated into the 
super-agent.  
4.3.6.8 Inter-Super-Agent Communication (several super agents) 
Hyper-technological processes may turn into higher-level meta-technological 
processes if several successions of agent aggregation create different 
layers of agent complexity. Inter-super-agent communication and agent 
communication are similar to some extent. Each layer of complexity, 
however, is likely to bring about its own hyper-technological challenges. 
The decisive difference to artificial-intelligence agent technology is that 
extended artificial memory systems will always be bound to the personal 
artificial memories behind them. This, as I have argued is a question of 
technological correspondence, based on the replication/variation memory 
process. From a more general, philosophical perspective, it is a question 
of biophilia or, more plainly, foresight.  
4.3.7  RECAPITULATION OF EXTENDED ARTIFICIAL MEMORY SYSTEM GOALS 
AND FEATURES (LIST FORM) 
In the following lists, I will shortly recapitulate the basic goals and 
basic features of extended artificial memory systems that we derived from 
our theoretical discussions. 
4.3.7.1 Extended Artificial Memory System Goals 
• Increase technological effectiveness and efficiency by supporting 
(computer mediated): 
o creativity 
 thinking (endogenic memory variation) 
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 learning (exogenic memory variation) 
o acting 
 planning (memory variation) 
 substitution (reproduction) 
o communication (as technological double-process) 
• Tackle basic memory-process problems. 
• Reduce artificial memory artifact fragmentation and corresponding 
functional digital Taylorism. 
• Avoid (extended) artificial memory de-personalization (loss of 
epistemic information). 
• Tackle artificial memory artifact obsolescence by lifelong 
artificial-memory-dynamic (thought- and action-accompanying) artifact 
updating [without preventing forms of historicization, though]. 
• Enable instantaneous associative learning. 
• Support artificial memory for improved expert cognition: 
o increase consistency of thinking by fostering inference 
engraphy 
o improve coherence and consistency of hierarchical and 
relational semantic artificial memory network structures 
through coherent representation 
• Support socio-technological communication and collaboration extension 
and substitution. 
• Avoid epistemic uncertainty and cryptomnesia172. 
• Enhance (artificial intelligence) technology processes by re-
connection to extended systems.  
4.3.7.2 Extended Artificial Memory System Features 
• Extend (rather) mnemic-ecphoric memory-(sub-)processes into (more) 
perceptive-ecphoric memory processes: 
o extended ecphory 
o extended remembering 
o extended endogenic variation 
o extended exogenic variation 
• Perceptual proxy function: manage (control/economize) attention by 
focusing on extended sensorial-ecphoric stimuli (extended system as 
intermediate filter medium). 
• Individually universal (cross-domain) and individually normalized 
artificial memory artifacts data store and system. 
• Universal interface to functional technological processes (services). 
• Foster transparent technology-processes of chunk-expression / chunk 
engram exteriorization (using direct parameter specification, co-
                         
172 Cryptomnesia means mistaking a memory for imagination. 
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productive skills) in public and private speech and, more generally, 
action. 
• Foster transparent technology-processes of re-information through 
universal epistemic actions (making systematic and strategic use of 
ecphoric priming). 
• Integrate multi-faceted life-recording data (visual/audio recording, 
contextual meta information, sensor data, etc.) to (for example) … 
o enrich the representation of co-reproductive artificial memory 
entities (offering additional representational trigger-pathways 
and extended trigger memory structures) 
o support meta- and hyper-technological processes for 
technological efficiency  
• Provide data granularity matching artificial memory chunks. 
• Represent semantic network structures, namely … 
o compound/chunk hierarchy 
o relational semantic network 
o abstraction hierarchy 
o syntactic/anticipatory schemata 
• Disambiguate polysemous, homonymous language chunk representations. 
• Support (more precise) verbal encoding by word field representations. 
• Allow to express controlled (visual) language. 
• Allow representing language visually (visual language). 
• Support visual visual language for visual co-reproductive chunks. 
• Support chunk-based semi-structured natural language text writing 
(representation). 
• Offer reading assistance by extended system-based pre-chunking, 
extended exogenic variation extraction etc.173  
• Enable collective extended thinking and acting by extended system 
agent technology. 
• Include transclusions of other extended artificial memories’ entities 
(thus enabling epistemic transparency).  
• Allow referencing to and actuating a Web/Internet of things and 
services. 
• Support onomasiological and semasiological co-reproductive 
completion. 
• Support minimal memory strategies/technological processes. 
• Support perceptive augmentation strategies/technological processes. 
• Support different forms of extended conceptual blending or extending 
conceptual blending. 
                         
173  Tom Mitchell (Mitchell, 2012) imagines a reading assistant extracting relevant 
information based on machine learning technology, which could prove useful in combination 
with extended systems. The semantic enrichment of natural language text by ontology-based 
named entity highlighting, for example, is an older idea (that did not prove too useful). 
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• Allow variable schematic abstractions for querying (the Selzian means 
abstraction).  
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4.4 WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE? – PHILOSOPHICAL EXCURSION INTO 
KNOWLEDGE PROCESS AND KNOWLEDGE STRUCTURES 
What is knowledge? I cannot discuss this question in any detail here. What 
I can do, however, is to check how our ideas about a replication/variation 
memory process, about artificial memory and extended artificial memory by 
an extended system would, in general, influence an answer. In our 
theoretical considerations, there are many different informational states, 
all related to the memory-process and the extension options we have 
discussed. The following list summarizes these information states, possible 
sub-states, and variations in an ordered way to give an overview for 
further discussion:  
(1) (original) sensory stimuli 
(2) primitive (sensory) memory 
a. sensory engrams 
b. (original) stimulus excitation (sensory engram activation) 
c. perceptual priming 
d. perceptual integration 
e. original (pre-ecphoric) sensation 
i. pre/peri-conscious stimulus sensation (e.g. in peripheral 
vision) 
ii. (conscious) original stimulus sensation 
(3) replication/variation memory 
a. original episodic memory trace 
i. original engram 
ii. original engram associations  
b. (static) chunk-abstractions 
c. (variable) schema-abstractions 
d. chunking episodic memory trace 
i. chunk engram associations (of contiguity / simultaneousness) 
e. (meta-)chunk-abstractions 
f. (meta-)schema-abstractions 
g. co-reproductive chunks (forming artificial memory structures) 
h. ecphoric influences 
i. stimulus-ecphoric influences 
1. homophonous (for familiarity) 
2. stimulus trigger (for co-reproduction) 
ii. mnemic-ecphoric influences 
1. mnemic-associative (for remembering) 
2. mnemic trigger 
i. ecphorization (engram activation) 
i. ecphoric(-associative) priming 
ii. pre-conscious mnemes (e.g. masked) 
iii. sub-conscious mnemes (e.g. in automatic actuation) 
iv. conscious mnemes (episodically effective sensations) 
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v. deterministic (technological) schemata 
1. reproductive schema (e.g. static-anticipatory) 
2. productive (variable) schema (e.g. syntacto-semantic) 
(4) simultaneous complex 
a. perceptive simultaneous complex 
b. mnemic simultaneous complex 
c. mnemic-perceptive simultaneous complex 
(5) artificial memory artifacts (co-productively created, co-reproductively 
triggering/effective artifacts) 
(6) (partially) reflective artificial memory extension (by extended 
artificial memory system) 
a. extended ecphorization 
b. extended remembering 
c. extended endogenic variation 
d. extended exogenic variation 
(7) social artificial memory extension 
a. innate eusocial mirroring (e.g. via facial expressions) 
b. double-technological process (memory-process-based, using artificial 
memory artifacts for co-reproductive ecphorization {e.g. in reading texts, 
visual instructions etc.}; potentially ambiguous) 
i. sender-artificial-memory-detached artifacts (using unchanged 
artifacts after dynamic artificial memory changes) 
ii. sender-artificial-memory-isomorphic artifacts  
1. synchronous communication (e.g. instant conversation) 
2. asynchronous extended artificial memory system 
based communication 
iii. super-sender-artificial-memory-detached artifacts (e.g. 
statistics, co-authored texts, Wikipedia articles etc.) 
iv. super-sender-artificial-memory-isomorphic artifacts 
1. synchronous aggregation (e.g. voting by hand) 
2. asynchronous aggregation (presentation) by virtual 
extended artificial memory system agent groups / 
super-agents 
To the memory process, artificial memory artifacts (5) are sensory stimuli. 
Their epistemic distinction, however, is important, because they are 
usually part of a double-technological process of social cognitive/mind 
extension (7.b). Reflective artificial memory extension (6) is also a 
double-technological process, but specifically designed to (at least 
partially) refer back to the originating co-reproductive artificial memory 
chunks (i.e., in the same organism). Reflective extension is a decisive 
pre-condition for isomorphic social extension (7.b.ii.2 and 7.b.iv.2), the 
latter, in turn, being a decisive pre-condition for correspondence of 
inter-individual double-technological processes. Both, primitive memory (2) 
and replication/variation memory (3) contribute to simultaneous complexes 
(4). Replication/variation memory is also originally constructed via 
primitive memory sensations (memory traces). Artificial memory artifacts 
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(5) (especially) of natural language, as initially encountered in language 
games, have an inherent syntactic structure (mostly based on word 
similarity and word position) that reproduces productive schema-
abstractions by means of the schema-abstraction mechanism of 
replication/variation memory.  
The Semonian primary state of indifference represents an a priori 
engrammatic state of a priori knowledge. Primitive sensory memory (2) is 
sensory knowledge, which is integrative and abstract in a pre-episodic 
manner. Replication variation memory (3) contains episodic knowledge (3.a, 
3.b) and abstract knowledge. Sensory, episodic and abstract knowledge is 
either indifferent engrammatic, primed or activated. Knowledge, of course, 
can be distinguished by other memory dimensions, too. Co-reproduction 
engrams are the basis of artificial memory (co-)structures. The traditional 
meaning of language does not fully cover the alleged great variety of co-
reproductive engrams. I would therefore rather speak of artificial memory 
knowledge than language knowledge or semantic knowledge. The simultaneous 
complex (4) integrates active sensory knowledge (percepts) and active 
episodic and abstract knowledge (chunk/schema-mnemes) (4.c). It is normally 
perceptive-ecphorically, mnemic-ecphorically, and mnemic-associatively 
chunked. A specific chunking state can be achieved by more or less 
endogenic or exogenic influences. Knowing the time, that is, episodically 
filling a variable task-schema of type the-time-now-is-…, can be achieved 
by remembering a recent time-information (episode) or by an epistemic 
action of reading the time. Let us call the knowledge-schema being filled 
here (engrammatic) variable-schematic knowledge. If knowing were to refer 
to an invariable reproduction (simple ecphory or mnemic-associative 
remembering), the respective engram complex would best be named invariable 
knowledge. The effectiveness and efficiency of variable-schematic knowledge 
(technologies) is to be considerably increased by using an extended 
artificial memory system. Extended exogenic variation delivering the 
missing variable parts (by means of content services), substitutes specific 
epistemic actions (e.g. looking up the time on my wristwatch) with a 
general epistemic action: extended exogenic variation reading. Extended 
variable-schematic knowledge thus starts to resemble invariable knowledge, 
in that it, too, demands but a transparent epistemic action [bethinking 
versus retrieving]. Losing the epistemic variable-schematic knowledge (e.g. 
because of Alzheimer’s disease or a substantial brain lesion), will render 
the extended system useless, though. Knowing (as a certain simultaneous 
complex), as we have seen, does more or less depend on (engrammatic) 
knowledge. Extended knowledge could be said to any specific set of 
engrammatic, effectuation-/tool-, and artifact-preconditions given in order 
to instate a particular simultaneous complex (of knowing). Artifacts 
serving extended knowledge thus present artifactual knowledge. The 
content/role of artifactual knowledge depends on the extended knowledge 
scenario they help to instantiate in a simultaneous complex. Artifactual 
Extended Artificial Memory 
[232] 
knowledge is always part of technological processes instantiating the 
anticipated/desired simultaneous complex. In (personal/social) artificial 
memory extension (7), extended knowledge is shared through artifactual 
knowledge.  
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5. EXTENDED ARTIFICIAL MEMORY TECHNOLOGY 
5.1 SOFTWARE EXPERIMENT 
5.1.1  EXPERIMENT 
The theoretical work presented so far, which constitutes the main part of 
this thesis, would have been impossible for me to think without the 
insights and software support gained from an experiment creating and using 
a software prototype called Artificial Memory (AM), which I started to 
develop 10 years ago. Right from the start, the purpose had been to create 
an artificial memory (which I nowadays would rather call extended 
artificial memory system) that would solve the technological problems in 
(personal) knowledge management that I had encountered in my professional 
work and for which I did not see adequate software-solutions or software-
concepts. In 2004, I took a one-year scientific sabbatical to study 
Semantic Web technology and theory at the Digital Enterprise Research 
Institute’s subsidiaries in Innsbruck, Galway, and Stanford. I am thankful 
to Prof. Dirk Fensel, Prof. Stefan Decker, and Dr. David O’Sullivan for 
their support and the exceptional freedom they gave me to follow a 
scientific path of my own. Some software-features and early theoretical 
ideas developed during my stay with DERI were published in (Ludwig, 
O'Sullivan, & Zhou, Artificial Memory Prototype for Personal Semantic 
Subdocument Knowledge Management (PS-KM)., 2004) and (Ludwig & O'Sullivan, 
Deploying Decision Support Systems Using Semantic Web Technologies., 2010). 
More recent software-features and theoretical ideas were published in 
(Ludwig, Lösungen zum multilingualen Wissensmanagement semantischer 
Informationen, 2010) and (Ludwig, Artificial Memory - Eine kurze Einführung 
in Struktur, Aufgaben und Erfolgskennzahlen., 2009). The Artificial Memory 
experiment was thus accompanied by extensive scientific research and 
scientific publishing and contributions to different conferences dealing 
with semantic information technology and information/knowledge management. 
This chapter, therefore, is intended to present but a supplement to the 
existing publications. It is restricted to highlighting core features (more 
or less) matching the theoretical ideas presented so far.  
The Artificial Memory experiment is, at its core, a self-experiment, 
swaying to and fro between the (micro/bottom-up) perspective of personal 
software (usability) testing and the (macro/top-down) perspective of 
scientific theorizing. The usable technological idea had and has to 
translate into theory, and important theoretical ideas had and have to 
translate into usable technology. The context of use is real life. In 
Personal Information Management research, this method is called 
naturalistic approach, characterized by (Naumer & Fisher, 2007) as studying 
whole systems, in real-life or field settings, seeking to understand 
phenomena, possibly not using theory as the study's outset, viewing the 
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researcher as an insider and as the primary data collection instrument, as 
this would allow for adjustments of initial working expectations or 
hypotheses, which often change during the research hermeneutic process. 
This is somewhat similar to the wicked problem approach of Horst Rittel. 
The Artificial Memory experiment is thus not an experiment for test or 
proof [Beweisexperiment], but an experiment for understanding 
[Erkenntnisexperiment]. The software-technological advancements at the 
beginning of the experiment used to outpace the theoretical progress, 
whereas today, the theoretical progress has by far outpaced the software-
technological advancements. 
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5.1.2  SOFTWARE 
Regarding the software type, the Artificial Memory (AM) prototype resembles 
most a personal semantic wiki.  
5.1.2.1 Wikis 
Wikis are hypertext content management systems for user-generated hyper-
personalized content. In wikis, content is organized in hyperlinked, named 
freeform text articles that are structured using wiki syntax/markup. Wikis 
are said to use networked collective intelligence by contributions of wiki 
article readers, correcting errors in the wiki article and adding missing 
information. Wikipedia is a popular example of a public encyclopedic wiki. 
The named article structure of a wiki is similar to the article structure 
of an encyclopedia. In Wikipedia, this has led to the belief that there 
should only be a single article on any one subject and that certain 
subjects are not worthy of being discussed in Wikipedia. This age-of-print 
dogmatic stance 174 is one reason why so-called edit wars were frequent on 
Wikipedia before administrators established their personal views and author 
numbers (consequently) dropped sharply. Wiki software does only restrict 
the names of articles (disallowing name duplicates), though.  
A wiki’s main access mechanism is search. Search is first of all article 
name index search, not article content index search. The success of the 
wiki paradigm on the WWW is in part based on its inherent keyword-oriented 
structure, automatically optimizing wiki pages for search engines. The 
search engine keyword index forces all content providers (striving for 
visibility) to organize their content by (PageRank-optimized) named pages 
fragmenting text into keyword-conforming snippets. In a way, search engines 
are turning the WWW into a single wiki, and, thus, massively change reading 
habits, very probably impairing reading skills and text interpretation 
skills of digital natives. Jaron Lanier (Lanier, 2006), for example, 
remarks that he observes a loss of insight and subtlety, a disregard for 
the nuances of considered opinions, and an increased tendency to enshrine 
the official or normative beliefs of an organization. Search engines, which 
are increasingly habitually used thought-accompanyingly for generating 
(extended) knowledge on the fly, limit the individual to a single (search-
engine-optimized condensed) view [allegedly the truth of the matter, so to 
speak], at least unless they are sourced by adequate memory-process 
oriented extended systems allowing access to and exploration of 
individually varying knowledge structures. The search habit may not be that 
bad after all, the source habit, on the other hand, certainly is.  
                         
174  This was sarcastically dubbed as Digital Maoism by Jarone Lanier, who fears that 
wikifying decontextualizes texts, erases personality, and results in normative beliefs 
(Lanier, 2006).  
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5.1.2.2 Semantic Wikis 
A semantic wiki comes in two variations, as wiki for ontology and ontology 
for wiki, often depending on whether a wiki system is attached to an 
existing ontology management system, or an ontology editing system is 
called from an existing wiki system 175 . Semantic wiki systems use to 
implement Semantic Web stack languages like RDF (Resource Description 
Framework) / RDF Schema and, less commonly, OWL (Web Ontology Language), 
which support variations of description logic (e.g. OWL DL) or (full) first 
order logic (e.g. OWL FULL). Logical inference of new knowledge, however, 
is not a core function of semantic wiki systems. The main use of computer 
ontologies in semantic wikis are type (class) creation, ontological 
typification (classification) and feature statements in entity-property-
value or entity-property/relation-entity (triple) form. Typically, the 
computer ontological class, instance, and property/relation entities are 
accessible as wiki pages. Their creation is possible via semantic wiki 
markup statements within wiki articles (often as casual annotations) or via 
specific user interfaces, such as wiki plugins and components of ontology 
management systems. The computer ontology is represented as wiki links 
(through the data creation markup), as semantic inline queries (wiki syntax 
stating semantic queries) and/or as special visualizations (depending on 
plugins and system components available). The basic goal of semantic wikis 
is to combine - within the collaborative wiki paradigm - both freeform text 
editing and formal ontology management, that is, (metadata-)unstructured 
and (metadata-)structured language expressions, thus combining the 
advantages of collaboration, (easily findable named, focused/sub-document) 
natural language texts, and normalized databases.  
5.1.2.3 Personal Semantic Wikis 
The use of Semantic Web technology for personal knowledge/information 
management was first discussed in Leopold Sauermann’s diploma thesis 
(Sauermann L. , 2003), promulgating the idea of a Semantic Desktop, which 
developed into the international research project: NEPOMUK 176. Due to the 
decreasing importance of the desktop (metaphor) in an age of Internet 
services and Internet (text snippets) content, the file- and application-
oriented Semantic Desktop idea had always appeared to be a somewhat 
anachronistic undertaking, though. The general idea of a universal personal 
information system (desk) was originally introduced by the visionary 
Vannevar Bush in his Memex concept (Bush, 1945) that inspired generations 
of researchers in the field, especially the astonishing Douglas Engelbart, 
inventor of computer mouse, hypertext, networked computers, and graphical 
                         
175  A prominent example of an ontology for wiki is the Semantic MediaWiki (www.semantic-
mediawiki.org/) system that integrates a semantic/ontology system into the MediaWiki system 
(which runs Wikipedia). An example of wiki for ontology is OntoWiki (www.ontowiki.net). 
176 See nepomuk.semanticdesktop.org/nepomuk.   
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user interfaces (GUIs) 177 – all more or less at once. Engelbart, as Terry 
Winograd and Ben Shneiderman after him, represents the idea of 
computational knowledge augmentation rather than (autonomous) computational 
artificial intelligence. Knowledge augmentation is an idea that the author, 
too, strongly supports, by stressing the fundamental importance of 
technological correspondence and of human-computer extended-system design.  
Personal semantic wiki means the use of a semantic wiki system for personal 
knowledge management. The personal use can be further facilitated by 
shipping a personal ontology schema such as PIMO 178  (Personal Information 
Model). An important difference between a (personal) semantic desktop and a 
personal semantic wiki is that the semantic wiki user will normally give up 
creating documents for personal knowledge management, for rather than 
writing documents, the wiki author edits wiki pages. Personal semantic 
wikis therefore have to offer the mechanism of transclusion (virtual 
inclusion) for aggregation of more focused content sections into different 
(audience tuned) sequentially structured documents. In personal wikis, 
editing of a wiki page by multiple users is replaced by repeated editing by 
a single user. Changes on personal wiki pages normally reflect changing 
knowledge of a single individual. Changes on wiki pages, on the other hand, 
rather reflect different knowledge of different people. In terms of 
extended systems, a traditional wiki would be a kind of meta-content-
system, transcluding the content of different extended systems onto virtual 
wiki pages.  
Single-application personal semantic wikis, multiple application semantic 
desktops, and, in-between both of them, single semantic desktop-
applications (ontology-based personal information management systems)179 are 
as close as we can get to extended systems in terms of current IT concepts. 
However, placed under theoretical scrutiny (which would need another 
publication, though), none of these system designs manages to live up to 
the expectations introduced by the extended system framework. 
  
                         
177 See en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Douglas_Engelbart (accessed on 29.11.2012). 
178 See, e.g., (Sauermann, Ludger, & Dengel, PIMO - a Framework for Representing Personal 
Information Models, 2007). 
179 A good example would be David R. Karger’s Haystack system. See, e.g., (Adar, Karger, & 
Stein, 1999).  
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5.2 TECHNOLOGICAL SKETCHES FOR EXTENDED ARTIFICIAL MEMORY 
5.2.1  INTRODUCTION TO ARTIFICIAL MEMORY BASIC FUNCTIONALITY 
Artificial Memory 180  (AM) is a server application 181  with a Web-browser 
client using platform-independent standard Web technology (HTML, CSS, 
JavaScript, Ajax etc.). Information is kept in a proprietary triple (or, 
rather, n-tuple store).  
Artificial Memory uses a huge integrated lexical database including, for 
example, over 4 million unique word and phrase strings in several different 
languages (relevant to its creator, i.e., mainly English and German, to a 
lesser extend Spanish, Russian, French, and Latin). Most word strings of 
English and German are enriched by grammatical information that could 
possibly be represented by them, such as word types, conjugation, 
government, declension, comparative, gender etc. Word strings are pre-
analyzed with regard to their syllabic structure and (all) their possible 
compound and phrase structures. Word strings are, furthermore, inter-
related using thesaurus relations. Word-stem and affix structures were pre-
analyzed generating a hierarchy of morphological derivations across 
different word types. There are many additional bits and pieces supporting 
specific functions. Corpus-related language-dependent string/n-gram 
frequency, for example, is used as one of several indicators for automatic 
language disambiguation; the Wikipedia article index is used for 
dynamically setting icon-links from named ontology entities onto their 
respective Wikipedia articles. 
As by today, the author’s personal ontology acquired during the experiment 
contains more than 100.000 named ontology entities and nearly 500.000 
triple-type propositions, the vast majority of which were added 
consciously 182 . Hence, they represent distinct word chunks and controlled 
natural language propositions that were thought at least once by the 
author.  
                         
180  A functionally restricted version for information viewing is available online at 
www.artificialmemory.net.  
181 AM is programmed in C# (4.0) using ASP.NET. It uses a proprietary triple store based on 
Microsoft SQL-Server.  
182 There are only few ontology meta-schema relations being created automatically.  
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FIGURE 32: ARTIFICIAL MEMORY MAIN PAGE / UI 
To give an overall impression (as we will soon focus on very specific 
features only), in Figure 32, the main page of AM is depicted, with an 
ontology entity/semantic wiki article open. At the left side, there is a 
menu panel. It is mostly used for contextual information and navigation. 
The main panel contains, at the top, the autocomplete/autosuggest search 
field and the huge [for quick selection] horizontal functional-menu bar. 
Below the menu bar, there are different content sections (in the example of 
Figure 32: Name, Abstraction, Properties, Words, Tree). A content section 
visualizes a specific type of information for in-depth consideration. The 
main view focuses information around a single ontology entity / wiki 
article (single window interface). However, multiple focus objects can be 
shown in different browser tabs or browser instances. There are three 
standard sections (out of 17 possible). The Name-section shows the name of 
the focus object and information for (conceptual) disambiguation. The 
Properties-section shows the Wiki article or, more generally speaking, any 
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property-value pair information. Wiki articles tend to be provided as 
content-properties. However, they can have an outer (object-oriented) 
property-structure (i.e., one article across multiple properties/property-
values) or an internal (wiki syntax) text-structure. Each property value is 
encapsulated into an ontology entity, thus becoming individually relatable. 
All ontological propositions (triple statements) concerning a focus object 
are listed in the Tree-section. The proposition-tree contains all direct- 
and reverse-relation statements including the focus object. It also 
comprises direct reifications and higher-level reifications. Semantic 
complexes like the following sentence, stacking two reifications, will be 
represented:  
 {A | LIKES | (THAT) {B | KNOWS | (THAT) {C | WANTS | D}}} 
A tree will show this complex from the perspective of each respective focus 
object involved. The proposition tree of D, for example, would restructure 
the complex like this:  
 {{{D | IS WANTED BY | C} (THAT) | IS KNOWN TO | B} (THAT) | IS LIKED BY | A} 
 
FIGURE 33: CLIPPING: REIFICATION REPRESENTATION (THAT-CONSTRUCT) 
 The tree can be organized into different views for different purposes. It 
can be directly manipulated to a huge extent and dynamically extended via 
AJAX-calls (i.e., without reloading the page), in order to advance 
(associatively) into the related semantic network structure (see Figure 34 
for an example).  
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FIGURE 34: CLIPPING: TWO-STEP AJAX-EXTENSION OF PROPOSITION TREE 
 In the tree, the focus object (time series) is represented as the basic 
node. The secondary tree level is made up by active and passive predicate-
object labels (e.g. consists of word) depending on whether the focus object 
is the subject or object of a bi-directional relational proposition. The 
predicate-level subsumes all subjects/objects of the respective 
propositions, further structuring them by template-membership.  
Templates such as person, object, organization or book are special, pre-
configured sets of property-value propositions and standard-propositions 
(e.g. a default typification) automatically applied during ontology entity 
creation. The typification of ontology entities is not restricted by 
templates, though. The template-membership can, furthermore, be modified or 
changed later as needed. Range- and domain-restrictions 183  are bound to 
templates rather than types (aka classes). Inheritance, on the other hand, 
is coupled to types, not templates. The reason for combining template-
structures and template consistency rules with (classical) type-based 
inheritance structures is that ontology engineering in the context of 
knowledge management, or, more precisely, ontology-based knowledge 
management, cannot reasonably enforce full-grown type hierarchies (for the 
purpose of type-based consistency and inheritance-based templating), as the 
expression of ontology entities has to follow thoughts and cannot be 
dominated by the needs of proper/classical ontology schema engineering. In 
ontology-based knowledge management, however, types tend to form islands 
that are not properly integrated into (underspecified, highly abstracted) 
upper ontologies anytime soon. I have called thought-accompanying, bottom-
up ontology engineering reverse ontology engineering, for it uses to start 
                         
183 In a subject-predicate-object triple-statement paradigm, a predicate-domain rule limits 
the subject-instances to which the property (predicate) can be applied. A predicate-range 
rule limits the object-instances to which the property (predicate) can be applied. Both 
rules refer to instance-types.  
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with middle or domain ontology entities (basic-level concepts) instead of 
upper ontology entities, only gradually growing into hypo-specific 
(schematic) abstractions and hyper-specific (combinational) chunk-
abstractions. The author has found that the engineering of computer 
ontologies typically follows computational/logical needs (of reasoning 
support) rather than being appropriate to accompany knowledge acquisition 
and knowledge expression. Thus, standard ontology engineering (technology) 
is usually not suitable in an extended system context. This is also evident 
in other design restrictions, such as forbidden multi-level instantiation 
(an instance functioning as a type of another instance and so forth), which 
are essential in representing abstraction hierarchies. In my experience, a 
lot of (semantic design) confusion in the IT-world (especially in ontology-
engineering and object-oriented design) is due to mixing (schematic-
reductive) abstraction hierarchies and (combinatorial) compound/chunk-
hierarchies in shared type-hierarchies for single-level (or, more 
precisely, meta-schematically, double-level) instantiation. It would be an 
interesting and challenging task to design an alternative general 
information-technological model more apt of reflecting symbolic artificial 
memory structures. 
In Artificial Memory, triple statements are easy to add. Referring to the 
focus object, in a two-step process, predicate(s) and object(s) are 
selected (and, if needed, first created), supported by Ajax-
autocomplete/autosuggest lists.  
 
FIGURE 35: CLIPPING: TRIPLE CREATION USING AUTOCOMPLETE/AUTOSUGGEST 
In Figure 35, the passive predicate label (is being influenced by) has been 
selected, and, in the second step, a name is being inputted to identify the 
triple object, supported by a suggestion list below the text box. The 
process is optimized in a way that it is usually faster than freeform text 
editing (by means of autocompleting, multi-selection, use of wildcards 
symbols etc.), in order to enable thought-accompanying triple additions. 
The domain and range consistency rules are already enforced in 
autocompletions and autosuggestions before actual selection. Controlled 
natural language triples offer an alternative to freeform wiki text, the 
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latter always being ontologically encapsulated, but – as natural language 
statements - not machine-readable.  
As controlled natural language triple (or, rather, n-tuple) statements 
offer numerous advantages over sentential natural language statements (e.g. 
in navigation, automatic inference, findability, etc.), in Artificial 
Memory, there is an easy-to-learn syntax-marker inventory available for 
enriching triples semantically:  
- Valence (I want, I avoid)  
- Deontic Valence (I think it … must be, should be, is permissible, should 
not be, must not be) 
- Epistemic Origin (I experience, I infer, I hear someone/something 
saying) 
- Realism (I perceive it … as fiction/fantasy, as hypothesis, 
metaphorically) 
- Trust (I believe, I doubt) 
- Typicality (I think it to be … categorical, typical, accidental) 
- Period Under Review (I think it to be/have been/will be valid … in the 
past, at present, in the future, at all times) 
- Frequency (I think it to be … anytime, most times, sometimes/at least 
once) 
- Potentiality (I think it to be … a necessity, a possibility, an 
impossibility) 
- Existence (I think it to be … uncertain, not valid/untrue) 
- Literalism (I mean it … as a subject-literal/significant, object-
literal/significant) 
- Closed World (Assumption) Marker (I think … these triples belong to a 
complete set of propositions)184 
Many of these markers are sensitive to predicate bi-directionality. There 
are, furthermore, special advanced dialogues for specifying precise or 
fuzzy times under review, precise or fuzzy frequencies (predicate 
quantifiers), and precise or fuzzy quantifications (subject and object 
quantifiers). In Figure 36, the sub-menu to mark a proposition (or set of 
propositions) selected in the tree-section is shown. By its 
triple(-components)-marker-system, the AM prototype supports a high degree 
of ontological expressivity. The markers are sequentially combinatorial. 
One could state, e.g., that … one wants [W] that in the future it is true 
[(] (that) (A | is being influenced by | B). Most markers can also be 
applied onto single ontology entities (and reification entities). The two-
letter sequence )A, for example, would mean that in the past [)] there 
existed (say, a person) A. I cannot discuss the marker-system in more 
                         
184  Normally, AM does not operate under the closed world assumption, which states that 
anything not said must be wrong. Some sets of propositions in AM, such as all the 
continents (the instances of type continent) could be final, however, and hence can be 
marked as completed/closed.  
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detail here, though, as there are many complicated questions touched by it 
that would need another thesis to answer.  
 
FIGURE 36: CLIPPING: SUB-MENU SHOWING TRIPLE(-COMPONENT)MARKERS 
It should not go unmentioned, however, that there is another, far more 
experimental marker system available in AM, namely for emotive marking. It 
makes use of Robert Plutchik’s wheel of emotion 185, as depicted in Figure 
37.  
 
FIGURE 37: POP-UP COLOR-FIELD-MENU FOR EMOTIVE MARKING 
For (wiki) text editing, AM wiki syntax supports, for example, name-based 
inline linking, link-based entity creation, inline link paraphrasing, 
(image-)attribute transclusion, and multi-level transclusion. The 
importance of transclusion for unstructured text normalization has been 
                         
185  See, e.g., en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Plutchik#Plutchik.27s_wheel_of_emotions 
(accessed on 26.11.2012) 
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stressed by me before. In Figure 38, examples of inline linking and 
transclusion from a help page are shown.  
One of the most usable features in AM is its support of HTML5 drag-and-drop 
of web-images, system files and text snippets into AM or an existing 
entity, which permits a quick transfer of different outside information 
objects into the system.  
 
FIGURE 38: EXAMPLES OF SEMANTIC-WIKI-SYNTAX APPLIED (ON A HELP PAGE) 
I will now turn to a choice of specific functions of the Artificial Memory 
prototype, paying special attention to the questions of disambiguation 
(polysemy and homonymy) and synthesis (synonymy and compounding). 
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5.2.2  MULTILINGUAL VIRTUAL SYNSETS 
Synonymy poses a problem to ontology engineering (and knowledge management 
alike). A (first) common simple solution to this problem is to declare it 
nonexistent, by stating that ontology entities represent concepts rather 
than labels. As synonyms refer to the same concept, there allegedly is no 
problem: labels just don’t matter. Strict logicians sometimes hold this 
view, for labels indeed do not change the symbolic mechanics of logical 
inference. If there is doubt about a concept definition, the shortest way 
to end a dispute is to point out that the opposite party’s ideas simply do 
not matter, because they use (other, often synonymous) labels to describe 
their deviating ideas, while, in the opinion of the strict logician, all 
that really counts is the consistency and correctness of her axioms and 
inferences, not a philosophical discussion - endangering her work. Of 
course, the symbols manipulated by the logician are not meaningless (to the 
logician). They belong to meaningful co-reproductive chunk complexes. The 
problem of differing interpretations (or, more precisely, of inter-
individually differing co-reproductive chunks and their memory-trace 
related differing meaningfulness), often (but not exclusively) manifesting 
itself in the use of synonyms, cannot be tackled by denying the critical 
role of word-labels as shared triggers of engrammatic concepts forming the 
basis of logical inferences or, in other words, conceptual blendings. The 
proof of the pudding of symbolic logical inference is its engrammatic 
effectiveness, not (just) its formal conclusiveness. The uncommunicative 
logician is a logician of her personal logic or grammar.  
Another, rather conciliatory problem solving method is to allow multiple 
(synonymous) labels of a concept, as everybody should find a way to the 
symbolically expressed concept. The labels become name-properties of a 
concept. This strategy makes it easier to reach agreement on a concept. 
Referential synonyms, however, represent specific co-reproductive units of 
their own. Integrating them into a single (logical) concept may blur 
important conceptual differences. Furthermore, the creation of synonymy has 
to be thought as a process rather than a single step. Words we consider 
synonymous may turn polysemous or non-synonymous. Non-synonymous words, on 
the other hand, may turn out to be synonyms. The idea of a label not 
representing a specific concept (a singular co-reproductive unit) of its 
own is problematic also because memory traces will refer to specific 
synonyms (or, in other words, will contain specific triggers and their 
respective co-reproductive units). Hence, both non-label/artificial label 
and multiple label concepts are not satisfying problem solutions.  
In the Artificial Memory prototype, each synonym is presented as an 
ontology entity of its own. Synonymy is being indicated by a synonymy-
relation statement. Conceptual integration is virtual and, thus, 
reversible. A virtual synset is a network of ontological entities (being 
more or less directly interrelated. The property set of the synset consists 
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in the aggregation of all propositions of each participating ontology 
entity into a distinct [sic] set of propositions. In checks for future 
consistency, the virtual synset acts as if it were a single entity. 
However, due to the individualistic history of virtual synonyms, existing 
inconsistencies have to be accepted (for a while). Even though virtual 
synsets pose a considerable computational problem (as losing decidability 
requires counter-measures, for example, in order to prevent endless looping 
in an allegedly hierarchic structure), they still [sic] represent a 
desirable state demonstrating to the user her own engrammatic 
inconsistencies resulting from declaring two (named) ontological entities 
(and their possible respective virtual synsets) to belong to the same 
virtual synset. With virtual synsets, therefore, the proof, indeed, is in 
the pudding, whether we like it (it is consistent) or not (it is 
inconsistent). The seemingly illogical artistry of the virtual synset is in 
not avoiding the pudding in the first place. Reversibility or other, 
corrective measures may help restoring a state of (desirable) consistency 
in the virtual synset.  
 
FIGURE 39: CLIPPING: EXAMPLE OF VIRTUAL SYNSET SECTION 
The virtual synset is highlighted in a separate section (the EQUAL-
Section). In Figure 39, the equal section of the focused ontology entity 
artistry is shown. There are hyperlinks of three different colors: black, 
blue and gray. Black (as in Artistik) indicates an existing ontology entity 
related (as the section title suggests) as a synonym. This exhibits 
information for extended remembering. Blue (as in Kunst and 
Kunstfertigkeit) indicates existing ontology entities that (by an external 
interpretation) are suggested to be declared as synonymous. This exhibits 
information for extended endogenic variation. Gray (as in artistries or 
talento artístico) indicates possible new ontology entities (that, in this 
section, would become candidates for synonymy). This exhibits information 
for extended exogenic variation. This color code for different information 
types of extended artificial memory is (to be) used consistently in the 
Artificial Memory prototype. In Figure 39, the three forms of extension are 
grouped by (available) languages, as indicated by the three country flags. 
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Virtual synsets are used for multilingual knowledge management in 
Artificial Memory. A (word-)translation is, in the simplest case, but a 
foreign language synonym. Proposition sets across synonyms of different 
languages are aggregated and sometimes (for special purposes) even 
language-normalized186 into a distinct set. The virtual synset demonstrates 
how the theory of extended artificial memory may influence and considerably 
change the design strategies used for ontology and knowledge management. 
From a memory-perspective, inconsistency is not a situation to be avoided 
or denied (to ensure computation in finite time or rule-conformity), but an 
information state inducing dis-homophonous, discrepant simultaneous 
complexes, showing possible engrammatic discrepancies. The inconsistencies 
of inter-individual virtual synsets could highlight (through meta-
technological strategies) possible difficulties of communication due to 
differing, incompatible opinions (between the parties participating in the 
virtual synset). Networked extended systems may thus become an important 
tool for collaborative ontology engineering or, more generally, for 
(enabling) efficient knowledge-sharing communication, gradually reducing 
or, at least, uncovering and emphasizing inter-individual conceptual 
differences and inconsistencies (as were discussed with respect to the 
plurality of theories in chapter 1.1.1.). 
An important practical aspect to virtual synsets is the display of property 
values. Propositions are aggregated into a distinct set that is displayed 
in the Tree-section. Property values have their own Properties-section. An 
ontology entity in a virtual synset displays property values of synonyms of 
the virtual synset it belongs to as if they were their own. This allows for 
a manual process of textual normalization or alignment (e.g. of 
multilingual entries). Property values of co-members of the virtual synset 
are integrated via transclusion, marked as to their origin and made 
directly navigable.  
 
FIGURE 40: EXAMPLE OF TRANSCLUSION OF PROPERTY-VALUES IN VIRTUAL SYNSETS 
In Figure 40, for example, the German language entity Engramm [engram] 
automatically transcludes (virtually includes) the Content-property value 
of its English language synonym engram.  
                         
186 This means that equivalent propositions stated in different languages (i.e., different 
from the language of the focus entity) are automatically identified (via virtual synset 
membership) and consequently suppressed.  
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5.2.3  WORD-FIELD-BASED SEMANTIC TAGGING  
In chapter 2.6.3 on word fields, we have learnt how meaningful words 
indicate individual mental spaces in a word-field organization (or, more 
generally, semantic network structures). In the meantime, we have 
identified spoken and written word-symbols as (trigger-)components of co-
reproductive units of artificial memory, organized in modality-specific 
trigger fields. In chapter 1.1.2, we have dealt with the problems caused by 
plurality of word-senses (polysemy and homonymy), which are sometimes 
(unsuccessfully) tackled by a plurality of sense-words (resulting in 
synonymy by an abundancy of neologisms). Ambiguity hampers communication. 
In verbose textual and contextual communication (i.e., in situations rich 
in disambiguating ecphoric influences), this may not appear as a central 
issue, but in the ubiquitous information landscape created by, for example, 
an extended system, by a universal ontology, a science rich in theories, or 
a search-engine optimized WWW of keyword-focused text snippets, we find 
that plurality of word-senses poses a huge problem to communication and 
self-information (i.e., more specifically, to extended artificial memory).  
A common strategy for disambiguation found in ontology engineering is a 
descriptive label. However, each word added into the descriptive name 
phrase will add a new reference of the respective keyword. Overall, this is 
not a good idea, as it will soon lower the precision of named entity 
search. Moreover, after adding descriptive words, one cannot tell 
identifier and descriptor apart anymore. Even if the description were 
extracted into a description-property value, it would represent 
unstructured text content. Another problem is that if the meaning of the 
ontology entity described changes, the freeform text description might 
become obsolete.  
Now, in Artificial Memory, each ontology entity is (to be) embedded and 
represented in its respective word-field, demarcating it conceptually. All 
sections of the main view represent a certain area of this (i.e., the focus 
entity’s) word field or, generally speaking, semantic (artificial memory) 
network. The Tree-section represents the relational semantic network, 
insomuch as it is centered around the focus object. The Equal-section 
creates a particular synset or synonyms word field. The synonyms 
represented in the Equal-section are also reflected in the Tree-section (as 
are all word-field entities), but the Equal-section (as any other word-
field section) offers a more dense and organized/optimized view (for 
example, by grouping synonyms first by language instead of putting them 
into alphabetical order first). The word-field sections create a visual 
word-field to reflect (to some extent) the semantic word-field or 
conceptual field. Let us remember that Trier (1931, S. 2) wrote that the 
structure of the whole (field) would determine a single word’s sense [vom 
Gefüge des Ganzen her empfängt das Einzelwort seine inhaltliche 
begriffliche Bestimmtheit]. If this holistic structure [Gefüge des Ganzen] 
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determines the word sense, would it not be appropriate to use it for 
disambiguation of polysemous and homonymous words?  
 
FIGURE 41: CLIPPING: SEMANTIC TAGS IN SEARCH RESULTS (SECTION) 
In Figure 41, (a section of) the instant search results for the string cell 
is depicted. Cell has two homonymous word results in the author’s 
Artificial Memory. These identically named ontology entities are 
disambiguated by semantic tags gained through related synonyms (of German 
language). All existing triples referring to the focus object, which 
includes all word-field entities (other than morphological derivations, 
which are directly retrieved from the lexical database), can be used to 
create a semantic tag. If the semantic-tag-triple uses a predicate used for 
word-field (section) creation, the semantic tag will show a special symbol 
to indicate the nature of the relation. As visible in the example of Figure 
41, the synonymy-predicate is indicated by superscript Unicode character U-
2261 (identical to): ≡ and followed by a likewise superscript proposition-
object entity-name. Thus, the homonymous cell ≡ Funkzelle [network cell] and 
cell ≡ Zelle [biological cell] are disambiguated by their translation into non-
homonymous ontology entities [Funkzelle and Zelle]. If the synonymy-
relation used for semantic tagging were to be deleted, the semantic tag 
would be deleted, too, indicating a resultant state of ambiguity to be 
resolved. The semantic tag can be stacked, meaning that a semantic-tag 
object can have another semantic tag. 
 
FIGURE 42: CLIPPING: STACKED SEMANTIC TAGS IN SEARCH RESULTS 
In Figure 42, the ontology concept Bedeutung [meaning] is tagged by 
Intension [intension], which is in turn tagged by Begriffsinhalt [Fregean 
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Sense]. The two entities of the homonymous name Bedeutung are disambiguated 
by two dichotomous word pairs (Intention versus Extension, Begriffsinhalt 
versus Begriffsumfang). Semantic tags create a disambiguation word-field 
(representation). Even in the absence of a homonym, a semantic tag can 
clarify an entity. 
 
FIGURE 43: CLIPPING: SEMANTIC TRIPLE MARK TAG  
In Figure 43, a non-word-field triple (called a triple mark) is used as 
semantic tag. The object de anima (of type book) has the triple mark (™) 
tag:  
™ ) ( └ | is authored by ∆ authors | Aristotle ) ) 
The letter └ is a placeholder for the name of the tagged object. The blue 
letter ) is the syntactic marker for in the past. The letter ∆ separates 
the active from the passive form of a bi-directional predicate. In a 
nutshell, this triple-statement can be read from both directions, as de 
anima was authored by Aristotle or Aristotle authored de anima.  
  
FIGURE 44: CLIPPING: SEMANTIC DOUBLE TAG 
The semantic tag (notation) is easy to learn and a very efficient way of 
disambiguation or extended remembering - or both. In Figure 44, we find a 
combination of two semantic tags. The first is for disambiguation, 
identifying composition as lexical composition. The second creates a micro 
word(-trigger) field of opposition, stating lexical decomposition to be an 
opposite of (lexical) composition, as is indicated by the special-predicate 
symbol ↓↑. Thus, multiple semantic tags can be combined on a single level 
for different purposes.  
In Artificial Memory, (nearly) each representation of an ontology entity 
name is navigable (by being marked into hyperlink text or by icon-links 
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made available by means of progressive disclosure). Thus, both the macro 
word(-trigger) fields created by different sections of the main view and 
the micro-word(-trigger) fields created by semantic tags offer quick 
thought-accompanying navigation paths. In Artificial Memory, the (at best 
mnemic-associatively ecphorable) trigger-fields of artificial memory turn 
into perceivable fields of extended associations. The perceivable form of 
Trier’s holistic structure [Gefüge des Ganzen] creates episodically 
experienceable areas of tension [Spannungsfelder] provoking further 
differentiations. In chapter 2.5.3.2.1, I had already mentioned that 
categorizing or instantiating something new (as examples of generating 
formal knowledge) will cause more than just an addition of a piece of new 
knowledge and belief into an ontology. It may create a productive area of 
tension between the neighboring ontology objects, provoking further 
ontological additions that cannot be gained through (automatic) inferences. 
By now, with respect to Artificial Memory, we can state neighboring 
ontology objects more precisely as a word-(trigger-)field of extended 
associations. In unextended (or nonreflective) mind, engrammatic 
word(-field) associations tend to be limited to the semantic network 
associations described in chapter 2.6.1. Their abstraction from countless 
memory traces tends to create a rather uneven holistic structure. 
Reflections on the (holistic) artificial memory structure, by perceiving 
and conceiving the field of extended associations (ecphorizing different 
co-reproductive units into rather artificial simultaneous complexes), will 
bring to light many inherent irregularities (which then can be tackled). 
For co-perception of artificial memory chunks that are not directly 
associated to become productive in an artificial-memory constructive 
manner, the perceptual organization has to follow consistency rules or 
logical principles, as there is little to be gained from an arbitrary word 
field representation. In Artificial Memory, as has been mentioned before, 
the macro word-fields are organized into sections. For their construction, 
the following special relation-types are being used:  
(1) equality      [≡] 
(2) inequality      [≠] 
 
(3) similarity     [≈] 
(4) antonymy     [↓↑] 
 
(5) super-class     [▪◄] 
(6) sub-class     [◄▪] 
 
(7) set / whole     [◘] 
(8) member / part    [●] 
 
(9) feature of     [╒] 
(10) featured by     [╕] 
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(11) variable of     [Vᴀ] 
(12) varied by     [ᴀV] 
 
(13) predecessor / evolution from  [╦] 
(14) descendant / evolution into  [╩] 
 
(15) abstract / type     [□ꜜ] 
(16) concretization / instantiation [■ꜛ] 
 
Each relation type can be directly used (in form of a standard predicate) 
to relate two ontology entities in the word fields given (or, more 
generally, any ontology entities on screen). For this, each ontology entity 
shown comes with a mouse-over-event progressive-disclosure command menu, as 
shown (disclosed) in Figure 45. 
 
FIGURE 45: CLIPPING: WORD-FIELD COMMAND MENU 
The command menu offers a quick way to position an ontology entity visible 
anywhere on screen relative to the focus entity into a word-field section. 
As these relation-types tend to be mutually exclusive, given an existing 
positioning, choosing a new position in the command bar (i.e., creating a 
new proposition) will automatically delete the existing position(-
proposition). This can be circumvented, though, by adding the proposition 
by the main command menu. What Artificial Memory thus provides, is a word-
field oriented meta-association system. The relation types used for word-
field creation have consistency and inference rules associated to them, 
which are being applied for word-field section creation. 
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FIGURE 46: EXAMPLE OF SEQUENCE SECTION  
In Figure 46, an exemplary sequence section is shown, dynamically built for 
the focus ontology-entity Originalempfindungskomplex [original sensational 
complex]. It shows the ontology entities chains it evolves from and evolves 
into, offering numerous opportunities for navigation, repositioning, and 
semantic tagging. I cannot introduce the various word sections in detail in 
this thesis. Therefore, even though most of the word-field relation-types 
are well known to ontology engineering and logics, their actual use for 
personal knowledge management differs considerably from the current 
practice of ontology engineering and automatic reasoning.  
Another type of semantic tags is derived from part of speech. If possible, 
language and part of speech are assigned to newly created ontology entities 
automatically. For practical reasons, I distinguish nine parts of speech 




(3) adposition (incl. preposition) 
(4) adverb 
(5) verb 




Each (entity) name can be assigned to one (in some combinations even 
several) of these parts of speech and be semantically tagged by them for 
word-class-based disambiguation. This allows, for example, distinguishing 
homonymous words of different parts of speech or homonymous syntactical 
morphemes. An ontology entity in Artificial Memory can be a very specific 
meaningful unit. The virtual synset, on the other hand, does not restrict 
synonyms to a particular part of speech (which sets it apart from 
traditional synsets).  
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Last but not least, semantic tags can be used reciprocally (i.e., in cyclic 
graphs). In Figure 47, the German phrase schwache Emergenz [weak emergence] 
is semantically tagged by its antonym starke Emergenz [strong emergence], 
which is in turn semantically tagged by schwache Emergenz. In the name 
section, this cyclic construction is indicated by the inclusion of the 
cyclically repeated entity schwache Emergenz. In other sections, though, 
the repetition of the first cyclical entity will be suppressed (see the 
Tree-section in Figure 47).  
 
FIGURE 47: CLIPPING: DISPLAY OF RECIPROCAL SEMANTIC TAGS  
Ideally, word-fields will be used for extended thinking and extended 
learning in single extended systems and networked extended system. In 
Artificial Memory, there are already many, sometimes very refined features 
(inference rules and data sources) in place enabling extended thinking and 
learning in a thought-accompanying, word-field-oriented manner. 
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5.2.4  LANGUAGE CHUNK / LINEAR UNIT TAGGING 
In the last section, we have discussed the disambiguation of named ontology 
entities by outer semantic tagging. In this section, I want to discuss 
semantic disambiguation by inner tagging of words, word compounds and 
linear units (see chapter 2.5.3.1) of words. Normally, in ontology 
engineering (other than in linguistics), name-properties are not subject to 
further structuring, as they are seen as mere identifiers, that is, as 
unique labels that help distinguish between formal objects. In chapter 
2.6.1, on Semantic Networks, we have learnt about a compound/chunk 
hierarchy based on contiguity associations (episodic memory traces). This 
hierarchical structure (multiple overlapping compositional containment 
hierarchies, to be more precise) of co-reproductive trigger-components 
becomes manifest in the trigger-component-chunking of the simultaneous 
complex. It would be false to think of chunking as of a linear process 
(this can even be excluded phenomenologically). The simultaneous complex is 
rather chunked as a whole, to some extent forward-looking, to some extent 
in parallel, and to some extent backward-looking. Some chunks are extended 
(excitation moving up the nervous containment hierarchy) sequentially, as 
can be experienced in slow reading. Some chunks seem to appear at once, or 
they are at once predicted. Some frozen metaphors, for example, form chunk 
units that seem not to be constructed sequentially. However, many other 
linear units are instantiated predictively, too, probably due to high 
conditional probabilities between the respective words (which translates 
into a flat containment structure and little overlapping {i.e., a lower 
cardinality of upward relations}). A very interesting phenomenological 
peculiarity of linear units is the possibility of backward-changes. What do 
I mean by backward-changes? Well, let us imagine a sequence of three words 
or small phrases, ABC, is being perceived (up to AB) and chunked, first, as 
AB (a single unit). Now, imagine C is being perceived (perhaps after a 
saccadic eye movement) and causes a re-chunking into A-BC (i.e. chunk A and 
chunk BC) in the simultaneous complex. The AB chunk is (normally) masked by 
A and BC. In reading or listening, thus, one is usually not aware of 
backward-changes of chunking, in the same way in which one is not aware of 
forward-changes of chunking (e.g. moving from AB to ABC after perceiving 
C).  
I have pointed out before that chunking does not translate directly into 
semantics. AB-C in person A may result into a similar conceptual blending 
as ABC in person B. AB-C in person A may blend into the conceptual unit 
that is later to be known as ABC to person A. In any case, ABC marked as 
derived from AB-C is probably a different unit than ABC derived from A-BC. 
The difference between these two polysemous strings could, of course, be 
marked by an outer semantic tag, but it could as well (and even better and 
with some other advantages, as I would argue) be marked and semantically 
disambiguated by its inner linear unit (or, in other words, chunk) 
structure. The inner structure helps us to reconstruct the linear unit when 
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circumstantial ecphoric influences supporting chunking (conceptually) are 
missing or rare.  
 
FIGURE 48: CLIPPING: CHUNKING SUGGESTIONS LIST  
In Figure 48, the Name-section of the newly created ontology entity named 
cell communication is shown. Below the name, a suggestion list for chunking 
is displayed. The three list rows result from three homonymous ontology 
entities of name cell. This time, they are disambiguated by English 
language semantic tags. We find biological cell, (mobile phone) network 
cell, and (general) cell (marked as a super-class of network cell. We thus 
have a simple means of giving cell communication three different meanings, 
by selecting one of the rows.    
 
FIGURE 49: CLIPPING: CHUNKED ONTOLOGY ENTITY NAME 
In Figure 49, the Name-section of the previous example is shown after 
selecting biological cell communication. The name was structured twofold: 
by inserting small subscript separation markers, ‘<‘ and ‘>‘, between the 
words and by replacing the single words with the potentially semantically 
tagged (hyperlink-)references to the ontology entities chosen. By now, the 
ontology entity named cell communication can be identified as biological 
cell communication. Not choosing a descriptive name pays off at this 
moment, but with two words involved, the advantage of chunk tagging is 
limited to inner semantic tagging.    
 
FIGURE 50: CLIPPING: CHUNKED ONTOLOGY ENTITY NAME 
In Figure 50, a three-word chunk was splitted for disambiguation into an 
AB-C structure. (Biological) cell assembly and (neural) activity are joined 
to disambiguate cell assembly activity. This is a hierarchical chunking 
structure, as cell assembly is itself chunked into (biological) cell and 
assembly. The disambiguation uses three types of information: direct 
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semantic tagging of one chunk (neural activity), lower-level semantic 
tagging within another chunk (biological cell within cell assembly), and 
chunking into the AB-C structure itself, which identifies cell assembly as 
a single co-reproductive unit that is (to be) blended with (neural) 
activity. Disambiguation by chunking automatically implies chunk tagging if 
at least one chunk or sub-chunk involved includes a semantic tag or is 
itself chunk-tagged. However, chunk tags can be set on and off as needed. 
Moreover, chunking is an offer, not a requirement. Anyway, the possibility 
of easily disambiguating homographic co-reproductive chunk-complexes offers 
the opportunity to include linear units that are traditionally ignored by 
ontology engineers, knowledge managers, lexicographers etc.: phrasal 
constructions of all kinds, which (as it seems to me) make up a huge chunk 
of (language) artificial memory. Noun phrases, adjective phrases, verbal 
phrases, prepositional phrases etc. refer to multilayered co-reproductively 
generated conceptual complexes (i.e., hierarchically organized chunk 
complexes). Truly (language-)thought-accompanying, co-productive artificial 
memory expression cannot tolerate any limitation with regard to the types 
of linear units allowed, solely because common ontology management and 
knowledge management tools lack the means for their proper semantic 
organization and disambiguation. Language-symbolic (extended) endogenous 
and exogenous variation is often based on complex linear units and their 
formation into new chunks. Artificial Memory supports synthetical and 
analytical chunk formation.  
 
FIGURE 51: CLIPPING: TECHNOLOGY FOR SYNTHETICAL CHUNK FORMATION 
In Figure 51, the focus entity analytical chunk formation (as visible in 
the Name-section) is referred to in the upper search field by the special 
letter #, which translates the search string technologies for # into 
technology for analytical chunk formation. As this unit does not exist, the 
search result list restates the (completed) search phrase as a hyperlink. 
Clicking the hyperlink will create an ontology entity (of default type 
abstract) named by the search string. In synthetical chunk formation, the 
focus entity or parts of the focus instance are referred to by special 
letters inserting information from the focus entity into a search or 
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addition string. The chunking of the synthetically formed new chunk is done 
analytically. 
     
FIGURE 52: CLIPPING: TECHNOLOGY FOR ANALYTICAL CHUNK FORMATION 
In Figure 52, the chunking suggestion list for the entity technology for 
analytical chunk formation is shown. It is a Cartesian product combining 
all existing homographic ontology entities and possible bipartite 
segmentations. If one of the chunks does not yet exist, it will be first 
created and then integrated as a chunk-tag component. The Cartesian product 
is filtered and, therefore, reduced whenever there is an ontology entity 
matching a chunk-tag-component suggestion string (as is the case for chunk 
formation and analytical chunk formation). The user of Artificial Memory is 
not restricted to bipartite chunking. Any number of chunk-tags can be added 
by explicitly stating them. Only chunk-tag suggestions are restricted to 
two-part chunking. The chunking tag list gives navigational freedom, 
because each suggested chunk could be created or, if already existing, 
navigated irrespective of whether one decides to use it for chunking or not 
to us it for chunking. Analytical chunk formation is often a multi-step 
process, including chunking decisions on different levels in ever-smaller 
chunks. 
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FIGURE 53: CLIPPING: ADVANCED CHUNK TECHNOLOGY 
In Figure 53, the entity technologies for analytical chunk formation is 
displayed after it was chunked by technologies and for analytical chunk 
formation, combining a noun and adjacent prepositional phrase. In a next 
step, the head of the resulting noun phrase (technologies) was used for the 
embedding of the phrase into the class(-chunk)-hierarchy. The result is 
indicated in the Hierarchy-section shown. The columns to the left of the 
focus entity displays actual (i.e., technologies) and possible top-classes 
(e.g. cinematic art), which are derived from sub-classes of available top-
top-classes (art). This example demonstrates the close interdependency 
between chunking and other (logical) relations, such as superordination. It 
is an example of a chunking-component (i.e., technologies) being used for 
integrating a chunk-complex (i.e., technologies for analytical chunk 
formation) into the extended artificial memory network. Any phrase’s 
head(-phrase) tends to be an excellent super-class, demonstrating the 
general origin of any type of class hierarchy in chunk hierarchies of   
combinatorial, conceptual-blending-based specification.  
The chunking of word-compounds is similar to the chunking of linear units, 
as indicated in Figure 54.  
 
FIGURE 54: WORD-COMPOUND CHUNKING SUGGESTION LIST 
Chunking in Artificial Memory is a somewhat experimental, but very 
promising set of technologies that is successfully used for disambiguation 
and for weaving of (extended) artificial memory. 
  




The major theoretical ideas have already been summarized in the overview 
given in chapter 4.3.7 Recapitulation of Extended Artificial Memory System 
Goals and Features (List Form). For a final discussion, I want to return to 
the fundamental requirements that we formulated in chapter 2.4.6 Overcoming 
Defects of Written Language, after discussing Plato’s criticism of written 
language. 
In requirement 1, we stated that propositions should be presented only 
insofar as they can be understood by the reader. The fundamental concepts 
of extended remembering (4.3.5.2), extended thinking (4.3.5.3), and 
extended learning (4.3.5.4) all aim at supporting this requirement.  
In requirement 2, we wanted to allow the reader to advance beyond the 
surface of text artifacts into the field of the author’s knowledge. In 
general, the artifacts collected in an extended system do offer this 
opportunity, especially if, as I suggested, any text artifacts were to be 
made up of transclusions from extended systems. Chunking for disambiguation 
is a first step into the right direction. Using chunked and semantically 
annotated entities for text annotation (as is available in the Artificial 
Memory prototype by inline links) can only be a first step toward a more 
refined set of technologies using extended systems in co-productive 
writing.  
 
FIGURE 55: VISUAL INFORMATION AND UNSTRUCTURED TEXT IN VISUAL LANGUAGE DISPLAY 
The Artificial Memory prototype is still very much a hybrid system, 
expressing natural language in controlled natural language form via triple 
notation and in an unstructured form by property value (article) text. 
However, there are already many bridges built connecting both text forms. 
Triple components can be complex phrasal constructions, chunked and 
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semantically tagged, including secondary relations. Text snippets 
containing annotations, on the other hand, can be reflected in triple 
statements, as is shown in Figure 55: The focus entity daemon is annotated 
in the wiki article (or, in general, a property value) of an entity named 
Pandemonium Theory (Selfridge, 1959). The context of the annotation is 
automatically shown. The display is also enriched by a thumbnail icon of a 
diagram attached to the Pandemonium Theory entity. 
In requirement 3, we stated that the text should do more than remembering 
the author of what he already knows, it should be a creative tool. Extended 
systems support memory variation via simple universal technologies. This 
has been discussed at length in chapter 4. It is less obvious, though, that 
the different trigger-fields (fields of extended associations) created in 
the Artificial Memory prototype are a rich source of inspiration. Take, for 
example, the chunking suggestion list. Often, it will not only contain the 
intended chunking structure, but also additional interesting chunk-
components and polysemous or homonymous homographic options. Creating 
highly productive trigger field displays in combination with sequential 
text poses an interesting scientific challenge. 
In requirement 4, we asked that the text should help to build up a memory 
structure improving instantaneous knowledge. Reflecting artificial memory 
by means of extended systems improves memory structures considerably. 
Logical inferences become perceivable and thus engraphically effective. An 
aspect we did not talk about so far is the systematic creation of chunk-
variation suggestions by analogical reasoning. In Artificial Memory, some 
basic analogical reasoning mechanisms can be triggered off by declaring two 
ontology entities to be similar. There could be done much more, though. The 
benefit of extended artificial memory here is to enrich instantaneous 
knowledge beyond what has been expressed and is engrammatically fixated.   
In requirement 5, we asked for support of instantaneous, thought-
accompanying and thought-complementing information retrieval. These are 
core-requirements for any extended system. Very fast search and selection 
processes via combinations of eye tracking, gestures, pointing and typing 
movements, voice control etc. could fundamentally change the processes of 
writing, searching, and textual communication, as we know them today. These 
advances would have to be embedded into extended systems and be planned as 
universal co-productive technologies. The common quality factors of 
information retrieval, recall and precision, have to be redefined for 
extended remembering, extended thinking, and extended learning, taking into 
consideration the engrammatic corpus of (extended) artificial memory and 
the (mnemic-)ecphoric stimulus situation within the momentary simultaneous 
complex.  
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